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ABSTRACT
British projects and activities in the Philippines during the 
period 1759 - 1805 coincided with important politico-economic develop­
ments in Europe, and particularly with those within the British and 
Spanish empires. European and imperial developments, indeed, provide 
the Background and starting point of the events covered by this study.
To the English, the importance of the Philippine area, in fact, 
of the whole Malaysian Archipelago, lay in its bullion resources which 
the expanding China trade was chronically in need of. The Eastern 
islands were a source of products for which there was a demand in the 
China market, besides being a consumers' depot for British trade goods, 
in particular, Indian piece-goods and opium. The islands were also a 
potential market for British manufactures. Strategically, they con­
stituted a vital link not only in the defense of the Indian settlements 
but also in the security of the English commerce between India and China. 
An English settlement established amongst the islands would thus create 
a vast network of exchange of Malaysian, Indian, Chinese, and European 
goods.
A period of sustained British interest in the Philippines 
commenced with Dalrymple's voyage from India to the lands further east, 
bringing him, amongst other places, to the Sulu islands which the 
Spaniards had been hard put to annex to their Eastern possessions, and
3which now form part of the Republic of the Philippines. Almost 
simultaneously with this voyage, an expedition was planned and launched 
against Manila, the capital of the Spanish Philippines. The outcome of 
the first event was the establishment of the first English settlement in 
Balambangan, an island belonging to the Sulus. The expedition to Manila 
was a military success, but on balance proved fruitless to either the 
English King who sanctioned it or the East India Company which aided it. 
Other projects followed, calculated to tap the bullion resources of the 
Spanish-American trade converging in Manila and also the possibilities 
of trade and cultivation amongst the Philippine islands. The fruits of 
these projects were not immediately enjoyed, but British interests in the 
Manila trade were firmly established before the end of our period. In 
fact, toward the end of the Spanish rule, the Philippine export and import 
trade had become concentrated in English hands. Meanwhile, Dalrymple’s 
exertions with the Sulus had also paid off with the cession to a British 
company of the Sulu Sultan’s territories in Borneo.
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CHA.PTEB I
INTBQDUCTOHY
The ’’golden age” of Spanish rule in the Philippines may he said 
to commence with the first settlement established there toward the close 
of the sixteenth century. By 17^0 it was hut a faint memory. During 
the last fifty years* hardly anything intervened to break the cultural 
morass in which the islands were submerged. The Oriental possession 
excelled those held by the Spanish Crown in America only in the depth of 
its moral and material stagnation; indeed it had been consigned to 
oblivion. As Raynal put it* were it not for the colony’s connection with 
Mexico* its name would scarcely be known.
The accession to the Spanish throne of an enlightened and dynamic
despot, bestirred shortly thereafter by outright British intrusion in the 
Philippines* opened a new phase in the history of the colony. This phase 
may be said to cover the years 1759-1805. ^he first year saw both the 
beginning of Charles Ill’s reign in Spain and Dalrymple’s departure from 
the English East India Company’s settlement at Madras* on a voyage of 
exploration which took him to the fringe of the Spanish Philippines.
The year 1805 marked an all-out struggle against Dapoleon and the 
consequent absorption of all Europe in the contest and distraction from 
non-European questions. That year witnessed also the withdrawal of the 
settlement on Balambangan, thus ending a half century of British 
experimenting in one area of East Indian trade.
During this period, British activities in the East extended to the
Spanish Philippines and to peripheral areas over which Spain laid a
claim and which now form part of the Philippine Republic* British
interests ifc this portion of the Eastern Archipelago were mainly economic
and commercial. Those of/^ast India Company, in particular, transcended
the boundaries of their settlements in India. They were motivated by
two primary considerations - first, the recovery of their lost share in
the spice trade, and second, the expansion of the commerce with China.
These ambitions were to be accomplished by setting up intermediate bases
between China and India and attracting the trade of the Eastern islands
to those bases. The Philippines, particularly that area separating
actual Dutch and Spanish spheres of authority, was considered ideal for
the Company’s purposes. In the pursuit of their objectives, the Company
received more than just moral support from the King’s Government, the
*
latter at times even anticipating the motives of the other.
The effects of British activities within the alleged limits of the 
Spanish Philippines were revolutionary. The successful invasion of 
Manila in 1762, in particular, roused the Spaniards to the extent of the 
foreigner’s threat to their authority and monopoly inside a vast, rich 
empire.
Spain, with a predominantly agricultural economy and with an 
industrial capacity hardly sufficient to meet the needs of the peninsular 
population, yet under the necessity of supplying an extensive colonial 
territory with that same pattern of needs and resources, had proved to be 
a lucrative vent for the surplus production of more industrialized countries. 
Of these, England was becoming obtrusive.* For her, Spain was a veritable
1 On the British economic interests in the Spanish empire before and 
during the period under study, see A. Christelow, "Great Britain
silver mine, a source of bullion with which to settle the balance on her 
trade with other countries. Hot content with their profitable trade with 
the Spanish mainland and the limited one with the Spanish Indies under the 
asiento de negros and faavio de permiso,*' the English sought a direct share 
in the general trade of Spanish America which was carried on in the silver 
fleets and galleons calling at Vera Cruz and Puerto Bello. A tremendous 
clandestine commerce thus grew up as the arm of the Spanish commercial 
code strained to contain it. In 1750, the English attempt to get into the 
American trade by legislation was abandoned officially, but the fact that 
the expanding British trade was still being fettered by the Bourbon policy 
of colonial monopoly remained a serious irritant.
In Manila, although here too Europeans were excluded from trade, the 
English were able to penetrate under cover of Asian flags. Their trade 
with China increasingly necessitated a supply of bullion, and for years 
before the invasion, the Fort St. George establishment had been procuring
and the trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil,
1759-1783,” in The Hispanic American Historical Review, V. 27, Feb.
1947, No. 1, p. 2-29; Idem, "Economic Background of the Anglo- 
Spanish War of 1762" in The Journal of Modern History, T. 18, March 
1946, No. 1, p. 22-36; J.O. MacLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old 
Spain, 1667-1760. Cambridge University Press, 1940.
1 The "Tratado del asiento de negros" was an agreement entered into 
by the rulers of Great Britain and Spain in 1713• By this treaty, 
England should bring to the Spanish West Indies, during a period 
of thirty years, 144,000 negroes of both sexes, at the rate of 
4,800 each year. Philip V of Spain further conceded to the South 
Sea Company, in charge of the nigro contract, right to send a ship 
of 500 tons burthen to the Indies to trade, referred to as the 
"navio de permiso". In return the Spanish King should receive one- 
fourth of the profits and an additional 5 Per cen  ^on ^ e  other 
three-fourths accruing to the English. For further details, see 
A.S. Aiton, "The Asiento Treaty as Reflected in the Papers of Lord
Shelburne,” in The Hispanic American Historical Review, V. 8,
1928, p. 167-77.
9silver by purchase or exchange at Manila, and likewise Spanish dollars 
which were the foreign currency recognized in China. Manila, in turn, 
got her supply of money and "bullion by the annual galleon from Acapulco.
After the invasion, the Philippines took its place in the forefront 
of Spanish colonial policy.1 Direct contact was opened with the mother 
country via the Cape of Good Hope, thereby ending the isolation of the 
colony. Economic and commercial development programs became the order of 
the day. The administrative machinery was overhauled to meet higher 
standards of efficiency and morality. Military defenses were brought up 
to date to forestall further British designs against the islands; indeed 
until the coming of the Americans in 1898, no western power ever again 
forced the colony from its Spanish rulers. It was as if the colony had 
awakened from a deep and protracted slumber and was hastening to catch 
up with a transformed world.
While politically British interest and activities in the Philippine 
area could be traced to the current situation in Europe, by their very 
nature, however, they were intimately linked with the history and moti­
vations of the English East India Compeny. The invasion of Manila was to 
be the opening by which the Company would establish the much-coveted 
trading base - their access to the spice trade and halting-place on the 
route to China. The Balambangan settlements and the Mindanao projects 
all tended to the same objective goals of the Company.
1 Some useful readings in Spanish Colonialism are: M. Blanco Herrero,
Politica de Espana en Ultramar, Madrid, 1888; C.H. Haring, The 
Spanish Empire in America. Hew York, 1947; B. Moses, Spain Overseas, 
Hew York, 1929; W. Hoscher, The Spanish Colonial System (trans. ed. 
by E.G. Bourne), Hew York, 1904.
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The Company itself underwent a thoroughgoing transformation 
during the forty-six year period under study. The French wars marked 
the first disruptive disturbance in the purely business ways and 
interests of the trading body. The acquisition of political power in 
Bengal and the opening up of a vast field of dividends, patronage, and 
spoil raised serious imperial and moral questions, thus bringing the 
Company and affairs in India within the focus of public and parliamentary 
scrutiny. The occupation of Manila emphasized the difficulties in 
reconciling state interests with those of the organized merchants. Sub­
sequent events in India heightened the contradiction between the purposes 
and the administrative organization of the Company. Mo doubt the 
compelling need of the time was to bring Company and State into a fruit­
ful and unimpeachable relation. The Regulating Act of 1773 w*3 the first 
assertion of parliamentary control over the unwieldy body of merchants. 
Under the India Act of 1785, Company and Crown closed ranks and entered 
into a formidable partnership for expanding and consolidating British 
dominion over India.
The energies of this partnership, however, were all but absorbed 
by affairs on the Indian continent. Subsequent British projects in the 
Philippine area were uniformly frustrated by the attenuation of the 
imperial drive beyond the boundaries of that continent. The withdrawal 
of the Balambangan settlement in I8O5 marked the beginning of a long 
postponement of British ambitions in the peripheral no-man’s land wedged 
between actual Spanish and Dutch domains.
As we have pointed out, British interest and activities in the
11
Philippines during 1759-1805 had their roots embedded in the politics 
of Europe. I shall therefore trace briefly those events on the continent 
which form a background to the matter under study. The point of emphasis, 
of course, will be the relationship between England and Spain, principally 
the recurrent failures to resolve differences and the consequent 
repercussions on the islands. Religion, national sensibilities, personal 
ambition and sentiment, accidents, all have their place in the conception 
of policy, but the limits set for this study allow consideration only 
of the political, commercial, and diplomatic.
In the relations between Spain and England during our period,
France was the dominant obstructive element. England and France, locked 
in their epic struggle for supremacy in Europe, dragged Spain also into 
their arena, although the latter was of course, no unwilling contender.
The union of France and Spain under the Bourbon House at the turn of the 
eighteenth century and the subsequent succession of alliances which a 
common dynasty interposed between the two nations were a strain to the 
British foreign policy makers who were hard put to maintain the balance of 
power on the continent. During the second half of the century the rivalry
1 For the general background of political and diplomatic relations 
between Spain and England in this period, see Jeronimo Becker,
Esoana e Inglaterra, sus relaciones -politicas desde las paces de 
Utrecht. Madrid, 1907; V.L. Brown, rTAnglo-Spanish delations in 
America in the Closing Years of the Colonial Bra, 1763-1774” 
/Heprinted from The Hispanic American Historical Eeview, V. 5*
Ho. 3_/; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919,
The University Press, 1922-3; J.S. Corbett, England in the Seven 
Years* War. 2Y., London, 1907; H.E. Egerton, British Foreign Policy»
178^-1815. V.l, Cambridge University Press, 1922; Don Manuel de 
Marliani, "Hesena de las relaciones diplomaticas de Bspana desde 
Carlos I hasta nuestros dias,” /^extracted from Historia -politica de 
la Bspana moderna 7. Madrid, 1841; Juan Perez de Guzman, ”Las 
relaciones politicas de Espana con las demas potencias de Europa al 
caer el conde de Floridablanca en sus ministerio en 1792” [_ extract_/, 
Madrid, 1906.
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■between the two sides expressed itself signally and decisively in the 
overseas possessions of the contending powers. Spain, whose colonial 
territory lay astride the highways of communication and trade, in 
precarious isolation and festering with a moribund economic system, 
proved to he the most susceptible and also the most vulnerable to enemy 
reprisal. England, on the other hand, with an eye for strategy ranging 
over the world, marshalled all her military, naval, and diplomatic forces 
to bear on the other side, and in the end bested Prance, her real rival 
for empire.
1
France and England had both held vital political and economic 
interests in Spain and her overseas possessions. The two enjoyed 
exclusive privileges in the trade of the latter and looked upon her as an 
indispensable source of bullion for their treasury. Spain, on the other 
hand, regarded their trade as a mere engine to bleed her of her precious 
metals and to defraud her of her revenues.
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748 left various questions between 
the three powers unsettled. Of these, the imperial problem was the most 
absorbing. Each felt the other a menace to her own possessions in the West 
Indies and America, a feeling which between England and France extended to
1 French interest in the Spanish empire during the eighteenth century 
is outlined in A.S. Aiton, T,Spanish Colonial Reorganization under
the Family Compact," in The Hispanic-American Historical Review, ¥.12, 
Aug. 19^2, No. 3* P* 269-80; A. Christelow, "French Interest in the 
Spanish Empire during the Ministry of the Due de Choiseul, 1759-1771," 
ibid., ¥. 21, Nov. 1941, No. 4 p. 515-37.
2 The commercial rivalry between England, France, and Spain in the 
Caribbean and in Spanish America is treated extensively in Hichard 
Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 17^9-65, Oxford, The 
Clarendon Press, 1936.
India. When Charles III arrived in Spain to take up the sceptre there, 
war had already “broken out between the two other powers over limits of 
territorial expansion in America. With this issue merged the European 
one, that of maintaining the equilibrium within the system of state 
alliances.
The defeat of the French forces in America revived in Charles III 
the traditional Bourbon antipathy toward England, besides stirring up 
old-standing grievances against her. He was aware that France had always 
sought the subordination of Spanish interests to her own, but between the 
two contending nations, France was to his mind a lesser menace to his 
American dominions than England. The Bourbon Family Compact, the 
imminence of which had caused the English Minister, Pitt, some diplomatic 
nightmares and had driven him to withdraw from an increasingly pacific 
Ministry, was finally sealed. England declared war against Spain in time
for the latter to share in the defeat of her ally. Manila, besides Havana
was taken by the English, and the ease with which this was done rudely 
awakened the Spanish from their complaisance with regard to their Eastern 
possession.
Shortly before the project for an attack against Manila was launched 
two of the Company’s servants at Madras were devising a scheme for 
extending the English trade to the Eastern islands. Dalrymple, the chief
architect of the plan\ was taken by the idea of acquiring a trading settle
ment amongst those islands* to serve as a feeder to the important India
1 George Pigot, president of the Madras settlement encouraged and 
sponsored Dalrymple's "Far Eastern" project.
Hand China trade and to holster the exchange in British manufactures.
His choice fell on a spot of land belonging to the Sultan of Sulu, a 
Mohammedan chieftain whose domains were wedged between the Spanish and 
Butch territories and whose abiding submission had long been sought by 
the Spaniards in Manila.
When the Company’s Birectors in London were advised of the 
projected expedition to Manila by the King’s Ministers, the former seized 
upon it as a means to obtain the desired trading base. Their choice fell 
on Mindanao, adjacent to the Sulu islands and also the object of Spanish 
claims. When this plan did not materialize, the Company ordered the 
settlement of Balambangan island, Balrymple’s proposed site. But in 1775* 
this settlement was attacked and despoiled by Suluans, and the considerable 
losses suffered and the situation in Europe disheartened the Company from 
pursuing the project further.
The Peace of Paris signed on 10 February, 176} was as much a 
diplomatic impasse as the Treaty of 1748. The Bourbon allies felt 
humiliated and exposed to further danger by its terms, while England 
fretted over the inadequacy of her rewards in terms of her victories. 
Outside factors continued to strain relations between the Spanish and 
British governments. The growing contraband trade of British interlopers 
in the Gulf of Mexico was one irritant. Another was the question of pay­
ment of the "Manila ransom" bequeathed by the late war. Thus when the 
Falklands question^ was aired, the two nations were disposed towards war.
1 Falkland Islands, situated in the southern Atlantic, JOQ miles 
east of Magellan Straits, were claimed by both Spain and England. 
An English settlement was established there in 1765* just after
IS
The fall of Choiseul, the French King’s Minister and "agent provocateur/1 
and Charles Ill’s dread of facing English naval might single-handed, 
however, saved the day*
Fresh opportunities to get even with England did not take long to 
present themselves before the Bourbons. The declaration of independence 
by the American colonies provided such opportunities. France quickly 
extended aid to the dissidents and then entered into a treaty with them. 
The result was open rupture with Great Britain in 1778. Meanwhile, Spain 
sought to remain neutral, although she had also been secretly aiding the 
rebels. Assuming the role of a broker, whose profits lay in being able 
to get certain pending questions with England settled, Charles III offered 
to mediate between England and France. The offer was rejected by the 
former power as lacking in good faith. Further diplomatic exchanges
the French had moved in, later giving up their claim to the islands 
in favor of the Spaniards. In 1770, a Spanish expedition from 
Buenos Aires expelled the English from their settlement (Port Egmont), 
which occasioned a strong protest with a demand for reparation from 
the English Court. Subsequently, the Spanish forces were withdrawn 
from the islands and the English settlers reinstated, "but without 
either acknowledgment of the British right or reparation for the 
insult offered to the British flag; and the withdrawal of the British 
garrison followed as soon afterwards as to seem like a virtual 
recognition of the Spanish title."
The islands, which were themselves valueless, had been recommended 
by Lord Anson as a suitable place for anchorage and refreshment of 
ships on the way to the South Seas. Spain, on the other hand, had 
shown an awakening interest in the China trade and the direct one 
between herself and the west coast of South America. British 
activities in the islands were thus interpreted by the Spaniards as 
an attempt to control this sea route to China and the Fax East and 
to obtain a base for illegal trade with the Spanish settlements.
See V.L. Brown, on. cit.
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convinced England of Charles' partiality to Prance, and Charles of 
England's lack of amenability to the proposed mediation. Spain signed 
a secret alliance with Prance on 12 April, 1779•1 Two months afterwards 
she declared war against Great Britain.
In the following year the British Ministry entertained an ambitious 
proposal for an expedition against Spanish America by way of India. The 
forces which were to depart from this point would cut across the
Philippines to New Zealand, thence to the Pacific Coast of South America.
This plan was then incorporated into another more advantageous to the 
interests of the Company whose aid was vital to such a project. The 
Company's condition for its assistance was the establishment of a settle­
ment on the island of Mindanao in southern Philippines, and if possible, 
another on Calebes, whence the spice trade could be tapped and restraints 
might be imposed on the Spaniards in Manila. The Dutch entry into the 
war, however, gave a new aspect to the situation, and the English Ministry 
instead decided to order an attack on the Cape of Good Hope.
Spanish gains from the Peace of 1783 were a disappointment.
Gibraltar, which was one reason why she entered the war, was not returned 
to her. She resisted British overtures to draw up a treaty of commerce 
with her as provided for in the Peace, while difference between them still
The avowed reasons of the Spanish and French Kings for ranging 
themselves against England are given in Manifiesto de los motivos 
en que se ha fundado la conducta del Rey Christianisimo respecto 
a la Inglaterra, con La Exposicion de los que han guiado al Rey 
nuestro Senor para su modo de proceder con la misma Potencia, 
Madrid, 1779* (seen in Harvard University Widener Library).
persisted in the Caribbean. This uneasy relationship was bound to lead 
to open rupture, and the dispute over Nootka Sound* well-nigh provided 
the spark. England, who was averse to conceding to Spain the latter1s 
claim to an abstract right over the coast of America north of California,
prepared for war. Spain, finding herself again deserted by her French 
ally, yielded to the English demands.
France was now plunged into a cataclysmic revolution against the 
ancien regime, and Spain's relations with her began to take a new turn. 
Floridablanca, Charles IV'3 minister who had also served Charles III, was 
torn between staying the tide of revolutionary contagion and preventing 
the loss of the French alliance. Thus did he initiate his country into 
an ambivalent policy which was to prove disastrous under the guiding hand 
of the fumbling Godoy.
After Louis XVI was imprisoned by the revolutionaries in 1792, 
Charles IV felt an obligation to save his cousin. Yet Spain was ill- 
prepared for war, and in her search for allies turned to England. The 
revolutionary Assembly in Paris, on the other hand, which had taken the 
measure of its military strength in the battle against Prussia, thereafter
1 Nootka Sound is a harbour on the west coast of Vancouver Island. 
There was doubt as to who first discovered it. The Spaniards 
claimed to have visited it in 1774, while Cook insisted that they 
had never been there. Interest in the place, nonetheless, did 
not arise until after the Treaty of Peace of 1783. ’’From 1785 
onward English ships, coming both from India and from the mother 
country, visited Nootka to purchase furs.” This and Ibis si an move­
ments into Alaska stirred the Spaniards, who "did not wish that 
either their trade or their territorial rights should be interfered 
with." In 1789, the Viceroy of Mexico sent Martinez and Haro "to 
occupy Nootka before it should be taken possession of by any other 
Power." For details of this complicated question, see J. Holland 
iose* William Pitt and National Revival, London, 1911, chap. 25.
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made "bold to declare war against vacillating Spain, The disastrous 
campaigns under the Anglo-Spanish alliance, meanwhile, strained relations 
"between the two nations. In 1795, Spain was ready to make peace with 
France, which Godoy clinched with a treaty of alliance on 18 August,
1796. Charles IV now turned against his former ally, Great Britain, and 
a state of war was declared against the latter two months later.
In November of the same year, the East India Company’s Secret 
Committee advised the Indian settlements of the outbreak of hostilities 
with Spain, recommending that an expedition he undertaken against Manila. 
Elaborate preparations were made at both the Bengal and Madras establish­
ments which would have unleashed a much larger force than that sent 
against the same place thirty-five years before. It was reported that 
Manila’s defenses had been greatly improved since the last invasion. 
Indeed, this must have been a crucial moment in the historical life of 
the colony, when the balance of strength could easily shift in favor of 
the invading power and put it in the permanent possession of the latter. 
However, the expedition was called off upon the receipt at Madras of the 
news of the rapproachement between the French Republic and the Emperor 
of Germany.
By this time Napoleon had appeared on the scene. French policy
toward Spain then began to tighten, and threatened to turn the latter
nation into a mere puppet of France. In 1800 a new Franco-Spanish treaty
obliged Spain to help in the humbling of Portugal, England’s most steady
and useful ally. This done, isolated Britain initiated negotiations for 
peace.
1*
Meanwhile, the English force in the Bast had seized the Dutch 
possessions in the Moluccas. The Company’s Court of Directors who had 
always wished for a settlement among these islands, however, recognised 
that the conquest might he temporary. The Treaty of Amiens of 1802 did 
provide for the restitution of conquered Dutch territories, in view of 
which Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of India, ordered the re-establish­
ment of Balambangan. The resumption of war with France and Holland, 
however, dampened the Company’s enthusiasm. The settlement was ordered 
to be withdrawn, with the Company’s observation that the force required 
to maintain the settlement could ill be spared in the probable reconquest 
of the Dutch possessions in that quarter. The Company obviously rated 
the spice islands, from which the English had long been excluded, very 
highly, in fact, more than any other spot in the East Indies as an 
unerring means to the promotion of their commercial interests.
Thus ended a period of sustained British interest in the Philippine 
area. After the struggle for life against Napoleon, English energies 
would again be directed toward rounding off and consolidating their empire, 
especially in the East. In the Malaysian archipelago, their attention 
focused on the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo. Within the first 
half of the nineteenth century, British authority was secure on one of the 
main highways of Eastern trade, the Straits of Malacca. In the 1850’s 
British activities in north Borneo were resumed. Previous relations with 
the Suluans, in the days of Dalrymple, finally paid off. The Sultan, 
smarting under the growing weight of Spanish dominance, surrendered his 
rights over north Borneo and adjacent islands, including Balambangan, for 
a continuing money payment. In Manila, meanwhile, the import and export
exchange was becoming concentrated in the hands of British merchants.
This study aims to show the background of British interest in the 
Philippine area, and the nature of the activities to which that interest 
led. The effects of these activities on the Spanish colony are of 
special interest to the student of Philippine history. They relate to 
one comparatively unexplored aspect of that history. The major effect of 
the British impact upon the colony was to introduce a set of values by 
which to gauge and judge prevailing conditions in the islands. Spanish 
reformers thus obtained an opening for the re-examination of the 
imperialist position in their Oriental possession. At the end of the 
period covered by this study, some of the fruits of that re-examination 
were already being enjoyed.
The "alienation” of Sulu territory on North Borneo is a more recent 
effect of British activities in the Philippines, and now the object of 
increasing political interest in the latter country. It is beyond the 
scope of this study, but its roots go back to the days of Dalrymple. Thus* 
an attempt will be made here to bring out the relevant events and 
circumstances falling within the period 1759-1805*
Other than these activities, the British also conceived various 
projects involving the area, and which are treated here, notwithstanding 
they were never carried out, to throw further light on the nature of their 
interest not only in the Philippines but in the entire Far East.
CHAPTER II
Revival of British Interest in the Eastern Archipelago;
First Contacts with the Sulus.
With the discovery of the route via the Cape of Good Hope, Europe 
obtained direct access to the exotic products of East Asia. Portuguese, 
Spanish, Dutch, English and French all went in for a share in the trade 
of those goods and came into open conflict with one another. Their rivalry 
centered chiefly around the sources of spices, the most highly esteemed 
of the Eastern products in demand in Europe. During the early seventeenth 
century, the competition was fiercest between English and Dutch, and by 
the 1620's, the former had been effectively elbowed out of the spice- 
producing islands by the latter.^- The English thus reverted to India, 
where they subsequently concentrated their energies and eventually 
founded an empire.
The retreat to India, nevertheless, did not obscure the prospects 
for the English of trade expansion in Further Asia. In fact, the English 
trade with China grew considerably during the first half of the eighteenth 
century and its widening needs were pushing the English into new and 
broader avenues.
1 For an account of the early British contacts with Malaysia, see
T.C.P. Edgell, English Trade and Policy in Borneo and the Adjacent
Islands 1667 - 1786 (unpublished thesis), 1955; Johannes Willi of 
Gais,. The Early Relations of England frith Borneo to 1803, 1922.
2 Details of the beginnings and development of the English China Trade
are found in Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 
1800-42. 19515 Hosea B. Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company 
Trading to China, 1655-1834, V. 5, 1926-9; Earl H. Pritchard, The Crucial 
Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations. 1750-1800? 1936.
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Since the Treaty of Utrecht, England had had a long period of 
peace during which her industry was greatly expanded by the application 
of science and her commercial activity augmented by maritime exertions. 
Simultaneously with, or in consequence of these developments, the old 
concepts of colonial and commercial expansion underwent changes. The 
narrowly nationalistic theory of the balance of trade was rapidly losing 
ground, while the new mercantilist view now looked toward the development 
of markets for the expanding home manufactures.'*' In the East, the means 
of achieving this end lay in the creation of emporia or trading centers, 
preferably in the Malay Archipelago, as the main links in a vast network 
of exchange. The idea attained fruition toward the end of the eighteenth 
century, but the first clear statement of it was made in the 1760*s by an 
obscure servant of the English East India Company serving in Madras.
Alexander Dalrymple went out as a writer to the Company’s 
establishment at Fort St. George, Madras, in 1752. In 1757 > he became 
deputy-secretary. From the point of view of seniority, he had anticipated 
this promotion and prepared himself for it by diligent perusal of the 
Company’s records filed in Madras. The upshot of his research was that 
the Company would be able not only to regain their share of the trade in 
the Eastern Islands but also to extend it beyond the limits it had ever 
attained before. His ideas apparently came to a focus during the French 
seige of Madras, at which time also President Figot is said to have
1 Vide, James A Williamson, A Short History of British Expansion,
1922; Yincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British 
Sn^re, Vol. I, 1952.
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promised to give him "the necessary employment."1 On 11 April 1759 >
the President announced to the Madras Council that he had received
orders from the Secret Committee of the Company’s Court of Directors in
London for "some secret service," and that he had in mind to send
2
Dalrymple on the Cuddalore schooner to undertake it. The Council
3
seconded Pigot’s choice, and five days later, the Cuddalore set sail.
An element of irregularity seems to have attended this enterprise, 
not unusual in the proceedings of the Company's servants in India. 
Dalrymple was next heard of in the Madras Council through a letter 
received from him dated at Canton, 28 December 1 7 5 9 giving notice of 
a bill he had drawn on the Madras Presidency; but until his return to 
the settlement on 28 January 1762, two years and nine months after the 
Cuddalore's departure, there was no further communication from him.
Pigot, on the other hand, claimed to have received orders from the 
Company's Secret Committee to undertake such a voyage, yet the Committee 
complained later that they had not been told of the voyagee for which 
the Cuddalore was dispatched.
1 An Account of what has paased between the India Directors and
Alexander Dalrymple: intended as an introduction to a Plan for
Extending the Commerce of this KingdomT and of the Company, in 
the East Indies, by an Establishment at Balambangan, London, 1768*
2 Madras Public Consultations, 1759> Range 240, V. 17> f• 66.
3 Ibid., f. 71.
4 Read and entered in the Consultation of 10 June 1760, ibid., V. 18, 
f. 287.
5 Despatch from the Secret Committee to the Select Committee at Madras,
13 Mar. 1761. H. Dodwell, Calendar of the Madras Despatches, 1754 -
1765, II, 1920, p. 256.
There is no doubt that Figot tried to keep his intentions with 
regard to Dalrymple's voyage under a veil of secrecy as long as possible, 
and withheld information from the Committee in London until Dalrymple was 
well on his way, in fact, for more than a year after the latter's 
departure. There are no references to it even in the Presidency's 
Consultations, apart from that day when Figot announced his plan for 
Dalrymple and the Cuddalore. When Figot communicated much later with the 
Committee on the matter, it was to say that Dalrymple had been sent abroard 
"to attempt to discover a new track to China through the Molucca Islands 
and New Guinea, that the China ships may avoid the danger in time of war 
of going through the Straits of Malacca^" Two years afterwards, when 
Dalrymple was bahk in Madras, Pigot reported to the Committee the return 
of the man he had dispatched "to attempt to open trade at the island of 
Sulu."2
Precisely what Dalrymple's instructions from Pigot were, we have 
not been able to ascertain. There is not a direct clue from Pigot's 
correspondence with the Company, nor from any of Dalrymple's voluminous 
accounts. We can only deduce from the latter that Dalrymple had set out 
to re-establish connections with the Malays of the Eastern Archipelago,
1 Letter to the Secret Committee, 51 July 1760, Memoranda of the 
Committee of Correspondence, V . 18.
In 1757, Commodore Wilson of the Pitt discovered the eastward 
passage to China, that is, through the Moluccas into the Pacific 
Ocean by the coast of New Guinea, thence along the east coast of 
the Philippines round through the opening between Luzon and Formosa 
to Canton. Vide, "Memorandum from the China Diaries, etc. received 
in 1760," ibid.
Despatch to Company, 17 April 1762, Dodwell, op. cit., p. 280.
an area from which the English had been effectively ousted by the Dutch 
and which was a preserve divided between the Dutch and Spanish, and to 
secure a base for English trading operations in that area and in China.
It is also difficult to say whether Dalrymple's choice of the Suluans 
and Sulu territory was accidental or planned. We can only take note of 
the fact that on his return from his voyage, he proved to be particularly, 
perhaps excessively, sanguine of the contact he had just made with the 
Suluans, a people with whom the English had had no previous relations, 
and of the information he had gathered of their trade connections and 
interests. Prom this time on, he was to direct a relentless barrage of 
memorials, expositions, and recriminations at the Directors of the English 
East India Company to get them to expand their trade into the Malayan 
islands.^- Long after he was dismissed in 1771, from the Company's service, 
"as appearing to be a very improper person" to undertake the proposed 
trading base, his enthusiasm remained unabated. He continued to dig
amongst ships' journals and other records in Port St. George, and with his
2
own personal collection of rare Spanish materials, believed to be the 
largest assembled by an Englishman at that time, published one of the 
finest sets of nautical tracts of the island-strewn Eastern seas.
Dalrymple wrote that his "first and most striking object of research 
was the discovery of a Southern Continent," but that "other objects 
intervened." When he was irrevocably excluded from the East Indian 
project, he returned to "the great passion of his life." An Historical 
Collection of the several Voyages and Discoveries in the South Pacific 
Ocean. (2 Vols., Lond., 1770-71), Vol. I, Introd., pp. XXI - XXIV.
James Burney who had recourse to this collection for his work,
A Chronological History of the Discoveries in the South Sea or Pacific 
Qcean» C 5  Vols., Lond., 1803-17),acknowledged his having been 
furnished with several original accounts of Spanish discoveries which 
he had had "no other means of procuring."
Dalrymple’s interest in Spanish East Indian cartography "began 
with his first voyage to the Eastern Archipelago, while passing through 
the Philippines. The first important "Filipiniana" collection he made 
then was Manuel Correa’s plan of Luzon.'*' He narrated that in 1761, Don 
Manuel Galvez, Spanish governor of the settlement of Zamboanga in Mindanao, 
gave him leave to copy the manuscript. When he returned to Madras in 
January 1762, he transmitted it to his friend Hyde Parker who later during 
the year was in the expedition against Manila. Galvez also gave Dalrymple 
a letter for his brother in Manila to deliver to the Englishman several 
other port plans made by himself. But ’’unfortunately, by the illiberality 
of an English renegado, Norton Nichols, the Spaniards there were, from an
2
apprehension of imputation, afraid of making (Dalrymple) any communications.
Another interesting sidelight on Dalrymple's linkage with Spanish 
hydrographic and historical research was in connection with Er. Juan 
Francisco de San Antonio's Chronicas de la Apostolica Provincia de San 
Gregorio de religiosos descalzos de N.S.P.S. Francisco en las Islas 
Philipinas, China, Japon, etc. (3 Vols., Sampaloc, 1738-44)> and Fr. Pedro 
Murillo y Vilarde's map attached to his Historia general de la Provincia 
de Philipinas de la Compania de Jesus (Manila, 1749)> "the first detailed 
chart of the Philippines ever published." Dalrymple declared that he
1 An Exact and True Description of the Coasts, Ports, Islands and
Shoals with the Soundings and Marks on the Coast of Luzon * From
the Port or Bay of Mariveles, to beyond Cape Engano, together with 
the Description of the Babuyanes Islands, dated Port of Bangui, 
September 1740. "Trans, from the Spanish MS. by the late Sir Hyde 
Parker, Bar, Revised and published at the expence of the East India 
Company by Dalrymple." London, George Bigg, 1789-
2 Preface to Dalrymple's Nautical Tracts, No. 6, London, 1789*
Nichols is mentioned again in a subsequent chapter.
procured the first at Madras from W. Roberts after the seige, and that 
he sent the second to C. Howe who went with him in the voyage of 1759 
and had made several extracts from the Chronicas. He did not think that 
Murillo’s map was known to Lord Anson at the capture of the Spanish galleon, 
Cavadonga, as Parker claimed, or he would not have represented Manila in 
his Voyage as an open place.'1' Parker later remarked that if the whole 
of the Chronicas had been translated before the seige of Manila, the 
British "might have terminated the war with equal glory and riches, 
instead of burthening the King’s ministers with endless disputes or laying 
a foundation for another war by depending weakly on the Spanish honor."
It should be noted that Parker was for taking possession of Mindanao as
a British base conveniently close to the Moluccas and deplored the wanton
2
loss of opportunities in the Manila expedition of 1762.
Dalrymple’s first visit to the Sulu Sultanate had two tangible 
results. The cargo he had brought with him on the Cuddalore both paid 
for the voyage's needs for provisions and gave a return of Sulu goods, 
which it was estimated would make in China a 100 per cent profit on the 
cost of the entire cargo. Of greater interest to the Company was the 
agreement which Dalrymple entered into with Datu Bandahara and the
1 See marginal note in Dalrymple's handwriting to Adm. Sir Hyde
Parker's "Account of the Philippine Islands (ca. 1789 ? - sic),"
Add. MSS. 19. 2QS. f. 2-8.
2 rbia*
5 Dalrymple's account of his first voyage to Sulu in a letter to
the President and Council at Madras, 22 March 1762, entered in
the Consultation of the following day. Fort St. George Public, 
V. 20, f. 176, et. seq.
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collective body of chiefs in Sulu, under sanction of the Sultan."^ Goods 
from India were to be delivered to the amount of 44>000 Spanish dollars, 
which the Suluans were to receive at 100 per cent over the invoice price, 
or 88,000 dollars. This was to be paid in goods fit for the China market 
in accordance with a stipulated price list. The Suluans further undertook 
to make another 100 per cent on the sale of their goods in China for the 
benefit of the English, or 176,000 dollars, any excess over this amount 
to go to the Suluans and any deficiency to be made up by them. All in all, 
the Company exports to Sulu were to make a 300 per cent profit on the prime 
cost.^
With Sultan Bantilan, regarded by the Spaniards in Manila as usurper 
of his brother's throne,^ Dalrymple further made a treaty of alliance and 
commerce on 28 January 1761.^ The salient points in this agreement were 
to be insisted upon later by Dalrymple, against a background of shifting
1 Enclosed in the letter mentioned above.
2 Ignorance of the value of many articles for China induced Dalrymple 
to stipulate a certain rate of profit which should be fetched there, 
and the 100 per cent was clearly an excess, as the first 100 "in great 
measure secured to the Company an adequate profit for the whole 
voyage." Account of Sooloo by Mr. Dalrymple in Letter to the Company, 
London, 1765. Qrme Collection Various, Vol. 88, f. 1-18.
3 In September 1748, an "alleged" rebellion in Sulu unseated Sultan 
Alimudin I and sent him a "fugitive" to Zamboanga and thence to 
Manila. Spanish sceptics looked upon the dissention as rigged and 
designed to give the Sulhs inside information of Spanish doings in the 
Philippines.
4 Copy with seal, probably original, and another in Arabic, in Home 
Miscellaneous Series. V. 629. received by the Court of Directors from 
Dalrymple on 26 October 1768. Other English copies in H.M.S.t V. 102 
(henceforward Home Miscellaneous Series will be abbreviated thus) and 
Borneo Factory Records. No. 62 of Packet IX.
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power politics in the Sulu Court.1 The English were given "leave to chuse 
a spot of ground for a factory and gardens," which was to be secured to 
them, by the Sultan himself, in "perpetual and unmolested possession."
They were also free to trade with any part of the Sulu dominions, subject 
only to the Sultan's ban on certain articles. No other Europeans would be 
admitted to trade anywhere in the Sultan's territories, nor any Englishmen 
without the consent of the Company. Finally, the treaty provided for 
mutual assistance and protection against attacks and "enemies."
This treaty was said to have been ratified in September 1761 by
Datu Bandahara, "the head of the nobility on their behalf," and also by
2
"the chief people of Sulu," The datu was a kind of prime minister in tne
x
Sultan's council and enjoyed a wide influence beyond the Sultan's dominions. 
He appeared from the beginning to be receptive to the idea of an Anglo- 
Sulu relationship, and did provide Dalrymple with some valuable leverage 
in the latter's initial dealings with the Suluans, whose ways were yet 
unknown to the English and whose inclinations could hardly be gauged. The
1 In Manila, during the occupation, Dalrymple proposed to the deposed 
Sultan to ratify the treaty with Bantilan of 1761 and backdate his 
ratification to November of the same year, the other time Dalrymple 
was in the city. The Sultan agreed to do so as it appears he had 
written letters to Bantilan somewhat to the same effect. "Letter to 
the Secret Committee from Dalrymple," Manila, 7 February 1/64. Borneo, 
No. 57 of Packet IX. On 28 September 1764> the Sultan placed nis seal 
on a separate treaty with the substance of the other.
2 The document in Arabic with seal, probably original, was among the 
papers delivered to the Court by Dalrymple on 26 October 1768.
H.M.S., Vol. 629* The date 20 November 1761 was crossed out on the 
cover and replaced with September 1761. No copy in English seems to 
have been preserved; tnat listed in tne Borneo Records is also missing.
3 He claimed to be related to the king of a "rich and populous state" in
Borneo which he called "Kaely" and assured Dalrymple that a profitable 
trade could be carried on from there, offering to settle the 
preliminaries of a treaty and to escort the English there with some 
persons of consequence. Tnis, however, did not come about.
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datu, whose authority was "scarce inferior" to that of Sultan Bantilan, 
demonstrated his integrity by his support of the Chinese in Sulu against 
his own chief’s oppressions. In the contract for the India cargo, he gave 
Dalrymple an order on his own account which took up almost half of the 
entire amount‘d
The Madras Council was very much impressed by Dalrymple's exertions
and was convinced that the latter1s plans would open up a vast field of
opportunities for the expansion of the Company's commerce. They had his
word that besides the Sulu cargo for China, other goods could be obtained
2
for trial in the European market. They thus reported to the Directors 
that owing to the military success lately achieved in India the opportune 
moment had come for the Company to renew their activities in the Eastern 
Archipelago. The Council moreover hinted at territorial acquisition in 
that area, of places which by inference from the treaties of Munster and
1 See letter from Dalrymple to Orme, "Concerning the navigation and 
commerce of Sooloo and other eastern islands," 12 April 1762.
Orme Collection, V. 67, f* 107-19*
2 Dalrymple gave the following estimate of Sulu cargo which he said 
could be procured for the Royal George:
Pepper 70 tons
Clove bark 50 tons
Sago 50 tons
Cinnamon A small quantity
Sapan wood Any proportion
Ebony Ditto
Mother-of-pearl Ditto
Canes and rattans Ditto
Agal Agal or Hysy Ditto
Massaroong 20 tons
Cloves 30 tons
Letter to the Governor and Council at Port St. George, 22 March 1762, 
Port St. George Public Consultations, 1762, V. 20, f. 176-80.
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Madrid "lay outside the Spanish and Dutch limits." They further maintained 
that "the cruelty and tyranny of the Dutch is become intolerable everywhere 
and the extreme indolence of the Spaniards in the Philippines renders them 
of little consideration."1
In order to fulfil Dalrymple’s contract with the Suluans, the Madras 
Council arranged to send the first available vessel with the contracted 
cargo. It was important that the India goods should get to Sulu as early 
as possible, since the sight of them would not only encourage the 
contractors there to collect the stipulated goods for exchange, but also 
forestall the sale of the latter to the Chinese.
The London got clear on 10 June 1762, with a cargo amounting to 
2
Pagodas 15,782. The instructions which Dalrymple received for this 
voyage are interesting for the insight they give, not only into the larger 
purposes of the service but also the nature of his commission. He received 
two separate instructions, one from the President and the other from the 
Council.^ The latter did not provide for his remuneration, "persuaded 
that his good and faithful services will meet with a more ample reward" 
from the Directors. Pigot's instructions were made from "circumstances of 
a private nature improper for public view." While the voyage was designed
1 General letter, 17 April 1762, Madras Letters Received, No. 1A.
2 The rate in the 1760’s was from 14i to 16J- dollars to 10 pagodas.
Fort St. George Public Consultations, 1764 and 1768, passim.
5 President Pigot's Instructions was dated 9 June 1760 in H.M.S., V.771
and were so taken by several authors. Reference to it in two letters
from Dalrymple to the Court rectifies it to 1762. Moreover, Kelsall,
mentioned in the contents, went with Dalrymple on his second not his 
first voyage to Sulu.
4 Extracts in An Account of what has passed, etc.
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to establish commerce with Sulu, Dalrymple was to make every kind of 
observation in the course of it. The Eastern Islands had by now become 
strategically important in the conduct of the war against the Bourbon 
combination. A successful wedge into the Spanish preserve might hasten 
British victory and open up fresh avenues for further expansion of British 
territorial trade. Dalrymple in fact toyed with the idea of wresting from 
them the southern Philippines or Luzon and using this conquest as a counter­
poise in the peace negotiations with Spain.^
But the immediate concern with regard to the matter at hand was the 
trade of the Malayan archipelago. Europeans who might question the right 
of the English Company to trade with Sulu must be treated with "the utmost 
circumspection." They must be kept in the dark as to the circumstances 
of the British alliance, the position to adhere to being that on Dalrymple's 
first arrival in Sulu, the people declared themselves free from any 
engagement with other European states. Efforts should also be made to 
obtain a treaty with the Bugis priftces similar to that with Datu Bandahara, 
and further to encourage them to bring specimens of spices for 
experimental cultivation in Sulu. As an extensive commerce with the 
Suluans would ultimately require a base for the English, the northern end 
of Borneo and the port of Banguey should be examined for a suitable place.
The reasons behind Dalrymple's choice of Sulu, through which to
1 Plan of an expedition for the conquest of the Southern Philippines, 
authorship of whicrh is not indicated on the document but ascribed 
to Dalrymple as entered in the catalogue of the British Museum and 
clearly in his handwriting, also dated 23 November 1762, which was 
after the successful taking of Manila and while Dalrymple was busy 
at Sulu for concessions to the British. Add. MSS. 19,298.
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re-establish an English foothold amongst the Eastern Archipelago, provide 
a further insight into the nature of British interest in the area. Sulu 
was the center of an archipelago whose sultan also enjoyed ’’imperial" 
jurisdiction over "one-half" of Borneo and the greater part of Palawan or
Paragua."^ Dalrymple maintained that its geographic position with respect
\
to China, south Asia, and important countries of Malaysia was suitable for 
communication and trade with these parts; it might also be worth exploring 
for opening up commerce with Japan. It was near the equator and could 
therefore be approached from every quarter at any time. It was also known 
to be on an amicable footing with Borneo, Celebes, and Mindanao, three 
relatively untapped places in the Eastern Archipelago for production and 
trading purposes in the European sense.
The products of the Sulu Archipelago, Dalrymple held, were suited 
chiefly for the Chinese market, but some, like cowries had a demand in 
Bengal, and a few others might in time be popular in Europe. Its pearls, 
for instance, were of a reputedly high quality. Dalrymple estimated that 
about half a million dollars' worth of goods could be procured in Sulu
1 Dalrymple’s Memoir of Sooloo, along with his other related accounts 
written in the form of letters to the Company and others, is perhaps 
the most informative selection on the state of commerce and economic 
relationships of the Sulu archipelago to be had for the period under 
study. Spanish accounts deal almost exclusively with piracies and 
campaigns, and those mostly by clergy with their religious pre­
occupations. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth 
century that anything approaching social history could be had for 
this late addition to Spanish dominions. A copy of the "Memoir,"
No. 22 in Volume 67 of the Orme Collection Various, fol. 97-131, is 
stated in the table of contents to be Stuart's. It is no doubt 
Dalrymple's, repeating verbatim the facts in his pile of 
correspondence on the subject.
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annually, all to be purchased with Indian and European goods at a high 
margin without the use of bullion. He had the word of Atjehnese settled 
in Sulu that from Borneo alone, about J00 piculs of birds’ nests might be 
obtained each year, which at the Sulu price of 500 dollars per picul would 
yield in China more than three times that amount. The birds’ nests of 
this part of Malaysia were more highly esteemed than those sold in Manila, 
even if not as white. The other products of the area which could be 
developed on a commercial scale were cinnamon, cloves, pepper and sugar.
In Dalrymple's mind, however, the unique importance of Sulu lay in 
the prospects of rechannelling the China trade. The junks from 
the more northern ports of China, which skirt the coasts of the Philippines 
and Formosa to guide them on the long, circuitous way to Batavia, would 
easily prefer the direct track to Sulu. Moreover, the vexatious charges 
laid on merchants trading in Manila and Canton would be done away with by 
diverting their trade to the English settlement in Sulu.^ Thus, in time, 
this place would become the principal mart for Chinese, Indian, European, 
and Malaysian products.
Next to the China trade, that of the Bugis would be most profitable 
for the English to intercept. This people had spread their commerce over 
a wide area, with Passir on the east side of Borneo as the center of their 
activity. Numbers of vessels came to this port with piece-goods which the 
Bugis distributed over much of the Eastern Archipelago as far as Papua and 
New Holland, and in return for which the Bugis brought back commodities for
1 Relief from the port charges of Canton alone would mean a saving of 
£1,200 on each ship. Ibid.
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Batavia. Much of the Bugis trade was clandestine, being carried on in 
territories over which the Dutch claimed a monopoly. As the Bugis had no 
jurisdiction in Passir, they could be easily induced to transfer their 
center of activity to a neutral port such as the English would have in 
Sulu.
We need not dwell on the validity of Dalrymple's judgment with 
respect to the situation and the possibilities of English trade in Sulu 
territory. Later events proved how much of it misfired. His greatest 
function lay rather in acquainting the English with peoples and places 
they had had no knowledge of, which might well have sparked off the 
interest which they showed throughout subsequent decades with regard to 
Malaysia. The East India Company, in particular, from this time on, was 
to be kept constantly aware of the needs of their commercial interest in 
East Asia and of the high stakes in Malaysia. As we have seen, the trading 
base which he proposed for the English in the Eastern Archipelago was not 
to be a mere gathering-place for spices and pepper to be sold in Europe 
and China, the preoccupation of previous endeavours. With respect to 
British interests in Malaysia, his proposed settlement in Balambangan was 
the forerunner of Penang and Singapore.^ But within the broader needs of 
the China trade, his proposals foreshadowed more closely the acquisition 
of Hongkong.
In his first voyage to Malaysia, Dalrymple reached Sulu from China
1 For the origins of Penang and Singapore, see C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth 
Century Malaya, Oxford University Press, 1961.
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by passing through the Philippines. The passage, however, which he had 
in mind for the China and India ships in the proposed commerce with Sulu 
was the entrance between the China and Sulu Seas, separating north Borneo 
from south Palawan. On his second voyage, Dalrymple set out to examine 
this passage, of which apparently there had been no reliable chart made 
yet. His only guide was a chart which he had himself reconstructed from 
the observations of an aged native pilot he met on his first visit to Sulu, 
and which was proved right on the second voyage. The Strait of Balabac, 
as the opening was called, was bounded on the north by the islands if 
Balabac and Lumbucan, and on the south by Balambangan and Banguey, with a 
number of smaller islands across it; thus, it was not one but several 
straits.
On the outward journey of the London from Madras, in June 1762,  ^
entrance into the China Sea was made by way of the Strait of Malacca, a 
place "so much frequented by Europeans, yet so incorrectly plotted.'1 
The London then steered a course along the northwest coast of Borneo,
1 A most valuable account of the voyage survives in James Rennell, 
Journal of a Voyage to the Sooloo Islands and the Northwest Coast 
of Borneo, Port St. George, 50 October 1765.
Add. MSS. 19,299. Rennell, "who was later to become the Surveyor- 
General of Bengal and the great geographer of India," was lent by 
Captain Hyde Parker of H.M.S. Grafton to accompany Dalrymple on 
this voyage "in the capacity of his companion and assistant draughts­
man or surveyor." A note by the author at the end of the MS. says: 
"The Charts, Plans, and Views, belonging to and mentioned in this 
Voyage, were all lost in the ship Union in Madras Road in October 
1765, this Book being saved by remaining on shore. Copies of most of 
these Plans, etc. are in the hands of Alexander Dalrymple, Esqr., 
lately gone to Europe."
Another MS. copy, believed to be the original, was advertised for 
sale in the Quaritch Sale Catalogues of 1932 (No. 976).
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"the particulars of which were entirely unknown to Europeans."1 
Passing the north promontory of Borneo, the London then entered the 
large bay formed by Banguey and Balambangan with the mainland. After 
coasting the northwest side of Balambangan, she soon made the Strait 
of Balabac, between the islands of Simanahan and Salingsingan.
Of the Sulu Archipelago, Dalrymple charted eighty islands, thus 
completing the work begun on his first voyage. Before returning to 
Madras, he had the harbor of Balambangan surveyed and wound up his 
examination of the Straits of Balabac, two of which, he observed, were 
safe passages for ships.
On a commercial view, the London voyage was somewhat
disappointing. Some of her cargo was damaged by bad weather on the
way. In Abai, north Borneo, Dalrymple received the news of the death
of Datu Bandahara and of the smallpox epidemic which had swept over
Sulu. In Banguey, it was reported that four Spanish ships and several
smaller vessels had arrived in Sulu from Manila with the deposed sultan, 
2
Fernando Alimudin I. On his arrival in Sulu, Dalrymple found that
3
the news about the Spaniards was only idle talk, but that the
1 To the cessions and grants Dalrymple was collecting was added the 
so-called Treaty of Bira Birahan, concluded on 26 July 1762. It 
was made with the chiefs of Tampasook and Abai who ceded the island 
Usoocan and the territory to the northward of Abai River and under­
took to bar other Europeans from their country. H.M.S., V.629,
f. 463-5.
2 He received baptism in Manila and was given this Christian name.
3 Governor Obando undertook in 1751 to restore Alimudin on his throne, 
but the latter with his entire retinue was returned to Manila, a 
prisoner, allegedly for conspiring with his brother Bantilan against
Bandahara' s death and the epidemic spelt greater inconveniences than 
he had supposed. The goods to be exchanged for the London's cargo 
had not been collected yet, as the epidemic had cut off the sources of 
supply. A new contract had to be made, as many of the datus who were 
involved in the first one had died. But the persons with whom the 
English were now compelled to deal, were thoroughly ignorant in matters 
of trade. They refused to contract for the cargo of the Indiaman 
which was to follow the London to Sulu, because they could reckon 
profits only by the actual sight of goods. Datu Juan Patatawan, had 
none of the influence and acumen of his predecessor. The Sultan who 
was not concerned in the contract of 1761, now tried to undermine the 
new agreement by insinuations against Datu Juan, with the result that 
"one half of the town appeared in arms against the other." Fortunately, 
the opposing camps only made a lot of noise, and not a drop of blood 
was shed.
The mode of securing this part of the contract was finally 
settled amongst the Sulus, but sqabbling broke out anew with regard to 
the distribution of the London cargo. A settlement was reached after 
a whole month had elapsed.
the Spaniards. Obando's successor, Arandia, sent all the princes 
and princesses, datos and women detained in Manila back to Sulu 
hoping thereby to end the wars with the Moros. Archbishop Rojo, 
acting governor at the seige of Manila, was arranging the return of 
Alimudin and his heir and had fixed the date for November 1762.
1 Dalrymple writes that the Bandahara "was taken ill not without 
suspicion of poison, as he and a former rival of the Sultan died 
under the same extraordinary circumstance, all their hair dropping 
off." Account of Sooloo .♦., 1765*
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The new contract*^ stipulated the delivery of Sulu goods to the 
amount of 20,000 Spanish dollars three months from the receipt of the 
English cargo and a second delivery of the same amount within eleven 
months. The conditions of exchange were the same as those in the first 
contract. After they had discharged the London account, the Sulus were 
to have the cargo of the Royal Captain, when this arrived, at the same 
rate of 100 per cent on the Coast invoice. The goods which they were to 
deliver in exchange would then be carried to China at their risk and sold 
for their account, under the same conditions for surpluses and
deficiencies as in the first contract. It should be noted that the second
100 per cent required as profit for the English on Sulu goods sold in 
China under the agreement of 1761 was eliminated, and instead the Sulus 
were to undertake the transport of those goods in China and assume the 
risks of carriage.
When the payment of the first portion of the London cargo was due,
all the goods were not ready, and those which were put on board the
English vessel were mostly cowries, an article for which there was no 
demand in China. Nevertheless, even if all the goods had come, the London 
could not have taken them all in from lack of space. In fact, as the rest 
of the goods arrived, the English rejected them under the pretext that 
the Sulus had delayed their delivery. When the London left on 7 January 1763,
1 Articles of the contract are enclosed in letter cited below, f. 154-7; 
"concluded between the United Company of Merchants Trading to the 
East Indies and the Datos and Orankys, etc., of Sooloo, by Alexander 
Dalrymple for the English Company and Dato Juhan Pattawan for 
himself and those whose names are hereunto affix'd."
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the Sulus had collected enough goods to fulfil their engagements, only 
three days behind schedule if the expected second ship had arrived.^
The London was scheduled to return to Madras before November of the
previous year, but she had run out of provisions waiting for the Indiaman
which was to follow her to Sulu as planned. Unable to get any assistance
from the Sulus, Dalrymple thus set out for Zamboanga, the Spanish fort
and settlement on the southwestern tip of Mindanao. In the afternoon of
21st November, a Spanish boat informed the English of the war between the
two nations. This left Dalrymple only one alternative, to return to Sulu.
On 24th December, the news of the surrender of Manila to the English
2
invaders was received. After this,the English in Sulu noticed "a much 
more pacific" attitude on the part of the inhabitants, and soon obtained 
provisions.
The London arrived back in Madras on 26 March 17&3• In view of the 
current situation in Sulu, Dalrymple advised that no further arrangements 
ought to be entered into with the Sulus until the outstanding account had 
been settled, and indeed, unless there was a change of government. The 
best mode of commerce with them was through some individuals, like the 
Bandahara and the Fatatawan, who could be held responsible for the 
performance of the contract. The man who now appeared to be the most 
eligible was Datu Sarapodin, Bantilan1s nephew and the exiled Sultan’s son
1 This account of Dalrymple’s second visit to Sulu is taken from his 
letter to the President and Council of Madras of 30 March 17&5 
written jointly with his Assistant, Thomas Kelsal, and read and 
entered in the Consultation of 12 April 176}. Fort St. George Public,
V. 21, f. 141-54.
2 Rennell, op. cit., f. 75*
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by a concubine. Dalrymple further recommended that the Suluans should 
be allowed to freight Company ships for transporting local products.
Above all, an English settlement should be established as soon as possible 
to facilitate the proposed commerce and cultivation of spices in that 
quarter.^
if
On 4 July 1763> Dalrymple left Madras again, on the Neptune, to
2
collect the Sulu debts. Arriving on 7th September in Sulu, he was met 
with the disconcerting report that the goods of the Royal Captain, which 
arrived after the departure of the London, had been divided among the 
Suluans despite the opposition of Datu Sarapodin, who insisted that the 
London cargo ought to be cleared off first. Moreover, Datu Juan Patatawan 
had died and his charge, under the contract with the English, had since 
passed through several hands, with the result that the person on whom it 
now rested had very little understanding of it.
Meanwhile, the Company Directors had not been pleased with the results 
of the project in Sulu. At the moment a settlement there was unthinkable, 
unless it was well fortified and maintained with a respectable force, to 
secure it from ’’such malicious, designing people who seem to be as little 
civilized as the generality of the Mallays are, who are remarkable for 
their inhumanity and have frequently cut off those that are dealing with 
them, whenever there has been the least opportunity given by an inattention
1 Vide, letter of 30 March 1763» loc. cit., f. 153-5*
2 See "Account of Sulu," loc. cit.
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to security in those that have been trading with them... They were 
referring apparently to the murder of two of Dalrymple’s men which remained 
unredressed, but the worst was yet to come. However, the Directors would 
keep Dalrymple’s scheme in mind, until the opportune time, aware of the 
advantages which could be derived from the existing relations between the 
Suluans and Amoy Chinese. In the meantime, the Madras Fresidency should 
continue its trade with Sulu as this might soon be a source of commercial 
quantities of capital articles for the European and Chinese markets.
The Neptune left Sulu on 19 September 1765? leaving a balance of
2
74j672 dollars payable to the English. She had arrived very late to allow 
the collection of all the goods, while those that had been gathered before 
her arrival were sold to the Chinese. Instead of returning to Madras, 
Dalrymple steered the Neptune to Manila, where, as he said, he was to 
communicate the state of affairs in Sulu. He arrived in the British- 
occupied city on 6th October.
Let us return to the original objectives of Dalrymple's second 
voyage to Malaysia. By way of securing the commerce of the Sulu Sea to the 
English East India Company and to forestall any contrary claim which 
another European power might put forward, President Pigot's Instructions 
of 9 June 1762 gave Dalrymple leave "to obtain the absolute cession of some
1 Prom General Letter to Port St. George, 9 March 1763* Madras 
Despatches, No. 2.
2 This included the 100 per cent profit laid on the original cost of 
the goods as delivered to the Suluans.
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convenient spot in the Sulu dominions'1 for a settlement. The latter, 
after examining the islands off the northern promontory of Borneo, 
settled his choice upon the island of Balambangan, "as equal to (his) 
most sanguine wishes and much exceeding any expectations he could have 
formed."^ Dalrymple then caused Sultan Bantilan to hold a council of all
the Sulu chiefs, in which the cession of the island was proposed and
2
granted. This was said to have taken place on 12 September 1762. On 
23 January 1763 > Dalrymple further maintained, he took possession of the 
island and hoisted the British flag.
In Dalrymple's mind, however, the acquisition of Balambangan was 
not enough. To ensure control by the English of the proposed gateway 
into the Sulu Sea, i.e., the Strait of Balabac, dominion must be obtained 
over the lands and islands converging on it. To bolster his position,
Dalrymple wrote to Port St. George that on his arrival in Sulu in July
' 31763, he found the Dutch trying to make an alliance with the natives.
1 Letter to the Court of Directors, 30 October 1769* H.M.S.> V. 771 > 
f. 189-222.
2 In the marginal note of "Case and Opinion of Council respecting the 
East India Company's Right to establish a Settlement at Balambangan," 
submitted with the letter to Lord Weymouth from the Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of the Company, 10 February 1770, it is stated that 
"the grant is mislaid but it is recited in the following grant of the 
19th September 1763*" Ibid., V. 102, f. 36—7• A letter from 
Dalrymple to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors written
on the London off Malacca, dated 5 February 1761, probably a copyist's 
error, advised of his receiving a cession of the island "with a 
promise of such other adjoining islands as (the Company) may have 
occasion for." Borneo Factory Records, 1648-1814* No. 52 of Facket IX.
3 Letter from Dalrymple, 10 October 1763> in Fort St. George General 
Letter to the Court of Directors, 4 May 1764* H.M.S., V. 771> f* 79-&1.
44
He thus thought it necessary in the Company’s interest to obtain the 
cession of the southern part of Palawan and the northern end of Borneo, 
with all the intermediate islands. The cession was said to have been 
made by Sultan Alimudin II, son of the deceased Bantilan, on the da.y of 
the Neptune*s departure from Sulu, on 19 September 1763.^  The cession 
was also allegedly signed by the three sons of the deposed Sultan 
(Alimudin I, who was still in Manila), one of whom being Israel, the heir 
apparent to the Sulu throne and who had arrived in Sulu with his English 
escort on 8th May.
1 The Spanish translation of this cession with date 19 September 1763 
was delivered to the Company by Dalrymple 30 March 1768 and was 
returned to him as it was ’’not clearly expressed.” The outside of 
the document refers to the cession of Banguey but the contents makes 
no mention of other islands to the north of Borneo, particularly 
Balambangan. Dalrymple's account of the matter was that the packet 
containing the original and Spanish translation was delivered to 
him sealed up on 19 September 1763> just before the Neptune struck 
sail. When he reached Manila he opened the packet to show it to the 
deposed Sultan and found it "considerably different from what (he) 
expected.” He said that his application was for a cession of the 
south point of Palawan and the north end of Borneo, with all the 
intermediate islands, and this "though imply'd is not clearly 
expressed" in the Spanish. Besides that, the people who signed were 
not properly those in authority. Thus, Dalrymple wrote, he took 
the liberty of keeping the Spanish translation and sent the Malay only 
to the Company in 1764.
See Note to his letter to the Secret Committee, Manila, 7 February 
1764 in Borneo. The document in H.M.S., V. 629* f. 479-81, said to be 
the original in Spanish, is undated and quite unintelligible. The 
English copy in H.M.S., V. 99 > which was enclosed in the letter of 
the Court of Directors to Lord Weymouth, 16 December 1768, is poorly 
written. Other copies in English are in Borneo with notes and H.M.S., 
V. 102, in the latter as an appendix to the"Case and Opinion of 
Council respecting the East India Company's Sight to establish a 
Settlement at Balambangan submitted to Lord Weymouth by the Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman of the Company, 10 February 1770."
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There is no doubt that Dalrymple resorted to Manila in 1763 to 
make further arrangements with the deposed Sultan before the latter was 
returned to Sulu by the English. He suggested placing the government 
of the Sulu districts in Borneo and Palawan, which had been ceded to the 
English, in the hands of Sarapodin, his new-found support in Sulu, to 
which the Sultan agreed. On the other hand, the treaty which the British 
Governor and Council of Manila had entered into with the Sultan should be 
abrogated.^
This treaty had been the subject of protest from Archbishop Rojo,
the Spanish Governor of the Philippines at the arrival of the British,
who claimed that the exiled Sultan had promised to turn over Sulu,
2
Basilan, Paragua and all the Sulu towns in Borneo to the Spanish. The 
Sultan, on his part, alleged to the English that he had not conceded so 
much as the Archbishop claimed, and that he had acted from necessity
1 Alimudin and his heir Israel put themselves under the English 
protection during the attack on Pasig, just outside Manila. The 
British government voted a monthly allowance for them and their 
family and arranged to return them to Sulu. An ambassador from 
this kingdom had been in Manila for some time with an invitation 
from Bantilan to his brother, the deposed Sultan, to retake his 
throne. The latter, for his part, then offered to the English 
Company "such part of his dominions on Xolo or Borneo as they may 
chuse to erect factory or factory1s for the security of their trade," 
also "to confirm the Treaty of Commerce between Mr. Dalrymple and 
(Bantilan), to give the English the exclusive priviledge of trading 
free from all customs, and to enter into an alliance offensive and 
defensive for the mutual protection of their possessions." The 
Manila Council deferred resolution on the matter until Dalrymple 
arrived. When he did not come, they went ahead with the proposed 
alliance, thinking that its terms "would not interfere but rather 
confirm" Dalrymple's engagements. The treaty went under date of
23 February 1763- Manila Consultations, V. 6.
2 Letter to Governor Drake and his Council, 19 March 17&3• fbid#
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rather than choice. As any treaty with the English could be made to appear 
to be under the same compulsion, it would be best to insist on the validity 
of the de facto government only. Dalrymple thus proposed to Alimudin to 
call a convention of the Estates when he arrived in Sulu to declare 
Publicly that no acts concluded by him outside of Sulu should be in force, 
whether with English, Spanish, or others. The Sultan was said to have 
bound himself to do this."1’
Dalrymple found other faults in the Manila Treaty. It obliged the 
British to install and support Alimudin I or his son Israel on the Sulu 
throne, thus precluding the English from taking a neutral position or 
backing up an opposition which might be more favorable to the Company’s 
interest. Furthermore, it provided for an English fort on the island of 
Sulu where no commercial article of consequence was produced and where 
the suspicions of the natives were likely to be aroused by so close a 
military establishment. The Treaty slipped off into disuse, and was not 
heard of again since. The Company were to rely chiefly on the various 
treaties and grants which with their varying degrees of authenticity had 
been preserved and passed on to them by Dalrymple.
From Manila, Dalrymple decided to return to Sulu, ostensibly to 
recover the debts due to the Company. But what was really worrying him 
was the fluid state of Sulu politics and the need for ensuring the British 
title to Balambangan prior to the establishment of the settlement.
1 Letter from Dalrymple to Company, 7 September 1765* Loc. cit.
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Already the Company Directors had shown signs of impatience with the 
results of the Sulu experiment. They had sent explicit orders not to 
employ any of the large Europe ships to Sulu until that area had been 
sufficiently "frequented.They complained that the cargo received on 
the Cuddalore was sold in China at a loss of about 30 per cent on the 
invoice price. Even the Madras Council had disavowed the proposed 
commerce which, "notwithstanding all Dalrymple's endeavours, is too
2trifling and liable to too many accidents and losses to be continued."
Dalrymple turned to the Manila Council for a ship on which to go 
back to Sulu. He would not only try to recover the balance due to the 
Company^ but also conduct Sultan Alimudin I to his kingdom, whence he 
had been exiled for sixteen years. The Council assigned the London for 
the purpose.
Meanwhile the British civil and military establishments in Manila 
were in a state of confusion. They had split on the matter of booty, and 
were now in a tumult over the question of authority for returning the 
conquests to the Spaniards and over the manner of evacuating the country. 
Negotiations with the Spanish "rebel" governor, Simon de Anda, for the
1 General letter to Port St. George, 30 Dec. 1763> Madras Despatches, No.2.
2 General letter to Company. 4 May 1764> Madras Letters Received, No. 2.
3 The Sulu debts had since increased from the voyage of the St. Anne.
This ship left Manila on 17 April 1763 and arrived in Sulu on 8th May.
The bales on board were delivered to Prince Israel who returned 
pearl shells and sago only 5>000 of the 31>029 dollars on the invoice.
See Manila letter of 21 Sept. 1763 in Abstracts Port St. George Letters 
Received, No. 1.
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cessation of hostilities had dragged on for months due to intransigence 
on either side. The dilatory orders of conflicting authorities added to 
the deterioration of British morale. The Deputy Governor, Dawsonne 
Drake, was linked with various sordid affairs and was compelled to 
resign his post before the withdrawal of the British authority in Manila. 
Dalrymple, who looked upon the office and occasion as "equally disagree­
able," was asked to take over.
Dalrymple’s main concern now was to conduct the Company’s ships to
Madras. They were to go by way of Sulu and through the opening between
Borneo and Celebes, since the season for the common passage, i.e., through
the China Sea, was far gone.^ The King's ships, after a futile attempt
on the part of the commanding officer to put the other vessels under his
direction, also went on the same track. All, except the sick, embarked
on 16 April 17&4 arrived in Sulu on 19th May. Here, Dalrymple was
reported to have detained "the London, the Squirrel and Cumberland gallies,
9 or 10 sampans containing from 1,000 to 2,000 Chinese, 1 officer,
39 Coffreys, 81 Sepoys and 4 artillery-men, and a large quantity of
2
military stores." This information reached Madras by private hands, and 
in their letter to the Directors, the Council disclaimed any previous 
knowledge of Dalrymple's intention. Obviously he was thinking of erecting 
a settlement on Balambangan, but they "could scarce think he would take
1 Signed despatches to the Captains of the Revenge, Admiral Focock, and 
Ilocos, 16 April 1784* Manila Consultations, V. 9«
2 Madras Military and Secret Cons., Range 251, V. 51 (l Oct. 1764).
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such a step without first consulting them or acquainting them of his 
intentions.” The Council was worried that Dalrymple's measures might 
involve the English in a dispute with either the Dutch or Spanish. A 
protest had already been lodged with them from the Spanish governor of 
the Philippines against the English presence on the island of Sulu.1
The Directors' reaction at hearing of Dalrymple's procedures was
one of annoyance. They would now positively forbid any new settlement
without due report to them of its usefulness and an independent opinion
from one of the Indian presidencies. With respect to Balambangan, they
would allow a trial settlement on it at "a reasonable expense," but on
the first sign of inconvenience and unprofitableness, it must be immediately 
2
withdrawn.
Dalrymple did not, in fact, establish his proposed settlement. But 
he must have been tempted to do so; the force which accompanied him to 
Sulu would have made a most effective "visual aid" for such an undertaking 
in that uncertain area. He was also chary of exceeding his commission
3and had been put off by the lukewarm attitude of the Madras Council.
The British fleet did not stay in Sulu longer than was necessary for it
1 The Spanish governor was Don Francisco Javier de la Torre, in an 
interim capacity, following the withdrawal of the British from 
Manila. Letter in Borneo Records, No. 10 of Packet IX.
2 Separate General Letter to Fort St. George, 26 April 1765*
Madras Despatches, No. 3«
3 His chief supporter for his projects had been President Pigot who 
left Madras for England at the end of 1763*
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to water there. Within a fortnight it was gone, leaving only the London 
and a galley with Dalrymple. A ship was expected to be sent from Madras 
to Sulu, and Dalrymple had requested that it be directed to go to Balam- 
bangan. He thus dispatched the London on 18th June with instructions 
for the expected ship. He followed in the galley on 3rd July and stayed 
in Balambangan until the beginning of September, when, no ship appearing, 
he returned to Sulu to load the London for China. Meanwhile, the galley 
had run ashore in a squall on Balambangan.^
In Sulu, Dalrymple had made fresh overtures to the new ruling
clique. He pressed Sultan Alimudin, who had come on the London with the
returning British fleet, to fulfil his promise made in Manila, that is,
to partition his dominions in favor of his son Datu Sarapodin. But
partisanship threatened to divide opinion on it, and to obviate such
danger, the Sultan and the men who formed his council resolved to make a
2
cession, "by way of sale,” to the English Company of the Sulu districts
3
in question. The lines were carefully drawn to include that part of Borneo
1 Letter from Dalrymple to Fort St. George, Canton, 1 Jan. 1765*
Read and entered in the Madras Military Cons. (15 July 1765),
Range D, V. 55•
2 What the purchase cost was in terms of money or any other tangible
form was not indicated in the deed of cession and not one of the 
documents examined gives it. The original grant in Arabic, the 
corresponding one in English, and the Spanish translation are in 
H.M.S., 629, all received from Dalrymple by the Company on 26 October 
1768. Court Book Minutes, No. 77, 262. Copies in English are in
H.M.S., V. 99 with letter of the Court of Directors to Lord Weymouth, 
16 December 1768 and in H.M.S., V. 102 with letter from the Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman of the Court to the same man, 10 February 1770.
3 The area covered by the "cession” was called Felicia by Dalrymple.
See map following this page, photocopied from the engraved chart 
published by Dalrymple in 1770, preserved at the British Museum.

proper from Towsan Abai to Kimanis,1 the island of Palawan, and all
the other islands to the north of Borneo. The full possession of Balam-
bangan was ratified, and it was understood, though not expressed, that
other Europeans would be excluded from settling in the neighborhood of
the island; this was ensured in the cession by granting the English the
control of the straits between Borneo and Palawan. It was also implied
that the government of the ceded districts should be vested in Sarapodin.
2
Accordingly, Dalrymple gave him a commission dated 30 July 1764.
On 28 September 1764> before leaving Sulu, Dalrymple signed a treaty
x
of commerce and friendship between the Suluans and his people, which was
in effect a confirmation of that entered into with Bantilan in 1761. This
treaty was, however, only provisionsal until the English Company resolved
on it, having been made chiefly "to quiet some little jealousies the
4
Sultan had hinted."
1 Dalrymple gave the limits of this part of the acquisition as 6° 
North latitude on the East side to about North on the West. 
Account of Sooloo, 17&5« loo* cit., The whole cession was under 
date 2 July 17^4*
2 Ibid*
3 "Articles of Friendship and Commerce between the English and Sooloos, 
Alexander Dalrymple, Esqr. on the part of the United Company of 
Merchants of England trading to the East Indies end Sultan Mahomud 
Ally Modin Son of Sultan Badorodin for himself and his successors 
and by the Datos, Oranky's and others of Sooloo for themselves and 
their successors on the part of Sooloos this 28th day of September 
1764.” The originals in English and Arabic in H.M.S., Y. 629, the 
Spanish (perhaps also original) in Borneo.
4 Account of Sooloo, f. 18.
With the Balambangan grant secure in his pocket, Dalrymple set out 
to work on the Company Directors in London* He arrived in Canton in 
November, departed there in January 17&5» and reached England on 10th July 
following.^
Meanwhile, the opinion against Dalrymple!s plans was hardening
amongst the Company Directors. Captain John Desplan, who was put in
command of the detachment waiting in Sulu to be taken away on ships from
2
Madras, had made a damaging report on the situation in Sulu. The 
Suluans would not assist him in providing for his exhausted men; they were 
in fact "more bent upon robbing the English." Their chiefs had very little 
power to prevent them and were inclined to behave in much the same way.
They were "an ungovernable set of robbers and murderers given to lance- 
rattling at the first hint of dispute between one of themselves and an 
Englishman." The English had to be on their guard always, like "an 
advanced post before an enemy;" they had already suffered two killed and 
three wounded. The Sultan, who had just been restored by the English, 
commanded very little respect. Government was by mob rule. Desplans had 
seen the band of a'mean man oppose that of the Sultan. The latter and 
his heir, Israel, were far from being friends of the English. Sarapodin, 
who had "espoused the English interest with sincerity," had fallen into 
disfavor.
1 Extract of a letter from Dalrymple to the Court of Directors,
26 August 1768. Borneo, No. 20 of Packet IX.
2 Letter from Desplans, dated Sulu, 19 March 1765* read and entered
in Madras Military and Secret Proceedings, (15 July 17&5) > Range 251,
V. 51, f. 680-5.
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The case of Captain George Dodwell added to the disgust of the 
Company. This man was sent in his snow Patty from Madras to fetch the 
stranded troops in Sulu, also to recover the balance owing to the 
Company, and to deliver some letters and presents to the Sultan and Datu 
Sarapodin.^ Instead, he made use of the voyage to conduct his own business,
causing unnecessary delays and giving the troops a bad time in the way
2of accommodation and provisions. As to the situation in Sulu, what he
had to say only confirmed the Directors’ doubt about the feasibility of
trade there. No one, not even Datu Sarapodin would own responsibility
for payment of the debts to the Company. The Sultan was a man who "made
large promises without intending to perform them," indeed "there was
3
little dependance to be put on his word."
On 4 January 1765, the Company sent orders to Madras to suspend 
the trade with Sulu.^ They deemed Dalrymple's plans to settle on Palawan
1 Vide, Madras Public Proceedings (22 July 1765) * Range 240, V. 23, 
f. 514-6; Port St. George General Letter, 18 Oct. 1765* Abstracts 
Fort St. George Letters Received, No. 1.
2 Several heavy charges were laid against Dodwell by the administration
at Port Marlborough. See Port St. George Separate Letter, 4 Nov.1767,
ibid.
Dodwell returned to England "to endeavour to obtain justice." He
3 published his defense and counter-charges in A Narrative of the
Principal Transactions Betwixt the Agents and Officers of the Honor­
able East India Company and George Dodwell, Esq., Commander of the 
Ship Patty; Respecting a Voyage to Sooloo in 1765 and 1766: With an
Appendix, containing the Original Papers and Other Documents, 1775*
3 Abstract of a letter from Capt. Dodwell to the Gov. of Madras on his 
return from the Sooloo voyage, Madras, 7 June 1767> Appendix,
Article XVIII, ibid.
4 Madras Despatches, No. 3*
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and Borneo as impracticable, at a time when pressing matters in India 
required undivided attention. They were reserving these projects to such 
time when they could provide a proper force for the proposed settlement. 
Meanwhile, they were not renouncing any rights which the Company might 
have derived from the treaties and grants obtained by Dalrymple from the 
Sultan of Sulu. With regard to the Spanish claims over Sulu, they could 
not acquiesce in them, yet it was not the proper time to assert British 
pretensions, and therefore "it were best to avoid any discussion of the 
subject with them.”'1'
But Dalrymple was not a man to be shaken off easily. By sheer 
persistence, he broke the Directors' resistance to his ideas. From 
September 1767 mid-1768, the Joint Committee of Correspondence and
Treasury, to which the matter was referred by the Directors, mulled over 
estimates of expenses, probable returns, the proper persons for the under­
taking, the most feasible means of conducting the settlement, and the
2
reliability of the natives. The problem of interruptions from other 
Europeans, however, proved to be the most trying. In view of the situation 
in India, the Company would be risking too much if they were to embark on 
a new enterprise without the sanction of the King's Government, and this, 
they were afraid, could be had only at a price.
The Committee's opinion, submitted on 7 July 1768, indicated that
1 See General Letter to Fort St. George, 19 February 1766. Ibid.
2 See especially minutes of 26 Feb., 1, 8 and 22 March 1768.
H.M.S., V. 771, f. 116-20.
it would be to the interest of the Company to open a trade with the 
Eastern Archipelago, and that Balambangan was a proper place for a settle­
ment from which to carry out that purpose.^ On 11th August, the Committee 
recommended that orders should be sent to the administration at Fort St..
George to take possession of Balambangan and that the King1s Ministers
2
should be informed of the Company's act. Six days afterwards, the Court
3
of Directors passed the orders to be despatched to Madras. More than a
month elapsed before a letter was sent to Lord Weymouth informing the
Government of the Company's orders for the acquisition of Balambangan and
requesting his intercession that the King might grant his support and
4
protection to the Company's new project.
The King's reply, which was transmitted to the Directors by Lord 
Weymouth on 24 November, bore a reproachful tone. He had trusted entirely 
to the Company’s knowledge of their own commercial affairs, but he was 
"extremely surprized" to find that his protection was desired on a measure 
upon which he had never been consulted, and that a piece of territory was 
being acquired upon no other right than that of utility, regardless of 
the political consequences to which such a proceeding might lead. The 
Company was thus directed to submit "without delay" all manner of inform­
ation pertaining to the settlement, on the basis of which the King would
1 Ibid., f. 120-1.
2 Ibid., f. 122.
3 Court Book Minutes (17 Aug. 1768), No. 77, f• 171•
4 H.M.S., V. 771, f. 122-5.
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judge whether or not he should give the solicited support.
The Company justified their act by an appeal to their Charter
rights, insisting moreover on the validity of their title to Balambangan.
But they were nevertheless willing to put a stop to the project if the
2
King or his Ministers desired them to do so. The Company was at the
threshold of another constitutional crisis. In the first half of the
eighteenth century, the right of the Company to a monopoly of the India
trade was bitterly assailed. Since the military conquests in Bengal, the
right of that same Company to the revenues of the conquered territories
had been called in question. Whether such profits belonged to the nation
or to individuals was to be argued both from the legal point of view and
upon considerations of expediency. But the constitutional position which
was clearly evolving was that where the Company's incompetence, corruption
or rashness of policy endangered the national interest, ministerial inter-
3
vention was a necessity and was not precluded by its Charter rights.
In 1769 > the Company was compelled to admit to the Ministry the bad 
state of their affairs in the Persian Gulf and parts of India in an effort 
to obtain assistance. The Government diagnosed the distress as due in 
great measure to "an infringement or neglect of the engagements entered 
into with other Europeans.”^ In exchange for the use of His Majesty's
1 Ibid., f. 127-51.
2 Letter, dated East India House, 16 Dec. 1768, ibid., V. 99 > 253-6.
3 Vide, F.P. Robinson, The Trade of the East India Company from 1709 to 
1813» 1912, passim.
4 See first "Draught of Instructions to Sir John Lindsay, Knight, Full 
Power.” Court at St. James, 7 Sept. 1769.H.M.S., V. 101, f. 53-5*
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forces, Lord Weymouth wished to know what share the Crown would have in 
the deliberations and resolutions of the Company’s government with regard 
to the "two objects of peace and war."^ The Court of Directors debated
on the subject at length, unable to reconcile themselves to a definition
2
of the authority sought for the Commander of the King's forces in Asia.
The Ministry, somewhat in awe of the still powerful Company, was secretly 
framing its own instructions for Sir John Lindsay which were calculated 
to give him a bold and peremptory hand in the settlement of the Company's 
muddled affairs in the East.
In the end, however, the power and influence of the Company
prevailed, and the Ministry was content to instruct Lindsay "to assist
such councils as the Company shall appoint to deliberate upon the measures
3
of peace or war with the Indian princes. In a separate, secret letter, 
however, Weymouth was to persist in directing Lindsay to make the 
strictest inquiry into the Company's conduct towards the Nabob of Arcot. 
With regards to/Salambangan settlement, it was decided not to take a 
retrospective view of the "improper" manner in which it was concluded, but 
rather to look forward to the advantages which it would bring to both the
1 "Extracts from the Minutes of the General Court of the East India
Company: At a General Court holden 30 Aug. 1769.*’ Ibid., f. 175*
2 Id., ibid., f. 175-81.
3 See "Draught of Instructions for Sir John Lindsay, Kni^it, or for
the Commander in Chief of Our Ships and Vessels designed to be 
employed in the East Indies and of the Marine Force of the United 
Company of Merchants Trading to and in those parts for the time being." 
Court at St. James, 7 Sept. 1769• Ibid., V. 101, f. 59-83*
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Company and the nation, under competent and enlightened management,
Lindsay was therefore to give all due assistance for the success of the 
settlement and, at the same time, to prepare himself for such difficulties 
as might arise from the circumstances under which the settlement was 
obtained.^"
In the year following, 1770, Lindsay informed the Bombay Presidency
of the existence of a Spanish settlement on the island of Palawan, which
had been included in the Balambangan grant given to Dalrymple. He was
cautioning them against settling there without the King's approval and
2
annoying the Spaniards with whom a treaty of peace then existed. In 
1775, just before the taking of Balambangan by a Sulu band, Sir Edward 
Hughes, successor to Lindsay and under confidential instructions from the 
Earl of Rochford to enquire into the Company's affairs in Balambangan, 
remarked on the negligence of Company servants in the settlement in giving
7
accounts. After the loss of the settlement, the Company had to rely
4chiefly on this Government channel for information on the disaster. In
the same year, they were notified by the Secretary of State of the
1 "Draught to Sir John Lindsay, St. James 13 Sept. 1769» Secret from 
Weymouth. Ibid., f. 101-32.
2 Extract of General Letter to the Company from Bombay, 3 Dec. 1770.
H.M.S., V. 771, f. 723-4.
3 To Earl of Rochford from Sir Edward Hughes, Madras, 17 February 1775 
(extract). Ibid., V. 165, f. 141-2.
4 Extract of General Letter from Bengal, 20 November 1775* Ibid.,
V. 122, f. 1-8. By a packet sent to The Earl of Rochford from the
Salisbury in Bombay Road, 22 March 1776, Sir Edward Hughes trans­
mitted "every intelligence necessary for (the Earl's) information 
respecting the capture of Balambangan ..." Ibid., f. 259-568.
complaints put forward by the Spanish Ambassador at St. James against 
the Chief and Council at Balambangan who had been reported to be aiding 
pirates in the eastern seas to the detriment of Spanish shipping.'*'
From the date of Lindsay’s instructions, a further year and nine
months elapsed before the proposed settlement was finally effected. The
Company Directors continued to press for the King’s ’’blessing" of the 
2
project, while they tried to bring Dalrymple over to their terms in the 
execution of it. Such was their uncertainty with regard to the project 
that they asked the Earl of Rochford to obtain a letter from the King
addressed to the Sultan of Sulu, recommending the East India Company, their
3
commerce, and interests to his protection. The reply was that the King 
was not sufficiently informed of the rights of the Sultan and the objections 
which might be made by other powers to the proposed settlement, and there­
fore, "for prudential reasons did not think it proper to make it his own 
act by writing such a letter."^ Much time was also spent on trying to
1 Extract of East India Company's letter to their Chief and Council at 
Balambangan, 25 October 1775* Ibid.t V. 118, f. 609.
2 The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Company, in their letter to 
Lord Weymouth of 10 February 1770, stating their case with respect to 
Balambangan, asked to see the Minister on the subject, but the latter, 
refusing to commit himself, agreed that "it should be considered as
if nothing had past at that meeting." On 20 March, they wrote again, 
pressing him to signify if he had any objections to the Company's 
making the establishment, and once more he demurred. Ibid., V. 102, 
f. 18-79* passim.
5 Letter from Sir G. Colebrooke, Arlington St., 8 Feb. 1771. Ibid.,
Y. 105, f. 57.
4 Letter from Rochford, St. James's, 14 March 1771. Ibid., f. 49-50.
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establish the Company's rights to Balambangan. In a brief presented to 
Lord Weymouth on 12 January 1770, the Company stated their case against 
Spanish claims to suzerainty over the Sulu dominions.1 Dalrymple's 
views were evident throughout, based on his somewhat spurious interpret­
ation of the provisions of the Spanish-Sulu Treaty of 1646 and the
ambiguous terms of the Treaty of Munster, and also his oversimplified
2
translation of certain Spanish authors.
The negotiation between Dalrymple and the Court of Diiectors
regarding the conduct of the projected settlement, however, proved to be
a more protracted business. Asked for his own conditions for undertaking
the settlement, Dalrymple proposed, among other things, that the choice
of the principal persons to go on the expedition should be left to him
3
and that he should have the absolute management of the settlement. The 
Court, jealous of their patronage and accustomed to the conciliar form of
1 "Case and Opinion of Council respecting the East India Company's 
Right to establish a Settlement at Balambangan, 12 January 1770, 
submitted to Lord Weymouth, 10 February 1770, with enclosures." 
Ibid., V. 102, f. 18-51. Cf."Mr. Dalrymple's Defence of the East 
India Company's Right to the Fossession of Balambangan in Opposition 
to the Pretensions of the Spaniards, 30 January 1770." Original in 
Borneo, No. 25 of Packet IX. The whole text was published by 
Dalrymple in 1774 as A Full and Clear Froof that the Spaniards Can 
Have No Claim to Balambangan.
2 These were Father Murillo, chronicler of the Jesuit Province in the 
Philippines who wrote Historia General de la Frovincia de Philipinas 
de la Compania de Jesus, (Segunda Parte, Manila, 1749)? and. Father 
Combes, another Jesuit writer, author of Historia de las Islas de 
Mindanao, Jolo, y Sus Adyacentes: Progressos de la Religion y Armas 
Catolicas, Madrid, I667.
5 At a Committee of Correspondence, 23 and 24 Aug. 17^9, H.M.S., V.771» 
f. 151-61.
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government for their territories, rejected these proposals'^ and resolved
to put off the project for the remainder of 1769* Chagrined at this 
2
dilatoriness, Dalrymple moved for the summoning of the Quarterly General 
Court where he would present his plans. The Directors demurred, declaring 
it unusual to call a Special Court unless at the motion of nine 
Proprietors.^ Dalrymple's riposte was that he had not meant a special 
Court session, hut rather a General Court which was at all times "open to 
every matter relative to the Company's interest." Assuming an impudent 
tone, he then declared that he would publish his "Plan,"^ unless the 
Directors agreed to recommend to the General Court to refer the matter to 
a Committee of Proprietors "conversant in the affairs of the Company
5
abroad." The Directors were adamant; they considered submitting any 
business to any Committee of Proprietors at the time as "improper" and 
his publication of the plan as "greatly prejudicial to both Company and 
country."^
1 Court Book (Minutes, 29 Aug. 1769), N o . 78, f* 187-8.
2 Ibid. (Minutes, 18 Oct. 1789), f• 273*
3 Ibid. (Minutes, 29 Nov. 1789), f* 317*
4 The plan, embodying the most important of Dalrymple's ideas regarding
the matter of a British settlement in the Malaysian Archipelago, was 
published in 1789 as threatened, under the title of A Plan for 
Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom and of the East India Company, 
by A. Dalrymple.
5 Letter to the Directors, Soho Square, 13 Dec. 1789, H.M.S., V. 771, 
f. 234-8.
8 Court Book (Minutes, 13 Bee. 1769), No. 78, f. 349*
In January 1770, his importunity renewed, Dalrymple submitted an 
estimate of expenses for the settlement for three years,1 which was laid
aside while the Directors waited for their lawyers to finish the brief
2
proving the Company’s rights to Balambangan island. In March, he 
threatened again to introduce the subject before the next General Court, 
if the business was not terminated before then.'* The Directors refusing 
to budge, Dalrymple turned to Lord Weymouth, with whom the Company was 
already having difficulties, urging the speedy communication of the 
Ministry’s opinions on the matter, whatever they might be. He added 
that Vansittart in India was determined to pursue the project, with the
4
utmost vigour, ’’whether anything about it was or was not done in England."
5Dalrymple's letter was handed over by the Minister to the Directors.
In July, Dalrymple again offered to found the Balambangan settle- 
ment ”in joint commission" with his friend, Thomas Howe. The Directors, 
however, remained firm on the idea of a council; but they would not 
specify its powers, appearing to wait till Dalrymple tempered his require­
ments. The latter then declared that he would accept a council in
1 Letter of 10 Jan. 1770, H.M.S., V. 771, f. 223-31.
2 Court Book (Minutes, 10 Jan. 1770), No. 78, f. 395*
3 Ibid., f. 469.
4 Letter of 27 March 1770, H.M.S. V. 771, f. 256-7.
5 Letter to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Company from
Lord Weymouth, 30 March 1770, enclosing Dalrymple's letter to 
the Minister. Ibid., f. 249-54*
6 Letter to the Directors, 11 July 1770, ibid., 265-6.
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transactions with E u r o p e a n s B u t  "in all internal regulations and
forming laws for the good government of the colony and in all other
political affairs," he must have the sole management. In matters of
trade he did not see any necessity for extraordinary powers. He further
remarked that the settlement would not succeed if it were made dependent
on any of the presidencies in India. The rules resolved upon by the
Court on 25th July confirmed practically all of Dalrymple's conditions,
2
including that of giving the command of the ship to him. Fresh disputes 
were to arise with regard to Dalrymple1s recompense.
Dalrymple maintained that an annuity of £500 at the end of twenty 
years’ service to the Company, plus three years in Balambangan, was not 
unreasonable. He gave a recital of his past services, and insinuated how
an ill-provided,improper Chief might line his own pockets from the
3
Company's disbursements. The Court then fixed an annual salary of 
£1,000 for the Chief of Balambangan, to commence on his arrival there.^ 
Dalrymple interposed an objection. The Court had deemed it fit to start 
his salary as Commander of the Britannia, the ship taken up for the 
expedition, from the day of his appointment, but denied the same for the
5
Chief; "he was as much Chief of Balambangan as Commander of the Britannia."
Rupture was not far off now. Dalrymple had complained against the 
_____________________
1 Letter of 17 July 1770, ibid., f. 267-82.
2 Court Book, No. 79, 104-5-
3 Letter to the Directors, 3 Aug. 1770, H.M.S., Y. 771, 287-300.
4 Court Book (Minutes, 5 Sept. 1770), No. 79, 140-51 •
5 Letter of 18 March 1771, H.M.S., V. 771, f. 349-52.
Surveyor hanging up his cot in the Great Cabin to sleep in;1 and the
Court peremptorily told him "to follow such orders as he shall from time
to time receive from the Committee of Private Trade or the Committee of
2
Shipping relating to the ship Britannia." Dalrymple’s application for
3
a painter was also rejected. Then the Court appointed a factor for the
settlement against which Dalrymple inveighed as "in direct contradiction
to the engagements of the Committee."^ On 21 March 1771> the Court,
"considering that an establishment at Balambangan must require the
greatest address, moderation, and judgments, .. the persons principally
employed •.. should pay a due deference and obedience to the order of
this Court; and Dalrymple, from his conduct of late, appearing to be a
very improper person to employ on that undertaking," unanimously resolved
5
"that he be dismissed the Company’s service."
1 Letter of 29 Nov. 1770, ibid., f. 526-8.
2 At a Court Meeting, 50 Nov. 1770, ibid., f. 529*
5 Ibid., f. 530-2.
4 Letter of 6 March 1771 > ibid., f. 540-6.
5 Court Book, No. 79 > f. 421-2.
CHAPTER III
The Invasion of Manila, 1762.
While Dalrymple was maturing his plan for expanding the trade of 
the English East India Company* the carrying out of which was to 
disturb Spain’s claim to a troublesome area bordering on her most vital 
Oriental possession* another Briton was laying a scheme for striking 
directly and decisively at the heart of that possession. Dalrymple saw 
the interest of the Company, as well as that of the nation, as best 
served by a policy of peaceful commercial penetration in the Eastern 
Archipelago. In this area, whose geographic position and natural 
productivity offered great commercial possibilities, he proposed raising 
trading settlements or bases with the ultimate objective of linking 
together major areas of consumption and production.
William Draper, on the other hand, was a soldier with^considerations 
in mind. It is difficult to ascertain his specific objectives in 
proposing an assault on Manila. It may be inferred, nevertheless, from 
the correspondence between the King’s ministers and the Company’s 
officers who considered the matter, that his proposal was in tune with 
the Government’s preoccupation with problems of strategy and diplomacy. 
Prom his subsequent behavior, we may further deduce that he did hot intend 
the conquest to be a permanent one, but rather thought of using it as a 
counterpoise with which to bargain for other political objectives.
Draper’s credentials seemed to have derived chiefly from his 
’’gallant behavior"* at the seige of Madras in 1759. Thereafter, he went
1 Robert Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 
1727 to 1783. V. 2, 1BU4\ p. 4Y5T
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to Canton on "board the Company ship Winchelsea, which was under the
command of Thomas Howe.* It was said that while in China "he had had
opportunities of collecting satisfactory information with regard to the
state of Manila, as to make him of the opinion that the conquest of so
important a settlement might he attempted with well-grounded probability 
2
of success". In giving their approval to the proposed expedition, the 
Government expressed the view that attacks on the settlements of Spain 
would cause distress to her, and that a blow against Manila in particular 
would cut at Spanish commerce and help English trade.
The diplomatic and economic issues which led to the Anglo-Spanish 
War of 1762 can not be dealt with here at any length. We can only point 
out the principal difficulties in the relationship between the two nations. 
To begin with, European politics had revolved for many years around the 
maintenance of the so-called balance of power, and between France, England,
1 Howe appears to have associated not only with Draper but also
with Dalrymple. According to Beatson, Draper "met with great
assistance from Howe" in drawing up a memorial respecting the 
proposed attack on Manila, which he was to lay before Lords 
ESgremont and Anson. Dalrymple, for his part, "learnt seamanship 
from Howe". Both appear to have left Madras after the French 
seige and boarded Howe*s Winchelsea, Dalrymple for the Straits 
of Malacca to catch the Cuddalore Schooner there and Draper for 
Canton on a sick leave. These facts are given separately in the 
Dictionary of National Biography, 1737 - 1808, where there is no 
indication that the two went on the same voyage. The detail about 
Dalrymple is in fact disproved by the Madras Public Consultations, 
1759, V. 89, which records that the man sailed on the Cuddalore, 
not on the Winchelsea, on 16 April 1759.
2 Draft of secret letter from Lord Egremont to Major-General
Lawrence Whitehall, 25 Jan. 1762. CO 77/20.
3 Secret Instructions to Brigadier-General William Draper from the 
Court of St. James (draft), 21 Jan. 1762. Ibid,
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and Spain* the weights had to he watched most closely. War first broke 
out between France and England in 1756, precipitated by border clashes 
between their colonies in North America. Fear of a further rupture with 
Spain then began to mount in England, and with valid reasons.
Charles III had recently arrived from the Bourbon principality of 
Naples to become King of Spain. He was met with reports of British 
successes against French arms in America, which he construed as a threat 
to his own dominions in that hemisphere. He had also brought with him 
some ideas of industrial and commercial revival for his Spanish heritage. 
Bearing an old grudge against England, he was therefore quick to impute 
obstacles to his projected reforms to the British, whose commercial 
activities were in fact disturbing Spanish hegemony in the Caribbean.1
William Pitt, George Ill’s indomitable war minister* penetrated 
through this array of circumstances. He believed Spain would eventually 
cast in her lot with France, to whom she was bound by dynastic ties. He 
thus urged immediate war against her before she could have time to prepare. 
But the peace party in England was gathering strength, and the truculent 
minister was driven to resign. Three months afterwards, war was declared 
against Spain. The Bourbon alliance, or the so-called Second Family 
Compact between France and Spain, which Pitt feared and correctly predicted 
had been brought to light.
The British invasion of Manila, which appears to be a mere episode 
in the great struggle between the three colonial powers, rather than a
1 Vide, Hichard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 17^9-65, 1956.
69
major part of the general British strategy* may be put in its proper
1
perspective against a background, of British policy in the Bast. The 
conception and plan of attack have been ascribed to at least three 
persons* e.g.* Pitt, Anson, and Draper. There is no doubt that it 
fitted well within Pitt’s strategy of stabbing quickly and unerringly 
into the heart of the enemy’s colonial power and wealth. Although he 
had not in actual fact proposed the reduction of Manila itself, his 
successors kept his policy in mind. Anson, to whom is attributed a 
similar scheme against Havana, the key to the Spanish power in the 
Western Hemisphere as Manila was in the East, is said to have been 
approached by Draper with the idea and may well have contributed to
1 The most extensive modern account on the subject of the British 
invasion and occupation of Manila is The English Expedition to 
Manila in 1762, and the Government of the Philippine Islands by 
the East India Company. It is a thesis presented by K.C. Leebrick 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Cali­
fornia in 1917. Source materials used were typewritten copies of 
documents preserved in the Record Office at Madras under the title 
of ’’Manila Records", certain Spanish documentary collections at the 
Archivo General de Indias at Seville, copies of docuirants found in 
the Public Records Office and the British Museum in London, and the 
Ayer collection in the University of Chicago’s Newberry Library.
The work is crammed with details, somewhat lacking in unity, and 
mainly narrative in its manner of presentation. It reproduces all 
the mistakes in spelling of Philippine and Spanish names of persons 
and places either of the records themselves or from their transcrip­
tion. The same defects mar the printed transcripts of the Madras 
Records made available in the India Office Library at London under 
the title, Records of Fort St. George - Manila Consultations, (in 8 
books). Leebrick’s thesis, nevertheless, provides some very interest­
ing and useful side information, his interest in the subject dating 
back to a master’s thesis presented in the same university in 1915 
under the title The English Expedition to Manila and the Philippine 
Islands in the Year 1762.
There are a great number of Spanish accounts also treating of the 
subject. The standard ones are: Marques de Ayerbe, Sitio y Conquista
de Manila x>or los Inglese en 1762, Zaragoza, 1897; Juan Ferrando, O.P., 
Historia de los P P Dominicos en las Islas Fllipinas, etc., Madrid, 
1870-2, V. 4 and 5; Eduardo Malo de Luque, Historia politica de los 
establecimientos ultra-marinos de las naciones europeas, Madrid, 
1784-90, V. 5;
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certain aspects of the project. As to Draper, it is certain that it 
was left to him to estimate the amount of force necessary to take the 
place
What has been overlooked, however, by writers on the subject, is
the part played by the Company, or rather the influence exerted by this
group in the final shaping of the expedition. True, the project was
throughout essentially a Government undertaking. The King’s Ministers
deliberated and agreed upon Draper’s scheme before the Company was asked
2
to express its views on it. They in fact assumed responsibility for 
its execution; in the actual campaign, the main strength was provided by 
the King’s forces.
Yet it could not have been undertaken without the Company’s 
assistance or even its accord. The resources of this powerful body 
would bolster up the project considerably and assure its success. Besides, 
the area involved lay within the Company’s preserve.
On 29 December, 1761, the Chairman of the Company’s Court of 
Directors was called before Lord Anson of the Admiralty. He was informed 
that "Government had an intention to order an attack to be made on Manila”,
Joaquin Martinez de Zuniga, Historia de las Islas Filipinas, 
Sampaloc* I8O3; idem, Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas, 
/""Annotated and published by W.E. Betana_/* Madrid, 189^; 
Sinibaldo de Mas* Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas 
en 1842, Madrid, 1843; Jose Montero y Vidal, Historia general de 
Filipinas desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta nuestros 
dias, Madrid, 1887-05, V. 2.
1 Minutes of the Secret Committee, 8 Jan, 1762. Memoranda of the 
Committee of Correspondence, V. 20.
^ Ifrld. See also letter from Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Jan. 1762, 
Add. MSS. 32935, f. 179-82.
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and that "His Lordship desired to know what assistance the Company 
could give thereon”.* The Chairman then laid the matter "before the 
Directors* who after debating on it at length resolved to give ’’all 
possible assistance" to the proposed expedition. But for this promised 
aid* they meticulously laid down their terms.
Their primary concern was the security of their settlements in
India and of their trade in the Eastern Seas. The Committee of Secrecy
Z
which they deputed to parley with the Ministry on the measures to be 
taken to carry out the expedition was instructed to hold fast to the 
following conditions: that sufficient sea and land forces be left at the 
Company’s settlements for their protection; that none of their ships should 
be employed on the expedition without their consent or that of their 
agents abroard; and finally, that in case Manila or other places be taken 
as a result of the expedition, they should be delivered to the Company.
The Secret Committee drew up a proposition which was laid before
Lord Egremont, Pitt’s successor.^ At a subsequent meeting with Draper
and Egremont’s secretary, it was agreed that the Company would contribute
to the expedition and the King’s forces were to be enployed "so fax only
as might be consistent with the safety of the settlements and trade in 
4
India.” In order that the Company’s ships might not be diverted from
1 At a Court of Directors, JO December 1761. Court Book (of Minutes), 
No, 70, f. 251.
2 The transactions between the Committee of Secrecy and the Ministry 
were recorded in the former’s Minutes of the 8th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 
16th and 17th of January 1762. See draughts in Memoranda of the 
Committee of Correspondence, 1762, V. 20.
3 At a Committee of Secrecy, 14 Jan. 1762. Ibid.
4 Id., 17 Jan. 1762. Ibid.
their channels of trade, it was also agreed that the troops to he 
employed on the expedition should he transported on the King’s men - 
of - war, with hut one, or at most, two vessels from the Company to 
serve as hospital and store ships. The King’s Minister further agreed 
to deliver to the Company whatever conquest should he made on the 
expedition, although they refused at first to eonmit the King outright.
The Government, however, held out on one point. The Company asked 
that their agents abroad be left to determine what force could be 
safely spared from the settlements for the expedition. They were in 
effect seeking for themselves the authority to decide whether the 
expedition should be launched or not. It was agreed to form a council 
and invest it with that authority. The discussion then turned on the 
choice of persons to serve on the council. In the end, the Company 
obtained only one seat, to be taken by the Governor of Fort St. George. 
However, the other members,1 besides Draper, were men - on - the - spot, 
officers of the King doing service in the East, and could be relied upon 
not to prejudice the security of the Indian settlements. The ultimate 
decision then was to be made in Madras, upon Draper’s arrival there, and 
the expedition was to be launched from there, if at all.
Two other questions were raised by the Company, but the Government 
tried to evade them. One concerned the distribution of booty. This had
1 These were Hear-Admiral Charles Steevens, Commander of the King’s 
Sea Forces in the East, his second-in-command* Vice-Admiral Cornish, 
and Major-General Stringer Lawrence, Commander of the King’s Land 
Forces in the East. In April, before the invasion, Steevens died 
and his place was taken by Cornish while Commodore diehard Tiddeman 
succeeded the latter.
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been the subject of acrimonious dispute between the Company’s agents 
and the King’s officers in recent Indian conquests. The Company tried 
to get a settlement of their share from the new project, which they hoped 
would be one-half of whatever might be brought in.^ The Government 
washed its hands of the matter and left it to the Company and Draper to
decide between themselves. Draper was said to have verbally consented
2
to an equal distribution between Company and captors, but upon embark­
ing on the expedition, he arranged with the Commander of the King’s Sea 
Forces to assign the Company only a third of the total booty.
The other question was whether the Company was entitled to 
compensation for whatever expenses they might incur in the expedition, 
in case it did not prove profitable to them. It should be noted that 
neither the Company nor the Government expected to retain Manila after
3
the Conquest. The Government at first refused to undertake to reimburse 
the Company for such expenses, but seemingly eager to accommodate the
1 See letter to Colonel Draper from the Secretary of the Company, 
Hobert James, East India House, 19 Jan. 1762. Correspondence 
Memoranda, 1762, V. 20.
2 Secret Minute, 21 Jan . 1762. Ibid.
3 The Company’s view on the matter was expressed in the following 
terms - ’’Manila being an object of infinite importance to the 
Spanish nation, the Company can hardly flatter themselves with 
holding it when peace takes place. Great sums must certainly 
be expended on the works and fortifications and in garrison 
charges* and the advantages are distant. Trade must be created 
and new channels opened for we can expect no intercourse with 
the South Seas, and before we are there established according 
to human reason, the Company must deliver it back again”.
At a Committee of Secrecy, 14 Jan. 1762. Ibid.
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Company, acquiesced in the end. Furthermore, following the suggestion 
of the Company’s representatives, the Ministers instructed the two 
Commanders-in-Chief on the expedition to attempt the conquest of 
Mindanao in southern Philippines, after the taking of Manila, where a 
settlement might "be established for the benefit of the Company.
While the Company still pressed Draper on the question of plunder,
the Government issued its instructions on the conduct of the expedition.
Draper was appointed head of the entire attacking force, with the rank
of brigadier-general, and was ordered to proceed to Plymouth, thence to
embark for Madras.*- Two days later, on 23 January 17&2, a secret letter
was addressed to Major-General Stringer Lawrence, Commander-in-chief of
the King’s Land Forces in the East, informing him of the espedition and
2
of the procedures to be followed toward its execution. On 25 January, 
Whitehall issued its Secret Instructions to Hear-Admiral Charles Steevens, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Hoyal Navy’s forces in that area, repeating the 
essentials in Draper’s mandate, including the injunction for mutual
3
cooperation on the project between the naval and military branches. The 
Company also received a communication from Whitehall* reiterating Draper’s 
instructions and requesting as much aid as the Company could provide in 
the way of troops, artillery, stores, and ships. They would be reimbursed 
for their expenses, and should Manila be restored before the Company
1 Secret Instructions to Brigadier-General William Draper from the 
Court of St. James (draft), 21 Jan. 1762. CO 77/20.
2 Draft of Secret Letter from Lord Egremont to Major-General Lawrence, 
Whitehall, 23 Jan. 1762. Ibid.
3 Secret Orders and Instructions to xtear-Admiral Chas. Steevens,
25 Jan. 1762. Adm. 2/1532.
could gain any commercial advantages, they would he compensated 
1
accordingly. The Company, in turn, issued their instructions to the
Presidency of Port St. George, hut these were merely informative,
rather than mandatory, as the expedition depended entirely on Draper’s
2
arrival in Madras and the charge rested mainly with him.
It is evident that the Company was not eager to join the enterprise. 
They had had enough military trouble in India and did not care to have 
more. Moreover, their knowledge of the Eastern situation gave them 
reasons to think that they stood to lose rather than gain from the 
expedition. Spain certainly would not acquiesce in the permanent loss 
of so important a possession as Manila. They were as sure as the Ministers 
who promoted the project that Manila would have to he returned to Spain
3
after the war ended, if the higher stakes in the Hew World were to he won. 
Their agents, in Madras especially, were content to leave Manila in 
Spanish hands* There had heen a reliable influx of silver from that port 
in exchange for Indian and Chinese goods which British ships had heen able
4
to send there under Asian colors. a  resort to arms would certainly cut
1 Letter from Whitehall to the Secret Committee of the East India 
Company, 23 Jan. 1762. C.O. 77/20.
2 Separate Letter, 21 Jan. 1762, per Colonel Draper on the Argo and
Tilhury. Madras Despatches, Ho. 2.
3 By the treaty of peace signed on 10 Feb. 1763* Spain ceded Florida
and logwood rights in Honduras to the British, receiving hack Havana 
and Manila.
4 The transactions in bullion which were carried on between the Madras 
Presidency and Manila are described in the chapter on trade.
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off this hullion supply* as future events proved.
The only foreseeable advantage they could derive from the proposed 
campaign was the alienation from Spain of the southern islands, near 
where the spice center and the Spanish possession abutted, and 
consequently the establishment there of their bases. Dalrymple's 
reported success in obtaining a treaty with the Sulus, a Mohammedan 
people always at loggerheads with the Spaniards in Menila, bolstered 
their hopes for a share, at last, in the spice trade. Thus, as a 
corollary to ths proposed expedition, the Company suggested the taking of 
Mindanao, whose people bore an affinity to the Sulus, as soon as the
operations against Manila were over.*
\
Draper arrived in Madras on a royal frigate, the Argo, on 27 June, 
2
1762. The Council for directing the expedition was assembled, and on 
10 July, they issued their resolution outlining the state of affairs in 
India and recommending the size of force which could be spared for the 
Manila expedition. The Indian settlements were not in any imminent 
danger. Besides, by the following November the outcome of the invasion 
would have been known, and by January of the following year, a great 
part of the squadron and land forces would have returned to the Coast.
1 See instructions to Draper and Steevens above.
2 Madras Military (Diary) and Consultations, V. 48, f. 80.
3 Copy of a letter from the Council appointed for directing the 
expedition against Manila to the President and Council of 
Madras, 10 July 1762. Home Miscellaneous Series, (hereafter 
abbreviated as H.M.S.), V. 77, f. 1-4.
Major-General Lawrence, however, thought differently and did not
sign the resolution. He believed that the reduction of the forces on
the Indian settlements would encourage the enemy in their vicinity to
1
make fresh attempts against them. The general1s dissent greatly 
worried the Madras Council* as his judgement from his long experience 
and proven abilities was highly valued in those parts. This must have 
accounted for their rejection of most of Draper’s requests. In fact,
as the latter complained later, the gentlemen at Madras ’’took every
2
method in their power to discourage the attempt against Manila”.
The amount of force available at the Madras Presidency for the 
expedition greatly disappointed Draper; indeed it fell far short of his 
expectations. In the conferences at London, he had suggested 2,000
3
troops as an adequate contribution from the Company. In Madras he 
found difficulty in getting even half that number. Somewhat despairing* 
he then asked to be supplied with some fifty additional European 
soldiers, in return for which he would be willing to settle for only 
1,000 Sepoys. His request was denied on the ground that any further 
diminution of the European contingent on the settlement would endanger
4
the latter. In the end he got only about 600 Sepoys, half of whom
1 General Lawrence’s dissenting opinion was delivered before the
Madras Military Council on 10 July 1762 and reproduced in full 
in Madras Military Consultations, V. 48, f. 105-112. It is a 
detailed, perceptive exposition of the situation in India.
2 Letter to Whitehall, 2 Hov. 1762. WO lAl9.
3 At a Committee of Secrecy, 8 Jan. 1762. Memoranda of the Committee
of Correspondence. V. 20.
4 Madras Military Consultation, (1} July 1762), f. 128.
were "raw and new-raised".1 To these the Madras presidency added
2 3
thirty of artillery, a company of "Coffreys", another of "Topasses",
another of "pioneers", two companies of French and assorted deserters,
and "some hundreds of unarmed Lascars". Fortunately, "as compensation
for this feeble supply of men, those gentlemen favoured (Draper) with
some very good officers in every branch of the service". The King's
contribution to Draper’s army, on the other hand, consisted of the
seasoned 79th itegiment, a company of artillery, and "a fine battalion
4
of 55® seamen and 270 good marines".
The MadraB Council was more concerned with providing for the civil 
administration of the conquests which Draper was to turn over to the
Company. Their instructions to the gentlemen whom they appointed to
/
receive and take charge of them showed some insight into the Philippine 
situation. They also reflected the advanced English thinking of those 
times which was to make an impression on both Spaniards and Filipinos 
during the occupation. The natives should be won over by not interfering 
with the religion to which the Catholic priests had’thorough 1/ converted 
them. At the same time they should be relieved of the oppressions to 
which the Spanish government had long subjected them. Instead, they
1 Draper’s letter to Whitehall, 2 Nov. 1762. Loc. cit.
2 Also spelled Caffrees. These were slaves from Madagascar.
3 Also spelled Topa*es. They were Portuguese Christian half-castes.
4 "Draper’s Journal of the Manila Expedition", 2 Nov. 1762. CO 77/20.
5 Full text in Madras Military Consultations (^1 July 1762) V. 48,
f. 167-81.
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should he secured "in the enjoyment of the fruits of their labor", 
thereby encouraging them to industry. Trade, as a source of revenue 
and with its possibilities for expansion, should be "the object of the 
greatest attention". The Port of Manila, from its size and position, 
could become "the place of resort for trading vessels from all parts". 
Thus it should be flung open to all nations, collecting a moderate 
duty on all imports similar to that in Madras. These innovations 
unfortunately did not outlast the British occupation and were to be 
discontinued by the Spanish government until a much later date, despite 
the importunities of farsighted reformers.
Preparations for the expedition proceeded apace; mostly through 
the joint efforts of the King’s commanders, e.g., Draper who was to head 
the whole attacking force, and Cornish, Steevens’ successor, who was to 
command the squadron. The Madras Council who concerned themselves little 
with those preparations were preoccupied with other aspects of the 
expedition. They entered into an elaborate correspondence with Draper 
and Cornish,1 pressing the latter to fix the Company’s share in the booty 
at one-half of the total amount. They also wanted an assurance from them 
that the conquests would be delivered to the absolute authority of the 
Company’s agents» without military restraints. The Company, as we have 
seen, was assigned only one-third of the booty, and this was to apply 
only to booty taken on land; that taken at sea could not be shared with
1 Manuscript copies of the letters exchanged on this occasion are 
found in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 7-45, including that of "an agreement 
proposed to have been executed between the President and Council 
on the part of the Company and the Commanders-in-Chief on the 
expedition”. Also in Madras Military Consultations, V. 48.
90
the Company. As to the matter of authority in Manila, Draper and 
Cornish embarked without clearing it up with the Madras Council.
The speed and energy with which the expedition was prepared and 
dispatched was a tribute to all concerned, in particular, Draper and 
Cornish. From the beginning, the relations between the two was one of 
harmony and mutual cooperation, and remained so throughout the seige 
and up to the final assault on the Citadel of Manila*
The armada was fifteen sail in all, with about 5*000 w e n  o n board.
One division, under Commodore Tiddeman and Colonel Monson, left Madras 
on 29 July for Malacca, to complete with water there before the arrival 
of the rest. The second division, with jlear-Admiral Cornish and Brigadier-
1 Copy of a letter from Cornish to Governor Pigot, Admiralty House,
Madras, 28 July 1762. H.M.S., V. 77, f. 25.
2 There is not one single document amongst the English sources examined
which gives an over-all return of the forces despatched from Madras
on the expedition. Draper reported that the total number of men
embarked on the King’s ships and the Company’s transports was 2*500. 
This evidently does not include the "55^ seamen and 270 marines” 
whom he further stated were contributed by dear-Admiral Cornish to 
his "little army" for the attack. In the return rendered at Madras 
upon the embarkation of the troops, the figures come to less than 
2,000, 5OO short of that reported by Draper. This may be accounted 
for by the omission of the Lascars, who numbered "some hundreds" 
according to Draper. In Beatson’s enumeration of the royal ships 
employed and the men embarked on them, the figures add up to 4 ,550.
Of these, 2,550 are said to have made up the total strength for 
conducting the seige, exclusive of the Sepoy contingent which does 
not appear in the breakdown into that army’s component parts, and 
inclusive of the seamen and marines landed from the fleet, roughly 
estimated at 1,000. From both the Madras* and Draper’s returns, the 
Sepoys appear to have numbered around 600. It may be deduced from 
all those figures that the English employed a total of 4,000 men on 
the seige and assault. The Spanish governor gave his own inflated 
estimate of 6,850. If he included in this the crew and officers 
necessary to be retained on the ships to man them, say about 1,500, 
then he had exaggerated the total force sent out from Madras by
only 1,500.
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General Draper* sailed three days later* and in company with the other, 
stood out towards Pulo Tiraoan, the second rendezvous. Here they were 
joined hy the Seahorse* which had heen dispatched earlier hy Cornish 
to intercept any vessel passing through the entrance to the China Sea 
and hound for Manila. Success of the enterprise depended greatly on 
surprising the Spaniards, who were indeed caught off guard as completely 
in Manila as in Havana.
In the evening of 23 September* the whole fleet, except two store-
ships which had drifted away from the rest, entered Manila Bay and
2
anchored off Cavite port. The plan at the beginning was to attack 
Cavite first, but finding Manila, the major target, surprised and unprepared*
1 It should be noted that in the Spanish accounts of the invasion 
and occupation, the dates are one day behind those of the English, 
who had them in common with the Portuguese who reached the Orient 
by the eastward route from Europe. The Spaniards, however, did not 
rectify their Eastern calendar until 1845, when they finally 
adjusted it to the standard time.
2 For the seige and assault on Manila see Draper1 3 Journal of the 
Manila Expedition, 2 Nov. 1762. CO 77/20: Copy of a letter from
Admiral Cornish to Lord Anson giving an account of the taking of 
the Manila islands, 1 Hov. 1762. Brit. Mus. Add. 5*5,898; Rojo’s 
Journal (English translation of the Spanish original published
in Helen Blair and James Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1903- 
1909, V. 49); Rojo’s Narrative, ibid.; A Journal of the 
Proceedings of the Forces before Manilha under the Command of 
Brigadier-General Draper, (no author), in the Orme Collection,
V. 52; Journal and Account of the Seige and Taking of Manilla by 
Captain Fletcher - from 25 Sept. to 6 Oct. 1762, to the Secret 
Committee for Affairs of the East India Company, ibid., V. 27;
A Narrative of the Transactions of the English Army before the 
City of Manilha from the Disembarkation of the Troops to the 
Capture of the Place, by Captain William Stevenson, in the 
printed copy of the Records of Fort St. George: Manilha Consult­
ations, 1762-64, 1940-46, V. 1, H. de la Costa, "The Seige and 
Capture of Manila by the British, September - October 1762" in 
Philippine Studies, V. 10, No. 4* Oct. 1962 (reproduces the corres­
pondence between the Spanish authorities and British commanders 
preserved in the original at the archives of the Jesuit Province 
of Aragon).
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the English commanders decided to make a direct attempt against the 
latter. On the following morning, a Spanish officer went on hoard the 
Admiral’s ship to ask what the English had come for. He returned 
ashore with two English officers who bore their commander’s summons 
for the surrender of Manila and its fortifications^ On that same day, 
Draper and Cornish reconnoitered the bay and observed some stone churches 
and other buildings near the fort, on the south side of the walled city. 
This they decided was a good place to take up their first position.
At dusk, the first landing was effected under cover of three 
frigates, whose continuous cannonade dispersed the opposition forming on 
the shore. About a quarter of a mile up the coast the English took up 
their positions in the village of Malate, which was separated from the 
southern walls of Manila by a distance of only a mile. Here the stone 
churches served them well, first against the rains which poured just 
after the first landing, secondly as cover while they raised and formed 
their batteries, and finally as a vantage point whence they made the 
breach on the city walls.
On the 26th, the Spaniards sent out their first sortie, but this 
was beaten back. By the 29th, the battery for breaching the southwest 
bastion opened fire. It was seconded by two ships of the line. The 
Spaniards fired back but without effect, the enemy being well protected 
behind the thick walls of the churches which served them as posts. On 
the third day of October, the Spanish pieces on the left face of the 
bastion were silenced. On the following day they made their last 
desperate sally, seized the English outpost nearest the wall, and were
1 See map of Manila following this page, photocopied from the "Plan of 
Manila ... taken by storm the 6th October ..." preserved at the 
British Museum.
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pushed back only after both sides had suffered heavy casualties. On 
the 6th, the breach was mounted, "the few Spaniards upon the bastion 
dispersing so suddenly that it was thought they depended upon their 
mines”• Archbishop Hojo, who was then the acting Governor and Captain- 
General of the Philippines, "waved the white flag and retired to the 
citadel". An English officer was sent in to demand the immediate 
surrender of all the Spaniards. Ho jo then came out bearing the Spanish 
proposals for capitulation.* He was conducted to the Hoyal Palace to 
confer with Draper who had already taken up quarters there. The two 
gentlemen had some difficulty in understanding each other at first. 
English and French not sufficing, Latin also was used, "in which the 
Archbishop talked and which Draper understood, each pronouncing it in 
accordance with his native language". Believing that Draper had agreed 
to the conditions proposed by the Spanish Council of War, Hojo then 
issued an order for the surrender of the citadel Fort Santiago.
The English losses in terms of human life were slight, considering
the magnitude of the enterprise. The capture cost them killed and 
2
111 wounded. On the Spanish side, the casualties were greater, with
1 "Proposals made to their Excellencies His Britannick Majesty*s 
Commanders in Chief by Sea and Land, by His Excellency the Arch­
bishop Captain-General of the Philippine Islands, the Hoyal 
Audience, the City and Commerce of Manila". Enclosed with the 
proposals of the British commanders made on 7 Oct. 1762. Signed 
Manuel Antonio, Arzobispo de Manila, Don Manuel Galban y Ventura, 
Don Francisco Carabeo, Don Francisco Henriquez de Villacorta, Don 
Francisco Leandro de Viana, Don Manuel Luis Lopez, El Marques de 
Monte-Cristo (Montecastro). H.M.S., V. 77, f. 6^-5» other copies 
in ibid.. V. 76, f. 29-)l, and enclosed in Cornish’s memorial to 
the Earl of Halifax, Parliament St., 3 Sept. 1764, ibid., V. 97, 
f. 269-72.
2 Draper’s Journal, loc. cit.
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the Filipino inhabitants receiving the brunt of the attack. Their 
accounts showed 85 Spaniards and 500 natives killed and more than 400 
wounded.*
Each side maximized the losses of the other, as well as the 
strength of the force pitted against it. At the time of the invasion, 
the Spanish garrison in the fortified city of Manila numbered about 800, 
and this small body, according to Hojo, had to contend with a force which 
was 685O strong. Two days after the storming of MAnila, he further 
claimed, the English counted 1,000 men and 16 officers less on their side.
On the other hand, Draper alleged that the Spanish garrison was
augmented by a body of 10,000 Indians from the province of Parapanga,
while another English source reported that in the assault alone ’’near
800 ofthe garrison drowned in attempting to make their escape over the 
2
river”. The English invasion would appear more spectacular if the 
Spaniards had even half of the alleged number of natives fighting at their 
side, disciplined and loyal. At the height of the influence of Anda, the
Spanish loyalist who organized the resistance against the English
5
occupation, it is said that he had about 5*800 natives in his pay, but 
that he could not attempt an offensive to drive the English out of Manila 
because he did not trust in them and had hardly enough Europeans and
1 Hojo*a Journal, loc. clt.
2 A Journal of the Proceedings of the Forces before Manila, etc., 
loc>, cit.
5 Figure from ”Historia del sitio de Manila, por el P. Agustin de 
Santa Maria: Manuscrito del Archivo de San Agustin, de dicha
capital.” Quoted by Jose Montero y Vidal, on. cit., V. 2, f. 2, p.69.
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troops to keep order in the provinces.*
In the afternoon following the assault, Draper and Cornish sent
the Archbishop the conditions under which "the city of Manila would he
spared from plunder, and the inhabitants preserved in their religion,
goods, liberties and properties under the protection of the government
2
of His Britannick Majesty.1. Among them were the surrender of Cavite 
and other forts subject to Manila, and the payment of 4,000,000 
Spanish dollars.
The English commanders also returned the Spanish proposals for 
surrender with their modifications. Of the proposals, the most 
interesting is that by which the political and civil authority should 
remain in the hands of the Spanish Royal Audiencia, "that by their means 
a stop may be put to all disorders and the insolent and guilty be 
chastised." This was accepted by the English, "subject," however, "to 
the superior controul of their government.V
In actual fact, Draper dealt with the Archbishop alone and 
encouraged him to exercise his executive powers as under the Spanish laws.
1 Almodovar, on. cit., V. 5* P«
2 "Done in the City of Manila the 6th day of October 1762 (signed)
Samuel Cornish and William Draper". Copy of the document received 
(at London) per Essex, 11 Oct. 176^ by the hands of Major Barker, 
in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 55? another copy, ibid., V. 76, f.
another copy enclosed in Cornish’s memorial, ibid.
3 "Proposals of their Excellencies His Britannick Majesty’s Commanders
in Chief which are agreed to by the most illustrious Governour of
these Islands as likewise the Royal Audience, the City and Commerce,
with the Clergy both Secular and Regular. Done at Headquarters in
the City of Manila this 7th day of October 1762". Ibid., V. 77,
f. 59-60. Other copies in ibid., V. 76, f. 28 and in Cornish’s
Memorial, ibid.
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Ho jo* on the other hand* showed himself to he so ready and willing to 
comply with the Englishman’s demands that he was suspected of collabor­
ating with him in order that he might retain the title of governor and 
captain-general of the islands.
Hojo’s guilt lay rather in his lack of discretion and will power.
His connection with Cesar Faillet, a French resident in Manila who was
accused hy the Spanish officials as a collaborator to the English, was
particularly damaging. This man figured in the transactions involving
the cession of the entire Spanish Philippines to the English.*^ Under
2
his influence, Ho jo agreed to make the turn-over. But the Hoyal 
Audiencia persistently refused to affix their signatures to the document, 
until "compelled and urged" to do so under "many threats of penalty to
4
their lives and confiscation of their property."
1 In the words of Drake, Faillet was recommended to him by Draper 
"for having procured from the Spaniards the cession of the Islands." 
Letter to the Earl of Egremont, Manila, 1 Feb. 1764, H.M.S., V. 97, 
f. 2^1.
2 "Orders for the cession of the Philippines to England, 50 Oct. 1762.
CO 77/20. Another copy in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 67. Spanish text is 
published in Montero y Vidal, op> cit., II, 45-6.
3 Draper, impatient of the delay in obtaining the assent of the Hoyal
Audiencia to the oession, wrote a somewhat menacing letter to Hojo,
reminding him how "by the cession of a few places, the archbishop
has avoided much ruin, for the English arms would easily have 
reduced them.V He then warned that "those who persuade the arch­
bishop through a false sense of honor not to cede the islands will 
be responsible for the consequences". The letter was dated 28 Oct. 
1762. Copy in English published in Blair and Hobertson, op. cit.,
V. 49, f. 148, p. 2)7. Spanish version in Montero y Vidal, 44-5.
4 Testimony by Hamon Orendain, "Secretario de Camara de la Heal 
Audiencia, Corte y Heal, Chancilleria de las Islas y del Heal Acuerdo," 
cited in Montero y Vidal, f. 1, p. 46-7.
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Hojo also wrote letters and manifestoes enjoining prelates*
provincial governors, Spanish and Filipino inhabitants1 to submit to
the British authority while the occupation lasted. He sent orders for
the recall of the money, which had been out of the fort into safety
2
during the seige, in order to deliver it to the English. On the day 
of the capitulation, he wrote to the commander of the incoming galleon 
from Acapulco, ordering him to bring the treasure to the city, also for 
delivery to the English on account of the four millions agreed upon as 
"ransom" of Manila.
Ho jo further showed , great zeal in making up these millions to
the English. In his own words he had to give up even "the wrought plate
4
which served to adorn the churches". Further, when the English chided 
him for his failure to secure the Filipino galleon for them, he drew 
bills on the royal treasury at Madrid to the amount of the second half
1 Anda to Carlos III* 23 1764, in Blair and Hobertson, p. 275-6.
Tide. "Manifiesto del Arzobispo a los Naturales de Filipinas, Santa
Cruz, 28 Oct. 1762," published in ibid., Appendix 8. It states in 
part that "the British generals are enemies but generous...and desire 
no less than your quiet and peaceful conservation under their 
dominion..."
2 Ho jo in fact objected to the taking (£ the money outside the city,
and insisted that it was safer "where there was security of their
lives". From his "Narrative" in Blair and Hobertson, op. cit., p.209-10.
3 "Copy of the order sent by the commissaries for the delivery of the
treasure of the ship Phillippina, Sta. Cruz, 9 Nov. 1762", signed by 
Hojo and "a considerable part of the proprietors of the treasure on 
board". H.M.S., V. 76, f. 89-90.
4 Ho jo deposed further that he "voluntarily delivered all his valuables 
and vases without reserving his pectoral or anything else in order to 
aid so far as he was concerned in the ransom of the city". From his 
"Narrative"• loc. cit., p. 245*
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of the ransom, which it had been agreed would he paid from the treasure
of the galleon.* To top all this, he wrote a letter to Anda on
10 October, 1762 ordering him to observe the terras of capitulation
2
entered into with the English. This was the man he had commissioned, 
when the fall of Manila seemed imminent, to go out into the provinces 
to maintain the Spanish authority. The letter sparked off a long-drawn, 
virulent controversy between the two men.
The point at issue was whether Hojo was still entitled to the 
prerogatives of governor, or whether such rights did not devolve upon 
Anda after the fall of Manila.
Simon de Anda y Salazar was a junior "oidor" in the Hoyal Audiencia
at the time of the English invasion. On 2 October, 1762, he received a
commission from Hojo as "teniente de gobernador y capitan-general" of
the Philippine Islands, and another from the Hoyal Audiencia and the
Hoyal Chancery as "juez visitador-general de la tierra de todas les 
4
provincias". It was customary under the Spanish rule to give those
1 Hojo stated that he drew those bills in order to placate Cornish, 
who despairing of catching the Filipino, proposed a new sack of 
Manila and the suburbs. Ibid., p. 249-50.
2 "Carta del Arzobispo a Anda mandandole observer los tratados que 
estaba haciendo con los ingleses"* published in Montero y Vidal,
o p. cit., II, Appendix IV and in Malo de Luque, op. cit., V, p.288-9.
3 The resulting exchange of bitter and captious letters is abstracted 
in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., p. I32 et sea., under the heading 
"Anda and the English Invasion, 1762 - 4".
4 "Testimonio dandose a concocer Anda por Gobernador y Capitan 
General de Filipinas, Bulacan, 5 Oct. 1762", published in Montero y 
Vidal, Appendix 3*
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titles to men sent out to the provinces to maintain the King’s authority, 
especially in times of emergency.
On 5 October, Anda left beseiged Manila for Bulacan, a prosperous 
Tagalog province to the north of the city. Thence he transferred to 
Bacolor, capital of the province of Pampanga, further west from Bulacan. 
Here he set up his headquarters, whence he governed* organizing and 
equipping military units, appointing provincial governors and inferior 
officials, coining money, manufacturing arms, punishing crimes and 
suppressing rebellions, issuing laws affecting the natives, Chinese, and 
trade, regulating finances, and dispatching forces to attack the English.1
Anda in effect assumed the powers, and as a matter of fact, claimed 
the title, of Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines following 
the surrender of Manila and the taking of Ho jo as "prisoner" by the 
English. Anda*s claim was based upon certain outdated Spanish Laws of 
the Indies, the gist of which was that in case of vacancy in the governor­
ship, its powers devolved upon the Hoyal Audiencia. The duties and powers
of the latter in turn could be discharged by one single oidor, should
2
only he remain out of all the members. In Anda’s case, he was the only 
oidor who did not surrender to the English, the three others, Francisco 
Henriquez de Villaconta, Manuel Galban y Ventura, and Francisco Leandro 
de Viana having submitted to the terms of the capitulation, like Ho jo.
In truth the law in force was that decreed in 1761 providing for
1 Vide« "Synopsis of letter from Anda to Carlos III"* 22 June 1764, 
in Blair and Hobertson.
2 Vide, "Letter from Anda to Carlos III", 2} July 1765* Ijbid.
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the succession of the archbishop of Manila to a vacant gubernatorial 
chair, and in case of his death, absence, or incapacity, for the next 
highest prelate to succeed to the office. When Hojo fell ill, Bishop 
Ustariz of the northern provinces was in fact suggested for the office 
by a faction in Anda’s own camp#*
£
The curious fact is that Ho jo insisted on his retention of the
highest executive title in the islands under Spanish rule even while
the English were already in power and their own governor reigned at
Manila. The truth was that the English encouraged him in his claim and
that he was too naive to realize that he was being used against his own 
2
people. He must have been flattered to be consulted by the English on
3
the appointment of parish clergy and even of provincial governors.
Curiously too, the English did not seem to be aware, until very
1 Mas* on. cit., I, 188-91.
2 The English, for example, circulated the report that Ho jo had 
declared Anda a rebel to the Spanish King. The prelate emphatically 
denied this and begged them to destroy their letter implying that he 
had made such a declaration, in order "to obviate some calumnies of 
the Spaniards, particularly of the Fiscal Don Francisco de Viana", 
apparently being hurled at him.
3 When the governor of Laguna province was murdered by the natives,
Hojo was asked to choose his successor afterwards to be Confirmed
by the English. In explanation of this procedure, the Manila Council 
wrote: "How vain our appointment of itself would be where we had
not the force to support it. Indeed on all such occasions for some­
time to come we must follow this plan, and we ought either to 
confirm the present governor at Mindanao or appoint a new one from 
hence,... sending a ship to perform the ceremony of hoisting the 
colours until we have force to support." Manila General Letter to 
Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762. Head in Madras Military 
Consultations, (22 Feb. 1763)* V. 49, f. 82.
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late# of Anda’s position* which hy virtue of the commission granted to 
him hy Ho jo and the Hoyal Audiencia was tenahle even against the most 
legalistic interpretation of the law.^ He was designated "lieutenant 
to the governor and captain-general" and "judge visitor-general of the 
provinces". As such his powers were an extension of those of the Governor 
and Captain-General in restive or unsettled areas of the islands. Under 
the circumstances* the claims of a captive governor were vitiated hy the 
effective authority of a military dictator.
Later, Ho jo realized the absurdity of his position, when asked to
issue orders to the governors of Zamboanga and Iloilo for the delivery
of those places to the English, he refused on the ground that those
Spanish officials were Anda’s appointees, his own having heen replaced
£
hy them and were therefore not hound to obey him. In fairness to him 
we can say that he tried to reach a working agreement with the English 
in order to ease the occupation for both Spaniards and Filipinos. He 
also tried to get the cooperation, if not the acquiescence, of his 
colleagues in the transactions with the English, hut they refused to
1 On 14 Dec. 1763# the British Governor and Council at Manila 
requested Hojo for "a copy... of the consultation held hy the
Hoyal Audience and hy some other of the royal officers on 1st
October... to send Anda as Lieutenant-General to maintain the 
Government of the Province". Even after their receipt of Hojo’s 
reply affirming Anda’s commission, the English Board refused to 
deal with the latter, insisting that he was a rebel and that Hojo
was the proper person to negotiate with for a cessation of
hostilities. Man. Cons., ¥. 5 6, passim.
2 Letters from Archbishop Hojo to the English Board, 11 April and 
17 April 176^. Ibid., V. 6, p. 76-81.
avoid "being answerable to the Spanish King afterwards. Furthermore, 
his conciliatory attitude enabled him to use his influence with the 
English to get some of his countrymen and friends out of very 
precarious situations.*
The aged priest broke down under the reproaches and calumnies of 
his countrymen, who left him in such desolation that when he died it was 
the English who took charge of his funeral. During the occupation he 
wrote two journals* justifying his conduct, the gist of which was that 
he had acted under duress and also in the interest of peace and order. 
Later Spanish writers described him as "more imbecile than disloyal", 
absolutely ignorant of the prerogatives attached to his position as 
governor of the King and displaying such weakness of character in the 
face of the enemy.
On 11 November, Draper left Manila for England, xlemaining behind 
was Cornish, with the King’s Squadron, apparently waiting to get hold 
of one of the richest treasures afloat, the incoming galleon from 
Acapulco, carrying the yearly load of plate valued as high as 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
dollars.
On the second day of the invasion, a galley was seen entering 
2
Manila Bay. Cornish immediately detached some vessels to seize it.
1 He interceded for the oidores that they might hot be deputed by 
the English to deliver the order for the surrender of the Filipino 
cargo. He possibly saved Villacorta’s life when he was discovered 
by the English communicating with .anda. A Spanish priest, one 
Padre Esteban, Santiago Orendain, and Cesar Faillet, among others, 
were spared by the English through Hojo’s intercession. Ibid., passim.
2 Letter from Cornish to Mr. Clevland of the Admiralty Office at 
London, dated Manila Bay, Oct. 1762. Published in Blair and
Hobertson, p. 44-59.
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The ship was hoarded and found to hear a message from the commander of 
Filipino galleon, recently arrived from Acapulco. She was lying at 
Palapag, on the north-eastern point of Samar at the mouth of San 
Bernardino Strait, which led from the Pacific to the Philippine waters. 
Cornish detached the Panther, a ship of the line, and the Argo, a 
frigate, to go after the ship. The English stumbled upon and captured 
the outgoing galleon instead, the Santissima Trinidad, duhhed the 
"Powerful”.* She was on her way to Acapulco with her cargo of Asian 
goods to he exchanged for Mexican gold and silver. On this trip, the 
galleon1s load was registered at 1,000,000 dollars with a market value 
of three times that amount.
The Santissima Trinidad was declared a prize and therefore not 
admitted into the capitulation. The Spanish inhabitants of Manila, most 
of whom had consignments on the galleon, objected to the seizure on the
ground that the cargo was private property and that Draper and Cornish
2
had agreed to secure the inhabitants in their "goods and fortunes".
1 The galleon left Manila port in August, 1762. About 500 leagues 
from the Embocadero, a tempest broke and dismasted her, driving her 
back to the Philippine waters. The English fell in with her among 
the Naranja group of islands near the San Bernardino Strait, south 
of Sorsogon and west of Capul. She was taken after an action of two 
hours on JO Oct. 1762, and later, reported to be "one of the largest 
ships ever seen in Britain". For accounts of "the engagement between 
the ships, see letter from Cornish to Clevland, Bay of Manila, 10 Nov. 
1762, in Blair and Hobertson, p. 57-8; idem to Fort St. George, Cavite, 
26 Dec. 1762 in Madras Military Cons., V. 49, f. 87-8
2 Three representations were made to the English by the Spaniards on 
the illegality of the seizure of the Trinidad: one by Don Pedro 
Calderon Henriquez of the Philippine Hoyal Audiencia, a second one 
by the same man, and another by Don Francisco Vicente Meylan and Don 
Juan Francisco Solano "on the part of the commerce".
Copies in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 79-85, 87-91, 95-6.
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When the question was debated in Europe, the Spanish Court justified 
their non-payment of the hills drawn hy Hojo on the Royal Treasury hy 
the illegal seizure of the ship, the value of which, together with the
cargo, was claimed to he in excess of the "Manila ransom". Draper and
2
Cornish argued, however, that the galleon was a legitimate prize. She 
was taken ahove 200 miles from the port of Manila, and the Englishmen 
who took her were not aware of the surrender of that city. Besides, she 
was not included in the capitulation* having sailed one month before the 
arrival of the invaders. The Trinidad and her cargo were sold at public 
auction and the proceeds distributed among the captors.
Immediately upon hearing of the capture of the Trinidad, Cornish 
prepared the Argo and Seaford frigates to search for the Filipino, which 
was reported to he at Palapag. Dawsonne Drake and Council, the Company’s 
agents appointed to take charge of the conquest, suggested, as "the only
1 "The Earl of Halifax to Brig. Gen. Draper: transmits a copy of a 
memorial and its enclosures delivered hy the Spanish Ambassador in 
March 1764 reclaiming the galleon The Most Holy Trinity as unjustly 
taken at Manila in Oct. 1762 and contrary to the laws of war" in 
the Calendar of Home Office Papers, 1760-5, (1^91). See also 
"Abstract of letters which passed relative to the ship Santissima 
Trinidad and the ranwom of Manila from 20 Aug. 1765 to 20 July 1766.” 
Ibid.. 1766-9, (217).
2 The English side of the question was argued in "A Plain Narrative 
of the Reduction of Manila and the Philippines Islands", possibly 
the work of Draper alone but enclosed in Cornish’s letter to the 
Earl of Halifax, Parliament St., 5 Sept. 1764, H.M.S., V. 97,
f. 269-72. The question was pursued further in Colonel Draper’s 
Anewer to the Spanish Arguments, etc., printed in London, 1764, 
which includes various related documents, in particular, the 
"Spanish arguments claiming the galleon and refusing payment of 
the ransom bills for preserving Manila from pillage and destruction".
means of making sure of the treasure”, the sending of some Spanish
officials on the ships with orders from their Governor and Ministers
to the commander of the galleon to deliver her cargo to the English
captains. Cornish then asked that the Fiscal, two oidores, and two
gentlemen of commerce he deputed for the purpose. The Archbishop
however requested that the Fiscal and the oidores he excused, such
commission heing "below their dignity".* Two "regidores", or city
councillors, were chosen in their place who were joined hy two gentlemen
of commerce and with them sailed on the English ship on 21 November,
2
1762.
For three months the Argo and the Seaford scoured the seas in their 
quest of the Filipino. The Northeast monsoon had set in before they 
could reach San Bernardino Strait, at the far end of which was Palapag.
For ten weeks they tried to get through this passage. After running 
great risks of losing their ships and with their provisions nearly 
exhausted, the English captains decided to give up the search and returned 
to Manila about the middle of February. '
Unflagging, Cornish, who had to return to Madras with the Squadron,
1 Copies of the letters exchanged on the subject, with dates from
NOV. 7. to 18, 1762, in H.M.S., V. 76, f. 59-85.
2 Letter to Cornish from the Manila Board advising of the choice of
Spanish deputies and enclosing the order to the General of the
Filipino galleon for the delivery of her treasure. At a Manila 
consultation, 19 Nov. 1762. ibid., f. 86-7.
5 General letter from Manila to the Government of Fort St. George,
2 March 1765. Madras Mil. Cons., V. 49; Beatson, op. cit., V. 2,
p. 512.
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left orders with Captain Brereton of the Falmouth man-of-war to renew 
the search. On 27 March, 1765* the English ship sailed, accompanied hy 
a hrig and a sloop. They reached Falapag and found the Filipino there, 
hut with her holds empty. Her cargo was reported to have heen unloaded 
at Albay in the southeastern part of Luzon, thence to he conveyed to 
Anda in Pampanga hy land. After burning her and destroying the guns at 
Palapag, evidently landed from her, Brereton returned to Manila on the 
28th of April.1
The saving of the Filipino treasure, worth more than 2,000,000 
dollars, from the clutches of the enemy was a stroke of good fortune for 
the Spaniards. It cast a ray of hope in the dark hours of their empire. 
Hot since the Butch, more than a century hack, challenged their claims 
to a monopoly of the spice trade and tried hut failed to oust them from 
the area altogether, had they seen an organized European attempt against 
this Oriental outpost of their empire. In fact no foreign power had ever 
forced their citadel and dislodged them. Enemies they surely had around 
them. The Mohammedans in the south were especially formidable and 
frequently made descents on nearby provinces. But they were quickly 
repelled hy Spanish firearms and gunboats* just as were unruly natives 
and defiant Chinese outside the walls of Manila.
Twelve days from their appearance in the Bay of Manila, the 
British had taken the city hy storm. This was in itself a fine military 
performance. The want of resistance on the other side, however, detracts
1 Man. Con3., V. 5* P* 95-4•
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from it somewhat. The Spaniards were incredibly unprepared for the
attack. They were not completely taken by surprise* but only the shock
of an actual attack could awaken them from their lethargy.* Such was
the complaisance which years of peace had lulled them into that the
fortifications of the capital itself were allowed to slip into disrepair.
The defenses were fit to withstand an "Indian” but not a European enemy.
among the weak points seized upon by Draper to facilitate his assault on
the city were an unarmed ravelin, a very low glacis, and a seedy covered
way. Furthermore, the ditch did not extend round the southwest bastion
2
which the English quickly chose for the breach.
The accounts of several Englishmen who served on the expedition 
disclose the enemy’s lack of some basic knowledge in the art of defense.
i
3
There was no effective opposition on the shore to meet the first landing.
1 At the arrival of the English invaders, no official notice of the 
outbreak of war between the two nations had reached the Spaniards 
yet in Manila. The Filipino galleon from Acapulco was to have 
brought such news to the islands. However, when she arrived, the 
invasion had already commenced. But the Spaniards had had previous 
warnings of the forthcoming attack. Ten days before the arrival of 
the English squadron, for instance, a ship entered Manila Bay, 
refusing guards on board and inquiring of the state of the Spanish 
navy there and whether the Acapulco galleon had already arrived.
The effect which this produced on the Spaniards in the city was a 
fear for the galleon; thus they only sent advices to the provinces, 
where the ship was likely to appear, for them to warn the latter to 
be on guard. Malo de Luque, op. cit., I, p. 237-8; Mas',- o&; .cit.,I, 
p. 125; Rojo's Narrative, loc. cit., p. 208-9*
2 Draper’s Journal, loc. cit.
3 If the English had met with a stiff opposition to their landing on 
the seaside south of the city, they would have had to resort to the 
risky alternative of attempting a second landing from the north, 
across the broad and deep Pasig river. This operation ’’must at 
least be so dear a purchase that the surviving few would be too
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Thus the English acquired a beachhead which cost them nothing. The rest 
of the attacking force was landed with ease, the first post taken, then 
another hy the following day which brought them within 300 yards of the 
Fort. The Spaniards should have had the sense to place "a field-piece 
or two on the beach to the right and left of the landing party, with 
musquetry in front, behind the hedges and trees”. By this "simple means” 
they could have emasculated the 79th Hegiment, the spearhead of the 
invasion.
When the invasion commenced, the Spaniards made no attempt to 
prevent the English from taking possession of the stone churches which
1
were to serve the latter as ”so many castles” just outside the city walls. 
Here the English found shelter from the torrential downpour of the 
typhoon season. They were protected by the thick walls from the firing 
from the Spanish fort, while they prepared the battery and deployed their
inconsiderable to guard that place against being surprized and 
retaken”. Captain Fletcher’s Journal, loc. cit., f. 83.
The greater risk involved in a north landing was confirmed by 
Draper who reported that during the seige it was not possible 
to take possession of Binondo, Tondo, and Santa Cruz, the posts 
which commanded the river and communication with the country.
From his "Journal”, loc. cit.
1 The previous Spanish governor-general of the Philippines, Arandia, 
had proposed the demolition of these churches which prejudiced 
the defense of the city, but he met with violent opposition from 
the clergy and died without accomplishing any of his reforms.
Anda* realizing the great advantage which similar churches would 
give the enemy if taken by the latter, ordered the burning of any 
which was in imminent danger of falling into their hands. Order 
dated Apalit, 27 Jan. 1763* published in Malo de Ltugue,
On 17 May 1763* the English finding themselves being more and more 
confined within Manila, ordered the destruction of the Ermita and 
Malate churches which had aided them greatly during the assault. 
Man. Cons.* V. 5* P* 120*
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forces to make the break-through. They were also provided with a vantage 
point whence they could view the works of the city and design the plan 
of assault.
The Spaniards did not even possess a good look-out; thus the 
English had mounted the breach "before they were well-alarmed".* The 
natives who fought under them were an undisciplined lot* and owed them 
the loyalty of mercenaries. Yet when led properly they proved to be 
formidable fighters. During the invasion their descent in large numbers 
caused great terror and consternation in the English camp. As Draper 
observed* "Had their skill or weapons been equal to their strength and 
ferocity, it might have cost us dear. Although armed chiefly with bows 
and arrows and lances, they advanced up to the very muzzles of our pieces, 
repeated their assaults, and died like wild beasts, gnawing the bayonets". 
The Spaniards, however, lacked officers to train and lead them.
To make matters worse, the Spanish government in the islands was 
led by a man who had had no military training and was lacking in those 
qualities requisite to the position and the emergency. His Mexican birth 
added to this handicap and accounted for the little respect and 
cooperation from the other Spanish officials who were "peninsulares" or 
natives of Spain.
The English, nevertheless, did not have an easy time. The elements 
were against them. At the time of the landing, a large surf arose and
1 Capt. Stevenson’s Narrative, loc. cit.
2 Draper’s Journal, loc. cit.
102
smashed some "boats. The troops waded ashore in water that reached the 
chest, ’’carrying their rmiskets and cartouch "boxes on their heads.” The 
rains poured on them, holding up the transportation of stores and 
ammunition from the ships and obstructing communication "between posts.
Draper’s ’’little army" was overworked, shifting from one kind of
service to another. When they were not landing and "bringing up stores
or making trenches, they were working at the "batteries or keeping guard.
In fact, Draper hastened to launch the assault because his troops "had
1
begun to complain of fatigue”•
The two storeships, which had lost touch with the Squadron in the 
passage from Madras, did not arrive until many days after the landing, 
thus holding up the work on the trenches. Cornish was obliged, under 
the circumstances, to employ all the forges on the ships and all the
smiths and carpenters belonging to the fleet in the making of spades,
2
pickaxes, and other tools for the army.
Draper’s tenacity and good judgment, the skill of the officers under 
him, and the firm cooperation of Cornish combined to give the enterprise 
a swift and rather smooth victory. But this undertaking which began so 
auspiciously for the British and ill for the Spaniards wound up in the 
reverse for either side, anda was able to rally Spaniards and Filipinos 
alike to a resistance which proved very irksome to the English. The 
latter fell to bickering and intriguing among themselves, a fact which
1 Ibid.
2 Letter to Clevland, Oct. 1762, loc. cit.
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reinforced many in their opinion that the outcome of the entire project 
for the nation was a barren one.1 To the ledger-minded Company, "the 
comparison of the risks and expense with the prospects of advantage
p
shows that it ought never to have been undertaken".
1 Vide, Indian Records Series: Vestiges of Old Madras 1640 - 1800,
II, 587* By Henry D. Love.
2 Separate despatch from the Company to George Pigot, 3° Dec. 1763* 
Dodwell, Calendar of Madras Despatches, II, 388*
CHAPTER IV
The Rule of the Bast India Company 
in Occupied Philippines
PART I
According to his instructions from the Court of St. James,
General Draper should give up Manila, after its conquest, to an
1
accredited representative of the East India Company. On the day 
"before the formal turnover, Dawsonne Drake, the man appointed hy the 
Madras Presidency to head the Company’s government in the new acquis­
ition, asked to he assured that this would he delivered to him without
2
military restraints on his civil administration. Draper was to appoint
the commandant of the troops who were to he left in Manila "to enable
*
the Company to keep and defend the place‘J. he was also to choose three 
other officers to comprise a military council "to assist Drake in all 
matters relating to the defense of the said place and other military 
operations".
The Government at Madras had expressed a misgiving that Draper 
might leave military instructions to the commandant tending to limit the
4
authority of the Company over the new conquest. Drake and the Council
1 Secret Instructions to Brigadier General William Draper, Court 
of St. James, 21 Jan. 1762 (draft) CO 77/20.
2 At a consultation, dated 1 Nov. 1762, signed Dawsonne Drake, John 
Lewin Smith and Henry Brooke, Home Miscellaneous Series, (hereafter 
to he abbreviated as H.M.S.), V. 76, f. 7.
2 General Orders of 2 Nov. 1762, given by Brigadier General Draper,
ibid., f. 10-12.
4 Further instructions to the Deputy Governor and Council for Manila, 
Madras Military Consultations, (^1 Ju.ly 1762), V. 48, f. 190.
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appointed to assist him were thus instructed not to accept the charge
of any conquests unless they could govern them with the same powers as
the Company held their other possessions. Draper, however, assured Drake
that he ’’need entertain no suspicion of military control," and that Manila
would he delivered over "upon the same footing with the honorable
1
Company’s possessions in India.”
On 2 November 1762, Drake, attended by his Council, was conducted
by Draper to the Hoyal Palace of Manila. ”In the presence of the officers
of the garrison, His Excellency the Archbishop, the late Governor, with
2
his Hoyal Audience, and the principal inhabitants of the city,” Drake 
was proclaimed Governor of Manila and all its dependencies.
It should be noted that the Company’s Directors at London granted 
the Madras Presidency wide discretion in the issuing of directions for the 
management of Manila# They, however, stressed the sine gua non in the 
administration of the new possession, as it had been for all the Company’s 
settlements, e.g., attention to revenue and commerce, economy, and treat- 
ment of the inhabitants with ’’kindness and humanity” . This was in turn 
elaborated upon by the Madras Presidency in their general instructions to 
Drake and the Council. Although in principle Manila was to be subordinate 
to the Madras settlement, in actual fact it was to be managed by a Deputy 
Governor and Board exercising the/aufhority as if it were an independent 
settlement. There were no restrictive clauses in the Madras instructions,
1 Manila diary, 2 Nov. 1762, H.M.S., V. 76, f. 12.
2 Ibid.
5 Company’s letter to Fort St. George, 21 Jan. 1762, per Col. Draper 
on the Argo. Madras Be snatches, No. 2.
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and as we shall see later, the Company’s Government at Manila proceeded 
with the same discretionary authority as that of the presidencies in 
India. Drake in particular exercised this authority, often arrogating 
even that of the Council.
The first subject of consultation of Governor Drake and his
Council was the collection of the 4,000,000 Spanish dollars stipulated
in the capitulation, one-third of which was to he accounted as the
Company’s share. Two million dollars ought to have been paid immediately,
while the other half was ”to be paid in a time to be agreed upon and
1
hostages and security given for that purpose”. But the Spaniards had 
convinced Draper of their inability to meet the first half-payment, and 
the latter agreed to reduce it to 1,000,000. Of this, only 349,000 had
been paid, and Draper asked the Company’s agents to look into the matter.
2
It was agreed to detain the members of the Hoyal Audiencia, called
’’oidores," and some of the principal Spanish inhabitants of Manila as
3 4
hostages to secure the balance. Of these, Admiral Cornish suggested
the inclusion of the Marquis of Montecastro, a wealthy Spanish resident
1 ’’Conditions on which the city of Manilha shall be preserved from 
plunder and the inhabitants preserved in their religion, goods, 
liberties and properties under the protection and government of 
this Britanic Majesty,” H.M.S.. V. 77, f. 55; another manuscript 
copy in ibid.. V. 76, f. 31-2.
2 The Hoyal Audiencia was a kind of supreme court which served both 
as an administrative auxiliary to and a check on the governor- 
general of the islands.
3 Manila consultation, 3 Hov. H.M.S.. V. 76, f. 33*
4 Letter from Cornish to the President and Council at Manila, Cavite, 
4 Nov., ibid.. f. 39*
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1
whose property was valued at "above a million and a half,” and some of 
the Augustinians. The latter held most of the parishes in the Tagalog 
country, the backbone of Spanish power in the archipelago, and also in
2
Pampanga, one of the most fertile and populous provinces in the islands.
The oidores were taken into custody, but with the appointment of 
Spanish deputies to deliver the order to the commander of the Filipino 
to give up the galleon’s money, they were released. The Marquis of 
Montecastro had, however, escaped before they could take him. He was
declared a rebel to both Spanish and British Kings, and his entire
4
property was to be confiscated. The whole Augustine Order, "the chief
instruments in fomenting the troubles in the provinces of Bulacan and
Pampanga," indeed Anda1s main support, particularly during the first
5
months of the British occupation, was also proscribed.
These measures obviously did not have much effect, for by March
g
1763* the total contribution reached only about 600,000 dollars. Of
1 Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 25 Dec., Madras Military 
Consultations (22 Feb. 1763), V. 49, f. 81.
2 See Chapter 4 of John Leddy Phelan’s "The Hispanization of the 
Philippines, Madison, 1959. The map on p. 176 shows the distrib­
ution of the Jesuit, Augustinian, and Franciscan parishes in central 
Luzon. Of the Tagalog country, the Augustinians monopolized Bulacan 
and Batangas provinces and the villages to the south of Manila.
3 Manila consultation, 19 Nov. 1762. H.M.S.. Y. 76, f. 87.
4 Manifesto by Drake and Council given at the Royal Palace, Manila,
16 Nov. Ibid.« f. 82.
5 Ditto. Ibid.. f. 83.
6 Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 2 March 1763* Madras
Military Consultations (19 May 1763)* V. 49, f. 268.
Ditto to the Court of Directors, 2 March 1763* Abstracts of Fort 
St. George Letters Received, No. 1.
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this, 90,000 came from ”sundry naval, victualling and ordnance stores,
1
confiscated and secreted effects”.
The Spanish Archbishop - General, Manuel Hojo, complained that the
zeal with which the ”ransom” was exacted deprived him of his own personal
funds and jewels and the churches of their ornaments. He averred that
v/hat was agreed upon was only to deliver immediately everything that
2
could be found in the deposits of the pious foundations and to pay the
1 The Scots Magazine for 1764, p. 455“6* published the various 
collections received toward the $4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
2 The pious foundations, called obras pias, were institutions placed 
in charge of pious legacies, temporalities and other funds and 
property for religious as well as charitable purposes. These funds 
were laid out in maritime speculations in the following manner:
”one part appropriated to the China risks, at from 12 to 18 per cent 
premium* according to circumstances, and also those to Madras, 
Calcutta and Batavia, at from 16 to 22 per cent; the second which 
generally is in the largest proportion is employed in risks to 
Acapulco, at various premiums, from 27 to 45 per cent; and the third 
which is left in hand as a kind of guarantee to the stability of the 
original endowments”.
The accumulation of enormous premiums from those speculations not 
only sufficed ”to make up all the losses” but also ”to secure the 
punctual payment of such charitable pensions and other charges as 
are to be deducted from the respective profits of this species of 
stock”.
Almost to the end of the Spanish rule, the obras pias constituted 
the sole banks of the colony, the chief source of capital employed 
in external trade. Vide, Tomas de Comyn, Bstado de las Islas 
Filipinas en 1810 Brevemente Descrito (translated by William Walton) 
London, 1821, p. 77-8; Luis P. Alvarez y Tejero, Be las Islas 
Filipinas; Memoria, Valencia, 1842, p. 60-1; Hafael Biaz Arenas, 
Memorias Historicas .v Estadisticas de Filipinas, V. 2, I85O,
Cap. 15; Fray Jos^ Torrubia, Bisertacion historico-politica, etc., 
Madrid, 1736, p. 74-5.
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"balance toward the 4,000,000 dollars with money brought in by the 
Filipino galleon and bills drawn on the treasury of the Spanish King.
He claimed that the immediate payment of the first 2,000,000 was not 
1
provided for. There were indeed two agreements made on the same day,
2
6 October, one of which confirms Ho jo’s claim.
Nevertheless, in February 1765, Admiral Cornish, who was preparing
to leave for Madras and despairing that the 4,000,000 dollar "ransom"
would ever be paid in full from the elusive Filipino galleon, proposed
the second plundering of Manila. The Company’s Government rejected this
proposal as a violation of the capitulation. Cornish then threatened to
land his men to enforce his will, but seems to have balked when the
4
Manila garrison was put under arms. It was at this point that Archbishop
1 Letter from Archbishop Hojo to Drake and Council, Sta. Cruz,
16 Nov. 1762. H.M.S., V. ?6, f. 78-81.
2 "Proposals of their Excellencies His Britannic Majesty’s Commanders
in Chief which are agreed to by the Most Illustrious Governor of 
these islands as likewise the Hoyal Audience, the City and Commerce, 
with the Clergy, both secular and regular," Manila, 6 Oct. 1762.
H.M.S., 7. 77, f. 59-60.
5 Gov. Drake’s secret letter to Fort St. George, Manila, 25 Sept. 1765,
in Abstracts Fort St. George Letters Heceived, No. 1. Also Drake’s
letter to the Earl of Egremont, Manila, 1 Feb. 1764, in H.M.S., V. 97, 
f. 299-51. Hojo also wrote of Cornish’s proposal in his Narrative, 
published in Blair and Hobertson, The Philippine Islands, V. 49, 
p. 248-50. Several Spanish officers in duplicate letters to the 
British King and the East India Company, Manila, 24 Feb. 1765* com­
plained, among other things, that Cornish attempted to plunder the 
city "upon the apparent pretext that the capitulation had not been 
accomplished". H.M.S., V. 77, f. 159-77 (in Spanish). A copy in 
English is found in Miscellaneous Letters Heceived, 1765* V.45* f.590-400.
4 Hojo declared that when the Company’s Government resisted the Admiral’s 
suggestion for a sack of Manila, the latter then "set his gaze on the 
suburbs, especially on Santa Cruz where most of the Spaniards are."
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1
Hojo drew the hills on his King for 2,000,000. These were immediately
endorsed hy Cornish to the Bank of England, which was to negotiate their 
2
payment. At the end of the war, the Spanish King refused to acknowledge
the hills, along with those others, amounting to 45*000 dollars, drawn
hy Hojo for loans given to him hy the Company’s Council at Manila for
the support of the Spanish officers and soldiers taken prisoners. The
"Manila ransom” became a hone of contention between the Courts of Spain
4
and England and for some time occupied the public mind.
The disagreement over the proposed sack of Manila, which could have
He further claimed that the subsequent plunder of the church and 
convent of St. Augustine, along with that of the property of the 
Marquis of Montecastro and Don Andres Blanco, both of them escaped 
Spanish inhabitants of considerable means, swept away the effects 
of various private individuals. The account of the sack which 
Cornish furnished to the Archbishop was considered "improbable" 
and "ridiculous": $29,000 as against $800,000 which Hojo insisted
was the true amount. Narrative, loc. cit.
The Spanish officers, mentioned in the above note, enumerated the 
instances of the Admiral’s "inordinate manner of proceeding”. Ibid.
1 Manila letter to the Court of Directors, 2 March 1765.
Abstracts Fort St. George Letters Heceived, No. 1.
2 "Copy of letter from Admiral Cornish to the Governor and Cpurt of 
Directors of the Bank of England. Copied from a copy of the 
original in the hands of the Bank of England which copy was received 
from thence 5° Sept* 1765". The letter is dated Norfolk, off Cavite 
in the Bay of Manila, 2 March 1765* -Miscellaneous Letters Heceived, 
1765, V. 45, f. 50.
5 The originals of two bills and a notarial copy of a third, with 
the replies of the Company* s correspondent at Madrid, Estienne 
Drouilhet and Company, are found in H.M.S., V. 77 f. 127-52 , 268-79;
Misc. Letters Heed., 1765, V. 45, f. 46-46C, 280-281A, 515.
4 The Sixth Heport of the Hoyal Commission on Historical Manuscripts 
of Great Britain contains considerable material on the Manila ransom.
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led to an open clash between the King1 s squadron and the Company’s 
garrison in the city, shows the difficulty inherent in the relationship 
between the military and the civil, or between two authorities with 
differing loyalties and conflicting interests. The main concern of the 
King’s officer was to realize as much immediate gain as possible from 
the expedition, and the easiest, most effective way was through plunder. 
The Company’s representatives were under an obligation to maintain peace, 
as the condition most conducive to trade. Such disagreements had been 
heard of in the settlements in India, but in Manila they became almost 
general and nearly nullified every benefit derived from the expedition 
and the occupation of the city.
When Draper turned the conquest over to the Company’s agents,
Cornish was in Cavite and was not a witness to the formal transfer of 
1
authority. Cornish later expressed the opinion that "the conquest was
not sufficiently compleat to resign the power from the military to the 
2
civil". But when the Company’s Government undertook expeditions to the 
outlying provinces to pacify them and sought naval support, he grudgingly 
gave his assistance. He even threatened to leave the islands with the 
entire squadron, although he was convinced of the necessity of keeping 
one or two armed vessels for the security of the garrison in Manila and 
for maintaining a free communication with the Port of Gavite.
1 Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762. Read in
Madras Military Consultations (22 Feb. 1763), V. 49, f. 75.
2 Letter from Cornish to Fort St. George, Cavite, 26 Dec. 1762,
Ibi^., f. 88.
3 Cornish at length left behind the Falmouth of $ 0 guns, the Seaford
frigate, and all the galleys. Manila General Letter to the Court of
Directors, 2 March 1763. Madras Military Cons., (19 May 1763),
?. 49, f. 263.
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The military situation of the British in the islands was in fact 
a precarious one even from the "beginning. Draper had had to leave his 
entire Regiment and all other troops "brought on the expedition, all these 
just enough to garrison Manila and Cavite. After his departure the
Company’s government at Manila wrote to Fort St. George for a reinforce-
2.000
ment of/Sepoys, with which they hoped to have "a proper footing" in the 
country.1
The forces which Simon de Anda y Salazar had "been rallying around
him were getting increasingly formidable. He established his headquarters
first in Bulacan then in Pampanga, uniting with the Augustinians whose
rich fiefs were mainly in those provinces. The English ascribed the
"troubles” in the country to this combination. After the taking of
Manila, efforts were made, through Archbishop Rojo, to get Anda to return
to Manila and submit to the capitulation. When these failed, he was
declared a rebel to both Spanish and British Kings, "as well by his
Excellency the Archbishop and the Royal Audiencia as by the British
2
Governor and Council",
Anda*s proscription became the subject of prolonged quibbling not 
only between English and Spaniards but also among the Spaniards on the 
one hand and the English on the other. It touched upon the larger issue 
involving Anda’s claim to the title and office of Governor and Captain- 
General of the Philippine islands under his authority, and to which we
1 Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762, ibid., f.77
2 Full text of the manifesto in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 75*
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have already referred in some detail.
First in March, 1765* and again in the following August, the English 
tried to negotiate a truce with Anda.^ Both negotiations Broke down 
"because Anda insisted on Being addressed By his assumed title which the 
English consistently refused. Drake1s position on the matter was that 
such acknowledgement would invalidate the articles of capitulation and 
the cession of the entire islands as signed By ArchBishop Hojo and the 
Hoyal Audiencia. But other Englishmen in authority challenged the legal­
ity and validity of Anda1 s proscription. They argued that he was not at 
the capitulation, neither owed alliegiance to the British King nor violated
any parole. ArchBishop Hojo who was represented as having proscribed him
2
also denied having done so. But Governor Drake could not Be persuaded 
to remove Anda1s proscription. Thus hostilities continued after the royal 
proclamation of a truce reached Manila in July, and even after the 
preliminaries of peace arrived in August.
In December the Council strongly urged reconciliation with Anda 
owing to their "precarious situation". From information obtained By
1 See infra.
2 Hojo said that in his letters to Anda, "he reproved and Blamed him 
for the disturbances," But that his purpose was merely "to moderate 
his proceedings". Letter to the Manila Council, 25 May 1765. Head 
in Manila Consultations. (50 May 1765), V. 6, p. 116.
The English did presume to include Hojo1 s name in their manifesto. 
See Hojo^ letter to Anda, 10 Oct. 1762, published in the Duke of 
Almodovar1s Historia politica de los establecimientos ultramarinos 
de las naciones Euroneas, V. 5* P* 268-9. Another, dated 25 Oct. 
1762, synopsized in Blair and HoBertson, on. cit., V. 49, p. 40. 
Nothing in these letters suggest that Hojo proscribed Anda.
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Alexander Dalrymple while at Sulu, they had confirmed the report that
"Anda was sent out "by authority" to head the Spanish resistance against
the English occupation. Thus they recommended, "as a prudent and
necessary step," the removal of the proscription on Anda."*- Captain
Brereton, commanding officer of the King’s ships remaining at Cavite,
also urged the same measure not only with respect to AUda hut also as
2
regards the Augustinians. When Drake still refused, he took steps to
3
reach an agreement with the Spaniard on his own account.' The outcome 
was more acrimonious wrangling among the English. Finally, on 19 January
4
1764, the proclamation revoking Anda’s proscription was signed.
Meanwhile the violence of the invasion and the momentum of Anda’s 
resistance had thrown the entire countryside into a ferment. In the 
interest of trade and industry, the two sources of revenue on the 
Company’s ledger, Drake and his council were hid to placate and attract 
the Filipinos to the new regime. But from the start they found it almost 
impossible to get their exhortations heard. Indeed they tried almost 
everything in their power to win the inhabitants over to their side.
5
Following Draper’s example, they issued a manifesto exempting the
1 Letter to Gov. Drake from Parsons, Stevenson and Jourdan, 11 Dec.
176^. H.M.S.. V. 77, f. 297-301.
2 Brereton’s letter to the British Board, read in Manila Cons.,
22 Dec. 1763, V. 5, p. 235.
3 Idem, 16 Jan. 1764, ibid., V. 9, p. 2-3.
4 Proclamation dated 18 Jan. 1764, signed in the Cons, of 19 Jan.,
ibid., V. 9, p. 4.
5 "Draper and Cornish sent an edict to the Filipinos on 24 Sept. 1762,
announcing that the Filipinos need have no fear of the British fleet,
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native people from all taxes and personal services imposed on them "by
1
the Spanish G-overnment. They addressed themselves particularly to the 
inhabitants of Bulacan and Pampanga, the two "most disaffected” provinces. 
Subsequent manifestos were outright invitations to disloyalty to Anda 
and the Spanish clergy. Those who would ”quit the party of the rebels” 
and "make their submission” to the English Government would be released 
from "the capitation tax and personal services to the ecclesiasticks,"
would be kept "in the free exercise of their religion," in fact enjoy all
?
the protection guaranteed by the British King to his subjects. They
were even promised the earth. "All the lands usurped from the natives by
the Augustine Order" were to be restored to their former owners, upon the
3
latter "making good their claims".
All the villages which submitted to the British in peace were
allowed to resume elections of their captains and other officers as under
4
the Spanish government. Their choices were afterwards confirmed by
provided that they do not join the Spaniards or assist them in any 
way. They will be received under British protection; their women 
and children will be free from outrages; full prices will be paid 
them for food; they will be free to go and come as they please; 
and freedom of worship will be conserved to them. If they do, on
the contrary, aid the Spanish, then they must fear the punishment
that will be inflicted." Derived from a Spanish manuscript entitled 
Ingleses en Filipinas by Blair and Robertson, op. cit., V. 49, 
f. 104, p. I63.
1 Manifesto, dated 4 Bov. 1762. Full text in H.M.S. > V. 77, f. 75.
Another manuscript copy in ibid., V. 76, f. 35~6*
2 Manifesto given at Manila, 16 Jan. 1763* ibid., V. 77, f. 153*
Vide, another of 23 Jan. 1763* ibid., f. 157*
3 Manila Consultations (13 Bov. 1762), V. 1, p. 35*
4 Ibid., (30 Bov), p. 46.
116
sending them commissions* also according to an old Spanish practice.
An even more interesting measure, with possible implications for
2
the future, was the appointment of secular in the place of regular 
clergy to administer the parishes, particularly those previously held
4
hy the "rebellious" Augustinians. The seculars, whose superiors were 
the bishops, could be expected to listen to the English puppet, Archbishop 
Hojo. The natives would also be drawn to the new government by allowing 
them the choice of their parish priest, who was likely to be one of them. 
This was indeed an innovation for those times. The training of a Filipino 
priesthood had been discouraged by the "regulars", and the native priests 
had been successfully barred from administering any parish. It should be 
noted, for what it is worth, that not long after the departure of the 
English from the islands, Archbishop Sancho de Santa Justa y Hufina, 
prelate of Manila from 1767-76, in an attempt to get as many of the 
parishes as possible under the episcopal authority, ousted many of the
1 The villages whose elected officers were acknowledged by the British 
were Sta. Cruz, Binondo, Tondo, San Sebastian, Quiapo, San Pablo,
Pasay, Antipolo, Pandacan, Sta. Ana, Taytay, San Juan del Monte, 
Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Tambobong and Guadalupe. Ibid. (7 March 176}), 
V. 6, p. 39.
2 Seculars were priests trained in seminaries for parish work.
3 The regular clergy were members of various religious orders or corpor­
ations whose functions were mainly to proselytize and uphold Church 
doctrine.
4 When the English attacked Pasig, the Augustinian friar in charge of 
the parish there fled and Hojo was asked to recommend a secular priest 
in his place. The inhabitants of Taguig, Paranaque and other villages 
to the south of Manila, which were overrun by the English in their 
march toward the Lake or Laguna, were left to choose their parish 
priests. The Manila Board enjoined the English captain to follow this 
"same plan" which they believed would have"a good effect by attaching 
the Indians" to them. Manila Consultations, (Dec. 2,5 12, 1762),
V. 1, p. 48, 58; V. 2, p. 12.
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Spanish regular clergy and replaced them with Filipino priests.
These peaceful methods of reconciling the Filipinos evidently had
little effect. As the British Council at Manila early admitted, ’’only
force can ever accomplish” their objective. They also suggested that
’’until every friar is sent off the island,” they could not hope that the
2
country could he ’’properly settled.”
The truth is that the loyalty of the Filipinos to the Spaniards 
was in direct proportion to the effectiveness of the latter’s authority.
In provinces where the arm of the Spanish law hardly reached them, they 
were inclined to he recalcitrant and quite troublesome. In fact the 
English invasion unleashed several uprisings, the most serious of which 
were those in the distant northern provinces of Ilocos and Pangasinan.
But those places were too far also for the English to turn such opportune 
native unrest to their benefit, and before long the Spanish authority was 
re-established by Anda’s forces. On the other hand, as in Bulacan and 
Pampanga, where Anda was entrenched with the backing of the powerful 
Augustinian Order, there was scarcely any native disturbance directed 
against the Spaniards.
The invasion demonstrated at least one crucial fact in Philippine 
history. The Filipinos were not as attached to the clergy or the Catholic 
Church as the English seemed to believe. The clergy, unless they were 
backed by the authority of the alcaldes' and chiefs of the villages,
1 Phelan, on. cit., p. 87-88.
2 Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762.
Madras Mil. Cons. (24 Feb. 176)), V. 49, f. 75-6.
5 Provincial governors.
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exerted very little influence on the native inhabitants. The formidable 
alliance of Anda and the Augustinians in Pampanga and Bulacan is a case 
in point. The revolt in I locos is another, where the Augustinians were 
also established, but where the alcaldes had forfeited their authority 
by extortion from the natives and abusing their privileges.
In the Laguna or Lake province, where the English quickly asserted 
their authority by a show of force, the native inhabitants proved very
cooperative and for many months kept Manila supplied with most of its
provisions. But once the English showed a weakening of purpose, as in 
their inability to follow up military advantages, particularly in the
southern region of the Lake, the people threw in their lot again with the
stronger side. The Pasig post which guarded the northwest entrance to 
the lagoon was grudgingly retained, and might well have been abandoned 
if it had not been for Captain Backhouse's strong opposition.
The expedition to Pasig was launched on 21 November 1762. A
considerable body under Captain Backhouse was detached from the Manila
garrison to dislodge the enemy from the area at the junction of the
1
Pasig Hiver and the Laguna de Bay. Pedro Busto, Anda* s second-m 
command, had taken up his position there with a large native army so as 
to prevent supplies from leaving the Lake for Manila. The English detach­
ment marched through "inaccessible woods" and unceasing rain to Marikina,
2
where they were held up by the overflowing of the river. At the same
1 Manila Consultations, V. 1, p. 45J V. 2, p. 1.
2 Letter from Backhouse to Hussell• 24 Nov. 1762, ibid., p. 4.
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time, a large enemy detachment was reported to have come down from Bulacan
to head the English off and cut their communication with Manila. Admiral
Cornish was thus asked to send some armed Boats and sailors to guard the
river and join Backhouse in the attack on Pasig.'*' But Backhouse reached
his objective Before the Boats arrived. He fuund "many thousands of
people" Behind a Breastwork of BamBoo and earth. These were "immediately
put to the rout," many of them driven into the river, or pursued closely
2
By the English "on dry grounds for upwards of three miles."
The church at Pasig was reinforced and a regular post set up.
Backhouse stressed the advantages of the place* which to him was "the
Best situation ... to command the most fruitful country". He urged that
the outpost should Be kept as long as the English were in possession of
Manila. He visited other villages on the Laguna where the inhabitants,
hearing of his success at Pasig* received him without resistance. He now
recommended an expedition further down and round the lake to seal it off
from the enemy, But he would defer it until the Manila Board were sure of
the line of action to pursue with respect to captured "rebels" and their 
3
property.
The Company’s government at Manila was, however, impatient to deal 
a decisive Blow against Anda. Backhouse had scarcely set up a garrison 
at Pasig, when they proposed sending an expedition against Bulacan. The
1 Diary, 23 Nov., ibid., p. 3.
2 Backhouse, 26 Nov., ibid., p. 6.
3 Idem, 28 Nov., ibid., p. 10.
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plan was to leave a garrison at Pasig, thence to march Backhouse1 s 
augmented detachment, consisting of J 0 0 Europeans, 150 Sepoys and four 
guns, northward through the villages of Meycawayan, Marilao, Bocaue,
Bigaa and Guiguinto. At the same time, in the Bay, Admiral Cornish 
would "be asked to embark a force, landing it on the rear of the enemy,
1
to cut off their retreat to Pampanga, while Backhouse attacked the front.
Backhouse, however, strongly objected and convinced Governor Drake of
the "impossibility” of marching through rough country in the rainy weather
2
and with the paddy fields still uncut. The Manila Board then decided to 
send the entire force by sea, thus requiring substantial assistance from 
the Admiral. They, however, received a rebuff from the latter who chided 
them for planning expeditions without his counsel and declared that he was 
leaving for Madras with the whole squadron.
The Board was nevertheless determined to launch the campaign and
ordered Backhouse to be ready with at least 100 Europeans from the Pasig 
4
detachment. But Backhouse fell ill, and Captain Sleigh was appointed in 
his stead. In the end, the Admiral relented and detached a vessel from 
his squadron and landed 200 seamen to add to the depleted garrison at 
Manila. Meanwhile, the Chinese in the Parian offered Governor Drake 400 
of their people to be "armed as auxiliaries" at their expense to join the
1 Cons, of 4 Dec., ibid.. V. 2, p. 13-
2 Backhouse’s letter, Pasig, 6 Dec., ibid., p. 17.
3 Cornish’s letter, 18 Dec., H.M.S., V. 77, f. 119-20.
4 Cons, of 20 Dec., ibid., f. 123~5*
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expedition. Seeing that they would he useful for "repairing the roads
or scouring the hedges, procuring provisions* etc., ’’besides costing them
nothing, the English accepted the offer. On 19 January 1763* the
expedition2 sailed for Bulacan River. On the 20th, they arrived at
Malolos,^ eight miles from Bulacan, and forced the enemy’s strong post
4
there, "defended hy 1^00 °r 2000 men". Two days afterwards, the march 
on Bulacan was resumed. On reaching there, they found the enemy posted 
in the church, which was "strongly fortified with stockades and bastions," 
hut in about two hours was taken hy storm.^ In the church alone, about
g
400, "through their own obstinacy," were put to the sword.
1 Manila Cons.. (15 Jan. 1763), V. 5* P»
2 The force consisted of J 0 0 Europeans and 200 Sepoys embarked on the 
"half galley »’* the Company’s sloop, the Pasig and about 30 champanes. 
Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 2 March 1763. Madras 
Military Consultations, V. 49, f. 2^9.
3 According to one Spanish account, the English were to enter Bulacan 
River by the Bar of Binoangan (Binuangan), but were prevented by the 
strong wind, thus entered through Pumaraua (Pumarawan), arriving at 
Malolos by way of the streams connecting the two. Montero y Vidal, 
on. cit.. p. 33.
4 Letter of Dawsonne Drake to Adm. Cornish, 22 Jan. 1763. Ibid., p. 17.
Montero y Vidal writes that at Malolos the English did not encounter 
any resistance, on. cit.
5 Letter from Captain Sleigh to Major Fell, Bulacan, 23 Jan.
Manila Con3., V. 5, p. 22.
6 Letter from Manila to the Court of Directors, 2 March, ibid., V. 3,
p. 34. In another letter the Manila described the fight in the church
thus: "the beseiged obstinately defending the body of the church and
afterwards every room, so exasperated the soldiers and sepoys that 
few or none escaped." Ditto to Fort St. George, ditto, Madras Mil. 
Cons., V. 49, F. 260.
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Hearing of this victory, the Manila Board decided to follow it up
hy a march oil the province of Pampanga.'* But Sleigh got "bottled up in
Bulacan, with the entire country around in arms. In the town, there was
"nothing to he met with hut hare walls;" all the inhabitants had fled and
2
the valuables of the church had been sent out in safety. On 29 January, 
a large body of Anda’s men, which Sleigh believed to be the main enemy 
force, about 5 "to 4,000 strong, came down within half a mile of the rear
3
of the English post.
The Admiral was asked for a reinforcement, but troubles in Cavite
4
prevented him from sparing any. By 2 February, Sleigh’s position was
such that he could neither retreat to Manila by land nor go forward to
I
Pampanga, "without running too great a risk". A detachment was sent to
cover his retreat to the coast, where boats were despatched to embark his
troops for Manila.
Thus ended the inconsequential Bulacan campaign. The Manila Board 
was now gravely worried about their military situation. With the departure 
of the Squadron, they doubted whether they could even keep Manila. They 
feared the possibility of an enemy landing in the Bay and the loss of
1 Man. Cons.. V. 5, p. 22.
Z Letter from Sleigh to Fell, 25 Jan., ibid.,
3 Ditto, 29 Jan., ibid., p. 27.
4 Ditto, 2 Feb., ibid., p. 4^.
5 The returning party was to land above Tondo and either march through 
Sta. Cruz or go up the river Pasig to the Almacen Gate. They were 
to reach Manila by 10 Feb. Ditto, 8 Feb., ibid., p. 5^*
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communication with the naval "base at Cavite. Thus they decided to 
concentrate all forces at and near Manila, "by abandoning the post at 
Pasig, which had been lately cut off by the enemy from Manila, and by 
establishing a nearer one either at San Nicolas or Guadalupe. Armed 
vessels would be stationed on the Lake, which they hoped would accomplish 
the purpose of the Pasig outpost.
Backhouse was somewhat piqued that the Council decided to demolish
his post without previously consulting him. Besides, he was convinced
that the position in Pasig was the best for guarding the supply line from
1
the Lake to Manila. He was then sent, together with two other persons of
experience, to examine the area between Pasig and Guadalupe and to
recommend the best possible site for an outpost.. The choice reverted to 
2
Pasig, but Major Fell, Commandant of the Manila garrison, raised an
objection. Backhouse was thus called to Manila to give a more ample report.
3
At the consultation which followed, of both civil and military authorities/
1 Letter from Backhouse to the Manila Board, Pasig, 11 Feb., ibid., 
p. 58-9. Later, he justified the retention of the post from the 
services rendered by it, which the enumerated as follows (a) it 
dislodged the enemy from a post between Pasig and Taguey; (b) the 
bar or entrance of the river Pasig from the Laguna was cleared;
(c) all the enemy armed vessels on the Lake were either taken or 
destroyed, Tunasan was taken, and that part of the country settled;
(d) Pagsanjan was reduced and the enemy dislodged from the area 
reaching from that strong post all the way to Calamba; (e) Li pa 
and San Pablo in the interior were also occupied* and several enemy 
attempts to return frustrated. Ibid., p. 111.
2 Letter from Capt. Stevenson to the Manila Board, Manila, 1^ Feb., 
ibxd., p. 62.
3 At this special meeting, held on 19 Feb. were Governor Drake and 
his Council, Captains Stevenson and Myers of the Company's troops, 
and Major Fell and Captain Backhouse of the King's 79th Regiment.
1 bid., p. 64“,5*
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it was agreed to retain the Pasig post. As further security for the city 
of Manila, a galley should he stationed off Mariveles to guard the entrance 
to Manila Bay, while other vessels should he armed, which together with 
hoats loaded with provisions enough to last seven days for 200 men, 
should he kept always ready at the Almazcen Gate (Puerta de Almacenes), 
on the northern side of the city facing the river Pasig.
Whatever military successes the English reaped during their stay 
in the islands they owed mostly to Captain Backhouse, an officer in the 
King’s 79th Hegiment. Of the commanders who served in the field, he alone 
had a grasp of the military situation and a working plan to offer. His 
main concern was the Lake and the maintenance of its viability to the 
English. He was indefatigable in the pursuit of this objective and fought 
against overwhelming odds in the rugged and hostile countryside, directing 
campaigns with relentless courage tempered hy humanity. However, like 
many others, he clashed with the Company’s delegates administering at 
Manila, particularly the Governor. He was taken for an insubordinate 
rather than overzealous military servant. He was recalled from the field, 
and his talent thereafter went to waste on squabbles with the civil 
authority.
While Backhouse was setting up the post at Pasig, partisans of Anda 
were assembling along the southeastern side of the Laguna. Among them 
were the Marquis of Montecastro and Don Andres Blanco who had eluded the 
English and were being hunted to render their share of the "Manila ransom.” 
In February 1763* Backhouse made a reconnaissance of the northwest side 
of the Lake and saw that the enemy were active there also} After taking
1 Letter from Backhouse to the Manila Govt., 17 Feb., ibid., p. 62-3*
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their vessels and driving them from Tunasan, Backhouse hastened down to 
Manila to apprise the Board of the situation in the Lake. He had received 
information that the strength of the Spanish forces was concentrated at 
Pagsanjan and Sta. Cruz* on the southeastern coast of the Lake; "their 
numbers at the former were 4,000 and at the latter 3»°00 "by ihe best 
account". Backhouse proposes to march against them and asks the Board for 
100 men to reinforce those he plans to detach from the Pasig outpost.
The Board agreed, but a few days afterwards, the Spanish oidor,
Villacorta, was caught carrying on a conspiratorial correspondence with 
1
Anda. The matter worried the Board so much that they reneged on their 
former resolution to assist Backhouse, according to his request, fearing
that the city itself was the target of the conspiracy. After much dallying
2
and haggling. Backhouse got a scant reinforcement of twenty Sepoys. By 
that time the marquis had left Pagsanjan and was on his way to join Anda 
in Pampanga. Backhouse, with his meager force, was merely to try to 
intercept Blanco or prevent him and the others from crossing the Lake and 
uniting with Anda.
Backhouse’s expedition embarked from Pasig on 2rxLpril? He was two 
days leaving the bar of Taguig which had been effectively blocked by the
1 On 15”th March, a letter was intercepted addressed by Villacorta to 
Anda, informing the latter of the English straitened military 
situation and advising him to come down immediately to l/anila with 
his force. The Manila Board thus suspected that there was a plot 
afoot "to surprise Manila by treachery". Transcription of the letter 
in Man. Cons., V. 5> P* 73-4. See also letter from Gov. Drake to the 
Select Committee at Fort St. George, 17 March 1763. Madras Ml. Cons., 
V. 49, f. 53-4.
2 Cons. 24 liar ch. Ibid., p. 74-5*
3 See map of the Laguna district following this page, photocopied from 
the "Plano de Laguna de Bay...," dated 1792, preserved at the British 
Museum.
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native inhabitants, whence he sailed directly across to Pagsanjan, 
routed the enemy there, and proceeded to reduce Santa Cruz?" The enemy 
troops had, however, fled to Majayjay, in the interior of the Laguna 
Province. Backhouse, unable to pursue them with his insufficient force, 
instead swept south through Los Banos and San Pablo to Lipa.
At Los Banos, Backhouse learned that an enemy party was posted at
Lipa, commanded by officers from the galleon Filipino and in custody of
money landed at Batangas from that ship. On arriving at Lipa, however,
he was informed that the money had been carried back to Batangas. He
was told further that the entire Filipino load of silver money had been
re-embarked on smaller vessels at Palapag, which in turn were to land it
at two different points on the island of Luzon. One part of the treasure
2
was brought to Callavoya, thence to be conducted on land to Lukban, and
3
the other to Batangas* thereafter to make its way to Lipa."
Backhouse appealed to Manila for aid to enable him to attack 
Batangas. But the reinforcement was delayed by bad weather in the passage 
by sea, and he struck out before it arrived. Batangas was reached, 
deserted by all its inhabitants and relieved of the money from the galleon. 
About the convent, however, he dug up some shot and money, probably a ruse
1 Backhouse1 s "account of his expedition up the Lake, Cumberland, 
off Santa Cruz, 9 April. Ibid., p. 79-81.
2 Perhaps "Calilayan" on Tayabas Bay.
3 Backhouse^ letter to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George 
(n. d.) (imperfect). Ibid., V. 3, p. 41-5* Cf. letter to Manila, 
dated Cumberland galley, off Calamba, 19 April, read in Cons.
22 April, ibid., V. 5, p. 87-9.
*
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to make him think that the rest was "buried nearby.
Backhouse now proposed garrisoning both Batangas and Lipa. He 
claimed that ’’the spring of Anda*s action and sinews of his faction lay 
in this part of the island” . Both the bulk of the treasure brought in 
on the Filipino, worth ”at least four million dollars,” and the greatest 
part of An da* s forces were staked in the area. "Give me but one-fourth 
of your garrison and two field-pieces, and I will sit down on the most 
dangerous plain you can find out in the island," he urged the Manila 
Council. His plan was to sail either from Batangas to Mauban or from 
Calamba to Pagsanjan* thence to march against Majayjay and Lukban. His 
strategy consisted of drawing Anda from his secret bases into open battle 
at Lukban, where he would surely "fly with his adherents" to secure the 
treasure lodged there.
Governor Drake was, however, not convinced. From information fed 
to him, the galleon’s cargo had already reached Anda in Pampanga, and the
3real threat from Anda* s forces lay to the north of Manila. On 26th May,
1 Letter to Manila, dated Batangas, JO April. Ibid., p. 97.
2 Ditto, dated Lipa, 8 May, ibid., p. 110-1. Cf. ditto, dated Pasig,
26 June, ibid., p. 1^1•
J The gist of the intelligence received by Drake and communicated to
the Council on 17th May is as follows: At Bacolor are large
quantities of ammunition and JO cannons in the entrenchments. Twelve 
thousand people are kept in the pay of Anda composed of Spaniards, 
G-uachinangoes, French, Malabars, Pampangos and Indians (sic). Of 
these, 6,000 are at Quingua under Bustos whence they intend burning 
Santa Cruz, on the outskirts of Manila. Fifteen hundred are in the 
Lake. The rest are at Bacolor. From the great promises given to 
deserters from the English camp and the number of Indian troops main­
tained, large sums of money must have been defrayed, which Anda could 
hardly afford unless supported by funds from the Filipino. Ibid., 
p. 127.
Backhouse was ordered to repair immediately to Manila; "hut it was not 
till after triplicate orders had "been dispatched that he returned".
Anda had in fact sent huge bodies of troops to the Laguna to
reinforce his partisans there and to convoy the treasure overland to 
2
Pampanga. At the same time, he increased the pressure on Manila to 
divert the English from the line of march of those troops.^
1 Letter from Manila to Fort St. George, signed William Stevenson 
and Francis Jourdan, Mirabella (Mariveles) Bay, 16 April 1764.
Madras Mil. Con3., V. 51* f. 729-30. See also the letters exchanged 
between Backhouse and the Manila Board from 1J June to 12 August 176 J  
Man. Cons., V. 5, passim.
2 After Backhouse’s success at Pagsanjan and Sta. Cruz, Don Francisco 
Xavier Salgado, the Spanish commander in the Laguna and Batangas 
provinces, sent for reinforcement which Anda quickly supplied. The 
latter "sent deserters, Spaniards, and Pampangos to the amount of
4,000 men with four "guns". This detachment marched through Marikina 
then past Pasig, round the northeast side of the Lake into Majayjay. 
To fetch the Marquis of Montecastro, a cavalry party met him at 
Morong, thence to be conducted over the mountains to Anda’s base. 
Yide, Backhouse’s letter to Manila, JO March, ibid., p. 77; idem, to 
Fort St. George (imperfect and no date, probably written in June or 
July 1763 after his campaigns in the Laguna and Batangas provinces), 
ibid., V. 3, p. 41-6.
3 On 17th April it was reported that a body of J 0 0 Pampangos with 
firearms were moving against either Manila or Pasig. Military 
posturings were also subsequently rumoured in Cavite and seemed 
to be aimed at the English post in Lipa. On 9th May, a priest 
informed the English that 5*000 Pampangos with all the European 
and Sepoy deserters from the British camp and few pieces of cannon 
were in formation at Marikina and were "for certain to attack Pasig". 
Each subsequent report located the enemy closer to Manila. They were 
to be found in Maysilo and Malinta, had attacked San Pedro Makati, 
and were repulsed at San Francisco del Monte, The approach of the 
Spanish forces was driving the inhabitants from their homes in Sta. 
Cruz, Binondo, Quiapo, and other suburban villages of Manila. San 
Juan del Monte and Mandaluyong were said to be harboring "malcontents 
Becoming "very troublesome," a party was dispatched against those 
places, and the houses which the enemy had converted into barracks 
were burned. Ibid., V. 5* Passim.
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The enemy’s movements in the very outskirts of the city heightened
the alarm of its English occupants who had other problems worrying them.
One was the widespread desertion from their ranks: soldiers of the 79th
Begiment, Sepoys,^ Lascars, and most serious of all, the French 
2
auxiliaries. Within the last few days of February 1763, thirty-one from
3
the English camp had gone over to the Spanish side. Of the French 
companies brought on the expedition, nearly half had already absconded
and were strengthening the enemy greatly by supplying the European
4
contingent necessary to lead the Filipino fighters. Lest they should
1 An English officer wrote to a friend in October 1763 that he was 
afraid that the other side would soon have most of the Sepoys, as 
it was likely that the occupation forces would have to stay another 
year. Letter, Manila, 4 Oct. 1763, from Gapt. Matthew Horne to
Hichard Smith. Orme Collection, Various, V. 27, f. 99.
In Cainta, a town very near Pasig, the great majority of the 
population have distinct ethnic features, of the south Indian type.
It is generally held that they are descended from the Sepoys who 
came on the expedition of 1762 and deserted to the enemy. To my 
memory, an Indian scholar not too long ago came to the town and 
found no cultural affinities between its' people and their racial 
ancestors; Cainta is as Filipino as any other town in Hizal province.
2 These were deserters from the French lines during the fighting in 
India, particularly in the seige of Madras.
3 As inducement, the Spaniards offered to every deserter $200 advanoe 
and $1.00 daily allowance. In retaliation it was suggested that 
the English offer $200 to anyone who might cause the discovery and 
conviction of a person involved in suborning their men. The 
deserters from the English camp were believed to be conveyed out of 
the town in covered sedans sometime after they were discovered 
missing. Letter to the Board from Major Fell and Capt. Backhouse,
3 March 1763* Man. Cons., V. 5» P* 70.
4 Letter from the Board to Adm. Cornish, 27 Feb., ibid., p. 67.
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all go over to Anda, the remaining ones were shipped off to Madras
2
with the Admiral’s squadron which left on End March.
The English at Manila were now beginning to feel the pinch of a 
3
dwindling treasury and a growing scarcity of provisions. Anda was 
tightening his blockade of the city and had been fairly succesful in
preventing the native inhabitants from aiding the English by intimid-
4
ation. Where before the Manila Board hoped that a military reinforce­
ment from Madras would enable them to reap some real benefits from the 
conquest, now they discounted the notion as hardly feasible. Such
1 Out of some 150 embarked at Madras, 2 sergeants and about 60 
privates left the English side. Manila General Letter to Fort St. 
George, 2 March 1763* Madras Military Con3., 7. 49, f. 278.
2 Diary, 2 March, Man. Cons., V. 5> P* 69#
3 In March;- 1763, the Company’s cash at Manila was only about 114,000
dollars, ’’barely sufficient for the charges of the garrison for four 
months”. The Manila Government thus appealed to Fort St. George for
assistance, ”a consignment of treasure for a year... at least... six
lacks of rupees" (of 600,000 rupees, which had an exchange value of
300,000 in Spanish dollars). Man. Gen. Letter to Fort St. George,
2 March 1763, Madras Mi 1. Cons., V. 49, f. 268.
4 Anda published severe edicts against any person who should carry any
provisions to Manila or Pasig. In his manifesto of 5 Jan. 1763* 
issued in Mexico in the province of Pampanga, he ordered all 
provincial governors to prevent any victuals from reaching Manila.
He also warned the Friars Hospital&rians of the Order of St. John of 
God, whom he had heard had been supplying the English, to continue 
to do so on pain of being declared disloyal to the Spanish King, of 
losing their temporals, and of being expelled from the islands.
Copy of the manifesto in English in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 149-52.
On the 25th of the same month he condemned any person found supplying
the English ”to be burnt by the common hangman at the most public
places”. Man. Cons.. V. 5* P* 21. '
His edict of 11 Feb. 1764 issued at Bacolor, was milder and merely 
imposed the penalties of confiscation of effects, banishment to some 
out-garrison for two years, or work on a galley or foundry for two 
years without pay. Full text in English in ibid., V. 9, p. 32-3.
assistance as the Indian settlement could afford to send over would not 
he sufficient to subdue an island where the native inhabitants possessed 
many advantages for the guerrilla type of warfare. It could scarcely take 
the field until after a year from its arrival, owing to the intervening 
rainy season, during which time it was "absolutely impracticable" to 
march through a country deemed in every respect unfavorable to military 
operations even in dry weather.*
By the beginning of March the English had arranged to send
Fr. Bernardo Pazuengos, the Jesuit Superior and Provincial, to negotiate
2
with Anda for a mutual suspension of hostilities, during which they hoped 
to be able to gain fresh resources. The English terms provided, among 
others, for a demilitarized zone of two leagues between the two camps, a 
free and uninterrupted commerce, and the exchange of deserters and 
criminals "on promise of their lives and not too rigorous punishment".
The truce was to be valid for the island of Luzon only as they were think­
ing of taking Zamboanga as soon as the island was restored to peace. The 
negotiationnwould be done wholly by word of mouth "an entire faith and 
credit" being given to Pazuengos#
Two weeks afterwards, the Jesuit returned. "From the reception he
met with and the obstacles that arose," the English gave up all hope of
1 Letter from the Manila Government to the Select Committee of Fort
St. George, 1 March 1763# Ibid., p. 49.
^ Ibid., p. 5^ * et. seo.
3 The main obstacle evidently was that Pazuengos was to negotiate only
verbally; thus he bore no written acknowledgement of Anda in his 
assumed titles of Governor and Captain-General of the Islands. The
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success for further negotiation. The Manila Board now urged "the
1
absolute necessity" of reinforcement from India.
Meanwhile, Anda had been having troubles of his own. The Chinese, 
who had always been descriminated against by the Spanish government at 
Manila, took the side of the English immediately upon the arrival of the 
latter. Large numbers of them had been recently expelled by Governor 
. Arandia (1754-9) from the islands. Only those who were declared Christians 
were allowed to stay and on condition that they would engage exclusively
p
in agriculture. In December 1762, those resident in Pampanga conspired
5
with their countrymen in the Parian, with the alleged support of the
English, "to massacre Anda, all the Augustinian friars and all other 
4
Spaniards" in the church of Guagua, a village near the provincial capital 
of Bacolor, while they attended the Christmas night Mass. The plot was
persistent refusal of the English to address him accordingly 
frustrated several other missions which they themselves initiated, 
like those of Fr. Pedro Luis de Sierra, Prior of the Dominican Order, 
Juan Francisco Solano, a Spanish inhabitant of Manila, and Fr. Juan 
de la Concepcion, Prior of the Hecollect Order. Letter from de la 
Concepcion to the Manila Board, 11 Sept. 1765* H.M.S., V. 77, f.227-50*
1 Letter from Gov. Drake, etc., to the Select Committee of Fort St. 
George, 17 March 1765, Madras Mil. Cons., V. 49, f. 55-4 .
2 Juan Fernando, Historia de los P.P. Dominicos en las Islas Filipinas, 
1870-2, Tomo IV, p. $ Q 7; Sinibaldo de Mas, Informe sobre el estado de 
las Islas Filininas, I, p. I50-I; Jose Montero y Vidal, Historia 
general de Filininas, etc., II, p. 82-5.
5 The Chinatown during Spanish times situated beyond the eastern walls
of Manila.
4 Joaquin Martinez de Zuniga, Historia de las Islas Filipinas, I, 
p. 477.
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discovered, and the Chinese were nearly all cut down.
When the English were preparing their expedition against Bulacan
in the following month, the Chinese at Manila, allegedly to avenge their
1
disaster at Bampanga, made the offer of 400 armed auxiliaries to join 
the expedition, as we have seen. The Spaniards claimed that these Chinese 
committed various atrocities, especially during the storming of the church
p
and convent of Bulacan.
In February of the same year, the English received reports that the
I locos and Pangasinan provinces had thrown off ’’the Spanish yoke”. The
Manila Board agreed to send a boat to those places to find out from the
people there whether they would like to submit to the British authority
or carry on the same trade with the English as they had done previously
3
with the Spaniards. On 24th March they consulted again on the revolt 
4
in Pangasinan and dispatched an elaborate letter to the rebel chief there.
1 Man. Cons., (15 Jan. 1765), V. 5» P*
2 ’’After the English entered the convent, the Filipinos hid in the
sacristy and attic. The Chinese, many of whom had died by the enemy’s 
fire in the assault, hunted them down and asked the English to allow 
them to put them to the sword”. The same fate befell the Augustinian 
friars. Zuniga, on. cit., p. 451.
5 Man. Cons., 14 Feb., V. 5» P» 61.
4 Of the Filipino revolts that broke out after the English had taken
Manila, the most obstinate was that in Pangasinan, continuing well 
after the English had left the islands. It broke out in the village 
of Binalatongon on Kobember 5* 1762 when the Alcalde-Mayor enforced 
the collection of the royal tribute. Anda commissioned a lieutenant- 
general to set things right in the troubled province. The rebels, 
pacified somewhat by Bishop Ustariz* were induced to ask Anda for an­
other Governor with which the latter complied. But the rebellion 
broke out again. Anda then sent a considerable detachment to quell 
the revolts simultaneously in progress in Pangasinan, Ilocos and Cagayan.
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They offered protection to his people, aid against his enemies, exemption 
from the poll tax and other services* free commerce with Manila, ready
1
money for their goods upon receipt "by the English, and religious liberty.
On 14th May, a letter was received from Diego Silang, leader of 
2
the revolt in Ilocos. He recounted his people's grievances against the 
Spanish government in his province and complained about the cruelty of 
the Augustinian friars.' He feared that Anda, from information given him
The rebels in Pangasinan however, could not be subdued in one battle. 
They persisted under various leaders and were not effectually 
subdued until March 1765* The rebellion took such a heavy toll that 
only half of the original population was believed to have survived. 
Accounts of this and the other rebellions are given in Martinez de 
Zuniga, Historia de las Islas Pilipinas, Sampaloc, I8O3, cap. ^6;
Anda to Carlos III (extract of forty-six representations of June and 
July, 1764), Blair and Robertson, op. cit., V. 49, p. J Q O - 6 .
1 Manila Cons., ( 24 March), V. 5» P* 75-6.
2 Pedro delVivar, who was witness to many happenings in this revolt,
left a detailed account of it. His main argument was that if his
fellow Augustinians had proceeded with more enthusiasm and courage,
Diego Silang would not have acquired so much influence throughout
the Ilocano region. Relacion de los alzamientos de la ciudad de Vigan, 
cabecera de la provincia de Ilocos, en los anos de 1762 y 1765*
Composed in 1 7 6 J ; published as part of Vol. IV of Biblioteca Historica 
Filipina, Manila, I893.
5 The following are given by Spanish historians as causes of the Ilocos 
revolt: abuses of the governor, resentment of the tribute, nev/s of the 
English invasion, and the revolt of the Pangasinenses, with whom a 
large number of their countrymen settled in Ilocos Sur had been in
contact. Diego Silang, who had acquired a wide experience and acquaint­
ance from his frequent journeys to Manila as messenger of the parish 
priest at Vigan, easily roused the people in the province to unite for 
their defense against the invading English, on the pretext that the 
Spaniards could no longer protect them. He also enticed them with the 
prospect of eliminating all tribute and services. However, he over­
reached for his own good, meddled in religious matters and communicated 
with the English. He was assassinated by a Spanish mestizo on 28 May, 
1765* Shortly after, the insurrection broke anew under Silang* s uncle, 
Nicolas Carino, but was stifled before long. See Vivar*s Relacion.
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"by Bishop Ustariz, would burn and destroy the province. He was thus
seeking the protection of the English. He described how Ilocos might he
put in a state of defense by their aid and promised his allegiance in
return. He would also seize the Augustinians and deliver them to the
English. As proof of his "fidelity, submission, and sincere affection,"
he was sending 12 loaves of sugar, 12 baskets of calamay (a kind of pudding),
1
200 cakes or balls of chocolate".
The reply of the English Council at Manila was a promise of
assistance with troops and the appointment of Silang as Alcalde-Mayor or
Governor of the Ilocos province. They were also sending him blank
commissions to be distributed to the officers of the villages upon their
election. He should send down all Augustinians friars and any other
Spaniards and confiscate their property. He should also try to induce
the rebel chief of Pangasinan, who was a relative of his, to join the
English against the Spaniards. A present was being sent to him as a token
2
of their friendship. Captain Brereton also sent a letter by the Seaford, 
offering protection in the name of the King of England, and promising 
troops and war supplies to be sent "in a short time".
1 Full text of the letter read before the Board, 4 May, Man. Cons. ,
V. 5, p. 97-9.
2 Ibid., (6 May), p. 100-2.
3 Full text of Brereton’s letter to Diego Silang, dated Manila, 6 May 
1763 in Marques de Ayerbe, Sitio y conqui3ta de Manila por los ingleses 
en 1762, Zaragoza, 1897, p. 118-11. This letter caused one of several 
wrangles between Brereton and the Manila Board. The latter claimed 
that there was no necessity for him to write to Silang and that he had 
interfered in a matter which pertained to them alone, like Admiral 
Cornish did in a similar case on the Coast of Coromandel. Letter from 
the Manila Board to Brereton, 13 May 1763. Ibid., p. 116.
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Meanwhile Backhouse had "been pressing the Board for reinforcement
of his post in Lipa* in the province of Batangas, where he Believed Anda’s
1
main force was assembled and the Filipino treasure was lodged. The
2
proposed expedition to Ilocos was laid aside, and Backhouse’s request was
3
granted." The Seaford returned on 17th May hearing what was perhaps
Silang’s last communication with the English. As Captain Peighin of the
frigate was in a hurry to return to Manila Before the South-west winds
started, Silang would Be sending his own junk to trade with Manila and to
4
convey the Augustinian friars there. Brereton, who had also received a
letter from the rebel chief and who had earlier objected to the Board’s
maintaining the Batangas post at the expense of the proposed expedition to 
5
the north,- was convinced of Silang’s sincerity and pointed out the
advantages of an alliance with him, particularly that of attracting the
6
Pangasinenses and Cagayanes to the English side. On 28th May, Silang 
was assassinated By a man he knew and whom the Spaniards had tampered with.
1 Letter from Backhouse to the Manila Board, 8 May, ibid., p. 111.
2 The Manila Board resolved to send a detachment to Ilocos consisting 
of "twenty Europeans and thirty Sepoys under the Command of Lt. 
Bussell... with spare arms and ammunition". Cons., 4 May, ibid.,
p. 100.
3 Cons., 10 May, ibid., p. 112.
4 Letter from Silang to Drake and Council by the Seaford from Figan,
Ilocos, 15 May, ibid., p. 124.
5 Letter from Brereton, Cavite, 15 May, ibid., p. 118.
6 Ditto, 21 May, ibid., p. 124-^.
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1The insurrection immediately ceased, while the English turned to more 
urgent matters.
The only successful English attempt at alliance with the native
p
inhabitants against the Spaniards was with the Moros of the southern 
parts of the archipelago, particularly those of Sulu. Their relations 
with this people during the occupation is treated in detail in other 
chapters. How the Sultan of Sulu, who had been in Manila as a "hostage” 
to the Spaniards for many a year, came under the influence of the 
English provides an interesting background to a relatively unexplored 
subject.
At the fall of Manila, the sultan was supposed to have been
1 Other disturbances in various parts of the islands were unleashed 
by the successful English invasion of Manila. In Cagayan, in 
north-eastern Luzon, the masses declared themselves free of all 
tribute to their Spanish masters in February, 1763* The leaders 
were said to have been in touch with and instigated by Diego Silang. 
The revolt, however, was quickly put down, with the arrival of 
Anda’s lieutenant-general for the disaffected provinces of Cagayan, 
Ilocos and Pangasinan, Don Manuel Arza. Leguna, Batangas, Tondo, 
Cavite, Camarinas, Zamboanga, Samar, Panay, Cebu were all caught in 
the wave of anarchy which the effacement of Spanish authority at 
its very capital had precipitated. Read the accounts in Martinez
de Zuniga, Mas, Montero y Vidal and Ayerbe.
2 The Spaniards used the word ”Moro" to refer to anyone touched by 
Islam, although in the case of the Malays then, most of them were 
mere idolaters. Through the years, in the Philippines, the term 
became one of opprobrium, denoting all those who visited the 
Spanish islands to maraud. By mid-nineteenth century, the Moros 
appeared to be mostly those from the Sulu archipelago, the last 
great ones of their kind.
See D.Jose Garcia de Arboleya, Historia del Archipielago y Sultania 
de Jolo, Habana, 1851, p. 16; General Suarez, 1856, quoted in 
Fr. Francisco Gainza, Memoria y antecedentes sobre las espediciones 
de Balanguigui y Jolo, Manila, 1851, pp. 82, 150.
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conducted to Pampanga by an order from Anda.^ Somehow he never got 
there, having met with "an accident" in the village of Pasig, where 
the English overtook him and made him a prisoner, along with his entire 
household. This was Anda’s version. According to the English, the 
sultan, "tired of Spanish controul threw himself with his whole family 
under their protection" upon the attack on Pasig. Here he took refuge
in the church according to a plan he had previously made with the
2
English before the detachment marched into the village. He was taken
3
back to Manila, where he stayed on a monthly allowance from the English
until the latter returned him to Sulu. As compensation for all this
trouble, he ceded a part of his dominions to the English, where they
4
could establish their settlement near the spice-producing Moluccas.
1 "Synopsis of Communications to Carlos III; Simon de Anda y 
Salazar, Manila, June-July 1764* Blair and Robertson, op. cit.,
V. 49.
2 Manila General Letter to Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762.
Madras Military Cons. (24 Feb. 1763)> V. 49* !*• 82.
3 The Manila Board voted a monthly allowance of $100 for his support. 
Man. Gen. Letter to Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762, Madras Mil. 
Cons., V. 49, f. 82. Monthly stipends were also paid to the Sulu 
and Mindanao ambassadors who were in Manila at the time of the 
invasion. Man. Cons., (15 Jan. 1762), V. 6, p. 13.
4 The English made a somewhat foolhardy attempt to unite military 
forces with marauding Mohammedan Malays in order to chasten Anda. 
These people from the south had little love for the Spaniards and 
were quick to take advantage of the collapse of Spanish power in 
the Philippine islands. In January 1764* it was reported that a 
number of them had landed at Camarines and were "committing great 
outrages there." (ibid., V. 9> P*2). Later in the same month, a 
body disembarked at Tayabas. At the time, the Manila Board was 
having difficulties with Anda, who refused to cease hostilities 
unless on his own terms. They then thought of making a diversion
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by inviting the "Moors” to come to Manila and join an attack on 
Anda, The Speedwell under William Goodlad was despatched thither 
on 30th January, with 1,000 dollars to distribute among them on 
"their arrival in Manila Bay with a good supply of arms, etc,"
He also bore a letter of the Sulu Sultan to their chiefs, (instruc­
tions to Goodlad, ibid., p. 15-16). The Speedwell was not heard of 
again in Manila. (Postscript to letter from Stevenson and Jourdan, 
16 April 1764> Madras Mil. Cons,, V. 51> 747-8)• On 22nd March
of the same year, she was reported to have arrived in Madras.
What happened was that while going round Luzon, she was "drove off 
the coast by a hard gale of wind, and not being able to regain it,
was obliged for want of water and provisions to bear away for
Malacca." (Madras Mil, and Secret Cons., V. 51 A, f. 203).
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CHAPTER V
The Rule of the Ea3t India Company 
in Occupied Philippines
PART II
Since the abortive attempt to draw out and break the backbone of 
the Spanish force in Bulacan province, the military situation had almost 
completely absorbed the attention and energies of the English East India 
Company’s government at Manila. It was apparent that the enemy’s design 
was to block all land approaches to Manila with the hope of forcing the 
English out through starvation.1 It would appear also that the latter’ $ 
resources were not equal to their military ambitions. Both Draper and 
Cornish were satisfied with merely maintaining what had been taken during 
the invasion. The latter particularly opposed making any further 
conquests, and insisted that the invasion had been intended to open up 
commerce with the Filipinos and to increase the trade with China. Others
1 Anda’s strategy consisted essentially of preventing supplies from 
reaching the enemy ensconced in Manila, with the ultimate objective 
of starving them out and compelling them to withdraw. Recognizing 
the limitations of a mixed undisciplined host which made up his 
army and which necessity placed under his command, he avoided being 
drawn into a large-scale battle with the English. He had his troops 
constantly on the move, appearing at several points at once, thereby 
confounding the English who were hard put to locate the main body of 
his army. Indeed, throughout the war, he kept up this game of 
diverting the enemy from his base of operations, of leading them on 
false trails through inhospitable parts of the country, and then 
hieing off when they got close. Examples are his manoeuvres at 
Maysilo, Guadalupe and San Hicolas, Lipa and Malinta. Man. Cons.,
V. 2 and 5* passim.
2 Vide Cornish’s letter to Drake and Council, on the IT or folk, off 
Cavite, 17 Feb. 176}. Ibid., V. 5, f. 53-4.
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of the military establishment shared this view, which was in contrast 
to that which appears to have been pursued by the Company’s officials. 
The latter, whose concern should have been primarily the promotion of 
trade* could be seen instead mapping out and launching campaigns into 
the provinces.
The truth was that in their weak military state, the Company’s 
servants could not effectively carry out their mandate. Peace which was 
necessary for trade could not be imposed against the military superiority 
of the other side. Squally vital was industry, and in the islands this 
was as yet rudimentary. Internal commerce was almost negligible, and 
only the Chinese traded substantially with the Snglish at Manila. The 
Manila Council tried to let out the confiscated property of the
2
Augustinians, but none outside of the Chinese would accept tenancies. 
Under the circumstances, it was impossible to collect revenue through 
the customary channels, as in the Indian settlements. Thus the English 
resorted to old Spanish practices. They re-established the wine, betel, 
and pork monopolies and awarded them to Chinese.^ The Chinese taxes,
1 Letter from Capt. Bonjour, Bulacan, 4 Feb., ibid., p. 41.
2 Vide, Cons, of 11 March 1765* Ibid., V. 6, p. 49. The Augustinian 
estates ’’were offered several times to different persons to rent but 
no one was willing to take charge on reasonable terms". They were 
then to be entrusted to the Brother Hospitalarians of St. John of God 
who were to receive one-fourth of the revenues. At the Consultation 
of 5bh May following (ibid., p. 96), it was reported that the same 
order refused to take charge of the Augustinian sugar and other farms. 
Anda’s expostulations must have made an impression.
3 At the consultation of 14 Feb. it was resolved to put up a public 
advertisement announcing that the Manila Government would receive 
proposals "for renting the arrack and betel farms for the term of
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which were reimposed despite promising this people exemption from any 
levy for three years, were also farmed out.^ So also were the mflk-jng 
of plowshares, the keeping of gambling houses, and the retail of spirits. 
All these, however, were used as instruments of extortion by the Company's 
officials and proved to be of very little profit to the Company itself.^
The Chinese traders from China, who were expected to flock to 
Manila after hearing of the successful invasion, instead came in a
one year in the same manner as under the Spanish government," and 
that they would be let to the highest bidder. Ibid., V. 6, p. 31.
On the 22nd, one Miguel Orquisong gave in his bid for 14,000 
dollars, "but considering the great expense that the Honorable 
Company has in this place, thought proper to offer 2,500 more."
Cons, of 4 March, ibid., p. 38.
1 Under the Spanish Government, a capitation tax of 6 reals and 3 
barillas half yearly was paid by every Chinese for the support of 
a hospital. Part was appropriated to private interest such as the 
gratuity paid to the "corregidor" for his protection and as 
treasurer. The tax was resumed by the British Government. Soon 
after, another tax of 4 rupees per quarter was laid on each Chinese 
which was to have been rented, for 5>000 or 6,000 dollars per annum, 
and the person who was to have^ihis farm gave Drake a gold snuff 
box on making the agreement. This tax was formerly levied and 
clandestinely applied to the Spanish governor's use. On Cornish's 
complaint, the taxation was withdrawn. Drake then pressed the 
Chinese captain and the arrack farmer for a sum under the name of a 
voluntary donation. Five thousand dollars was promised of which
2,000 was actually paid to Drake. Ibid., f. 785* Cf. Letter from 
Stevenson and Jourdan, loc. cit.; Letter from the committee inquiring 
into Chinese grievances, 13 Dec. 17^3> Man. Cons., V. 6, p. 248-9.
2 The last two caused serious altercations between the King's 
commanders who objected to them on moral grounds and the Company's 
servants who looked upon them as a sure source of revenue, presum­
ably in view of the Malay susceptibilities. The moral consequences 
of these farms were particularly felt in Cavite.
3 Gov. Drake's letter to Smith and Brooke, 16 May 17^3» laid before 
the Council of 20 May. Ibid., 108-9.
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trickle - only four small "champanes"^ up to May 1765* To encourage 
them, the customs duties which were collected at Madras were not imposed 
on them until after 1 March 1763. But the Chinese who came after this 
time refused to unload where the collector of customs could supervise 
them more closely, evidently to avoid the full imposition.^
Silver, which it was hoped would be obtained in abundance as a 
result of the capture of Manila to help finance the Company’s growing 
China trade, was hard to come by. The biggest supply of silver for the 
city was that which annually came on the galleon, and this had escaped. 
Indeed the wealth of the colony consisted mainly of the regulated
4
exchange trade with Acapulco. After contributing to the "ransom" of 
Manila and losing the outgoing galleon, the Spanish colony would have 
suffered complete economic ruin if the incoming galleon had not been 
saved from falling into the hands of the enemy.
The Manila Board wan compelled, as a matter of fact, to draw
1 Or "Sampans" among English speakers. These were small boats similar 
to tenders.
2 A customs duty of 5 per cent was to be paid on all foreign goods 
imported from China, etc., "provisions of all kinds excepted," to be 
collected in the same manner as at Madras, Man. Gen. Letter to Port 
St. George, 2 March 1763> loc. cit. Also Man. Cons., (14 Feb. 1763), 
V. 6, p. 31.
3 This occasioned a dispute between the customs official and Gov. Drake, 
who allowed the Chinese to unload in San Fernando instead of the 
Parian. Smith, the sea customer, resigned, and Brook# was appointed 
in his place, but the latter refused. The charge devolved on Henry 
Parsons. Ibid., passim.
4 In 1593 the value of the annual cargo to be embarked at Manila was 
fixed at 250,000 pesos. In 1702 this was raised to 300,000, in 1734 
to 500,000, and in 1776 to 750,000. The return value from Mexico, on 
the other hand, was always fixed at double the outgoing permit.
See William L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon. N.Y., 1959> Chap. 4.
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heavily on the China investment subscribed in India and to borrow from
2
private merchants at a somewhat unfavorable exchange. The conquest of 
Manila benefitted the captors and lined the private pockets of individuals, 
w h i l e  the share of the Company in the Manila ransom amounted to little 
after splitting the collection threeways and fell far short of the expenses-;
1 The Company’s administration at Manila was directed to send to 
Canton whatever should accrue and could be spared from that place.
Fort St. George Letter to the Company, 9 Nov. 1762, Abstracts Fort 
St. George Letters Received, ho. 1. Of the China consignment brought 
on the expedition, one lack of rupees was detained for the expenses 
at Manila. Manila Gen. Letter to Court of Directors, 10 Hov. 1762,
Man. Cons., V. 3* P* 5* 1763» Fort St, George sent a lack
of rupees to Manila after receiving a request for 6 lacks (Man. letter 
of 1 March 1763)* Madras Mi1. Cons., V. 49, f. J O , On 21st Sept., 
the Manila Govt, wrote that they were constrained to withdraw 252 
Bupees of the Houghton’s silver for China, besides coining the plate 
intended for the latter (7,000 in May last). Man. Gen. Letter to the 
Court of Directors, 21 Sept. 1763, Abs. Fort St. George Letters Reed., 
Ho. 1. On the same day, 21 Sept., 12 chests of treasure (no less than
50,000 Supees) were detained from the Hawke, also destined for China. 
Man. Cons., V. 6, p. 192.
2 On 1 March 1763* the Manila administration wrote that they were 
obliged to take up dollars for bills on the Company at the rate of 15-3- 
dollars per 10 Pagodas, as it was not possible to get them at the 
exchange prescribed by Fort St. George, e.g. 16 dollars per 10 Pagodas. 
Man. Gen. Letter of the same date, loc. cit. On 27th June they took 
out a loan from Francis Barnewall, a veteran merchant in those parts, 
for 12,000 dollars. Man. Cons., Y * 6, p. 143.
3 The money received by the English from the conquest of Manila amounted 
to approximately 700,000 Spanish dollars. This was distributed into 
three equal parts: among the King’s armed and naval forces which went
on the expedition, and the Company, or about 230,000 each part. See 
the breakdown into exact figures of the total amount collected in
The Scots Magazine, 1764, p. 455~6. Another source gives £141,120 or 
564,480 Spanish dollars (at 5 shillings to the dollar, the current 
exchange then) as the share which went to just the Admiral, the General, 
and the Commodore. This probably included the prizes taken at sea, 
like the galleon Santissima Trinidad and its cargo, which the Company 
was not entitled to share. Beatson, op. cit., V. 3* P» 3&0.
From the accounts received from Fort St. George on the "State of the 
Expedition to Manila," dated 5 June 1766, the net expense incurred by 
the Company reached £166,236 or 664,944 Spanish dollars (£58,068 
received from customs, and dividends on the capture, or 232,272 Spanish 
dollars, out of a total expenditure of £224,305 or 897,220 Spanish 
dollars). Ii.M.S., V.98, f. 179.
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In 1780, when the expedition against South America "by way of India was 
under consideration, the Company asked the Government to procure payment 
of £159,877 as debt owed to them by the Spaniards from the capitulation 
of Manila.*
The worst disappointment of the Manila enterprise, really the blot 
on this short interlude in the islands, was the incessant quarrels among 
the English themselves, especially between the King’s officers and the 
Company’s agents. The erux of all disputes was one of limits and 
precedence between civil and military authority. The absence of specific 
instructions or orders from either the British King or the Company, the 
source of that authority, gave the protagonists plenty of room for dispute 
and recource to dubious precedents.
Most of the rows involved Drake, the ill-starred governor appointed
from the Fort St. George civil list to head the Company’s government in
the temporary possession, who was perhaps as much maligned as he was culpable.
He disputed against Admiral Cornish over the latter’s proposal to plunder
Manila after the capitulation, to which we have already referred earlier
2
in this paper, also over the burning of Cavite Viejo. Cornish in turn
took him to task for keeping the redundant post at Pasig and sending the
needless expedition to Bulacan. They also differed, over the amount of
naval force which should be retained in the islands after the squadron 
5
left for Madras. With Captain Brereton, Cornish’s successor on the service
1 See chapter on "Further British Projects".
2 Vide Letter from the Jesuit Superior, Fr. Pazuengos, 7 Feb. 1765 and
another from the Council expostulating with Cornish for alleged excesses
committed by his marines. Man. Cons., V. 6, p. 25-8.
Cornish’s letter to the Manila Government, Horfoik, off Cavite,
17 Feb. 1765. Ibid., V. 5, p. 55-5.
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in the islands, Drake duelled verbally over the licensing of arrack 
and games in Cavite,* on the manner of dealing with "rebels" against 
the British authority, the expedition to Laguna, Anda* s proscription, 
the treatment of Chinese, and disposition of confiscated rebel effects.
He and the Manila Council clashed with Captain Backhouse on military 
strategy, as we have seen. The latter became the Commander-in-Chief of 
the King1 s armed forces in the islands, following the indictment of Major 
Fell who had himself crossed swords with Drake. Backhouse further got 
into a personal quarrel with Drake over the right of trial and custody 
of accused prisoners. This was the most grievous bone of contention 
between the two sides.
The most serious defect in the organization of the Company^ 
government in Manila was the absence of a fiat for the exercise of judicial 
authority. During the first month of military pacification, many natives 
from the Spanish side were seized for attacking and murdering English 
troops and were summarily executed as a military expedient. The Manila 
Government were aware that they were not vested with such authority, yet 
they could neither send the accused to Madras, "for the very intent of 
punishment must be destroyed" thereby, nor deliver them over to military
law, since Manila as one of the Company^ settlements fell within the
2
jurisdiction of the civil courts constituted by the -ioyal Charter.
1 See letters exchanged on the subject from 16 May to 20 June 176^. 
Ibid., V . 6, passim.
2 Manila Consultation, 22 Bov. 1762, H.M.S., V. 77, f.91.
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Backhouse seemed to have conceded the latter point while he was 
setting up the post of Pasig. He asked the Manila Government on various 
occasions for advice on the disposition of prisoners not taken at the 
commission of the crime, or otherwise not deserving the capital punish­
ment.^ Even after he had caught and hanged a commissary of the Spanish 
commander, Busto, he wrote to the Manila Board, hoping that the latter
would have no objection to his ’’hanging this villain and every other 
, . 2
commissary that (he) can catch”. The Board’s reply was that all crimes
3
committed in his post should he punished on the spot.
In Manila, when Villacorta was caught sending a secret message to 
Anda, Major Fell demanded custody of him for trial at a military court. 
The Company’s government at first objected on the ground that to deliver 
up the accused to martial law "might be construed as giving up part of 
(their) Honorable Masters’ right”.4 In the end, however, they yielded* 
and the Spanish oidor was tried, found guilty, and condemned to die 
according to military law.
But as the petitions to Governor Drake from the Chinese for redress 
of various grievances increased, and as a number of prisoners remained in
1 Vide letter dated Pasig, 28 Nov., Man. Cons., V. 2, p. 7. 
ditto, 4 Dec., ibid., p. 10.
2 Ditto, 10 July, ibid., V. 5» P* 15®* Another letter of Backhouse,
26 July, asks whether ’’the commissaries the country is pestered with,"
should be regarded as "troops of His Catholic Majesty,” or as
"banditti and outlaws to the King of Great Britain”.
3 Letter dated 14 July, ibid., p. 159*
4 Fell’s letter, 18 March, ibid., V. 6, p. 5^“5*
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confinement for some time without "being brought to trial, the government
at Manila decided to have at least three of Council meet every Wednesday
to arbitrate all cases above 100 dollars, besides forming a court of
inquiry to probe into the validity of charges exhibited against prisoners
1
and to report accordingly to the Governor.
In a Court of Inquiry held on 25th January 1764, and presided over
by Captain Sleigh, several persons were found guilty of capital crimes
and ordered to be confined. Drake* who claimed the ultimate authority of
either dismissing a case or passing a sentence after a review of the court’s
proceedings, released the prisoners. Backhouse made a strong protest,
laying claim to the same power as commander-in-chief of the British King’s
2
forces in the islands. By this time relations between the King’s officers 
and the Company’s agents had reached breaking point.
A most bitter altercation had arisen over Cesar Faillet, a French
officer in the Spanish service who had turned collaborator to the English.
He became the close confidant and agent of Governor Drake, while he aroused
the suspicion and dislike of Admiral Cornish.' A letter written by him to 
4
Batavia, assailing and vilifying the admiral, was intercepted, and the 
contents transmitted to Fort St. George and Captain Brereton. rfhe latter 
demanded charge of him, but the Manila government refused and undertook to
1 Cons., 8 July, ibid., p. 153*
2 Cons., 27 Jan. 1764, ibid., V. 9, p. 9-11.
2 ^ide Letter from Capt. Matthew Horne to Richard Smith, 10 Oct. 1762*
loo, cit.
4 Full text of the letter in Madras Mil. Con3. (18 July 1762), V. 49, 
f. 78-80.
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1
confine the accused themselves. This, added to the other sources of
dispute with the Company authorities, led Brereton to relinquish the
2
government of Cavite in August 1765.
In the following September, an order arrived from Fort St. George 
to turn Faillet over to Brereton. But the former had escaped from his 
confinement at the citadel, setting off the most petty quarrel,
particularly between the King*s officers and Drake, over the manner of
4
delivering him up in accordance with the order from Madras. Major Fell, 
who was deputed by Brereton to seize Faillet, was accused of inciting 
the Manila garrison to mutiny while fulfilling his charge, arrested, and 
sent off to Madras for trial. In the proceedings, Captain Sleigh also 
was arrested and confined for having seized Faillet, under order from his 
commander Fell, but without authority from Governor Drake. In the end,
Brereton got hold of Faillet, confined him on his ship the Falmouth, and 
later put him on board the Admiral Pocock to be taken to Madras.
Such was the stir that the affair caused, even in England, that the 
Company had to reassert their prerogative as guaranteed by their Hoyal 
Charter, which was that the civil power in all their settlements "shall
1 Man Cons. (28 June), V. 5» P* 152~4*
2 Ibid., (22 Aug.), p. 181.
5 Ibid., (20 Sept.), p. 199.
4 For detailed accounts of the Faillet’s case, vide: Letter from the
Deputy Governor and Council at Manila, 24 Feb. 1764 read in Madras 
Military Cong. (9 July 1764), V. 50, f. 470-6; Letter from Major
Hobert Edvard Fell, Fort St. George, 5 May, to the Earl of Sgremont,
enclosing a memorial, H.M.S., V. 97, f. 547-55; Letter from Dawsonne 
Drake, Manila, 1 Feb., to the Earl of Sgremont, ibid., f. 251-62; 
Letter from Capt. Matthew Horne, loc. cit., Man. Cons. , V. 4 and 5» 
passim.
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be superior to and command the military,” that their governor, "by virtue
of the commission he held from them, should be considered as commander-
in-chief of their forces, with all the powers belonging to a superior
commanding officer. He was to enjoy those powers over all the officers
in the Company’s service even if the latter bore a brevet or commission
from the King. Anyone who thus refused to submit to this authority should
1
be dismissed from the Company’s service.
To round off Drake’s long list of antagonists, there was his own 
council who disputed with him separately and jointly. We have seen how 
they urged the Governor to lift the ban on Anda. Smith resigned his post 
as customs collector because Drake interfered in the case of the Chinese 
junk merchants unloading in Manila. The first serious difference with 
the Council as a group arose over a Spanish priest accused of trying to 
induce British troops to desert. The councillors Parsons and Jourdan 
claimed the right to be consulted on the manner of dealing with prisoners 
taken within the city, which Drake punctiliously denied, reserving the 
power to call them for consultation when he liked. They embarked on a 
prolonged and elaborate correspondence on the subject which the two 
council members cut off by announcing that they would bring the matter 
before the Company. On 11th December 1862, Parsons, Jourdan and Stevenson 
(the last one a new member of the Council, vice Brooke) addressed a letter 
to the Governor and the military Council suggesting alternative methods of 
dealing with Anda. Drake’s reply was that it was "a very unprecedented
1 Extract of a General Letter of the Court of Directors to Fort St. 
George, 19 Feb. 1766. H.M.S., V. 10£, f. 2^6-7.
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step for members of a Board to resolve themselves into a Committee and 
take the management of affairs into their hands as if a fixt majority".*
The point at issue was whether the G-overnor as a minority could
always be overruled by a majority, notwithstanding his executive power.
The Company, precisely to guard against autocratic rule in their settle­
ments, created the council type of government. Yet in the name of 
expediency they had to allow considerable latitude to their chief agents 
and leave much to their discretion by a loose construction of their 
orders. Indeed, Drake had the absence of law on his side, and he acted 
in much the same manner as, say, Governor Pigot would in Madras, whose 
doings he was very familiar with.
llothlng could be more eloquent of their dissatisfaction with their
governor or their jobs than the successive withdrawals of the Council
members. Of the four original appointees, none remained after September
176^• Henry Parsons, a factor, and Captain William Stevenson, an officer
2
in the Company’s forces, replaced Hussell and Johnson. After Smith and 
5
Brooke left, ostensibly on leave to go to China, Francis Jourdan, a 
former writer, took his place in the Council.
By July 1765, the occupants of Manila were in the grip of Anda* s
1 The full correspondence on the subject is found in H.M.S., V.77, 
f. 285-510.
2 Parsons and Stevenson requested to be admitted into the council
vice dussell and Johnson on 5 May 1765* They were admitted on a
temporary appointment. Man. Cons., V. 6, p. 105.
5 Smith and Brooke had both requested to proceed to China on leave. 
Their request was granted on 24 Aug. 1765» Ibid., p. 176.
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forces. The latter, joined "by Spanish citizens of considerable means
and fighting-men from the Filipino and the Santissima Trinidad, and
bolstered further by the monetary resources of the incoming galleon,
had approached within nine kilometres of the city. Don Pedro Jose de
Busto, Anda1s second in command, had established his headquarters at Malinta,
an Augustinian estate, fortifying the place with breastworks and several 
1
cannons. From this base he led and sent forays into the suburbs of
Manila which harassed the inhabitants so much that they abandoned their
homes. This left the city wide open to the enemy on the north. A strong
detachment was thus marched out with Captain Sleigh in command. But
hearing that the Spanish force was much greater than his, Sleigh "thought
it imprudent to put his party to such risk," exchanged a few shots with
2
the enemy, then returned to Manila.
Apparently Busto also thought that his position was a risky one for 
he abandoned Malinta and retired to Meycawayan, a little further to the
3
north. Attacks on the suburbs were then resumed, most of them quite daring.
1 Man. Cons. (27 June 1763)» V. 5* P* 15^»
2 Father Zuniga wrote that the two opposing sides were separated by
the river of Maysilo, but neither dared to cross it. "Both were so 
prudent that either one remained on its side and spared the blood of 
its soldiers”. He remarked further that the Spaniards were somewhat 
unprepared for the attack and that if the English had crossed the 
river in the morning they could have routed Busto1s fledgling troops. 
Estadismo, etc., I, p. J 4 2 - 7 .
3 The English sent a vessel to Batangas for provisions which was chased 
away by Anda’s followers. The same thing befell the English boats
despatched down the river Pasig to the Laguna. Even bolder was the
taking of an English galley at the very gate of Manila, at the 
Almacenes. Ibid., p. 553“"4:* ££• the Admiral Pooock' s trip to Orani, 
narrated below.
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Thus Drake recommended dislodging the enemy from their new position.
But Major Fell opined that "it would he running a great risk to no 
purpose". Instead three nearby outposts were occupied, e.g., the 
Jesuits1 Garden, Tondo, and Quiapo.
On 22nd July, a ship arrived from Fort St. George bringing the
royal proclamation for a suspension of arms.* A copy was sent to Arch-
2
bishop Hojo who in turn addressed it to Anda. The latter rejected the
overture and warned that if the English wanted a cessation of hostilities
they must deal with him directly, and give proper security for its
observance. It was then decided to notify Anda of the cessation by public
4
letter, but none of the Spaniards in the city would deliver it to him. 
Finally, Father Juan de la Concepcion, head of the Recollect Order, offered 
to convey the letter. At Anda’s camp, he received a rebuff from Villa-
g
corta* who demanded an acknowledgement of Anda as Governor and Captain 
General of the islands in the superscription to the letters addressed to him.
1 Letter from Fort St. George, 24 June, in Madras Mil. Cons., V. 49, 
f. 29-31.
2 Rojo’s letter, 24 July, ibid., p. 167.
3 Yide letter received by Rojo from Anda dated Bacolor, 29 July.
Ibid., p. 175-7.
4 Cons., 18 Aug., ibid., p. 179-80.
5 "Duplicate Copy of instructions to Padre Juan de la Concepcion 
enclosing Duplicate Copy of a paper for his guidance to be inter­
changeably signed by him and Mr. Anda"; also "Duplicate Copy of a 
letter to Mr. Anda, per Fray Juan," (all delivered to Concepcion 
on 23 August) in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 2I5-I6, 223-5.
6 "Duplicate Copy of a letter from Padre Juan de la Concepcion,
Manilha, 1 Sept. 1763." Ibid., f. 227-30.
155
Nevertheless, Concepcion returned to Manila supposedly with authority 
from Anda and "the chiefs of the faction" to present their proposals.
In the meantime, on 26th August, the preliminary articles of peace
were received in Manila.^ The British Council then asked Anda for a pass
for two English officers, one of whom was Major Fell, who were to bring
the preliminaries to Anda. However, they changed their minds and sent
instead Father Concepcion with their answers to the Spanish proposals.
Villacorta* s reaction was one of disgust, peppered with a strong
admonition to Concepcion for his presumptuousness and his Order* s obvious
2
"good understanding with the British Governor".
On 19th October, Manila received advice of the signing of the
3
Definitive Treaty between France, England, and Spain. While waiting for
orders to return the conquests to the Spaniards, the English were looking
around for provisions, the supply of which had become extremely precarious.
Plans were made to send a Company ship to Lubang, an island well off 
4
Manila Bay. Finding this hazardous, they sent the Admiral Pocock, four
1 See letter from Fort St. George, 24 June 1763, Madras Mi 1. Cons.,
V. 49, f. 29-31* Read in consultation at Manila, 26 Aug., Man. Cons., 
V. 3, p. 189.
2 It appears that Concepcion did not receive authority from Anda to 
negotiate a cessation of arms with the English, as Villacorta 
demurred to the sending of the articles in the name of Anda rather 
than in those of the British Governor and Council. Fide, letter 
from Fillacorta to Concepcion read in consultation of 14 Sept., 
ibid., p. 194-5*
3 Fort St. George letter per Admiral Pocock, 16 Aug. Madras Mil. Cons., 
V. 49, f. I22-3. Read in consultation of 19 Oct., Man. Cons., V. 5, 
p. 207.
4 Cons., 11 Nov., ibid., p. 213.
champanes, a number of small cascos, and all the Company’s vessels to
1
lay off Orani and other villages in Manila Bay. The Pocock returned
2
with only some ’’cavanes” of unhusked rice, recounting that a large body
3
of enemy troops cut them off from further supply.
In December, Brereton suggested that all the Spaniards in Sta. Cruz
should be called into Manila, in order that the guns of the city could
keep that suburb clear of the enemy T1by firing upon every part of it by 
4
day and night”. Backhouse, on the other hand, recommended an all-out 
preparation, both offensive and defensive. As soon as the season allowed 
it, parties should be sent ”to a considerable distance” to procure grain 
and provisions, attended by field artillery, etc.
In the same month, the Manila government made another effort to
reach an agreement with Anda. A letter was sent, addressing him as
"Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the provinces” and enclosing the
6
preliminary articles. On 6th January following, proposals arrived from 
Anda under a flag of truce, together with the letter, unopened, which had
1 Cons., 15 Ifov.f ibid.
2 The cavan ”is a unit of capacity used for measuring grain in the
Philippines. It holds 25 gantas of rice or 1 picul (equivalent 
to 100 catlies at Canton, or 132-137-g- ibs.) See ’’Glossaries,” 
H.M.S., V. 68; Rafael Diaz Arenas, Memoria sobre el comercio y la 
navegacion de las is las Pilipinas, Cadiz, I838.
3 Diary, 18tfov., Man. Cons., V. 5, p. 225.
4 Letter from Brereton to the Council read in Cons., 19 Dec., ibid.,
p. 23O.
5 Backhouse’s letter to Council, 29 Dec., ibid., p. 236.
6 Cons., 19 Dec., ibid., p.230-2.
"been sent to him. He asked that all edicts published against him should
he withdrawn, that he should he acknowledged with the title of ’’President,
Governor and Captain-General of the Philippine Islands,” and that all
documents of the suspension of arms to he sent to him should he signed
by the British Governor and Council, Captain Backhouse as Commandant of
1
their troops, and the Commandant of the Marine.
On 19th January, the han against him was lifted and it was agreed 
to recognize him with the title of General and Commander-in-Chief of His 
Catholic Majesty1s troops in the provinces. For reply Anda wrote the 
English that his government would agree to a cessation of hostilities as 
soon as they had set the date for their evacuation of the conquests, which 
should not he later than February next; otherwise he would continue the 
war.
The English retorted that they had not received any order yet for
the restitution of the conquered places, gave the Spaniards seven days
to answer, and prepared for the worst. Brereton and Backhouse were both 
4
consulted. The former urged the burning of Manila and withdrawal to
5
Cavite, which idea repelled the Company^ officers. Backhouse, on the
6
other hand, recommended an expedition either to Bacolor or to the Laguna.
1 p.i.
2 Text of the proclamation in ibid., p. 4.
5 Anda1 s "declaration,” dated Bacolor, Z 7) Jan. 1764. Ibid., p. 12.
4 Cons., 27 Jan., ibid., p. 1^ *
5 Brereton^ letter, 28 Jan., ibid., p. 16-17.
6 Backhouse1 s letter, 18 Feb., ibid., p. 28-9.
But the Board was convinced that the best way to .bring the enemy to
terms was to dislodge them from Polo, their new base following their
removal from Meycawayan. Backhouse, who was to head the campaign,
however, posed many difficulties and the plan was given up, Then the
Manila Board thought of taking a post at Tambobong, to intercept all
provisions reaching Polo.'1' Backhouse again objected and the plan was 
2
also shelved.
Shortly afterwards, the Manila government received a letter from 
Anda saying that he had given orders for a cessation of arms and
inviting them to send representatives to meet with his own to settle the
3
terms.' Stevenson and Jourdan were chosen to represent the English,
while Bon Francisco Xavier Salgado and Don Mariano Tobias were to compose
4
the Spanish delegation. The negotiations proceeded rather tortuously. 
Neither side would initiate proposals at first. The English deputies 
found that their Spanish counterparts had full powers to conclude a 
treaty, which they did not have.
The first British proposals turned principally on the inclusion of
1 Cons.* 28 Feb., ibid., p. 32*
2 Backhouse later claimed that if he followed "the advice of the
Governor and Council of Manila in military affairs and put in
execution their plans of operations since 6th Oct. 1763» the 
result and consequence... must have been a rupture between the
courts of Great Britain and Spain, 100,000 dollars1 expense to
the Company, and the destruction of most of the troops." Letter 
to Fort St. George, 17 March, Madras Mil. Cons. (26 June), V. $ 0 .  
f. 417.
3 Bead in Cons., 1 March, Man. Cons., V. 9A, p. 34“5*
4 Letter from Anda, Polo, 10 March, ibid., p. J 7 .
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"their allies and. dependents," meaning the Chinese and Suluans, in the 
truce, and the delimitation of the English outposts. The Spanish 
proposals were more elaborate and extensive, covering, among other things, 
the route which English ships should take on the way to China and the 
right of free commerce to Spanish and foreign vessels at certain points. 
The principal point of dispute was the extent of territorial jurisdiction 
to he allowed to the English. Later British proposals stressed the 
necessity of maintaing a free access to provisions from provinces for 
the city.*
2
On 8th March, the Company ship Revenge arrived in Manila bringing 
the long-awaited Definitive Treaty ending the Seven Years’ War and the 
orders for restoring Manila and any other conquests to the Spaniards.
The Tambobong conference, with all the obstacles to a mutual suspension 
of arms between actual combatants, was thus brought to an end. But among 
the English, the arrival of the final notices only posed more serious 
difficulties, the culmination of a long and disastrous record of petty 
disputes.
1 Details of the transactions at Tambobong in ihid., p. 41, et. seq.
2 The Bevenge was despatched from Madras in August 1765* Thus the
voyage took more than six months, which normally was made in less 
than three. Captain Horne writes about the delay in the following 
manner: "The Panther and the Revenge ... instead of pursuing
their instructions had been making a trading voyage to Malacca, 
Cudda, and Batavia, where Panther pretended she had lost her passage 
and proceeded no further; Revenge after taking in a private cargo 
pursued her voyage by Pitt’s passage and at length arrived..."
Letter to Richard Smith, 20 Oct. 1764, loc. cit.
5 Fort St. George Letter to Manila, 21 August 176^. Madras Mil. Cons., 
(22 Aug.), V. 49, f. 1^2-4.
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The question now revolved on who should deliver the conquests to
the Spanish authority. Brereton and Backhouse claimed that the right
"belonged to them, referring to the orders given by the Secretary of
State through Admiral Cornish, which directed that they should make the
1
restitution of any conquests remaining in their command. In reply, the 
Company administration cited their orders from Madras which repeated the 
Company’s instructions that although they understood the King’s commanders 
should concern themselves with restoring such places only as may be in 
their possession, they would have their respective presidents and councils 
"take the most prudent measures in concert with His Majesty’s forces to
2
carry into execution in the most effectual manner the Treaty of Peace”.
It should be remembered that Brereton relinquished the government
of Cavite in August of the previous year. As to Manila, there was no
doubt that the Company’s government was in charge at the arrival of the
Treaty. Confronted with the implied rights of the other side the two
commanders seemed to balk a bit in the pursuit of their exaggerated claims.
Then the Spanish ship, Santa iiosa, arrived from Acapulco, bringing the
new governor of the islands and a packet from the British King supposedly
3
for his commanders-in-chief. Although the papers contained in the packet
1 Vide, Copy of a letter from the Bari of Sgremont, one of His 
Majesty^s Principal Secretaries of State, to Vice Admiral Cornish, 
dated 21 March 1763* Man. Cons., V. 4, p. 2.
2 Extract from the 10th Paragraph of the Company’s General Letter 
of 31 March 1763. Ibid., p. 3.
3 Charles III, by royal order of 29 June 1763* entrusts the Marquis of 
Cruillas with appointing a person to carry ”los pliegos del real 
servicio para la evacuacion de (Manila)”. The marquis’ choice fell 
on D. Alfonso Hodriguez de Ovalle. The latter proceeded to Acapulco
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were the game as those received from Madras, the fact that the newly-
arrived G-ovemor Francisco de la Torre delivered them into the commanders1
hands confirmed the latter1s belief that the right to arrange the
1
restitution devolved on them alone. The debate on the subject was 
2
resumed, this time accompanied by imprudent action.
On 20th March Backhouse gave orders for the return of the Pasig
where he embarked on the Santa Hosa on 23 December. The frigate 
anchored in Manila Bay on 15 March 1764 (Spanish date), a voyage 
of 83 days. Prologue to Sitio y Conquista de Manila, Zaragoza, 
1897, by the Marquis de Ayerbe, a descendant of the Marques de 
Cruillas.
1 The Spaniards appear to have played the English against each other. 
Nicholas de Schauz Beaumont, one of the Spanish deputies on the 
arrangements for receiving the conquests, wrote to Backhouse that 
the Spaniards would deal with him alone, knowing his authority and 
remembering his disinterested behavior both at Manila and Pasig, 
which was "very different from that of the Governor and Council". 
Letter dated Sta. Cruz, 20 March 1764, reproduced in Backhouse’s 
"Narrative of Proceedings at Manila upon the Island of Luconia 
from the Arrival of the Definitive Treaty of Peace till the 
Departure of His Majesty’s troops and Ships from Thence," written 
in Batavia, 6 Sept. 1764. H.M.S., V. 98, f. 161.
Brereton made an assertion that in a "personal conference" he had 
with de la Torre on 23rd March the latter said that he "expected 
the conquests to be delivered up to him from the persons the 
British King had authorized ..., and from no others, nor would he 
have any negotiations with the Company’s servants as he had 
delivered the King’s order to (Brereton) and the Commandant of the 
troops". The Council’s reply was that "the Spanish governor in a 
letter addressed to them jointly expresses himself differently".
In fact a letter written by the four Spanish deputies (Beaumont, 
Salgado, Tobias and ilaymundo Espanol), desiring the evacuation of 
Manila and Cavite, was addressed "To the Governor and Council and 
the British Chiefs by Sea and Land," (Sta. Cruz, 27 March).
Man. Cons., V. 9, passim.
2 Vide letters exchanged on 24-27 March in H.M.S.. V. 98, f. I6I-3 
and Man. Cons., V. 9, p. 75-82.
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post to the Spaniards. On the 25th he was asked by the Board to show
His Majesty’s Sign Manual which he had claimed to be the basis of his
assumed authority. When he refused* he was ordered under arrest and
confined in the Citadel* while Captain Sleigh was appointed to take his 
2
place.
5
Meanwhile Brereton was busy piling up complaints against Drake.
Some of them were of scandalous proportions* and to avoid further 
aspersions reflecting on the name of the Company, the Council prevailed
on Drake to relinquish his post to Alexander Dalrymple and embark on one
4 5of the Company ships. Captain Sleigh then released Backhouse, and the
latter proceeded to withdraw the fort-in-guard of Manila and put himself 
in command of the city. In a last attempt to preserve their authority, 
the Company* s men sent Captain Stevenson to Cavite to assume the governor­
ship there and take charge of its restitution. On the next day, the ^Oth, 
they went on board the Revenge, leaving Manila to their Bnglish 
protagonists.6
1 Cons., 21 March, ibid., p. 71.
2 Cons., 25 March, ibid., p. 77-8
3 These complaints, mostly of extortion, were read in Cons, of 
28 March, dbid.-» p. 8^-9.
4 Drake resigned on the 28th and embarked on the Admiral Pocock 
on the 29th March. Ibid., V. 10, p. 1-2,
5 Dalrymple and Council (Stevenson, Jourdan and Parsons) tried to
bring Sleigh into line by depriving him of his command but they
were completely ignored. Ibid., p. 5-6.
6 Ibid., p. 6-8.
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On the 3 t ,  Backhouse issued his order for the evacuation of
Manila to take place on the following day.'1' In the handing-over
2
ceremony Anda fittingly received the keys of the city. Thereafter, 
the Snglish troops marched out at the Sea Gate and hoarded the vessels
in the Bay. Meanwhile, Captain Sleigh received orders to take over Cavite
„ 3
and deliver it to the Spaniards. Unable to dislodge Stevenson from there,
4
he also embarked with his detachment on 4th April.
On 11th April Stevenson delivered up Cavite, and then boarded the 
xievenge. This, with the I locos freight ship, sailed for Mariveles where 
the other vessels of the Company had been lying. On the 16th, the 
captains of the Revenge, Admiral Pocock, and I locos received their sailing 
orders. They were to return to Madras by the Pitt’s Passage, the season 
being too far gone to go by the usual route, that is, through the Straits 
of Malacca via the China Sea. But first, they were to touch at Sulu, 
where Dalrymple had some unfinished business. Then they should make their
I
way between Borneo and Celebes, thence into the Indian Ocean. They were
also to keep company with the King’s ship, the Falmouth, if she went on 
R
the same track. y
1 Heproduced in his "Narrative," loc. cit.
2 On the day of the ceremony, the new governor de la Torre took ill, 
probably feigned in order to make way for Anda who greatly deserved 
the honor.
3 Backhouse and Brereton to Sleigh, 2 April; also Sleigh to Dalrymple,
3 April. Man. Cons., 7. 10, p. 14-5.
4 Backhouse’s "Narrative," loc. cit.
5 Captain Brereton asked that all the ships on the return voyage should
be placed under his command, as they "must go on a very dangerous
track". He was denied. Vide, Council’s letter to Brereton, 29 March; 
Brereton’s reply, 30 March; and Council’s letter, 31 March. Ibid.,
p. 8-10.
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On the 17th, the entire British force left Manila Bay, some
1500 troops1 distributed, among the Falmouth, Siam, Revenge, Admiral
2
Pocock* Ilocos, and London, the last one to he left behind in Sulu 
under Dalrymple*s charge. Accompanying the fleet were between 1,000
and 1,200 Chinese on board about ten champanes, destined for either Sulu
3
or the West Coast of Sumatra.'
As a consistent finale to an unfortunate and rather ill-conceived 
enterprise, the return voyage met with all sorts of obstacles. The 
passage to Sulu was "very long and tedious". In the Strait3 of Macassar, 
the Admiral Pocock lost company* and its passengers were not heard of 
until many months later. At Batavia the Siam was run ashore, being very 
leaky, while the Falmouth was "in so bad a condition that she couldn’t 
proceed without a thorough repair”. Thus at Fort Marlborough, the 
Princess Augusta and the Admiral Watson had to be taken up to convoy the 
cargo of the two disabled ships. The Revenge and the Ilocos left Batavia 
together, but only the former, in fact the only one of the entire fleet,
1 By the general returns laid before the Board on 10 March, there 
were "upwards of 1,500 men, exclusive of servants, to be embarked.” 
Ibid., V. 9, p. 55* ££• Madras Mi 1 Cons., V. 5°» f w h i c h  
gives the exact figure 1,468 from the report of 1 March from Manila.
2 The whole artillery was embarked on the Revenge, the King’s 
Regiment on the Falmouth and Siam, the latter, a Spanish ship,
"old Cornish couldn’t take," Drake and all the civilians, along 
with 400 Sepoys on the Admiral Pocock, an Indiaman, the Company’s 
troops and the rest of the Sepoys on the London and Ilocos, the 
latter, a country ship taken up for accommodations. Matthew Horne 
to Richard Smith, 20 Oct. 1764, loc. cit.
See chapter on Balambangan settlement.
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arrived in Madras on 20 September 1764. Although no serious casualties
were reported among the returning troops, it was not until 25 1765?
that Captain Backhouse, with the remainder of the 79th itegiment, was
2
accounted for at Madras. Drake himself did not arrive at the settle­
ment until 11 April 1766, having teen to China and Bengal since leaving 
Manila.^ As late as November 1767 Sepoys from the expedition were yet to
come. They had teen left at Sulu ty the Admiral Pocock and were reported
4
to have undergone "the greatest hardships".
Thus ended the controversial Manila expedition. In terms of what 
toth the Company and the King1 s Government had hoped to derive from it, 
the enterprise was a complete disappointment. So far as the Company was 
concerned, they had two main objectives in joining the project - first, 
to enable them to tap a reputedly inexhaustible source of dollars and 
bullion with which to help finance their growing China trade; and second, 
to give them a springboard whence to establish a settlement astride the 
spice-producing area.
For many years a clandestine trade had been going on between Madras
1 See Horne’s letter to Smith, cited above.
2 Stringer Lawrence to the Earl of Halifax, Fort St. George, 15 Oct.
1765. H.M.S., V. 98, f. I55.
5 The delay was perhaps intentional, as he would be confronted with
all the complaints and charges laid against him at Manila. He was 
found guilty of "some" of them, and by order of the Court of 
Directors, was dismissed from the Company’s service. Fort St. George 
letter to the Company, 25 Jan. 1767; idem, 4 Nov., 1767; idem, 1 Bov. 
1768. Abstracts Fort St. George Letters lleceived, No. 1.
4 Fort St. George letter to Company, 5 Nov* 1767, ibid.
and Manila, through which cargoes of Indian and Chinese goods collected
at the former were delivered in exchange for dollars or ‘bullion at the
latter. The English administering Fort St. George customarily freighted
country ships flying Asian flags, since no European vessel was allowed
1
"by the Spaniards to trade at Manila.
Draper said that while preparations for the expedition were under­
way at Madras, he met with very little cooperation from the Company’s 
servants there, apparently because they had just consigned a cargo
valued at £70,000 to Manila and were afraid that their business would
2
suffer from the capture of the city. in fact the trade going on between 
Manila and Madras had been quite important, as may be gauged from the 
concern expressed by the Fort St. George Presidency as to the stoppage 
of the Manila trade in the war of the 1740’s.
When the English withdrew in 1764, Quintin Crawford was left in
4
Manila to act as the Company’s agent there. They had hopes that the 
Spaniards would allow the usual yearly shipment from Madras under Asian 
colors. In 1765 their hopes were justified; their Manila trade which
1 See chapter on "Manila Trade".
2 W.O. lAl9, f. 405-7.
5 Vide chapter on "Manila Trade".
4 Letter from Parsons, Stevenson and Jourdan to Governor Francisco de
la Torre, 28 March 1764, asking permission to leave Crawford as the
Company’s agent in Manila, ostensibly to take charge of the sick to
be left behind and embarked later. Man. Cons., V. 10, p. 4.
5 "The Spanish governor was said to have promised the renewal of commerce
■under Asiatic colours as formerly and the utmost friendship". Fort
St. George Letter to the Court of Directors, JO Jan. 1765*
Abstracts Fort St. George Letters Aeceived, I.e. 1.
amounted, to 220,000 dollars enabled them to furnish silver to China.
In the following year, however, their ship was detained, and the captain
2
and supercargoes imprisoned, ’’though under a Moorish pass". They
attributed this to the arrival of a Spanish ship by way of the Cape of
Good Hope which obviously had brought fresh orders from the Court of
Madrid.' On 11th May 1768, Fort St. George wrote to the Company that
the Manila trade was discontinued, having been declared illegal by the
4
Spanish government.
As to the proposed settlement in the south, the Company’s hopes
were also frustrated. Draper and Cornish, disregarding their instructions
left the islands without attempting to take Mindanao. During their
occupation of Manila, the Company’s agents sent a mission to Mindanao,
headed by Ensign Durand and accompanied by the ambassador of the sultan
of the Kingdom from which the whole island took its name.5 This too failed
as we shall see in a separate chapter. The only tangible legacy which
the Company seemed to derive from the Manila expedition was an uncollected 
6
debt of t£lJ9,877 due from the Spanish government by the terms of
1 Furthermore, British contacts in Manila enabled them to procure
silver at an advantageous rate. Fort St. George Letter to the
Court of Directors, 18 Oct. 1765* ibid.
2 Idem, 2^ Jan. 1767, ibid.
5 See chapter on "Manila Trade".
4 Ibid.
5 See chapter on "Further British Projects".
6 To the Earl of Hillsborough, from william Devaynes and Lawrence 
Sulivan, East India House, 19 Aug. 1780. H.M.S., V. 146, f. 1^7.
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capitulation signed in Manila in October 1762.
On the part of the king's Government, the taking of Manila scarcely 
served the purpose for which the expedition was launched, that is* to off­
set Spanish demands at the peace table. The preliminary articles of peace 
had been agreed upon before the news of Manila’3 fall reached Europe.
In fact, as one English author laments* by the time Havana fell, which 
was a month before the invasion of Manila began, the King and his chief 
minister Lord Bute, "had succeeded in dragging their unwilling country to 
the brink of a nerveless peace".1 In the Definitive Treaty of 10 February 
1763* the English victories at both Manila and Havana were squandered.
The two places were returned without exacting an equivalent price from 
Spain. The full amount of the "Manila ransom" was never collected. This
and other unsettled matters relating to the expedition exacerbated the
2
difficulties between the English and Spanish courts and for some time 
kept feelings high inside England.
1 J.S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, II. p. 298.
2 Letters and memorials were exchanged between the English and Spanish 
Courts relative to the taking of the galleon Santissima Trinidad, the 
alleged plunder of the Augustinian church and convent at Manila, and 
the demands of the English Company on the Hoyal Treasury at Madrid 
for bills drawn by the Spanish Governor at Manila. Calendar of Home 
Office Papers of the Heign of George III 1760 (Oct. 26) - 1766*
London, 1878, -passim.
3 Captains Backhouse and Brereton brought charges of misconduct against
the Company’s servants at Manila. Brereton speaks of his memorial to
the King being suppressed, of transactions at Manila which "would not 
bear the light nor ought to be known to the public," especially in 
times of uneasy peace with the powers on the continent, and of "a veil 
being drawn over those transactions". Ibid. The liveliest of 
discussions, however, were those which turned on the uncollected Manila 
ransom, debated to bitter lengths by Draper and Junius. See Gentle­
man’ 3 Magazine, 1764, Y. 33^* P* 3^4; London Chronicle, 28 Feb. -
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The expedition, nevertheless, had at least two favorable 
consequences* although the real effects were not felt until much later.
It was the instrument by which the deposed sultan of Sulu and his heir 
were returned to their seat of authority, under circumstances which
1
could not have failed to impress the impressionable Malays of the south.
Politically, it bolstered Dalrymple*s project for amicable, mutually
advantageous relations between the two peoples, by initiating among the
2
Sulus a tradition of partisanship inclined towards the English. This, 
indeed, proved invaluable for the future, in laying the foundations of 
British North Borneo and in providing the Sulu hierarchy with what was to 
them a fair expedient, besieged as they were by the Spaniards and Dutch 
to the north and south of them and harassed by "imperial" problems of 
their own involving the Bornean possessions.
One other people with whom the English established a successful and 
profitable liaison during their occupation of Manila and other places on 
Luzon island were the Chinese. The latter, an important element in the 
economic life of the colony, easily identified their interests with thoee 
of the conquerors, whose liberal attitudes toward trade distinguished them
21 March 1765, V. 17, No. 1279; Scots Magazine, 1766, p. 48, 270, 
441; Ditto, 1767, p, $ 49, 6O5; A Complete Collection of Junius* 
Letters with those of Sir William Draper, London, 1770.
1 The fleet returning from the Manila expedition stopped at Sulu and 
consisted of a man-of-war, the Falmouth, two Indiamen, the Eevenge 
and the Admiral Pocock, and three country ships, the London, the 
Siam and the I locos, besides some galleys, and nine or ten champanes 
carrying the Chinese immigrants. Military Despatch from George 
Pigot to the Company, 20 Oct. 1764. Dodwell, op. cit., V . 2, p. ^97.
2 See chapter on the Balambangan Settlement.
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from the other European imperialists. Under the wary and jealous Spanish 
regime at Manila, the Chinese had had to stand various oppressive 
impositions; indeed, at the coming of the English, their "maltreatment” 
under Governor Arandia was still fresh in the mind.
The Chinese were not made liable to the terms of the capitulation,
particularly with respect to the payment of the Manila ransom.* They
were placed in charge of confiscated "rebel" property, granted monopolies,
to which we have already referred, and awarded contracts for various jobs,
2
like the demolition of the stone churches outside the city walls. They 
were taxed only to the extent of their needs within their colony in Manila, 
called the Parian, and care was taken to look into and redress their
3grievances.
In return, the Chinese performed various services, military as well 
as economic. They organized an auxiliary unit to assist in the Bulacan 
campaign, as we have seen. They served as spies, guides, and sentinels,
1 Placido Pigolotti, whose ship was seized, along with the cargo,
by Admiral Cornish, objected on the ground that the cargo belonged
to the merchants of Batavia and should not be made liable to the
capitulation, which obviously pertained only to Spanish effects from 
the exemption of those of the Chinese. Man. Cons., (21 Feb. 1765 
IT. 6, p. 55 •
2 The paymaster presented a bill from a Chinese for destroying the 
church of Santiago, Cons., 6 June 1763* Ibid., p. 119.
5 Admiral Cornish once protested against the Board’s lading a tax on 
the Chinese, which he alleged to be the "impolitick and interested 
shhemes" of Faillet (letter, 17 Feb. 1765* ibid., V. 5> P* 55)»
This tax appears to be the lanuatz, a private fund levied by the
Chinese themselves for the benefit of their community. The Committee, 
"appointed to inquire into grievances the Chinese may labor under," 
adverts that if the "corregidor" of the Parian does not apply the fund 
to the uses intended, which appears to be the case, then it becomes "&n 
object of government’s attention." Letter from the Committee, 15 Dec. 
1765, ibid., V. 6, p. 248-9.
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performed cavalry duty, and joined sorties into Spanish outposts. Upon 
them the English at Manila relied mainly for keeping up the flow of goods 
from the Laguna area and for undertaking functions which the native 
inhabitants refused for fear of Spanish reprisal.
The English inclination to favor the Chinese in the Philippines
stemmed mainly from two motives. They were especially keen on acquiring
2
a good name for the Company at Canton and on drawing more Chinese to trade
at Manila. They were also badly in need of Chinese settlers for the West 
5
Coast of Sumatra and found the Philippines a good source of Chinese
manpower ready and willing to leave for greener pastures. Before the
English withdrew from Manila, they obtained a substantial number of
4
Chinese to go to either Sumatra or Sulu.
1 They performed these services in Pasig, Laguna, Batangas, and the 
suburbs of Manila, Ibid., Y. 2, 5» -passim.
2 Yide, Manila General Letter to the Court of Directors, 10 Nov. 1762. 
Abstracts Fort St. George Letters Received, No. 1.
5 Letter from John Herbert, Resident at Batavia, 28 May 1765* says that 
unless the West Coast were supplied with Chinese settlers, the settle­
ments were likely to continue "in a very languid and contracted state".
He advises that the sooner the Manila Board could sendk supply of them 
the better, lest a peace takes place and Manila should be ceded again 
to the Spaniards". He then adds, "with the assistance of the Chinese, 
Fort Marlborough is capable to be made a Batavia in a short time".
Man. Cons., Y. 6, p. 155*
4 The expense of transporting JOO Chinese from Manila to the West Coast 
was "carried to the head of Fort Marlborough" by Fort St. George in 
the letter of 14 Oct. 1765 to the Company, Abstracts Fort St. George 
Letters Received, No. 1. This number was evidently short of expectations. 
Manila writes - "although a number of them had offered for the West 
Coast yet when the ships came for them it was with much difficulty and 
expense that 220 artificers, etc., were prevailed on to proceed and the 
ships detained eight days for them." Manila Letter, 1 Feb. 1764, ibid. 
The Committee on grievances reports in December 1765 that the Chinese
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1
In the agreement which the English offered to make with Anda in 
September 1763 ?or a suspension of arms, they took pains to include the 
Chinese and "all other allies or dependents of the British nation" among 
the subjects of the British King and as such entitled to his protection.'1'
At Tambobong, in March 1764, they repeated this point, to which the 
Spanish deputies in charge of arranging the restitution of the conquests 
with the English replied that neither the vassals or allies of His 
Catholic Majesty, evidently referring to the Chinese and the Sultan of
Sulu and his people, were to be compelled to become British subjects
2
nor withdrawn from the islands.
From subsequent exchanges between the English Board and the
Spanish Authorities, it was evident that the English were bent on taking
3
away with them the Sultan and as many Chinese as possible, while the
Spaniards tried hard to stop them. Their correspondence was spiced by
denunciations on either side. The Spaniards claimed that the Chinese were
5
encouraged by the English to a "licentious manner” of withdrawing from
had become less sanguine of leaving for the West Coast because they 
heard that the English would probably remain another year, and 
because they had greater hopes of being reconciled with the Spaniards. 
Man. Cons. (22 Dec. 1763)> P* 248«
1 H.M.S., V. 77, f. 231-3.
2 Man. Cons., Y. 9, P* 41, 43, 46.
3 Orders were given to prepare the Falmouth and Siam and procure
champanes for conveying Chinese, 10 March. Ibid., p. 53-
4 The English Board received letters from de la Torre protesting to
the removal of the Sultan of Sulu and the Chinese. Read in Cons,
of 21 March, ibid., p. 68, 72, 74*
5 De la Torre’s letter, 3 April, ibid., V. 10, p. 13.
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1
the Parian and joining the departing forces at Cavite, while the
English jusitifed the Chinese for their lack of faith in the word of
2
the Spaniards to grant them amnesty m  view of the atrocious acts 
committed against them by the restored rulers.
When the English finally pulled out of Manila Bay, they had on
board their vessels the Sultan of Sulu and his entire retinue, 1,200
4
Chinese, besides two men whom the Spaniards had demanded for acts of
5
treason and malversation against them.
1 The Spanish Governor, de la Torre, is reported to be "exasperated 
to the utmost height of passion against the Company," the latter 
having left the Spaniards "destitute of every kind of embarkation," 
which, it was alleged, "were decoyed to Cavite under the pretence 
of carrying off the troops and then kept to carry off the Chinese". 
Crawfurd!s letter, 10 April, ibid., p. 21.
2 The Spanish deputies "promised in the most solemn manner that the 
Chinese should have a free pardon". Cons, of 18 March, ibid., p. 69.
5 Backhouse precipitately ordered the withdrawal of the fort-in-guard, 
thereby exposing the Chinese in the Parian to the "resentment" of the 
Spaniards. The Chinese were further placed "under great apprehension 
of the Indians," who were now apparently taking their revenge for 
past acts committed against them by those people. The Chinese were 
reported to have lost considerable amount of goods by seizures and a
number of lives in Oavite. Ibid., p. 7, 14, 17, 21.
4 One was Cesar Faillet (see chapter on the Invasion), and the other was
Bon Santiago Orendain. The latter was said to be indebted to the 
Jioyal Misericordia, a pious foundation, and to others to the amount
of 60,000 dollars. He was also involved in the irregular proceedings 
in the sale of property of the Augustinian convent. He was previously 
accused of carrying on a secret correspondence with Anda by the 
English, and of treacherously abandoning the command of a sally by 
the Spaniards. Ibid., V. 5* P* 220; V. 6, p. 222-5; v. 10, p.5.
5 As for the Spaniards, the English invasion demonstrated at least 
three lessons, the vulnerability of their Eastern possession, the 
danger from the Chinese community residing in the Philippines, and 
the inadequacy of their law of succession to the highest executive 
office, the governorship. They were also set astir by the apparently 
successful contact made by the English with the Sulus, an intrepid
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Mo&ammedan group who had successively resisted Spanish attempt at 
conquest and assimilation. They were said to he "highly jealous 
of the knowledge that Dalrymple had obtained of those parts;" 
indeed, they must have realized the fecklessness of their policy 
towards those "uncommitted" peoples of the south, that in the 
years to come they were making vigorous efforts, if not to subdue* 
at least to keep them effectively within their bounds. Above all, 
the Spaniards thenceforth would lend painstaking attention to the 
Philippines and give their administrative machinery there a long 
overdue shot in the arm.. Vide. Extract of representations made by 
Anda to Carlos III, June and July 1764, in Blair and ilobertson, 
op. cit., V. 49, -passim; Crawford’s letter to Fort St. George,
1 Oct. 1764, H.M.S., V. 77, f. 314-I5.
CHAPTER VI
The First Balambangan Settlement
Balambangan is an island situated off the north-west extremity of 
Borneo, lying to the west of Banguey Island on the opposite side of a 
channel from Balabac. It is nearly equal to the island of Hongkong in 
size, also irregular in outline, lying in a southwest to northeast 
direction at its length and greatly varying in breadth.
In Dalrymplefs conception of a colony, which would serve as the 
Company's main establishment in the East Indies, an island was "beyond 
comparison the best adapted... being generally more healthy and temperate 
than the mainland, and more easily maintained."^ Balambangan was such an 
island, besides being "full large enough for the purposes of a capital 
establishment and so formed that it has almost all the advantages of a 
smaller one."
Balamgangan's chief selling point, however, was its geographic 
position. It stood at the only navigable opening through a bar of more 
than 1,000 miles in length, which was formed by Borneo, Palawan and the 
Calamianes, and which sealed the Sulu Sea from the South China Sea. Ships 
coming in from the west were carried by the Westerly Monsoon, but passing 
north of the Calamianes encountered the Southeast Wind and were thus
1 These reflections of Dalrymple on the island of Balambangan were fully 
articulated in one of his more lengthy and numerous discourses on the 
subject of a British trading center in Malaysia, entitled "An Enquiry 
into the most Advantageous Place for a Capital to the Oriental Polynesia 
and Recommending for the Purpose Balambangan." A copy bearing the date 
February 1764 is found in Borneo Factory Records 1648-1814. No. 58 in 
Packet IX. Cf. A Plan for Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom, and 
of the East India Company, London, 1769> also by Dalrymple.
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prevented from getting further eastward. If they sailed by the south 
of Borneo with the Northwest Monsoon, they were met at the Equator by 
the contrary Northeast Wind. Therefore, a settlement established where 
they might stay till the next monsoon would be of definite advantage.
The existence of two good natural harbors on the island enhanced 
its convenience. Both were landlocked and capable of admitting "the 
largest ships." The North Harbor, with its many banks, could afford 
shelter to "above a thousand sail of ships in good clay and muddy ground." 
The landlocked part of the South Harbor, though small, was "steep to the 
shore so that the largest ship may careen to the land and in the outer 
part shelter from the Southwesterly winds."
The three districts into which the island naturally divided varied 
in their topography and mi^it be made to suit the type of settlement 
sought. The Southern one, situated between the South Harbor and the 
extremity of the island, was chiefly steep hills with some valleys, the 
high lands appearing to be very favorable to cultivation. At the harbor, 
where the hills attained the greatest height and steepness, with the 
intervening lagoon to the south, the land could be rendered inaccessible 
by a proper disposition of fortifications. It was also the most heavily 
wooded and the best watered.
The middle district, the largest in extent, was free of the rugged 
hills of the south; it was rather a mixture of high and low land, the hills 
sloping gently to the north and south, thus leaving a large plain towards 
either harbor.
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The northern district, which lay on the east side of the North 
Harbor and was separated from the middle district by a low isthmus at 
the head of the Harbor, was one expanse of downs, with sparse trees and 
brushwood, but abounding with water.
For an establishment with a small force, Dalrymple recommended the 
southern district. The northern one was easily the healthiest in appear­
ance, but for a substantially populated settlement, the middle part was 
more suitable. There were, besides, sufficient provisions to be obtained 
in Balambangan and adjoining islands, and for building purposes, those 
from Balambangan alone were adequate.
Such was the estimation held by Dalrymple of the island of Balam­
bangan as the most suitable site for the proposed British settlement in
Malaysia.1 But his dismissal from the Company*s service in effect
2
excluded him from carrying out his own project. The Directors gave the
1 Other men on the spot confirmed Dalrymple >* s views with regard to 
Balambangan's advantages as a trading base. The Chief and Council 
appointed for the settlement found the climate "very good”, the 
harbor "excellent” and the soil "very far from bad.” General letter 
to the Court of Directors, 12 Feb. 1774> Borneo. Sir John Clerke, 
commander of one of the King's ships, asked if he had observed any 
other place "equally eligible for a settlement” as Balambangan, 
answered in the negative. See "Questions from Governor-General and 
Council to Sir John Clerke and his answers in Oct. or Nov. 1775•” in 
Sir Edward Hughes1 letter of 22 March 1776 to the Earl of Rochford.
Home Miscellaneous Series (henceforth to be abbreviated as H.M.S.),
V. 165, f. 567-8.
2 On 26 October 1774, Dalrymple made a fresh tender of his services for 
Balambangan. By the declaration of a majority of the Court of Directors 
issued on 15 March 1775> Dalrymple's dismissal in 1771 was construed as 
dismissal from the charge of the expedition to Balambangan only. The 
new Regulating Act, nevertheless, was made to apply in his case, in 
accordance to which his restoration to the Company's service should be 
confirmed by ballot of the Proprietors. On 6th April following, a
command of the ship Britannia,^  which was to he used in the expedition
2for founding the settlement, to Captain James Swithin, while the "Chief” 
of the civil establishment was to be John Herbert, a council member at 
Fort Marlborough,
The project, which was first brought to the attention of the 
Company Directors in 1759» was finally launched in June 1771, with the 
issuing of a most detailed set of instructions affecting all the Indian 
presidencies. On 4 November 1768, the Company had sent secret orders to 
their servants on Bombay to despatch a vessel belonging to the Company to 
take possession of Balambangan, upon finding no other Europeans settled 
there, and to maintain possession thereof while the Directors formed a
5
plan for a settlement. In the following year, encouraged by the King's 
approval of their measure to send commissioners to India to integrate 
their affairs in that area and by the loan of one of His Majesty's ships
majority of Proprietors returned him to the Company's service, which 
was later specified as meaning his former rank on the Civil Establish­
ment at Fort St. George. Court Book (Minutes of 10 and 21 March; 6,
7, 10, and 11 April 1775), No. 83, f. 486-548, passim. See also "On 
the Proposed Restoration of Dalrymple, 1774" in Tracts on Trade, 1769- 
1792, N. 4.
1 The Britannia, with her stores, was purchased from Thomas Lane for 
£2,300. H.M.S., 771, f. 321.
2 Court's resolution of 1 May 1771, ibid., f. 381.
3 General letter to Bombay, enclosed in the letter from the Court of 
Directors to Lord Viscount Weymouth, East India House, 16 Dec. 1768. 
Ibid., V. 99, f. 259-61.
To carry out the Directors' orders, the Bombay Presidency dispatched 
to Balambangan, on 13 July 1769, the Success and Viper ketches and 
Tyger schooner. General letter to the Court, JO Nov. 1769, ibid.,
V. 102, f. 357.
On 18 Jan. 1770, Capt. Hall of the Viper returned to Bombay, with 
the "Instrument" by which he took possession of Balambangan and
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of war, the Directors resolved to make a trial of the proposed trading
base.'1' On 6 April 1770, they instructed Port St. George and Bengal to
provide an assortment of goods for consignment to the Company’s agents 
2
at Balambangan. On 12 December 1773» the Britannia anchored at the 
island after a most dilatory voyage from Madras, lasting fifteen months.
A little over a year later, the settlement was taken by a band of Suluans, 
with an estimated loss in Company property of 900,000 Spanish dollars.
3
The Instructions of 11 June 1771 formed a civil establishment 
consisting of a Chief and two other persons of Council, assisted by two
adjacent islands. A letter was subsequently received from Capt.
Savage Trotter of the Success, informing of his having accomplished 
the same service on 12 Sept. 1769. General letter, 6 April 1770, 
ibid., V. 771, f. 717-8; ditto, 26 April 1770, ibid., f. 735.
Captain Trotter obtained a fresh grant from the Sultan of Sulu, 
giving the Company ”a free and exclusive right and title to the trade 
and commerce of all his dominions and the liberty of fishing for 
pearls in any and through every part without any molestation.”
Trotter claimed that this was an improvement over the grant obtained 
by Dalrymple in 1764, which, ’’only secured the Company in the 
possession of the islands and lands specified therein, without 
restraining the Sultan from yielding like grants of other parts of 
his dominions to any European power, which might be greatly detri­
mental to, if not subversive of all their hopes for the intended 
settlement at Balambangan.” Trotter to the Court, Balambangan,
24 Dec. 1769, enclosing the grant, ibid., V. 102, f. 338-60.
1 General letter to Bengal, 30 June 1769, ibid., V. 771, f. 775-6;
ditto to Port St. George, ditto, Madras Despatches, No. 4*
2 Bengal was directed to send 350 chests of Patna opium, besides 10,000
pieces of various cloth. General letter, 6 April 1770, Borneo
Factory Records, I648-I6I4. Port St. George, on the other hand, was 
to make ”a timely provision of piece-goods and other articles suitable 
to the Eastern trade.” Ditto, ditto, H.M.S., V. 771, f. 785-8.
3 Abstract Separate Letter to Bombay relative to Balambangan, sent per 
Britannia in Personal Records, V. 10, f. 261-3. Also extracts in 
Borneo.
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factors and two writers. The settlement was to be an independent one, 
subject only to the control of the Court of Directors. Trade there was 
to be free and open to all nations, except in spices, raw silk and opium, 
which were reserved to the Company. The force necessary for the protection 
of the settlement and of the country traders calling there would be 
supplied by either Bombay or Fort St. George and wa& to be of such size 
as would prove effective against an Indian enemy, but not a European 
power.^ The settlement should at first be secured by a stockade only.
"Upon a proper prospect of success,” warehouses and dwellings might be 
erected on land; until then, the Britannia would serve as a floating 
factory. In addition to the Britannia, the Balambangan marine establish­
ment should include a small vessel to be used as tender and a Bombay
2
cruiser as guardship. The latter was to be relieved annually, the 
incoming one to bring Surat and other goods suitable for trade in the area 
and the outgoing vessel to be loaded with such articles for Surat and 
Bombay as might be indented for.
To start off the proposed trade in Balambangan, the Britannia
1 The prescribed force wass 60 seamen and 40 Lascars for the Britannia,
or the land service, as the occasion required, and one lieutenant,
one ensign, two corporals, 20 European soldiers, and 20 Front Sepoys. 
Borneo.
2 Dalrymplefs plan was to make Britannia a place of retreat in case of
danger, as well as a floating factory. The remaining part of the 
marine was to be a small vessel to proceed from time to time, to and 
from different parts of India, and two small armed vessels to procure
provisions and serve as convoys to the trading vessels of the
different islands. "Thoughts on the Present Situation of the Company's 
Affairs at Balambangan,” Borneo. Herbert and Council later wrote to 
the Court that the Bombay cruiser was unadapted to the settlement and 
asked instead for two gallivats, to be used for checking pirates, etc. 
Letter, 5 February 1774> ibid.
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carried from London goods to the amount of £20,052 for trial in the 
settlement. Cash, which would be necessary at the outset to draw 
strangers to Balambangan by a ready sale of their goods, was ordered to 
be supplied either from Bombay or Fort St. George, amounting to £5,000.
The trade, once opened, must afterwards be carried on chiefly by barter, 
the three Indian presidencies to provide such goods as the new settlement 
could dispose of to advantage, the idea of an emporium being foremost in
the conception of the settlement. As many ships as possible going to and
returning from China should touch at Balambangan to bring further 
necessaries to the colony and to carry to England goods of the Eastern 
islands. Moreover, the Chinese junks carrying tea, silk and other sale­
able merchandize should be encouraged to come, by according them "kind 
treatment;" and in case a sufficient cargo could be obtained from them, 
the Chief and Council of Balambangan were authorized to send it directly 
to England on one of the Company's freighted ships, or by such country 
vessels as might offer reasonable rates for carriage to Madras, Bombay, 
or Bengal, and from thence to be consigned home.
About a month before despatching the Orders of 12 June 1771 > in order
not to lose time in sending for Herbert and Michael Tierney, appointed 
Chief and Second of Council, respectively, for the new settlement, the 
Directors sent orders to Fort Marlborough, where the two were employed 
on the Company's service, for them to go to Madras and there to embark 
on the expedition. When these orders arrived in Fort Marlborough,
1 Extract General Letter to Bencoolen, 17 May 1771> H.M.S., V. 771> 
f. 739-40.
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Herbert had left for Madras on account of his health and arrived here in 
June 1772. The Presidency of Madras gave him his dispatches on 15th 
August, hut he did not embark on his new employment until a month later. 
Thence he returned to Port Marlborough, although, as he himself had said,
it would have been too late in the season to attempt a passage to
Balambangan via Benculen and the Straits of Sunda.1 His reasons for 
making this digression were that the season was too far advanced to take 
the direct course through the Straits of Malacca, his ill health preventing 
him from embarking on the day of the receipt of his orders, and that it 
was "absolutely necessary” to fetch Tierney at Port Marlborough to join 
the expedition at once. He complained that the servants who had been 
appointed to go on the voyage, "though in general possessed of ability 
and capacity, were notwithstanding very inadequate to conduct this under­
taking, having never had the least experience of or transactions with
2
Mallays, or any of the Eastern nations." He then made his own choice of
the people to accompany him to Balambangan, all of them from the West
3
Coast, a proceeding which was to cause "altercations, suspensions, 
dismissions, and almost universal confusion ... even before Balambangan
1 Herbert wrote to Tierney on 4 August 1772 that because the Britannia 
could not leave Madras till the 15th of that month, he could not 
possibly direct the commander to attempt the Straits of Sunda, in the 
prevailing monsoon, from Benculen. In this manner, they would not
be able to get further than Pasir and would be forced to remain in 
this port some months before proceeding to Balambangan. It was this 
course which he nevertheless pursued. Borneo.
2 Letter from Herbert to the Court of Directors, Port St. George,
15 September 1772, ibid.
3 Letter from Herbert to the Secret Committee, Port Marlborough,
25 November 1772. Ibid.
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was reached.”
Tierney was, nevertheless, left behind in Port Marlborough, in 
order to transact for stores, especially arrack, Hthose furnished by the 
Bombay Presidency being insufficient," and also to obtain a vessel to 
take the provisions to Balambangan. Evidently the intention was to palm 
off Herbert's own grab, the Devonshire« and this was "imposed" upon the 
Company for 30,000 Rupees.'1' Herbert had also drawn bills on the Court of
Directors to the amount of £6,067, "without purchases being made or any
2
expenses having occurred."
The Britannia left Benculen on 1 January 1773 > after a stay there
of two-and-a-half months, and arrived in North Island on the 24th of the 
3
same month. Pasir was reached on the 12th of March, and here, Herbert 
and his associates started upon a series of transactions, "not to be 
equalled upon the records of the Company." It was understood that Herbert 
was attempting a settlement on this port in order to establish a pepper 
trade for his employers; but he, undoubtedly, had other motives, of a 
private kind. A notice was put up offering to buy up the private trade
1 218 Rupees were valued at 100 Spanish dollars. The latter were the 
currency of Balambangan and neighboring islands. One Spanish dollar 
was equivalent to 5/6d.
2 Holmes, purser on the Britannia, testified before the Directors that 
they did take in some provisions for the voyage at Fort Marlborough, 
but that these could not have amounted to more than 500 dollars' 
worth or £132. "Case for the East India Company, 12 May 1779»” Borneo.
3 Holmes said that it was understood that Herbert stayed in Fort 
Marlborough in expectation of an Europe ship, and in the Straits of 
Sunda about a month, too long to get wood and water, to intercept 
returning ships from China for further necessaries for Balambangan.
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of individuals at 25 per cent upon the invoice price and to grant hills 
on the Company for the amount.'*’ The Court later objected on the ground 
that they had not given authority to purchase such goods. Prom the 
account subsequently given by the purser on the ship, it appeared that 
the true reason for the Pasir transaction was that the private traders 
could not find other buyers for their merchandise. The Court also found
that most of the goods sold to the Company belonged to Herbert, Swithin
2
and Kirkham.
A further irregularity appeared on the books of the Company, where
opium and other goods belonging to them were sold to the amount of
£27,655* tut the returns made in merchandise reached merely £10,407* The
debts contracted were put at £5,291 and the charges incurred, at £5,000,
A third set of bills was drawn on the Company, to the considerable amount 
3
of £12,945* They were labelled "sundry expences;M but as to the nature 
of the purchases and the manner in which the value was deposited by the 
several persons mentioned in their letter, the Chief and Council were 
silent. Later, from Sulu, they wrote to the Directors that they hoped 
that their long stay in Pasir would prove beneficial to the Company, as 
they expected to obtain 1,000 piculs of pepper annually from Banjar. To
1 The value of these goods for which the Company was debited was 
£10,000.
2 A factor on the establishment, later succeeded Henry Steers on the 
Council upon the latter1s death. Steers was in turn a successor to 
Tierney, who had also died.
3 Letter from Herbert and Alcock to the Court of Directors, Pasir 
Road, 10 May 1775* Borneo.
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start with they had consigned 700 piculs to China by the Devonshire.^
This shipment, however, proved to be one more cause of complaint against
the Balambangan servants; it was found to be deficient in weight and
2
mostly rotten.
The Britannia left for Sulu and arrived there 16 July 1773* One
of the first acts of the Chief and Council of Balambangan was the purchase 
*
of Alcock's snow, the Dolphin, ostensibly to add to the settlement’s naval 
force. This was viewed by the Court as "an absolute breach of orders,” 
making the same remark with respect to the purchase of Herbert’s Devon­
shire. It did not appear to them that those ships were or could be of 
any use to the undertaking, but they were convinced that both had been 
employed on the private trade account of their servants.^
At a consultation held on 4 September 1773 > the Balambangan Chief
and Council resolved to sell to themselves and to the Factors and Writers
the Company’s iron and piece-goods, amounting to £20,000, ”being such 
parts of the cargoes as were valuable and saleable in Sulu.” A premium
1 Letter from Herbert, Alcock and Kirkham to the Court, Sooloo,
8 September 1773* IbiA>
2 Kirkham and the secretary, Corbett, found the pepper brought by a
prow to be bad, add when they asked the Chief for advice, they were
told that they had nothing to do with the quality of the article 
and were only to direct its receipt on board the English ship.
Letter from Herbert to Kirkham and Corbett, Fasir, 18 April 1773* Ibid.
3 David Alcock, the third member of the Balambangan Council, who was 
appointed by Fort St. George presidency.
4 The Devonshire brought cargo which was sold to the Company and 
debited to Herbert.
5 The reason given for the transaction was that the voyage had been
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of 27-2 per cent was allowed to the Company, hut at twelve months' credit, 
really amounted only to 17i* They then proceeded to resell the same 
goods to the Sulus, payable in twelve and eighteen months.^ In the 
Company's books, the value of debts for bonds given by sundry persons for 
goods sold to the natives in that manner came up to £10,000, while returns 
amounted only to about £300. According to the purser, Holmes, what 
happened was that the profits on goods sold for ready money were put into
the pocket of Herbert and his men, and such debts as could not be collected
2
were charged to the Company's account. The debts were mostly for opium,
so delayed that the goods sent for from the different presidencies 
would have arrived at Balambangan before the Britannia and would 
create a glut there. Furthermore, the sale at Sulu would open an 
intercourse with the country and discover the extent of trade which 
might be carried on there.
See "Case for the East India Company, 12 May 1779>" a, brief presented 
against the Chief and Council at Balambangan. The original under seal 
of the Examiner's Office covers 148 folios and is found in Borneo. 
Drafts of the same are found in the same collection and in H.M.S.,
V. 771, f. 482-581. The latter enumerates 87 irregularities and mis- 
deamors, alleged to have been committed by the correspondents.
1 The explanations given for excluding the Company from the trade in 
Sulu "were such an insult to common sense as to excite (the Court's) 
indignation." After admitting that the whole of the Britannia's 
cargo was saleable, Herbert and company declared that the returns must 
be made in trifling articles, not meriting the Company's attention, 
yet, as they confessed, from these same insignificant articles they 
expected their own advantages and emoluments to arise. "Draught of a 
letter from the Court of Directors to their Chief and Council at 
Balambangan." Loc. cit.
2 Holmes said that he sold some damaged goods of his own in Sulu for 
100 per cent profit, and that there was very little private trade 
that could be pursued there, having been bought up for the Company 
before leaving Pasir. The goods sold in Sulu were mostly the 
Company's.
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"the article upon which the success of the Balambangan undertaking 
greatly depends.Seventy-three chests were left on credit to the 
natives and at 50 dollars less for every chest than what Herbert charged 
the Company for opium sold by him on the Devonshire. Moreover, Herbert, 
after selling his 25 chests to the Company, repurchased 8 at twelve months* 
credit, thereby giving his employers only 5 per cent profit which ought 
to have been at least 25. The Court was completely flabbergasted. "We 
do not recollect," they ranted, "an instance on our records prior to this 
by Herbert wherein any Company’s servant has compelled us to buy his 
merchandise at his own price for ready money and to resell the same goods 
to himself at long credit."
To crown all, after harping on the insufficiency of provisions made 
for the settlement, the Balambangan Chief and Council passed a new set of 
certificates on the Court, amounting to £12,303* "for value deposited" by 
Herbert and two other persons. The Court had omitted the subject of bills 
of exchange in their Orders of 1771* but they "could not expect that before 
the arrival of their servants at their destination they would pass bills 
and certificates upon England to the amount of £30,000 and upwards, which 
was really the case." The fact that they had already ordered £5,000 in 
specie to be provided for use of the settlement, and that Dalrymple had 
earlier estimated expenses for the outset at £15,000 and the whole expense
1 Dalrymple, in estimating the expense of the settlement for three 
years, which he put at £40,000, said that he had "the authority of 
a very worthy director’s opinion that the profit to the Company of 
one year’s opium investment only would exceed this sum."
Letter, Soho Square, 10 January 1770, H.M.S., V. 771, fol. 225-31*
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of the expedition for three years at £40,000,1 must have made the 
Directors thoroughly disgusted with their Balambangan servants.
The Britannia left Sulu after a stay of twenty-one weeks. The 
flimsy excuse of having to take in timber and other provisions, which 
task, according to Holmes, could have been done in three or four weeks, 
was flagrantly used. Balambangan was finally reached on 12 December 1773 > 
after a protracted voyage of twelve months from Benculen. From the 
Court's information, if Herbert had sailed as soon as he received his 
dispatches in Madras, on the 15th of August, which was as late as a ship 
ought to sail to get through the Straits of Malacca, he probably would 
have arrived in Balambangan in about two months. He should not have 
started out when he did from either Madras or Benculen; if he had waited 
till the next season, he must certainly would have gained his passage from
2
Madras to Balambangan in two months, or from Benculen in a matter of weeks. 
Herbert's "loitering," the Court was to discover, was only a foretaste 
of further enormities.
In Balambangan, Herbert matured his plan for carrying on the trade 
of the Company in the new settlement. From Fort Marlborough, he had 
written to the Directors that on his arrival at the island he would
1 Dalrymple's estimate transmitted to the Court 10 January 1770.
Court Book, No. 78, f. 395*
2 See”Case, etc.," loc. cit.
According to Dalrymple, a ship sailing directly from England on the 
15th April would get through the Straits of Sunda in five and a half 
months, whence, with the monsoon shifting early, say, by the middle 
of October, it eould work up along the West Coast of Borneo and 
reach Balambangan in December, a liberal allowance of two months. 
Letter to the Court of Directors, 30 October 1769 > H.M.S., V. 771, 
fol. 215-14.
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consider a proper method of disposing of the Company's piece-goods. 
However, he did not have to wait that long, for in Sulu, he saw the 
opportunity to start in his proposed line. The Company's iron and piece- 
goods on the Britannia and Carlisle were bought and sold by the Chief 
and Council, Factors and Writers in partnership on their own account.
In Balambangan, finding their indents to Bombay not complied with,
Herbert and Council, in co-partnership with three other persons, "who had 
not so much as (the Court's) permission to reside in the island,"^ 
contracted with John Hunter, a merchant from Bombay, for piece-goods to
the amount of 250,000 Rupees (£31,250) at 55 per cent premium, to be
2
delivered to the contractors or their order. It was further stipulated 
that the goods should be paid for by bills to be drawn upon the Company 
"by the six partners, and that Hunter was to receive 132,000 Rupees, as 
part payment for the goods, in bills on the Governor and Council of Bombay
1 They were amongst tne servants of the West Coast Presidency brought 
by Herbert to Balambangan and who were ordered by the Court to be 
returned to their respective stations.
Extract General Letter to Bencoolen, 10 December 1775* Ibid., V. 771? 
f. 741.
2 Articles of Agreement made this 30th day of December 1775 between 
John Herbert, Esquire, Chief of Balambangan, David Alcock, Esquire, 
second, and Robert Kirkham, Esquire, third of Council, Mr. Edward 
Coles, Mr. Thomas Palmer, and Mr. John Jesse, Secretary, on the one 
part, and John Hunter, of Bombay but now residing at Balambangan, 
on the other part. Ibid., V. 771> 405-9*
3 The Court could not help but point out ’the absurdity of stipulating 
for Coles, Palmer and Jesse to join the Chief and Council in 
issuing draughts upon them."
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and on the Court of Directors.^ Prom such transactions, the Court
"would not only soon acquire a competent knowledge of the Eastern Trade,
2
"but also of the profits of their Servants."
Herbert and Council assured the Court that although the contract
has the appearance of a private transaction, it was meant to be a public
3
one. The Court, of course, could not see this meaning in the specific 
terms of the agreement, especially as their servants did not constitute 
a majority of the contractors. The goods were no doubt intended for 
the partners1 own private account; "indeed some of them to the last 
disavowed turning it over to the Company." Moreover, the kind of goods 
contracted for were to be supplied by the Indian presidencies, and the 
Balambangan administrators, at the time of the contract, were in receipt 
of a letter from Bombay informing them that the Surat and other goods 
indented for had already been ordered. It was further observed that of 
the goods brought by Hunter from India, a very great part, 90,000 Rupees' 
worth out of a total of 211,346, did not fall within the contract, "not 
being goods of Surat or the country adjacent," and were probably of 
European growth or manufacture." The Account Current also contained a 
charge of 10,035 Rupees for freight, although the contract had stipulated 
that the goods should be delivered free.^
1 The bill on the Court was for 8,000 dollars, that on Bombay was for
125,000 Rupees. The latter draught was worded as for value received 
into the Treasury at Balambangan, "though not a rupee had been so 
received."
2 Extract of General Letter from Balambangan, 6 January 1774* H.M.S.,
V. 771, f. 410-13.
5 Ibid.
4 "Case, etc." Loc. cit.
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Another contract was made with Hunter, for a ship and on behalf of 
the Company. Herbert and Council undertook to load in the ship, to be 
provided by Hunter, merchandise to the amount of 500 tons at £21.13s.4d. 
per ton freight; also to return the ship from England to Balambangan, or 
to any other port in India, with the same load and at the same freight 
rate; and to allow 6,000 Rupees per month demurrage, if not laden at 
Balambangan in one month after her arrival and if not dispatched in two 
months after being unladen in England. In case the Chief and Council 
should not be able to fulfil these stipulations, they agreed to purchase 
the ship on reasonable terms or to pay 6,000 Rupees per month for at 
least one year and until its discharge at Bombay. The penalty for default 
was £12,000.^
The Directors looked upon this transaction as "presumptuous,
indiscreet, and unauthorized,” one which was "likely to prove unprofitable
and expensive," or Herbert and his partners would have included themselves
in it. They ordered their servants to endeavour to prevail upon Hunter
to dissolve the contract, or they would be held answerable for damages 
2
to the Company.
Herbert's experiments for carrying on the trade of the settlement
1 "Articles of Agreement made this 3.0th day of December 1773 between 
John Herbert, Esquire, Chief of Balambangan, David Alcock, Esquire, 
second, and Robert Kirkham, Esquire, third of Council, for and on 
behalf of the Honorable United Company of Merchants of England 
Trading to the East Indies on the one part, and John Hunter of Bombay, 
but now at Balambangan, on the other part." V. 771 > f.423-28.
2 Court's letter to the President and Council of Bombay to be 
communicated to the Chief and Council at Balambangan, 2 September 1774* 
Borneo•
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appeared to carry him even further. On 2 September 1774 > the Court gave 
positive orders for the Balambangan Council to discontinue their overtures, 
on the Company’s behalf, for a commercial connection with Mindanao, being 
one of the Philippine islands. They also entirely disapproved the advances 
made towards opening a trade with Manila, or actually engaging in it, also 
on the Company’s account, "as the Treaties subsisting between the British 
and Spanish Crowns absolutely prohibit such communication."^ Of more 
serious concern to the Court was the complaint of the Spanish Ambassador
to England against their Balambangan servants, which was transmitted to
2
them by the Secretary of State. Herbert and Council were charged with 
aiding the pirates with vessels carrying arms and ammunition for use 
against the Spaniards navigating in the Eastern seas. The Directors, who 
had already issued strict prohibitions to their agents before embarking on 
the Britannia against any form of aggression towards European or other 
nations, repeated their injunction to that effect.
There is no doubt that the Company’s Directors were anxious to 
confine the activities of their agents to Balambangan, in order to avoid 
entanglements with either European or country powers; but for their 
servants, who had to endeavour under certain conditions to fulfil their 
commission, this was easier said than done. The words of a man, well- 
acquainted with the area and who had served as supercargo on a vessel 
consigned to Balambangan, best illustrate the situation:
1 Ibid.
2 Extract of the East India Company’s letter to their Chief and 
Council at Balambangan, 25 October 1775* H.M.S., V. 118, f. 609.
"Merchants experienced in the Eastern trade say that 
it is impossible to make any new establishment in parts where 
the natives are in a constant state of war with one another, 
under their respective chiefs, without embracing the party of 
someone or other. And it is upon such conditions only that 
any advantages can be obtained from them. That the countenance 
of a few Europeans is generally sufficient to throw the ballance 
into any scale; and to give security to the reigning chief.
That when the trade of those parts was in private hands they have 
bean frequently obliged to give assistance to the person who 
called himself King against his enemies, or no trade could have 
been carried out." 1.
It follows from the above that where such a division was latent, 
it was to the interest of the European to stir it up. It was accepted 
that the success of the Balambangan settlement depended on the "friend­
ship," or more appropriately, the acquiescence of the Sulu ruling class, 
not a few of whom had had long connections with the Spaniards. In 1773 > 
it was reported from Balambangan that a revolution had taken place in 
Jolo which put the son of the Sultan in place of his father in the 
government. The son, Israel, seemed "rather to shew a jealousy of so 
near an English establishment as that of Balambangan" and insisted that
a duty of 5 per cent ad valorem on all commodities should be paid by
2
private traders in his dominion. He was further believed to be inclined 
to the Spaniards. It will be recalled that he was with his father in 
Manila throughout the latter1s exile there; and the Spaniards were to 
make much of the fact that he went to one of their schools and learned to
1 Intelligence from Xolo, Balambangan, etc. received from Mr. Majender 
the 6th October 1772, enclosed in the letter to the Earl of Rochford 
from George Patterson, Port St. George, 15 October 1772. Ibid. V. 107, 
f. 33-5.
2 Extract of a letter from the President adn Council at Fort William in
Bengal, 1 March 1773- Ibid. V. 108, f. 189-90.
3 See the Spanish accounts, Sinibaldo de Mass Informe sobre el estado
de las islas filipinas en 1842, Madrid, 1843> Parte Segunda, p.10-13; 
Vicente Barrantes: Guerras piraticas de filipinas contra Mindanaos
y joloanos, Madrid, 1878, cap. 9*
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speak Spanish very well. His coming into power was taken as a favorable 
sign for the renewal of relations with the Sulus, with the object, in 
particular, of alienating them from the English and bringing about the 
expulsion of the latter from their new settlement; indeed, Charles III 
addressed to him a letter, congratulating him on his accession to the 
Sulu throne, tendering all help and protection in return for his offer 
of friendship and alliance, and thanking him for resisting the proposal 
of the English to transfer their settlement to the Sulu mainland.^
The Spaniards in Manila, nevertheless^ wished to ascertain the 
disposition of the new Sultan through a person close to him, and then 
to send an expedition, ostensibly to pursue the Illanun pirates, but really 
to find out the true state and purposes of the English in Balambangan.
Proposals were drawn up to be made to Israel for a treaty, which included
4the opening of free trade between Jolo and Manila and the introduction of 
Spanish troops in some safe quarter of the Sulu territory whence to
1 Appendix XI of Najeeb M. Saleeby’s The History of Sulu, Manila, 1908.
2 Governor Raimundo Espanol of Zamboanga, under orders from the Manila
government, picked Manuel Alvarez, sergeant-major of that fort, "some­
what related to Sultan Israel and who had lived in Manila with the 
latter and other datus" with much familiarity. Through him it was 
known that the datus were divided into three factions; those inclined 
towards the English, those to the Spaniards, and the indifferent. 
Alvarez stayed in Jolo for 53 days, contriving to get as many datus
as he could over to the Spanish side. He returned to Zamboanga, 
seemingly satisfied, accompanied by many datus who,"as always, took 
advantage of the occasion to do business.” Barrantes, op. cit., gives
the only detailed Spanish account of the reign of Israel.
3 Ibid., Chap. 10.
4 "Jolo” is the Spanish and current name for the Sulu capital, although
it was previously extended to denote all the islands comprising the 
Sulu archipelago. The latter name is now more generally used, from 
the native ”Tao-Sug” or ’’people of the current."
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obstruct the English settlement. Israel, on the other hand, was believed 
to be sending secret messages to the Manila Government for assistance Min 
a stride he had long aimed at of reigning despotic."^
The Manila Governor, Simon de Anda, dispatched the expedition under 
Juan Cencely, "who enjoyed in Manila a certain reputation of capacity." 
Cencely1s instructions were to proceed to Zamboanga and there to concert 
with Espanol his subsequent course of action. The plan agreed upon was 
for him to direct his track towards Cagayan de Jolo, professedly to pursue 
Illanuns who were wont to shelter there, and then, with whatever pretext 
he could make use of, to anchor in the new English port. "At seeing the 
ships, fortifications, etc., he should give notice to the English chiefs," 
feigning surprise at finding them amongst the Spanish domains. Cencely 
was not to utilize his forces under any circumstance, even if he might 
consider them superior to those of the English, but he should inform them 
that "such an unexpected occurrence obliged him to recur to his Government," 
in so far as it was a matter for the Government of Britain also. At the
same time he should get plans to be drawn up of the entrances, anchoring
grounds, etc. of the island. Thence he should call at Jolo to deliver to 
the Sultan the Spanish tenders for peace and alliance which he was to 
receive from Espanol. He should further try to make the Suluans see the
irregularity of their agreements with the English and demand the opening
1 Extract of a letter from the Chief and Council at Balambangan to
the Court of Directors, 19 September 1774* H.M.S., V. 116, f. 663-5* 
Israel asked for Spanish troops, ships of war, and other aids, in 
return for which he offered to allow the preaching of the Catholic 
religion in his kingdom. He could not undertake to expel the English 
from his dominions for lack of military strength; but if the 
Spaniards helped with theirs, he could get rid of the English and 
would not admit them again in the future. Barrantes, op. cit.
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of their ports to the Spaniards.
The unannounced appearance of the Spanish armada in the Sulu harbor, 
however, alarmed even the Spanish-inclined Sultan, who was not above 
turning to the English for help against his supposed ally. The details 
of the ensuing parleys between the Sulu government and the Spanish 
squadron leader all reached the Balambangan Council through the means of
the English resident in Jolo, Edward Coles.^ Intrigue thus commenced
2
from both sides, splitting the datus into pro-Spanish and pro-
3
English factions. Unfortunately for the Spaniards, the untoward behavior 
of the commander, Cencely, chosen to head their expedition of "good-will,"
1 See letters from Coles, dated 25 Dec. 1773» 4 and 14 Jan. 1774? in 
Bombay Public Consultations (15 June 1774)*
2 See letters to the Court of Directors from the Chief and Council of 
Balambangan, dated 12 February 1774? H.M.S., V. 115? f*. 317-19? and 
15 September 1774? loc. cit. It was deduced from Coles' information 
and copies of the letters addressed by the Spanish commander Cencely 
to the Sultan that the Spaniards felt themselves "too weak to attempt
a conquest by force alone." Thus did they confine themselves solely
to "some underhand manoeuvres," and conceive some hopes "by a proper 
circulation of Spanish dollars and other promises and considerations, 
to attract an internal defection, which by a junction of their forces
might cause a revolution in their favor."
The Spaniards, on the other hand, claimed that the English, 
observing a growing resentment of their establishment in Balambangan 
amongst the Suluans, sought to disunite the Joloan datus by arousing 
hatred against the Spaniards. They cajoled, intimidated and insulted 
those datus, including the Sultan, whom they suspected of conniving 
with the Spaniards, and abetted those who feared a Spanish invasion.
In Tandundalaga and Sibuyan, new fortifications were made under the 
direction of the English factor, who also provided cannons and powder. 
Another Englishman, named Mr. Brun (Brown?), who had been a military 
man, directed the plan of defense for the capital and was "the soul 
of the agitation against Cencely1 s squadron!' Barrantes, op. cit.
5 Those whom the Spaniards claimed to be on their side were Sultan Israel, 
his father Alimudin, and Datus Manancha, Moloc and Teting. Datus 
Alimudin and Sarapudin were the principal English partisans, the first, 
a cousin, and the second, a brother of the Sultan. Ibid.
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served, to undermine their influence among the Sulus and to discredit the 
whole diplomatic mission.^ The English, sooner or later, had to go also. 
Their settlement with its enormous wealth was the greatest single prize 
any intrepid datu could hope for, for many a year; and its isolation 
dramatized its vulnerability.
Such was the precarious situation of the Balambangan colony from 
the outset. The timidity of the Court with respect to measures of defense 
and their antipathy to any act of aggression on the part of their servants, 
which might involve them in hostilities with either European or country 
powers, heightened the danger. Hardly a month after the arrival of the 
Britannia in Balambangan, Cencely1s armada of one galley and two galliots 
made its appearance in the Sulu Roads, ’’using such manoeuvres as rendered 
it pretty plain they meant to commit hostilities." Surmising that perhaps 
a rupture had occurred in Europe and that the armada was going to strike 
at Balambangan, Herbert wrote the Directors that they had turned totally 
to the work of fortification and were satisfied to say that they were "well 
prepared to give any enemy that molests them a warm reception," indeed,
"to repulse any armament that can be fitted out from Manila to the
2
prejudice of the establishment." The Court's reply was a repetition of
1 There had previously existed bad blood between the Zamboanga governor, 
Espanol, and the commander, Cencely. The "peace" mission to Sulu was 
planned by Espanol and Cencely sought in every manner to discredit him, 
by bungling it. The first of the latter's misdeeds was to proceed to 
Sulu, instead of Balambangan, as instructed, and cruise around within 
sight of the town, without paying the usual compliment to the Sultan.
The Sulus were alarmed at this behavior, which not only heightened anti- 
Spanish feeling but also cast suspicion on the Sultan for alleged 
collusion with the Spaniards. The Sulus, encouraged and aided by the 
English, made elaborate preparations for war. Spanish influence and 
prestige in Sulu had been badly injured, and never again were circum­
stances so favorable for Spanish-Sulu amity. Ibid.
2 Letter dated 12 February 1774 > loc. cit.
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their original injunction for their servants to avoid being the 
aggressor in any act of violence and to preserve themselves and the 
Company’s property by defensive measures only.^
On 3 January 1775* finding ’’little or nothing commendable” in the
2
Balambangan Council's whole behavior, the Court dismissed them. In
their places, the Court appointed Robert Naim as the new Chief, and John
Ewart and Alexander Lennox as second and third of Council respectively.
To their new appointees, after giving the usual admonition with regard to
the prop®r proceeding which they should adopt in all transactions or
disputes with Europeans and natives, they expressed the hope that the
settlement was not in danger of being ’’openly attacked or insulted” by
outsiders. In case of "such an unexpected circumstance,” they could only
advise that their property would be "less liable to danger on board the
Britannia than on shore." They also forbade settlement elsewhere should
any unforeseen accidents or circumstances prevent the continuation of
3
the Balambangan enterprise.
On 26 February 1775> long before the Court's order for the 
dismissal of Herbert and Council could reach its destination, the Balam­
bangan settlement was despoiled by a party of Sulus and Bangueyans. The 
author of the conspiracy and its principal executor was a Sulu datu, named
1 Extract of Company's letter to Bombay dated 2 September 1774*
H.M.S.. V. 116, f. 630-2.
2 Abstract Company's letter to the Chief and Council at Balambangan. 
Personal Records,Y. 10, f. 264-5*
3 Abstract Company's letter to Misters Robert Nairn, John Ewart and 
Alexander Lennox, of the same date, 3 January 1775* Ibid. f. 265-7*
199
Teteng, cousin to Sultan Israel, friendly to the Spaniards, and said to 
he indebted for goods delivered to him on credit by Herbert.'*' The capture
of the place was attributed to the little credence given to the inform-
2
ation regarding the conspiracy, which was transmitted to Herbert previous 
to the attack.
William Counsell, commander of the snow Speedwell, had been ordered 
to cruise off the south end of Palawan to look out for the China junks 
which were expected to arrive at Balambangan. On the 15th of February he 
was informed by a Bornean, named Bander Allam, owner of a prow which traded 
at Balambangan, that the Sulus and Bangueyans were preparing for an attack
on the settlement. Counsell then dispatched a letter to Herbert containing
3
the intelligence and conveyed by the informer himself. The same inform­
ation was repeated to him by a Sulu, and he made haste to return to 
Balambangan. He arrived here on 19th February where he found that Bandar 
had delivered his message; yet Herbert "neither threw up any entrenchments 
on the side that was open to assault, nor did he take any other measures 
to defend the place."^
On the 25th, in the evening, a slave belonging to Datu Teteng
1 Extract of the General Letter from the President and Council of
Fort Marlborough to the Court of Directors dated 24 July 1775*
V. 119, f. 267-9.
2 See "Narrative of the Loss of Balambangan taken by the Soolooens
and Bangueyans 26 February 1775* M by James Barton. In Sir Edwards
Hughes1 letter to the Earl of Rochford, Salisbury in Bombay Harbour, 
22 March 1776. Ibid. V. 165, f. 505-7. "
5 Extract of a letter to John Herbert from William Counsell, commander 
of the snow, Speedwell, 15 February 1775. In Sir Edward Hughes’, 
loc. cit., f. 319-20.
4 Extract of the General Letter from Bengal dated 20 November 1775* 
H.M.S., V. 122, f. 5-8.
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informed a person living in Commander Barton’s house that the attack was 
to he executed on the following night by the Sulus, about 150 of them, 
living on the island ’’under the pretence of trade and building houses and 
godowns, etc.," in conjunction with some 60 others gathered in a prow at 
Banguey. They were to land quietly in the rear of the stockade where 
they could get as near as they could to the hill on which the stockade 
stood, concealed in the thick bushes. The Sulus living in the boats 
hauled to the shore were to give the signal for the attack by setting a 
house on fire in the town. Barton went and informed Coles, who had been 
recalled from Sulu and was now the second in Council; and the latter in 
turn informed Herbert. The Chief then called a council to determine 
whether the Sulus on the island should be sent off that night or on the 
following morning. The decision went in favor of the latter. A strict 
watch was kept all night, with the troops under arms.'*'
At daybreak, the troops retired, leaving the customary sentries on 
duty. Within a short time, the signal was given and the raiders rushed 
upon the stockade. The guns were seized and turned upon the houses on 
the beach and then on the vessels in the harbor. After the attackers had 
got possession of the stockade, ’’which was done without opposition,”
1 The whole force in the settlement consisted of 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign,
8 Europeans, 46 Sepoys and 50 Bugguesses; the last mentioned were 
living in the town and were ’’under the very guns of the stockade.” 
Barton’s Narrative, see above.
It should be noted that in its first few months, owing to Herbert's 
large-scale planning, the settlement had: 77 Military, 70 Britannia's 
crew, 18 Devonshire's crew, 7 Dolphin*s crew, 35 Marines imported on 
shore, 63 Buggueses; besides 20 Civil servants and 4 European 
artificers. Memo to the Balambangan Consultation of 22 December 1773* 
Borneo.
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Herbert and his associates, ,!followed by the garrison, of whom 13 only 
were missing, retired with precipitation on board the vessels, not one 
paper ... either publick or private being saved, much less any of the 
Company's property on shore." From Herbert's latest calculations, the 
loss in Company property should have amounted to 926,886 Spanish dollars. 
The value of the several vessels saved and the consignments on board 
them was computed at 240,521 dollars, exclusive of the debts contracted 
at Sulu and other ports to the eastward.1
Herbert and his party steered for the island of Labuan, off the
northwest coast of Borneo, in order to establish another settlement. The
situation of the island, it was claimed, "promised fairer for forming an
emporium and raising a colony of industrious settlers than Balambangan."
They started immediately to set up works and made an exclusive contract
2
with the Borneans.
Vide, Extract of General Letter from Fort Marlborough to the Court 
of Directors, 24 July 1775. H.M.S., V. 119, 267-9.
In their General Letter to the Court of Directors, of 15 Sept.1774, 
the Chief and Council of Balambangan gave the value of the stock in 
the settlement as 800,000 Spanish dollars. Abstract in Borneo.
From scattered journals and accounts in Borneo and H.M.S., V. 771, 
the following information is extracted to show the extent of the 
Balambangan investment.
Supply of goods, bills and money from London, Bengal,
Bombay, Fort St. George and Canton £231,470
Bills drawn on England at Fort Marlborough, North Island,
Passir Road, Sulu, and Balambangan 70,955
Bills accepted in England 32,263
Ships purchased, charges incurred and disbursements 
made before the arrival at Balambangan (exclusive of the 
outset from London and the purchase of Hunter's Antelope. 24,182
Credits given before the arrival at Balambangan 42,359
See letter to the President and Council of Fort St. George from 
Fort Marlborough, 24 July 1775, in Fort St. George Public Consultations 
(22 Feb. 1776), Range 240, V. 41, i* 102-3; also letter from John 
Herbert and Thomas Palmer, Island of Laboan, 12 May 1775, ibid., f.103-9,
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In Jolo, the Sultan and his Council disclaimed all responsibility 
for the offense and protested their innocence by laying a proscription 
on the perpetrators. They feared, nevertheless, that the English would 
make reprisals. They sought the assistance of the Spaniards under the 
terms of the Treaty of 1737 > which plea was rejected with a reminder from 
the Governor of Zamboanga that the Treaty did not bind either party to 
give aid against a European enemy. There was talk of putting Jolo under 
the protection of either Prance or Holland, but it was decided in the end 
tp prepare for war with the English in the best manner possible. Datu 
Teteng*s return to Sulu with his rich booty contributed in no small 
measure to this decision.
Teteng declared before the council of datus that Mhe had no other 
inducement for perpetrating the acts against the English than their 
demanding his arms, which he thought was not only a reflection on his 
honor as an individual but a general one on that of the Soolooans.”^
1 Extract of a letter from Mr. John Jesse, Resident at Borneo Proper,
3 May 1775* In Edward Hughes’, loc. cit., f.355-7*
Barrantes gives the following version of Teteng’s squabble with 
the English: Teteng was in Balambangan, paying a debt, which he had
incurred in a game, by means of his personal labor. There he made 
friends with Herbert who proposed to him that he bring his relatives 
and slaves over to work at cutting timber. Teteng did so, and in 
returned obtained on credit articles to the value of 1,000 pesos 
from Herbert. These the Sulu datu sold in Borneo, and out of the 
profits he made, he paid part of his debt to the English Chief. He 
then expressed his wish to return to Jolo to visit his family, but 
Herbert insisted that he should leave his slaves behind as security 
for his debt. An altercation followed in which Herbert disarmed 
Teteng and put him in the stocks. In the end, Teteng left his 
slaves in Balambangan and returned to Jolo, where he formed his 
plot against the English settlement. Op. cit., cap. 12.
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The size of the booty no doubt made a much greater impression, and the
distribution of it, "down to the slaves," re-established his position
amongst his fellowmen. Datus Alimudin and Sarapudin, "esteemed friends
of the English," and amongst those who railed publicly at Teteng for his
2
act, shared in the spoils. This had the effect of putting everybody 
under the obligation of defending himself against the English in the 
event of an outbreak of hostilities with this people. Consequently the 
English royal commander, who came to obtain amends, was put off by a 
refractory council of datus.
Sir John Clerke, commander of H.M.S. Dolphin, was dispatched to 
Balambangan with a consignment of opium from Bengal. He arrived there 
on 11th July and was informed of the disaster by Barton, who had been 
sent back by Herbert to retake possession of the island and intercept the 
ships destined for the settlement. Clerke thence proceeded to Sulu in 
hopes of inducing the Sultan and Estates to make some reparations for "the 
insulted honor of England" and for property taken from the East India 
Company. On his arrival in Sulu on 22nd July, he was received by two 
principal datus with a boatload of refreshments which he returned. The
1 Barrantes also enumerates the Balambangan loot as: colored cloths, 
fine and ordinary linen from Bengal, woollens, elephants, coconuts, 
game bones, Surats and bedspreads, silks, chests of opium, diamonds, 
Moorish earrings and rings, 14,000 pesos in Spanish silver and rupees, 
45 cannons of 12, 10 and 8, 228 rifles, 35 pistols, 45 sabers,
22,000 bullets, 200 quintals of powder, plenty of European iron, 
steel, lead and tin in bars, and small pieces of gold. The Sultan,
as Chief of State, received the artillery, armaments, powder, iron 
and other metals; and as a personal gift, 2,000 pesos and many 
effects.
2 From Jesse's letter; see above.
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Sultan was peeved, and each tried to bluff the other. Clerke finally- 
got the Council to agree to the justice of his demand respecting satis­
faction for damages. Expecting them to offer him much less than what he 
might ask for, he represented the losses as amounting to 400,000 dollars. 
After much delay and evasion, the Sultan offered 10,000 dollars, which 
’’seemed rather to carry signs of derision than a wish to redress."
Clerke took leave immediately, "after giving the Sulus to understand that 
they might expect any disagreeable visit from the English."^"
The Labuan settlement was withdrawn in November 1775> being 
contrary to the Directors1 orders not to settle elsewhere in case of 
failure in Balambangan. The new Chief and Council for the defunct settle­
ment received the remains of the Company’s property from Herbert and his 
associates, who were to reply to the charges laid by the Directors against
them and to give sufficient security for all money owed by them to the
2
Company. Alcock and Kirkham were to return ultimately to their stations
3
at Port St. George, while Herbert must proceed to England to answer for 
his conduct.
1 Extract of a letter from Sir John Clerke, dated Off Calcutta,
13 October 1775* In Edward Hughes' loc. cit., f. 295-301*
2 Letter to the President and Council of Port St. George from William 
Broff and George Salmon, on the ship Antelope off the island of 
Laboan, 16 January 1776. Fort St. George Public Department 
Consultations (4 April 1776), V. 41> f* 183-4*
3 "Extract from the 15th paragraph of the Honorable Court's Letter of 
3rd January 1775 to the Chief and Council of Balambangan newly 
appointed." Ibid., f. 185.
In 1781, Herbert was still waiting for "the investigation of the 
Balambangan affairs." As it appeared to him that "there is no prob­
ability of its taking place for some time, and as his creditors are 
exceedingly pressing upon him," he was anxious to know what was to 
become of him. The Committee of Correspondence thus recommended that 
"in consideration of his very great distresses," he should be allowed 
to proceed to and remain for three years in India, "to recover his 
effects under Free Merchants Covenants." Committee Reports 
(14 Sept. 1781), No. 14*
Thus ended the Balambangan project which Dalrymple had unremittingly 
advocated for years. The disastrous outcome of the experiment from which 
he was excluded was due as much to the unfortunate choice of the manage­
ment to run the settlement, as to the Company's uncertainty with regards 
to its proper defense. It should be recalled that when the Directors 
first rejected the project in 1763* it was because they could not spare 
the force adequate to maintain it; yet in authorizing the settlement, 
they refused to countenance any military measure which might suggest an 
aggressive posture towards European neighbors in the area. What they had 
not reckoned upon was the disposition of the native inhabitants, against 
whom a display of determined strength was the only security. As to the 
conduct of the settlement by Herbert and his associates, the Company 
admitted, with some mortification, that "the evident misconduct of the 
Chief and Council was rather an unauthorized exercise of power to the 
damage of the Company than a formal breach of positive orders." The gist 
of their complaint was that their servants had incurred "a profusion of 
expenses" and should not have entered on "such extensive plans of commerce 
in an infant settlement."^ The loss of all the Company's books in the 
raid further restricted the legal demands which the Directors could bring 
against them; and as the bonds, which were given by Herbert to supposed
creditors of the Company following the loss of the settlement, started
2
to pour in demanding payment, the Directors' laments increased.
1 In draft of letter from the Court of Directors to their Chief and 
Council at Balambangan, 1774* Borneo. Cf. letter of 3 Jan. 1775> 
Personal Records, V. 10, f. 264-5*
2 See "Case for the East India Company, 17 May 1779>" loc. cit.
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What of the Suluans, through whom Dalrymple had hoped to extend 
the Company's trade into Malaysia? Could the Balambangan settlement 
have succeeded if he had been sent instead? There is no doubt that he 
would have been far more cautious than Herbert in dealing with the 
Suluans; his conduct of the Sulu affairs in the 1760's had demonstrated 
his prudence. Herbert had been undeniably neglectful with respect to 
the security of the Company's investment in the island, which, moreover, 
he had allowed to mount out of proportion to the settlement's defensive 
capability. This only shows what little understanding he had of the 
Sulus. But whether or not Dalrymple, with his knowledge and insight with 
regard to the situation in Sulu, could have avoided the disaster and 
assured continuing success for the settlement, can only be speculated 
upon in the light of the long Spanish experience with a people to whom 
apparently treaties and grants were temporary expedients, a respite from 
pseudo-religious hostilities against all Christians.
CHAPTSH VII 
The Manila Trade and British Interest
Of the aspects of British interest in the Philippine area, the one 
which had yielded positive results and promised the brightest prospects 
was the Manila trade. We have already made references to this in previous 
chapters, precisely because it is difficult to treat separately the 
political and economic considerations involved. This chapter shall be 
devoted to it entirely, carrying the narration to the end of the period 
under study, but only in so far as it implies mostly commercial motives. 
The perspective will be shifted to the Spanish side, the better to under­
stand the intricacies of the trade and the nature of British involvement 
in it. Further British attempts to penetrate it from the political level 
will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Critics writing contemporaneously with Spanish rule in the 
Philippines more often than not reproached the incumbent government for 
its uninspired economic policy.^ Indeed, the material stagnation of the 
islands under the Spaniards is proverbial. The gist of the criticisms was 
that the economic possibilities of the colony were never fully grasped, 
much less exploited. This was said as well with regard to the Spanish
1 The most critical of these writers are: A.de Morga, Sucesos de las 
£-3las Filininas, Mexico, 1609; G-.T.F. Haynal, A Philosophical and
Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in 
the East and West Indies, trans. from the French by J. Justamond, 
Lon., 1776; H.P. Brougham, An Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of 
the European Powers, Edinburgh, 180% H. Piddington, Hemarks on the 
Philippine Islands and on their capital Manila, 1812-22, Calcutta, 
1828; S. de Mas, Informs sobre el estado de las islas Filipinas en 
1842, Madrid, 184}; F. Jagor, "Travels in the Philippines,” Berlin, 
187% trans. from the German by A. Craig, in The Former Philippines 
through Foreign Eves. N.Y., 1917.
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colonies in America, particularly under the later Hapshurgs. That the 
level of development throughout the empire was low could not he denied. 
Moreover, any attempt to trace the sources of weakness invariably led to
Spain.
At the end of the Hapsburg regime, Spain may be said to be 
languishing under a surfeit of gold and silver. She was rich but weak.
The acquisition of so much mineral wealth had led to habits of complaisance 
and lethargy, especially in the high places. Furthermore, to safeguard 
such wealth against intruders, it had been necessary to set up a water­
tight protective system.^ The legal framework within which the system was 
designed seemed perfect enough, but in practice the system failed from an 
inadequate machinery. Not only did it not prevent interlopers from breaking 
through the barriers, it hit certain classes of Spanish merchants. Long 
after the system had cracked in several places of the empire, it continued 
to be operated in other parts where it vitally obstructed economic growth.
The scope of this study does not allow more than a brief description 
of the Spanish system of colonial monopoly. It is treated here as an 
introduction to the way in which the Spaniards ruling in Manila handled 
Asian trade in contrast with the practice of other Europeans, particularly 
the English. Also, since the Manila trade was considered and administered 
by the Spaniards as a branch of that converging in America, it will be
~ »
1 For a detailed description of the Spanish system of colonial 
monopoly, see H. Antunez y Acevedo, Ilemorias historicas sabre 
1ft l.egislacion y gobiem o del comercio de los Esuanoles con sus 
.co_l_onias en las Indias Occidentales. Madrid, 1797; C.H. Haring,
Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of 
the Hansburgs. Cambridge, Mass., 1918.
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better understood within the purview of the entire colonial trading 
structure.
The Spanish monarchs, in common with their European contemporaries,
sought to confine the benefits of colonial trade to their subjects. This
meant, naturally, the exclusion of foreigners from sharing directly in
that trade. But whereas other European powers made use of the chartered 
company to ensure this end, Spain adopted a closely policed system of
state flotas and galeones. Within this system, colonists were not allowed 
to trade with foreigners, nor with Spaniards from Spain, nor even with one 
another, unless both panties belonged to the territory of the same trading 
fleet. Commercial communication between Spain and her American colonies 
were in fact limited to a few ports on both sides of the Atlantic, thus 
entrenching the class of royal subjects awarded the management of imperial 
trade.
Two convoyed fleets made their voyages across the Atlantic at
t
regulated intervals and over stipulated routes. They departed from either 
Cadiz or Seville and dropped anchor at the American ports of Vera Cruz 
and Puerto Bello. After the winter, the two fleets rendezvoused at Havana 
and together returned to Spain. Mexico and most of central America were 
supplied from Vera Cruz. Goods unloaded at Puerto Bello were carried 
across the isthmus of Panama and sent by another fleet to Lima. From here 
they were distributed throughout South America as far as Buenos Aires.
At Acapulco, Mexico, one or two galleons left and returned from 
Manila during each year.’*' The value of the cargo of Asian goods allowed
1 The history and workings of the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade are
described in: "Commerce of the Philippines with Nueva Espana 1640-17^6,"
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to come in was limited to 500,000 Spanish dollars per annum, and the 
remittance in silver to twice that amount.'*'
The failings of the system were manifested in the exorbitant prices 
paid for European articles in all the Spanish colonies, the scarcity of 
basic necessities in either colony or parent state, and the contraband
p
trade indulged in by both foreigners and Spaniards. The failure of 
Spain’s mainly agricultural economy to supply a vast empire hastened the 
decay of the system and consequently of society. When the Bourbons took 
over, Spain had no army to speak of, her treasury was empty, and the admin- 
instrative machinery a muddle. Her very national existence was threatened 
by political dissent and separatism in several areas on the peninsula.
The economic bankruptcy of the Philippines, the most neglected of 
all the Spanish colonies, was, as might have been expected, the most
from the Extracto Historial, Madrid, 1756, of A. Alvarez de Abreu, 
printed in H. Blair and J. Robertson, The Philippine Islands, V. 45;
W.L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, H. Y. 1959 ed.
1 The decree of I595 absolutely limited trade between Mexico and the 
Philippines to 250*000 Sp. dollars annually. In 1702, the outgoing 
cargo from Manila was raised to 5°0,000; in 17^4 to 500,000; and in 
1776 to 750,000. The return value in each case was fixed at twice
the outgoing cargo. Violation of the quota requirement was, of course, 
very common, and often perpetrated with wanton disregard for the 
safety of the ship through overloading. • The Santissima Trinidad, the 
outgoing galleon captured by the British invading Manila in 1762, was 
carrying a cargo of Asian goods with a registered value of 1,000,000, 
but which was believed to be worth three times as much in the market.
On the other hand, the consensus of testimony with regard to the value
of the cargo of the incoming galleon, the Filipino, was 2,000,000,
which might well have been an undervaluation by 1,000,000. The English­
man Parker, who came on the expedition against Manila, claimed that 
the money brought on the galleon amounted to 6,000,000 corresponding 
to the return of two cargoes "occasioned by the preceding year’s fair
at Acapulco having failed." From his "Account of the Philippine
Islands," Add MSS, 19, 296, f. 2 - 7.
2 Vide, V.L. Brown, "Contraband Trade as a Factor in the Decline of 
Spain’s Empire in America," in The Hispanic-American Historical Review,
VIII , 178 - 89.
complete. Under the system, Manila* the Oriental outpost and the only 
legal channel through which American bullion and pesos could be exchanged 
outright for Asian goods, was carefully sealed from the European World 
and all of Spanish America except Mexico. The trade with China was its 
logical basis for commercial development, but was ruled out owing to the 
competition which it threatened or was believed to threaten to bring upon 
the Spanish silk industry. Thus Spaniards in the city were prohibited 
from trading with China directly and were compelled to depend upon the 
Chinese to bring their goods to Manila. As the Spanish metals got 
dissipated elsewhere, Manila’s usefulness as the empire’s supplier of Asian 
commodities dwindled away. Its share of Asian trade was in fact reduced 
to the limited cargo which annually left it for Mexico, the types of 
articles which comprised the cargo remaining unchanged and in the same 
proportions almost throughout the existence of the galleon trade. The 
irony m s  that the shackles which the galleon trade laws had effectually 
girded round the colony were later proposed to be removed by concentrating 
on the potentialities of Manila as a strategically located commercial port.
Before the galleon trade laws came into effect, that is, during the 
early seventeenth century, Manila was drawing various Asian merchants to 
its trade.* Silks and spices were the chief items of exchange, highly 
esteemed in Europe; while payments were made in Mexican and Peruvian pesos 
which were to become the standard of value and currency along the coasts 
of Asia. Every year, from thirty to forty junks from China entered the
1 See Fr. Maria Octavio Agustiniano, "Estado que han tenido las Yslas 
Filipinas desde su conquista; razon del inmenso caudal que ha pasado 
a ellas desde Acapulco, y motibea por que no estan en el Estado 
floreciente de que son capaces." Add. MSS. 15,976. (Papeles Varios 
de Indias), f. 479-500.
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Bay of Manila. Commercial contacts were reported to subsist also with 
Japan, the Moluccas, Malacca, Siam, Cambodia* Borneo, and possibly other 
places nearby. European merchants, in the meantime, were increasingly 
attracted by the commercial activity in the Spanish colony. Those who 
had neither bullion nor staple commodities in sufficient quantities to 
finance their own Oriental trade sought to tap this traffic at Manila.
Such were the English, who, on several occasions in the latter part of the 
seventeenth century, petitioned the Spanish authorities in Manila to allow 
them to bring merchandise into the colony.1
At the opening of the eighteenth century, the commercial activity in 
Manila could hardly be considered as worthy of an empire’s Oriental capital. 
Its economic existence now chiefly revolved around the arrival and 
departure of the annual galleon, during which time the export quota was 
filled by wholesale bargaining and the returns distributed amorgat the 
holders of lading tickets, a class of Spanish citizens whose qualifications 
were prescribed by law. The balance of payments from the galleon’s round 
trip each year was practically the only material resource of the colonials, 
with the right to ship on the galleon reduced eventually to a form of dole.
Meanwhile, the European rivals of Spain had been establishing 
settlements and factories in China, India, and Malaysia, the great sources 
of marketable Oriental goods, and were supplying Europe and America, 
including Spain and her colonies, with those goods. Prices thus began to
1 These petitions are described in some detail in T.C.P. Edgell,
English Trade and Policy in Borneo and the Adjacent Islands, 1667- 
1786, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Lon., 19J5* Chap. 1.
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change, and those paid in Manila were generally higher. The sales at 
Acapulco were also increasingly difficult, since much of what the other 
Europeans were importing from Asia was passing into America. It should 
he noted that until the period covered by this study, practically none of 
the articles which comprised the galleon’s cargo were either the products 
or manufactures of the Philippines.* Manila had become a mere gathering- 
place for goods which annually filled the galleon. Cinnamon was brought 
in from Batavia, silks from China, and later, white linens and printed 
calicoes from Bengal and the Coromandel Coast.
The collapse of the Spanish trading system was foreshadowed by the 
adjustments made in it under the first Bourbon King. The reforming spirit 
of the new regime was gaining headway in Spain and slowly extending to the 
American colonies. By mid-eighteenth century, the appeal for the liberation
of the imperial commerce had won a hearing, wide enough to get the Atlantic
2
fleets suspended. But trading conditions in the East remained unaffected 
until the reign of Charles III, under whom the movement for imperial 
reforms reached its apogee. Even under this regime, the Philippines might 
well have remained on the fringe of the reform movement if the British 
invasion of Manila had not jolted the Ministry into a more active interest 
in the Oriental colony and its economic development. In fact, the old
1 Shipments were mainly of silks, "because of their small bulk and
inability of officials to check undervaluation.” C.L. Jones,
"The Spanish Administration of Philippine Commerce" in Proceedings 
of the American Political Science Association, III, 1907, 180-9^.
2 On the nature and development of Spanish economic thought during
the eighteenth century, see A.V. Castillo, Spanish Mercantilism: 
Geronimo de Ustariz - Economist, K.Y., 19^0; M. Artola, "Campillo 
y las reformas de Carlos III," in Hevista de Indias, XII, 1952,
685 “
trading system survived another half-century in the colony, while monopoly 
gained a new guise with the formation of the iioyal Company of the 
Philippines in 1785.
The view here taken is that, of all the Europeans trading in Asia, 
the English most directly touched upon the Manila commerce, "being the most 
persevering in their efforts to share in it, "besides providing the model 
for its improvement. With the Dutch, the Spaniards had had a violent 
quarrel over the spice trade, but were later content to relinquish the
i
field to their rival since spices were obtainable through Manila and other 
channels in Europe. With regard to the English, the case was different, 
They were looked upon by the Spanish Court as undermining home production 
and manufacture and invading the system of colonial supply, a belief which 
served as the power drive behind Charles Ill’s programme of reform.* The 
invasion of Manila reinforced this belief, and in striking a new direction 
in Philippine affairs, the Spaniards perceived the possibilities and the 
advantages which would accrue to them were they to have a direct concern 
with the trade of Asia.
We have already referred to the interest which the English had 
shown toward the Manila trade in the later part of the seventeenth century. 
While their overtures for an open commerce with Manila were consistently 
rejected, they penetrated the Spanish barriers by using Asian flags to 
cloak their operations. As elsewhere, the Spanish officials at Manila
1 The character of British trade in Spain and her American colonies 
is treated in J.O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old .Spain, 1667- 
17SO, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1940; A. Christelow, "Great Britain 
and the trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 
1759 - 1785,” in Hispanic American Historical Beview, XXVII, 1947, 
2-29.
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connived at this illicit traffic* which the conditions of the imperial
trade had rendered necessary and expedient. During the first half of
the eighteenth century, trading voyages were made with some regularity
"between Manila and the English presidency of Madras. In the despatches
of the latter to the Company at London, there were references to the
importance of Manila to the English in India as a source of silver, also
reports of the reduction of the land customs in Madras as a result of the
stoppage of the trade with Manila hy war.* The English further spoke of
"the English hounds" in the Manila trade which it had "been their concern
2
to maintain against Dutch and French designs to monopolize that trade.
The growing demand for silver with which to finance the increasingly
important China trade heightened English interest in the Manila trade.
Ships belonging to the East India Company were freighted to undertake the
voyage to Manila. In 1760, members of the Madras Council were directly
4
concerned with the investment sent to that port. The practice had also 
been established by which the dollar earnings on each voyage were forwarded
1 See letter from Nicholas Morse to the English Company, Fort
St. George* 15 Feb. 1745; ditto, Jan. 1746; George Pigot 
to ditto, 10 March 1755* i*1 The Madras Desnatches* I. Also 
letter from G. Pigot to Company, 27 Oct. 1755, in H.D. Lose,
Vestiges of Old Madras* II, 469.
2 Letter from Charles Floyer, etc. to Company, Fort St. David,
12 Feb. 1750; abstract of despatch from Thomas Saunders, etc.
to Co., Fort St. George, 5 Jtily 1752, in The Madras Despatches* I.
5 See abstract of general letter fr. Fort St. Geo., July 1760,
in Abstracts Fort St. George Letters Heceived* I, re BarnewalPs
application to freight one of the Company1s ship; also letter fr.
G. Pigot to Co., 2 Oct. 1761, re freighting of the Admiral Watson 
to Nicholas Morse, etc., The Madras Desnatches* I.
4 Bamewall, who freighted the Oxford in 1760, drew bills at Manila
payable to The Madras President, Pigot* for 121, 865 Sp. dollars,
and to J. Dupre, J. Alexander, and S. Dolber for 25,000. madras 
Public Consultations (14 Jan. 1761), V. 18.
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to Canton on the Company’s account for bonds or bills payable at Bengal
or Madras.1 In 1761, the Manila investment resulted in the transfer of
2
192,000 Spanish dollars to the English supracargoes in Canton. When
the expedition against Manila was being prepared in Madras in the
following year, the Company’s officials showed little cooperation,
allegedly because they were directly involved in the investment sent out
to Manila that year and were afraid that the invasion might ruin such
lucrative trade and cut off the supply of silver to China. The officials
were proven right,^ and after the war, efforts were made to revive the
4
Manila under the old conditions. On the other hand, the Spanish Court
1 Bamewall offered to advance £20,000 worth of Sp. dollars at Manila 
for consignment to the Company’s Supracargoes in Canton. Ibid.
(8 Ap. 1760). The total remittance of the voyage forwarded to Canton 
was 192,000 Sp. dollars. Despatch fr. G. Pigot to Co., 6 Mar. 1761, 
in H. Dodwell, Calendar of the Madras Despatches, II, Madras, 19^0, 
p. 233* In 1762, the Madras Presidency bought 73*700 dollars "from 
those concerned in the Manila voyage." Ditto to ditto, 17 Ap. 1762 
ibid., p. 276.
2 The holders of the bills drawn at Manila for consignment of the
192,000 dollars to Canton agreed to take bonds. Ditto to ditto,
2 Oct. 1761, ibid., p. 261.
3 It was hoped that the capture of Manila would increase the supply of 
silver to Canton. See Company’s despatch to Robert Palk, 13 May 1763, 
ibid., 340. Instead, it resulted in the diversion of money from Canton 
to help maintain the Government of Manila. The Madras Presidency wrote 
that Manila which "furnished considerable supplies" of silver must now 
receive from them. Gen. letr., 29 Ap. 1764, Madras Letters Received. 
No. 1A. See also chapter on the "Occupation of Manila."
4 President Palk of P.S.G. took the first step to revive the trade by 
writing to the Governor of Manila. Letr. to Co., 24 Oct. 1764, ibid., 
404. Carvalho, who carried the letter to Manila, reported back that 
he had "a good reception from the present Governor who privately 
promised for himself and his successor that if the commerce between 
Madras and the Philippines be renewed under Asiatic colours, the 
English should be admitted on the same footing as formerly, and the 
utmost friendship and cordiality shall subsist between the subjects
of the two nations." Duplicate gen. letr. fr. F.S.G., 30 Jan. 1765, 
ibid., No. 2.
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continued to snub proposals to legalize the English trade "between India 
and Manila.
The occupation of Manila "by the British revealed the appalling 
conditions in the Spanish colony, its economic "backwardness and the 
poverty of the inhabitants, "both Spanish and native. These conditions 
were "blamed on the isolation long inflicted on the colony, particularly 
the lack of communication with the mother country. The emphasis which 
was subsequently placed on the rechannelling of Asian trade through the 
Philippines by a direct link-up with Spain reflected the continued 
influence of the mercantilist ideals on Spanish thinking vis-a-vis the 
Oriental possession. Spanish reform there would remain geared to the 
ultimate object of keeping Spanish gold and silver in Spanish hands. 
Nevertheless, the acquisition of more accurate knowledge of the actual 
conditions of trade and production in that remote region of the globe 
served to broaden the Spanish perspective with respect to the economic 
needs ofthe colony.
Meanwhile, Spaniards with long experience in the East were 
independently maturing their views of economic development for the
In 1766, Fort St. George wrote to the Company that ’’the Manila 
trade is so far revived as to enable the Concern'd to send to 
China a large quantity of silver which has been delivered to 
and bought up by the Supracargoes for bills” on the Presidency. 
They had also purchased from the owners of the Manila investment 
the amount of 220,000 dollars, and what the latter had not sold 
had been coined ”to keep down the price of silver.”
Fort St. George Public Consultations (12 Ap. 1766), V. 24.
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Philippines.'1’ Foremost among them was Francisco Leandro de Viana, for
years a royal fiscal in the colony and who had "been through the British
2
occupation. We need not go into the details of his proposed project, 
our interest lying mainly in the influences of the politico-economic 
system of the English in the Far East as reflected in his thinking.
The salient points in his proposals were: the opening of direct trade
and communication "between Spain and the Philippines via the Cape of Good 
Hope* exploitation of the islands1 economic resources, and formation of 
a royal company similar to that of the English in Asia, charged with the 
political as well as the economic administration of the colony.
1 Nicolas Norton Nichols, an Englishman naturalized into Spanish, 
wrote a "curious” memorial to the Spanish King, dated Manila, 1759.
He urged the opening of direct commerce "between Spain and the 
Philippines via the Cape of Good Hope. He listed the products of 
Philippine soil which could "be developed for exportation to various 
places. Above all, he proposed the large-scale cultivation of 
cinnamon, pepper, and other spices, in return for which the people 
of Manila would get various products of Spain. The ultimate object 
of the entire project was to release the Spanish empire from its 
dependence on English and Dutch suppliers. Nichols further offered 
to make the first voyage through the proposed route, on condition 
that the King would remit the duties and allow him to embark as 
much silver as he would need to pay for his return cargo. On the 
second voyage, he was to pay not only the 5 P®r cent duty, but also 
the 5 P®r cent on silver. Finally, he asked to be allowed "to enter 
and anchor at any one of the Indian ports" (by these he meant Spanish 
America and the Philippines), therein to "buy, sell, exchange or lade 
the goods which shall be offered to him.” Comercio de las Islas 
Filininas e conveniencias que nueden dar a S.M. Carlos III, printed 
in Blair and Robertson, on. cit., V. 47, p. 251-84.
2 The printed translation of Yiana’s Memorial of 1765 found in Blair 
and Robertson was made from a manuscript, "apparently a duplicate 
copy of the first original and bearing Yiana*s autograph signature," 
then in the possession of Edward E. Ayer, Chicago.
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Viana argued that the chief leak in the designedly water-tight 
trading system of the Spanish empire was the contraband in Asian goods 
throughout the Americas and the consequent outflow of silver. The 
principal perpetrators of this contraband were the English. The goods 
imported by them from China to England were afterwards shipped to Jamaica, 
whence they infiltrated the Windward Islands. Similarly, they penetrated 
Mexico by way of the Honduras and the coasts of Campeche and Vera Cruz, 
and Peru through the Portuguese colony of Sacramento. This illicit traffic 
had been lately facilitated by the new and very extensive territorial 
acquisitions of the English further north on the continent and on the 
Mexican Gulf as far as the Mississippi. The commodities which the English 
introduced thus into the Spanish colonies were cheaper than those conveyed 
in the trading fleets by way of Vera Cruz, as the latter paid many duties.
By the same paradox, the people selling to the Spanish at Cadiz and paying 
the duties there sold the same commodities at a lower price in Mexico.
To undermine the English contraband in Asian goods, Viana proposed 
the adoption by Spanish ships of two direct routes, one passing through 
the Cape of Good Hope and the other through Panama.* The chief link in 
the exchange between the areas of consumption and production on these 
routes was to be the Philippines, whose natural resources would be exploited 
to add to the volume of trade.
1 The idea of a direct trade between Spain and the Philippines was 
explored by the Marques de Montesclaros, Viceroy of Peru, in a 
letter to the King, dated 12 April 1612, wherein he proposed the 
shifting of trade between Mexico and the Philippines to Spain. 
See printed translation from the Spanish in Blair and Robertson 
on. cit., V. See also footnote on Nicolas Norton Nicols.
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Of greater interest is Viana1s advocacy of a royal company which 
should not only undertake the large-scale economic development of the 
Philippines hut also rule the colony on behalf of the King of Spain.
Here Viana openly emulated the English example. He was thoroughly 
impressed by the success of the English East India Company in the trade 
with Asia and in the government of India, which he attributed to its 
enormous capital, the consistent support of the English King and its 
political prerogatives. He thus urged the endowment of the Philippine 
Company in the same manner. Such company was not formed until 1785* but 
Viana* then Count of Tepa* was still alive and influential enough to have 
a say in the matter. Much of what he had proposed in 1765 was incorporated 
into the Charter granted by Charles III twenty years after. The 
exception made to his proposal to give over political powers to the Company 
was to be expected. Viana had been too enamoured of his English model to 
reflect on the impracticability of his suggestion. The promise of 
monopoly to a given group of persons from the Spanish monarch was a breach 
of tradition. Abdication of his political authority over a colony would 
be sacrilege in the Spanish concept of royal absolutism and centralized 
power.
the
The idea o^/Spanish navigating via the Cape of Good Hope for trade 
purposes had been explored before Viana*s time. It was then inveighed
1 The idea of a direct trade between Spain and the Philippines by
means of a company was earlier aired in the colony by the Archbishop 
of Manila, Pedro de la Santissima Trinidad Martinez y Arissala.
Vide* "Hesumen en <jue el ano de 1752 hizo el Arzobispo de Manila 
de el proyesto de las islas Philipinas," Add. MSS. 17,58^, f.
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against not only "by Spaniards but by English and Dutch as well. The 
Spanish cities* which had opposed the Manila-Acapulco trade in Chinese 
silks because of competition with national manufactures* proposed direct 
access to the Asian sources of commodities in the 1730*s and were 
resisted on the same nationalist grounds. The English and the Dutch* 
on the other hand, looked upon the Spanish use of the Cape route as an
abridgement of their traditional rights to that route and a threat to
2
their trade interests. The Court of Directors of the English Company
stated their position in a memorial to the Duke of Newcastle dated 
3
10 May 1732. it claimed that the number of powerful competitors already
1 The ban on Spaniards against the use of the route via the Cape of
G-ood Hope was implied in the Papal Bull of Demarcation of the
fifteenth century. The course around Cape Horn, on the other hand, 
had been opposed by the Andalusians on the ground that it would be 
used to exploit the market on the west coast of America, which was 
a preserve of the Puerto Bello galleons. Portage at Panama would 
also mean cutting into the monopoly held by that same group in Peru 
through the "Fleet of the South Sea." Vide. Schurz, op. cit., 
appendix 1.
2 The stir amongst the Dutch and the English in 1732 was caused by the
Spanish King1 s grant of a ten-year asiento to Don Manuel de Arriaga,
for a company to trade between Cadiz and the Philippines. The grant 
was made in Seville on 26 April 1732. See extracts of the grant in 
Home Miscellaneous Series, V. 77, f. 415-19.
In 1735* largely through the instrumentality of the Spanish 
Minister, Patino, the first Philippine company was created. In the 
Royal Charter of 29 March 1733* which formed the company, the King 
revoked all the permissions and licenses hitherto given to carry on 
the commerce between Spain and the Philippines, particularly the 
asiento granted to Arriaga. An English translation of the Charter 
is found in ibid.* f.
The Philippine Company seems to have dropped of itself, Charles III 
in his decree of 1785, forming the second Company for the Philippines, 
ascribed its miscarriage to "subsequent wars and the serious affairs 
and cares of the Government." Viana in his Memorial mentioned the 
loss of Torres* fleet as a contributing factor.
3 "To the Duke of Newcastle, His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State, 
from C. Mole, Secretary for the Court of Directors, East India House.
H.M.S., V. 99* f. 81—6.
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engaged in Far Eastern trade had considerably raised the prices of 
merchandise in all parts of India. The French competition had in fact 
deprived them of a substantial part of the trade in calicoes, muslins, 
tea and silks with Holland, Germany and other countries. A Spain 
established commercially in their midst might confine them to the English 
market. In the new Spanish scheme, Indian and Chinese silk products 
could be imported into Spain only upon a register of re-exportation to 
countries which the English Company had been supplying. It was likely, 
moreover, that the Spaniards would be able to furnish themselves with 
calicoes and other cotton cloths more cheaply than the English had been 
selling them and would send what they could not consume to countries 
buying from the English. Finally, Spain1s intention was not to confine 
the trade to the Philippines alone, but to extend it to all the countries 
of the East Indies with the Philippines as the springboard. The strategic 
position of the Spanish colony could thus be exploited so as to disturb 
the English in their China trade and the Dutch in the spice monopoly.
All this fuss, however, was unnecessary. The Spanish scheme was 
not carried out and Asian trade was pursued as feebly as before through 
the Manila-Acapulco galleon. In 1764, the English were set astir again 
by the revival of Spanish interest in the Asian trade. In order to bring
The Dutch side was presented in a "Memorial of the Netherlands 
East India Company to the States-General relating to the project 
in Spain for the carrying on a trade from Cadiz to the Philippine 
Islands.” Ibid., V. 74, f. I63-8.
The Dutch and the English then joined together in presenting 
their case to the Spanish Court. See "Translation Joint Office 
presented by Messrs. Keene and Vandermeer to the Marquis de la Paz 
at Madrid as to a trade to be carried on directly from Cadiz to the 
Philippines, 16 August 1732." Borneo: 1648 - 1814, No. 45 of 
Packet IX.
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Spain and her colonies closer together, Charles III instituted a system 
of direct communication between them. Bach year, packet-boats were to be 
dispatched from Corunna to important stations in America, bearing letters 
and cargoes. Such cargoes were to be limited to products of Spain and 
the ships to return to the port of departure. In the case of the Philippines, 
the royal frigate was to embark European goods at Cadiz for Manila* and 
here to freight, on account of the merchants and inhabitants of the city, 
native products and Asian merchandise of all kinds, including those 
imported from China and Japan. Toward the end of 1764, the ship Buen 
Conse.io left Cadiz to undertake the first of fourteen such voyages.
The English presidencies in India, hearing of the Buen Conse.io’s 
voyage, immediately wrote to London, asking to be instructed on how they 
could make the Spanish ship’s use of the Cape of Good Hope look like a 
violation of standing treaties.* The Fort St. George Presidency further 
complained of the atop put to their trade at Manila, the authorities there 
having seized the private ship freighted by them and made the captain, 
supracargoes and other persons prisoners, ’’under pretence that no English 
ship is to trade to that port, notwithstanding she has as usual a Moorish 
pass.” It was believed that the arrival of the Buen Conse.io in Manila 
was the cause of ’’this change of conduct in the Spanish Council.”
The matter also reached the English Ministry, from the embassy in 
Spain. Sir James Gray wrote of the Dutch formal complaints to the Spanish
1 Extracts of the letter from Bengal of 6 Sept. 1766 and of those 
from Fort St. George dated 22 and 23 Jan. 1767, in Qrme Collection 
Various, V. XIX, f. 68-9, also in H.M.S., V. 77, and Borneo 1648 - 
1814.
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ministers* Puente-Fuerte and Grimaldi, against the Spanish use of the 
Cape route, which the Dutch claimed violated the treaties of Munster 
and Utrecht. The validity of these treaties with respect to the limits 
of Spanish navigation was in turn repudiated by the Spanish ministers.
They were considered out of date* and the example of the Swedish and 
Danish ships going through the same route was cited. The Spanish ministers, 
however, seemed to have assured the Dutch that there would not he many 
ships making the same voyage as the Buen Conseio’s.*
In London, the correspondence of 17^2 was dug out and several papers
were transmitted the Sari of Shelburne to the Company’s Court of
2
Directors for the latter’s information. The Company, however, had left 
it to the Ministry to negotiate for the protection of their interests 
against the Spanish threat, hoping that the English King might be
3
persuaded to intercede with Charles III.
The King of Spain was adamant in the face of Dutch and English 
opposition, and kept on with his packet-boats to the Philippines, stopping 
them only when the project for a royal Philippine company was launched.
The packet-boats were in fact only a beginning in a vast programme of 
reform. Bent on getting Spain a direct share in the Asian trade, Charles III 
made revolutionary changes in the commercial code and encouraged private
1 The correspondence between the Dutch and Spanish on the subject 
is found in full in H.M.S., V. 77, f. 391-449.
2 "From Bichard Sutton, for the Earl of Shelburne, Whitehall,
23 May 1768," ibid.
3 MTo Sutton from Michel1 for the Court of Directors, S.I.H., 
21 May 1768," ibid., V. 99, f. 79.
225
1
concerns to follow his example. In the "free trade law*’ of 1778, the 
King’s enthusiasm showed no hounds. It abolished all export fees and 
duties on Spanish goods, including silver money, leaving Cadiz and other 
designated ports on the Spanish peninsula for the Philippines. These 
goods, in addition, entered the colony customs-free. Philippine products, 
on the other hand, were exempt from export duties and admitted to Spain 
on a parity with the American colonies. Finally, certain goods of China 
and other Asian countries which were brought to Spain from Manila could 
be re-shipped by any of the King’s subjects to the northern parts of 
Spanish America.
In that same year, the Five Major Guilds of Madrid dispatched two
of their men to Manila to enquire into the prospects of investment in the
projected commerce between the Philippines and Spain via the Cape of Good
Hope. In the following year they sent out a trial ship, and spurred by
its outcome, fitted out two more in 1780 and 1782. Meanwhile, the King
had granted a private organization permission to undertake a voyage from
2
Manila to Spain via the same route.
The Philippines was inevitably caught up in the reforming spirit of 
Charles Ill’s regime, and this was reflected in the appearance of a new 
type of administrators and investors, openly critical of antiquated ways
1 See "Real decreto en que S.M. (Carlos III) ha resuelto ampliar 
la concesion del comercio libre, contenida en decreto de 16 de 
octubre de 1765. etc., (2 feb. 1778), Madrid, 1778 (fol.);
Reglamento y aranceles reales -para el comercio libre de Espana 
a Indias, de 12 de octubre de 1778 (pp. 262), Madrid, 1778.
2 For an account of the commercial awakening and goings-on in Manila 
during our period, vide, Manuel de Azcarraga y Palmero, La liber tad 
de comercio en las islas Filipinas, Madrid, 1872.
226
and eager to try new ones. A group of Manila merchants gathered together 
to explore the idea of "buying Oriental goods at their sources. In 1771, 
the Spanish Governor-General took the first step to carry out that idea 
"by sending the frigate Deseada to the Malabar Coast, with instructions 
to negotiate a trading arrangement with the Nabob of Carnatic.
All these experiments, however, yielded unimpressive results. 
Opposition to the new trade was strongest in the colony, where the 
progressively minded had to contend with selfish, long-established 
interests and the inertia of centuries-old practices. Moreover, trade 
conditions in Asia had been drastically altered in the past half-century, 
and to be able to cope with them required more than the sporadic efforts 
of sanguine innovators. It was left to a corporate body, with enormous 
resources in the form of capital, experience and royal backing, to make 
the breakthrough.
The idea of the Spanish Hoyal Philippine Company has been generally 
attributed to the Frenchman Francisco Cabarrus.* This may be due to the 
fact that his close relations with the Minister for the Indies, Joseph 
Galvez, were at the time of its conception a matter of general knowledge.
It now seems probable, however, that the idea originated not with Cabarrus, 
but with Bernardo Yriarte, a member of the Council of the Indies. It was 
indeed Yriarte1s proposals which, transmitted to Cabarrus by Galvez,
1 See B.D. Hussey, The Caracas Company: A Study in the History
of Spanish Monopolistic Trade, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 19^4; W.L. Schurz, "The Hoyal Philippine Company" 
in The Hispanic American Historical Review, Y. 3* Nov.20, No.4.
1
first "brought the Frenchman into the business.
Yriarte13 proposals were embodied in a letter to Galvez dated 
4 August 1781. This surveyed the prospects of trade linking South 
America, the Philippines* India* China, and Europe, in the light of a 
vast collection of papers and memorials which had been lying in the 
archives of the Council of the Indies for years. Amongst them was a 
memorandum by the Count of Tepa, formerly Fiscal Viana of the Philippines, 
who in the 1760*3 proposed the creation of a Company for Eastern trade on 
the model of the English East India Company. Yriarte took the same view, 
holding that only by being entrusted to a chartered company could the 
trade be made to prosper, and an effective competition maintained against 
the commerce and manufactures of France* England, and Holland. He further 
held that only through such a company could financial groups, like the 
Compania de Caracas and the Banco Kacional de San Carlos, be effectively 
associated with the trade. As a first step, he proposed the formation of 
a board of advisers with knowledge and experience of the trade, "zealous, 
trustworthy, intelligent persons", whose proceedings should be secret. 
Amongst those suitable for membership, he listed the Spanish naturalized
1 On 21 June 1782, Yriarte sent to the Count of Floridablanca a
copy of the proposals he had the year before submitted to Galvez, 
his reason being that Cabarrus had got wind of his project through 
a confidant the former had who was close to the Minister and was 
now proposing the same. Yriarte did not wish the Frenchman to have 
the chief hand in the formation of the proposed company, as there 
were people expert on the matter who had yet to be consulted. 
Yriarte evidently had a very low regard for Cabarrus.
From Yriarte* s memorandum (draft without date) followed by an 
"Advertencia," Biblio. Egerton. V. ^78, f. 8-9.
2 In "Papel al Sr. Conde de Floridablanca," signed Bernarde Yriarte, 
Madrid, 21 June 1782, ibid., f. 2-7.
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Dionisio Kelly from Britain and the Count of Tepa, hoth qualified "by 
years of experience in the Philippines* and the Marquis of Yranda* a 
man with a great reputation in Spain as a mathematician with a deep grasp 
of the techniques of commerce.
A few days after Yriarte had sent his letter to Galvez, he was 
approached "by Cabarrus who surprised him by referring to the proposed 
company and offering suggestions as to its formation.* Yriarte expressed 
his misgivings about Cabarrus to his chief and friend, the Count of 
Floridablanca, the King’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. He recalled that 
the Frenchman had been engaged in transactions involving the "dissipation” 
of silver from Spain, the chief item in the China trade, and that 
Floridablanca himself had on one occasion tried to restrain the man by 
denying him license to run a post service to Bayonne.
However, the decisive element in the formation of the Philippine
Conpany was the foundering Compania Guipuzcoana de Caracas. Cabarrus was
a stockholder in the latter and saw an opportunity for turning its assets
2
and unpaid dividends into account. Combining knowledge with acumen, he 
easily persuaded his fellow stockholders to reinvest in the new enterprise.
1 See second para, of Yriarte’s memorandum cited above, which he 
had intended to include in his letter to Floridablanca but which 
he withheld.
2 The idea of converting the Compania de Caracas into a company for 
the Philippines which Cabarrus proposed before a general board of 
stockholders was also claimed by Yriarte to be originally his.
See ’’Advertencia” cited above.
3 Vide, Cabarrus’ discourse before the stockholders of the Caracas 
Company on 9 July 1784. Two copies and two drafts in ibid., V. 
(Paneles Tocantes a la Compania de Filipinas), f. 17-45.
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And greatly disposed to favor such an initiative was the Spanish King 
himself* to whom the development of the Philippines was an object of 
deep concern.
1
The .Royal Decree of 1785* establishing the Royal Philippine Company, 
granted the latter the right of monopoly to the trade between Spain and 
the Philippines by way of the Cape of G-ood Hope and of Cape Horn. Its 
ships could stop at Buenos Aires en route to the Philippines, but under 
no circumstances could they return to Spain through Spanish America, 
except with a special permit. The Acapulco trade was to continue unmolested, 
the Company and all its dependents restricted from taking part in it, 
either directly or indirectly. Commerce with America in Asian goods was 
limited to 2,000 tons for Caracas, Maracaibo, and Cumana, and 800 for 
Mexico, and these as transshipments from Cadiz, liable to all the export 
and import duties laid by law on such goods. Admittedly, trade with Asia 
could not be maintained with Spanish and American goods alone; thus the 
Company could bring with every shipment to the Philippines 500,000 pesosT 
worth of silver coins.
The exchange at Manila of Spanish and American goods for those of 
Asia was to be the Company’s chief business. But it was discovered soon 
enough that neither was it easy to obtain Asian goods in competition with 
other Europeans, nor could a profitable market be found for them in Spain, 
where apart from the fine muslins, other cotton goods and many silk
1 Pull text of the decree, 100 articles in all, entitled "Real 
Cedula de Ereccion de la Compania de Filipinas de 10 de marzo 
de 1785,” in ibid., f. 47-77 (published copy by D. Joachin Ibarra, 
"Inrpresor de Camara de Su Majestad”).
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products were unknown. The great demand for these goods was in America,
hut the Company was harred from taking them there hy the direct and
2
lucrative route, via the Pacific. A plan was set on foot to secure for
the Company a factory at Canton, while French and English offers of
3
factory sites in India were brought under consideration. Unfamiliar
4
with the factory method, the Company resisted it as risky and costly;
indeed, of the European colonial powers in Asia, Spain had had practically
5
no experience of it.
1 Vide. "Heflexiones sobre las causas de que procede la corta ganancia 
que la Heal Compania de Filipinas ha experiment ado en las cuatro anos 
que hace empezo sus operaciones," ibid.♦ f. 83-5*
2 The Company, in a memorandum to Yriarte on 12 May 1788, declared that 
without the trade with America it could not possibly prosper as much 
as the other European companies. Ibid., f. 118-26.
The King’s Government, however, maintained that direct trade between 
the Philippines and India on the one hand and America on the other 
"can not be conceded," evidently in consideration of the old Acapulco 
trade. However, "in case of war or other emergency, or necessity of 
State or Company, such permits as shall be judged necessary shall be 
granted, with the qualifications and explanations proposed by 
Sr. Portier..." See "Hesolucion de la Junta Suprema de Estado 
comunicada por el Senor Ministro de Hacienda al Senor Vice-Presidente 
de la Compania con fecha de 24 de yulio de 1790,” ibid., f. 164. 
Portier’s opinion on the matter was that the most that could be 
conceded was to permit the Company to send two shipments each year, 
one to Acapulco and the other to Callao de Lima, the value of each 
shipment not to exceed 500*0°° pesos, principal cost at current prices 
in Manila." Dictamen del Senor Portier en la Suprema Junta de Estado,"
*«d., ibid.. f. I65.
3 In "Consecuencias de los echos i reflexiones presentados por la Heal
Compania de Filipinas,” ibid.. f. 86-7.
4 Suggestions were made to establish the Spanish factories in the French
possessions in India, specifically Chandernagore and Pondicherry, in 
preference to those of the English and other European powers. The 
French were represented to be "more tractable" than the English and not 
as ’tavenous" and "arrogant". Josef Pereira Viana to Yriarte, Madrid,
1 Oct. 1791, ibid., f. 248-53* Another Spaniard, who had been 20 years 
"on continuous voyages in America and Asia," recommended one factory in 
Madras and another in Calcutta, with permission from the English. 
Vicente Vasadre to Yriarte, Madrid, 14 Jan. 1791, ibid., f. 185-201.
5 In 1598, the Governor of Manila was authorized by Philip II to open
direct trade with any of the neighboring Asian countries.
The inertia of a long-established commercial habit could still be 
strongly felt. The merchants of Manila had been accustomed to a passive 
role in the commerce of Asia, and instead of dispatching ships to obtain 
goods at their sources, they depended on foreign merchants to bring them 
in. Europeans who were forbidden from trading in Manila nevertheless 
brought Asian merchandise on ships supposedly belonging to Asians, by law 
the only ones admitted into the Spanish city. The English at Madras were 
especially adept at this type of subterfuge, sending ships with native 
captains and crews but under the direction of their own pilots and super­
cargoes. When European pilots were prohibited altogether from entering 
Manila, the Spanish merchants were obliged to despatch their own ships to 
Madras or Bengal for piece-goods, the first voyages of which proved 
commercially disastrous.^ When the loyal Philippine Company was created, 
the port of Manila remained open to the native merchants of Asia, with the 
hope that these would bring in large quantities of goods and enable the 
Company to obtain those goods at a small advance on the prime cost. At
Consequently Juan Zamudio was sent to China to secure the grant of 
a port on which to establish a Spanish trading post. The concession 
of a site near Canton, known in Spanish records as El Pinal, seems 
to have been obtained. However, the hostility of the Portuguese in 
nearby Macao, the growing Dutch and English menace in the Eastern parts, 
and the indifference of the Manila settlement contributed to the 
abandonment of the China factory. W.L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, p.68.
1 Having no factories, it was necessary for the Spaniards to stay in 
Madras, where they could "most surely obtain a supply of the quality 
goods required," while the cargo was collected. This meant 6 or 7 
months from the time of their arrival and receipt of their order and 
advance payment, during which the cotton goods were "woven, printed, 
and dyed." Alexandro Malaspina, "Observaciones sobre el estado 
politico y economico de las islas Filipinas," (end of eighteenth 
century), Add. MSS., 17,624. f. 2-24.
232
first this trade was carried on principally by Armenians residing in
Bengal and on the Coromandel Coast, who sent ships annually to Manila
■under Portuguese colours. However, the right to purchase from them being
confined to the Company, and with the infiltration of "different
adventurers endeavouring to undersell each other," the trade fell off and 
1
was discontinued. Thus the Company was compelled to apply to European 
merchants resident in Bengal and Madras to supply them with the necessary 
piece-goods. This having also failed to materialize, the Company turned 
to English agents of the English East Company, thence to the latter 
Company itself, as we shall see.
As far as supplying Manila with Chinese merchandise, some of them
were brought in by champanes from Nanking and Amoy, but "the fine,
embroidered fabrics, silks, lacquer and other curious effects which were
2
made in Canton according to the European taste'r had to be fetched by 
Spanish ships despatched there from Manila. These ships had to wait for 
six or seven months until the goods were finished, since work on them was 
not started without a specific order as to quantity and quality and an 
advance payment. Thus travellers passing through Manila might wonder why 
the Spanish merchants did not station factors in Canton with the necessary 
funds, so as to have the cargo ready at the arrival of the Spanish ship 
and to take advantage of the dropping of prices after the other European
1 See letter from Mr. W. Paxton, and Misters Brown and .Rogers to 
the English Company’s Court of Directors, London, 21 May 1788. 
Auditor’s References, No. 4, 1783-8.
2 Malaspina, on. cit.
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companies had completed their 'business."
The difficulties in the Spanish methods were only too apparent to 
he denied. The stop at Manila, as prescribed by the fioyal Decree of 1785 
in carrying out the Company’s trade, was redundant and expensive for some 
Asian goods. It was impossible to sell in Spain Chinese silks and teas 
passing through there, being from 20 to 24 per cent dearer than those 
brought directly from their sources. The Philippines itself had very 
little to contribute to the trade. It would take many years before the 
development of the colony could return commercial profits to the Crown 
and the Company. The products which could be developed commercially in 
the Philippines were found "in abundance" in Spanish America. And even 
if the pepper of Mexico could not compete with that of the province of 
Tayabas, the latter could not be obtained with as much facility as that 
of India. Furthermore, merchants in Spain and America were wary of 
dealing with those of Manila, who had been notorious for their abuses 
and misdeeds in the handling of Asian goods via the Acapulco galleon. 
Finally, the European community in the Philippines was too small to have
1 Malaspina gives an incisive description of Spanish methods of 
trading in Asia, inquiring into the factors and reasons behind 
them. First of all he maintains that "the example of the other 
European companies does not prove anything in the question, as it 
is based in different circumstances." Among others, the Spanish 
difficulties lay in the fact thattthey had no territory in India 
on which to set up their factories, and that the "interests" on 
the China trade belonged to different persons. "The owners of 
the ships employed on the Canton business are not the same persons 
who put in the money for the investment; neither is it their job 
to establish factories. On the other hand, it does not interest 
the Spanish merchants to have a short voyage, the expenses of which 
are disbursed by the banks to whom the freight is paid." Loc. cit.
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any substantial consumption of Spanish and American goods.
The merchandise which so far had yielded clear profit to the
2
Spanish Company was Indian muslins. They early comprised the Company’s
main investment, but not without the disadvantage already referred to
above. The Company could not buy them as profitably as the English East
India Company, nor even compete with those who bought from the latter
Company. In fact by sending them to Europe through Manila, the Spaniards
incurred from 30 to 40 per cent surcharge over those which the English
sent directly from India. No credit exchange existed between India and
the Philippines, and as the bills of exchange recognized in Bengal and
the Coromandel Coast, as well as in Malabar, Surat, the Persian Gulf, and
the Hed Sea, were those of the English Company, the Spanish Company stood
4
to lose some 20 per cent by transacting in those bills. Moreover, the 
Spaniards had no insurance houses; thus the premiums paid to foreign 
underwriters represented money lost.
1 See "Exposicion de la Compania de Filipinas relativa a su estableci- 
miento, y a su importancia politico-mercantil, etc.,” Cadiz, 1810. 
Historia de Esnana, Paueles Varios, V. 18, Ko.l, pp. 73-8I.
2 In Spanish usage, ’’muslins” meant white cotton fabrics, or "all the 
cotton goods obtained from Bengal," which comprised two-thirds of all 
the cotton fabrics coming from India. "Copia de Minuta de la nueva 
cedula de la Heal Compania de Filipinas presentada con fecha de 5 
abril de 1790." Biblio. Sgerton, Y. 5I8, f. 16} (recto).
3 See "Heffexiones sobre el Heal Decreto de 7 de setiembre en que Su 
Magestad alza la prohibicion de las muselinas extrangeras pagando de 
derechos a la entrada 15 por ciento y los demas establecidos para 
los generos extrangeros." Ibid.. f. 87-90.
4 "Heflexiones imparciales que Bon Vizente Yasadre propone al Ministerio, 
Enero de 1791," enclosed in his letter to Yriarte, 14 Jan. 1791.
Ibid., f. 185-201.
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Under the Pragmatic Sanction of 24 June, 1770, the importation 
and use of muslins in Spain were prohibited on the oft-repeated grounds 
that they threatened national production, caused the dissipation of
silver, and defrauded the royal revenue through contraband. The ban was
2
lifted just when the Philippine Company was breaking into the muslin
trade and realizing some gains from their initial operations. The ban
had obviously not produced the desired reaults. There could not be found
a substitute for muslins in certain uses, and the demand for textiles
could not be satisfied by the national production, not even after direct
shipments from the Philippines had started. The new Pragmatic Sanction
put the Company in a precarious position. Caught with 100,000 unsold
piece-goods, it was sure to incur greater losses in competition with the
English. A glut in the market and the consequent dropping of prices
would compel the Company to relinquish the Indian trade and face complete 
3
ruin. In was, in fact, no longer able to send ships to Manila to fetch
those goods. To save the Company, a compromise measure was adopted by
4
which a price was fixed on muslins entering Spain. But this was not
1 Ley 65, tit. 18, lib. 6 de la Recooilacion.
2 "Pragmatica-Sancion en fuerza de ley, por la qual se alza la 
prohibicion absoluta de la entrada de muselinas en estos reynos y 
se permite su introduccion y uso no siendo pintadas, en la 
conformidad que se expresa," en Madrid, en la Imprenta de Bon Pedro 
Marin, ano de 1789. Egerton, V. 518, f. 127-30.
3 "Reflexiones sobre el Real Decreto de 7 de setiembre, etc.," 
loc. cit., f. 87 (recto).
4 The price of such muslins to be not less than JO reales vellon to
a yard, as stipulated in the Royal Resolution of 19 Feb. 1791
referred to in the "Pragma/tica-Sancion" of 1789, loc. cit.
enough. In 1793 > the prohibition was again imposed, restoring the 
Company to its monopoly.^
The Spanish Company, in common with the other European companies 
trading in Asia, made up shipments of Bengal and Coromandel piece-goods
p
by means of advance payments to manufacturers or their intermediaries. 
These advances usually amounted to two-thirds of the value of the finished 
products prior to delivery. Thus to make an assortment of 1,000,000 pesos' 
worth, 600,000 had to be brought in silver from Spain. As the Spaniards 
became more and more dependent on the English for the supply of this 
investment, it was felt necessary to reach some formal agreement with the 
English Company who had a monopoly on those goods.
The Royal Philippine Company commissioned their agent in London, 
Permin de Tastet, to negotiate a contract with the English Company. On 
1 May 1788, Tastet delivered his propositions to the Court of Directors 
of the English Company.^ The latter should undertake to deliver at some
1 "Pragmatica-Sancion en fuerza de ley, por la gual se prohibe la 
introduccion en el Reyno de las muselinas, y de otros generos de 
algodon de Asia por diverso medio o' conducta que el de la Compania 
de Pilipinas, a la que se reintegra en el privilegio exclusivo que 
la estaba concedido para introducir ella sola, y vender por mayor 
dichos generos, en la conformidad que se previene," (l Oct.), 
ibid.. f. 80-3.
2 See Josef Pereira Viana, "Methodo que propongo para establecer en 
Manila las manufacturas de mercaderias que se hacen en el grande y 
pequeno Ganjes, y en los principales lugares de la Costa de Coromandel," 
enclosed in his letter to Yriarte, dated Madrid, 12 May 1791* Ibid.,
f. 217-24.
3 Tropositions of Don Permin de Tastet for the Philippine Company to 
supply 600,000 dollars in exchange for merchandise to be delivered 
in the East Indies," Auditor's References, No. 4> 1783-88 (n.p.).
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mutually designated port or ports in the East Indies* at prime cost and
with all incidental charges, such goods as the Philippine Company would
order from them to the sum of 600,000 pesos, which amount should he paid
in Canton and the pesos to have the same value as that received by the
English from Europe. The Philippine Company, on the other hand, was to
send a ship to the designated port to receive the goods, and bring on the
also
same ship, besides bullion,/wines, brandies, and other products of Spain 
and Spanish America, which would be sold freely in the port, unless the 
English Company chose to buy them. The Spanish Company should also be 
allowed to maintain factors or commissioners at all English establishments 
in India, with all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by their 
equivalents in England. Any residual cash which the Spanish factor in 
Canton might find in his hands should go in payment of goods purchased 
there from the English Company, or should be entered as part payment of 
any bills which the Spanish agents in India might in future draw on Canton. 
Failing both, the money should be considered as a private loan to be repaid 
by the English in London to the order of the Philippine Company, at the 
same rate for the pesos as that in Canton.
These propositions were transmitted to the English Minister Pitt, 
who made no objection to the idea of a contract between the two companies.* 
The negotiations, however, proceeded very slowly, with both sides niggling 
unnecessarily. The Spanish Ambassador, the Marques del Campo, tried to
1 "At a Secret Court of Directors held on Wednesday the 7th May 1788;" 
also "At a Court of Directors held on Friday the 16th May 1788," 
ibid.
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speed up the transactions "by appealing to Pitt? Subsequently, the Court
2
of Directors of the English Company put forward their own proposals.
Tastet*s objections centered on three points. Firstly, the Philippine
Company, which would be opening "a new channel for the consumption of
Indian manufactures in Spain” at the same time "rehabilitating” India by
a large export of money there, was circumscribed as to its export cargo,
"under the false notion that it may hurt the trade of individuals.”
Secondly* the English Company need not stipulate that the Spanish Company's
factors should be natural-born subjects of Spain, since "the natural
predilection was too strongly in favor of one’s countrymen." Lastly, the
allotment of goods which might fall short of the guarantee ordered by both
Companies would in effect exclude the Spanish from any share in the most 
3
important items#
To the first objection, the English Company replied that unless the 
Spanish imports were restricted, "instead of dollars, goods to any amount 
might be carried to India and their produce only paid in for the invest­
ment to be furnished the Eoyal Company, whereas it was in view to benefit
1 "Dote from the Marquis del Campo to Mr. Pitt recommending the 
expediting the negotiation between the Philippine Company and 
Directors for supplying the former with piece-goods, 2 July 1788, 
Great Marlborough St.,” ibid#
2 "Proposed Articles of Agreement between the Honorable United Company 
of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies and the Hoyal 
Spanish Philippine Company," submitted by the Committee of Corres­
pondence and read in Secret Court 23 July 1788. Ibid.
See also correspondence between Tastet and the English Directors 
from 16 May to 22 July# Ibid.
3 Tastet, 23 July#
the country hy the introduction of specie." To the second objection, 
the English opposed the possibility of the introduction of foreigners as 
well as British subjects, the inconveniences of which they were not 
prepared to meet. As to Tastet's third objection, the English Directors 
maintained that they could not think of a fairer division than that 
already suggested.1
Tastet's further efforts scored for the Spanish Company one trifling
point, e.g., the addition of iron to the list of Spanish exports* the
amount of which should not exceed 80 tons, this "being sufficient for the
(kentledge) of the Spanish Company's ships."2 But Tastet was not yet through.
Just before the scheduled signing of the Agreement, he introduced minor
alterations to which the English readily agreed, as they did not materially
3
affect their original proposals.
Needless to say, the Agreement was never carried out, just as every 
effort made subsequently to reach a similar agreement fell through. From 
the Spanish point of view, the Agreement would have proved prejudicial to 
certain established interests, particularly in Manila. In fact, the Manila 
trade which was the Spanish Company’s raison d'etre was completely ignored. 
The Spanish pesos which were intended to be kept in Spanish hands would be 
literally poured into the English coffers. Moreover, 60,000 pesos' worth
1 At a Committee of Correspondence, 6 Aug. 1788. Ibid.
2 "Secret, Report (of the) Committee of Correspondence on Don Fermin 
de Tastet's letter of the 19th August, 26 Aug* 1788, read and 
approved in Court 10 Sept." Ibid.
3 Tastet to Nathaniel Smith, Bury-Court, 11 Nov. 1788; "At a 
Committee of Correspondence, 19th Nov. report on Tastet's letter 
referred 11th Instant, read and approved in Court the same day." 
Ibid.
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of Spanish exports could hardly he considered a fair exchange for the 
600,000 in silver money to he delivered into the English Company's 
treasury at Canton. Above all, a treaty with the foreigner to which the 
Spanish King was not a party could hardly interest his paternalistic 
government.
On the other hand, the Directors of the East India Company were in 
doubt as to the adequacy of the 15 per cent to be paid by the Spanish 
over the prime cost of articles to be delivered to them; if insufficient 
to cover all the charges involved in packing, sorting, etc., and "the 
commission," they would become "mere agents for the Spaniards."* They 
were also concerned that the Spaniards might go to the aurgangs or markets 
to make private purchases, "a measgire likely to prejudice the English 
interests in a commercial view," unless they tried to supply them with 
those goods required by the Spanish Company but ganknown to the Company's 
agents in India or which were not usgaally provided for the East India 
C ompany's inve stment.
The fears of the Bengal Government with regards to the possible 
consequences or effects of the proposed treaty between the two Companies 
were couched in more specific and realistic terms. The goods which the 
English Company were bogand to deliver to the Spaniards were the best 
assortment in the Company's investment in India. It gvas generally known 
that the private merchants who invested money in the aurgangs sold the
1 "Commercial Department: Separate (letter) on the Agreement with
the Royal Philippine Company, signed Win. Devaynes, S. Lushington, 
etc., London, 22 April 1789," (to the President and Cogancil at 
Port St. George). Home Misc. Series, V. 77, f.
produce in Calcutta at 25 per cent on the prime cost, 10 per cent more 
than the Spanish Company was to give on the same goods. It was also 
common knowledge that the Company purchased "considerably cheaper than 
any other order of dealers in some place as to exceed belief," and that 
as regards quality, its finer fabrics were worth 40 per cent upon the 
invoice. It would thus seem "entirely probable” that foreign agents or 
British traders would be glad to buy the Company's choice goods. Meanwhile 
the exports to Manila, including the freight on Bengal ships, could not 
have been landed in that city at less than 45 or 50 per cent, "perhaps 
more," on the Bengal aurung cost, and transshipped to Spain or Mexico, 
would perhaps fetch a total of 80 per cent on the first cost. Thus by 
paying a mere 15 per cent premium, as provided in the proposed treaty, 
the Spaniards would be trading "on better terms than other foreigners, 
whether adventurers or privileged companies,... better ... than British 
subjects, nay... better... than the English Company themselves," as to 
undersell them all in the markets of Europe. Viewed from another direction 
the supply of the Spanish consunption direct from Bengal to their European 
and American ports at the 15 per cent premium would constitute "such a 
saving as would soon bring on the decay of the Manila trade." The 
Philippine Company would eventually have no need for supplies to be sent 
to that place, and it was most likely that trade there with Bengal would 
be entirely prohibited. Thw loss of this trade would mean to the English 
the disappearance of the concealed trade of their private merchants, 
besides the loss of all the freight which British ships had been receiving 
from the Spaniards, of all the commission and profit in the sales at 
Manila, and of the duties paid by Spanish imports into England. The last
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three items alone, on an investment of 15 lacks in both Bengal and Madras 
at 35 bo 40 per cent premium, were calculated to amount to "above 5^*000 
pounds sterling" each year.1
Lord Cornwallis' view of the matter, which may well represent
English thinking in India with regard to trade with the Spaniards in the
East, was that the proposed agreement between the two Companies should
be dissolved, and that the Spaniards should be left to make purchases
from private merchants, or to employ their own agents "in executing all
2
their commissions for procuring the manufactures" of India.
As a matter of fact, while Tastet was negotiating in London, the
Spanish Company's officials in Manila were proposing to enter into a
contract with John and Lewis Da Costa, "native inhabitants of Calcutta
under the description of Portuguese." By this contract, a supply of piece-
3
goods would have been delivered in Manila by a Portuguese vessel. Agents 
of the English Company at Calcutta were approached by the Philippine 
Company for the same reason. To regularize their proceedings, the House 
of Paxton, Cockerell, Delisle and Company, and Joseph Thomas Brown in 
partnership with a Mr. Rogers, wrote the East India Company's Directors 
in London, requesting "a favourable construction of an Act of the twenty-
1 Extract of letter from the Board of Trade at Bengal, 1 Dec. 1789.
Ibid., f. 539-91.
2 Extract of letter to the Court of Directors, 7 Dec. 1789. Ibid., f.5^5*
3 This engagement proved unsuccessful. "The persons so employed 
were in every respect unfit for it. They made an attempt but their 
resources failed, and they by that means in some measure brought 
discredit to the Settlement." Letter from Paxton, etc., 21 May 1788, 
toe- cit.
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first of His Present Majesty, Cap. 65«" which would allow them to enter 
into a contract with the Spanish Company.* This project seems to have 
failed also. We can infer, however, the magnitude of the business 
involved from what actually passed between the East India and Philippine 
Company without benefit of contract or treaty. A Spaniard claimed to 
have been a witness to the delivery of 1,500,000 pesos to the English 
supercargoes in Canton by the Spanish Company, an amount corresponding 
to the year 1788 alone.2
Two years after Tastet signed the Agreement in London, the English
5
Company were still waiting for their Spanish counterpart to ratify it.
The matter was finally closed by a virtual rebuff from the Spanish side. 
The ports of Spain had just been opened to the importation of East India 
white piece-goods, which Tastet interpreted as "an annihilation of the 
Treaty,” although he had had ”no orders to declare it so to the English 
Company.”4" Moreover, the Nootha Sound dispute had broken out and was 
threatening to inflame the two nations into war.
After the war clouds had lifted, the project, which was set on foot 
in the ministerial chambers of London and Madrid in 1785 for a treaty of
1 l~bld.
2 Vasadre’s ”Reflexiones,” loc. cit.
5 Full text of the Agreement, signed by Fermin de Tastet on 10 Dec. 1788,
”sealed and delivered in the presence of John Smith and William 
Wright,” in H.M.S., V • 77, f. 45I-5OO; another copy in V. 6^4, f. 191- 
228.
4 ”At a Committee of Correspondence,” 15 Sept. 1790; idem. ,
2 Nov. 1790. Ibid., f. 598-9.
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commerce "between the two nations, was revived, "but in a different
direction. The declaration of war between England and Spain in 1779
had disrupted the commercial entente existing "between them. The details
1
of the negotiations which lasted four years in an effort to adjust their 
commercial relations by treaty are peripheral to our subject and therefore 
do not concern us here* We should note, nevertheless, that during the 
negotiations, the atmosphere in Spain hardly conduced to a revival of 
English privileges in the Spanish trade, since it was precisely these 
that Charles III had set out to destroy. But notwithstanding Spain’s 
continued resistance to English overtures for a commercial agreement, 
British trade in Spain and her American colonies went on without serious 
obstruction* This is the same picture we have seen with respect to 
British trade in the Philippines.
The man commissioned by George III to negotiate a commercial treaty 
with Spain was Halph Woodford, who lost this commission in 179^ when 
further hope of obtaining such a treaty had been dispelled. Woodford now 
turned to the East India Company through whom he thought he could put to 
profitable use the information and insights he had gained from his long 
negotiations with Spanish agents. In fact, before the withdrawal of his 
royal commission, he had matured a project "more consonant to the views 
of Spain and less prejudicial to her revenue than the project of 1786 
was construed to be." He seems to have been encouraged in this direction
1 In P.O.72, 7. 29-}2.
2 "State of the Negotiation now pending for a Treaty of Commerce with 
Spain," in Mr. Woodford’s of 20 Aug. 1791. Ibid., V. *1, f. 49-56•
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"by Lord Grenville* and had hoped that the latter could convince the
Court of Spain of the mutual "benefits which could "be derived from his
proposal.* He had also proceeded on a line which would most likely make
an impression on. the Spaniards* and that is* the possibility of salvaging
the Spanish trade with the Philippines and developing the colony for
commercial profit. He did not think that the concessions under the Royal
Decree of 1785 were sufficient to achieve these ends. He maintained that
the inhabitants of the Philippines and the Spanish Company were jealous
2
and distrustful of one another. The latter was undermined by "ignorance” 
and "rapacity” on the part of its servants. It had little or no credit 
with "the responsible mercantile houses in India,” and consequently, had 
incurred bad debts with houses of "doubtful reputation" and had been 
receiving merchandise of "inferior quality."
Woodford envisaged the opening of Philippine ports to British 
products and manufactures from India, which would enable the inhabitants 
of the Spanish colony to buy them at prime cost and avoid the high prices 
at Canton. Meanwhile, British settlers in India should be allowed to
1 See correspondence between Woodford and Lord Grenville, from
2 Aug. 1792 to 7 Dec. 1793. Ibid., V. 32, f. 232-404, passim.
2 The nature of the opposition which faced the Company in Manila
may be gathered from the following extensive memorials in support
of the body: "Copia del y nforme, que con el correspondiente oficio 
dirigio la Direccion de la Real Compania de Filipinas con fecha de
11 de enero de 1788 al Sxmo. Sr. Bo. Fr. Don Antonio Valdes, en 
contestacion a la xtepresentacion hecha a S.M. por el Consulado de 
Manila (con fecha 8 de julio de 1787)." Biblio. Bgerton, V. 5^8* 
f. 91-115; "Voto de Don Bernardo de Yriarte leido en el Consejo de 
Yndias, sobre el expediente de los recursos del Consulado y otros 
Cuerpos de Manila contra la Cia. de Filipinas," Madrid, 11 de 
diciembre de 1792. Ibid., V. 519, f. 59-78.
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establish themselves in the islands under certain regulations, with the
view to introduce capital and British techniques in industry and agri- 
1
culture. But the main point in his proposal, a theme which had been 
stressed again and again in the evaluation of British interest in the 
Philippine area, was the possibilities of the Spanish islands as a 
"general depot of the manufactures of Bengal, Coromandel, Malabar, Batavia, 
China and Japan." The need of the eapanding English trade for such a base, 
first cogently expounded by Dalrymple three decades before, was as yet 
unsatisfied.
Woodford was referred by the Chairman of the Court of Directors of
the East India Company to Charles Cockerell, who had been ruminating the 
2
same subject. On 27 June 179^, Woodford transmitted his Plan of 2 August 
1792 to Lord Melville, with "the new lights" he had acquired on the matter, 
chiefly from Cockerell and the Spanish Consul-General, M. de las Heras.
To obviate an obstacle in the 1788 negotiations, Woodford now suggested 
that the person or persons to act for the Philippine Company in the proposed 
transaction should have the full sanction and authority of the Spanish King.'
1 "Considerations for concerting a commercial arrangement with the
Philippine Islands," enclosed in Woodford’s letter to Lord Grenville,
Whitehall, 2 Aug. 1792. Ibid., f. 2^2-42.
2 Documents on the subject, from this point on, or covering the period 
from 27 June 179^ to 8 Feb. 1798* are made available at the India 
Office Library through microfilm of Professor Holden Furber’s collection 
of Melville MSS, said to be at Harvard University.
5 Woodford further suggested, "as a matter of deliberation, whether the
King’s authorization will not be requisite at the commencement as 
well as the conclusion of the proposed arrangement."
Woodford to Dundas, Hew Norfolk St., 27 June 179^.
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Indeed, the main reason why the agreement negotiated "by Tastet miscarried 
was because he did not have the right credentials.*
As Woodford immersed himself in the matter, his plan for a
commercial agreement with Spain became more ambitious, showing a greater
cognizance of the realities and difficulties of the Spanish Eastern trade.
He also introduced a note of urgency in his proposal, appealing to both
the nationalist and commercial interest of the East India Company. Word
was around that the Spanish King was contemplating the renewal of the ban
2
on muslins in his realm. The ”distresses of the manufacturers of Leeds,” 
which had been recently made known to Woodford ”on the spot," were likely 
to occasion an appeal to the British King’s Government. A memorial, in 
fact, had already been received from the manufacturers of Manchester 
pressing for a commercial treaty with Spain. The Spanish edict which 
Woodford had feared was issued in September 1793* and in a subsequent 
letter to lord Grenville, he expressed his concern of the effects which 
the news of such a decree would have when it reached the manufacturers
3
of the north.
1 In the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library, University of * 
Chicago, a document exists entitled "Sobre un tratudo de comercio 
y nauegacion entre las Companias Ynglesa y Espanola," (Ca. 1796), 
which points out that the two companies "have not been founded on 
the same basic principles, that is to say the English are masters 
of the lands they occupy and have power to make treaties, both 
political and economic with foreign nations and companies, whereas 
the Spanish have to answer to the King.” The document evidently 
treats of the convention between the two companies as proposed by 
Woodford, 21 Aug. 179}* describing the articles as involving questions 
of sovereigntyso that all would have to come to the attention of 
the King.” Paul S. Lietz, Calendar of Philippine Documents in the 
Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library, Chicago, 19^6, No. 252.
2 Woodford to Devaynes, 1 Sept. 1793*
3 Idem to Lord Grenville, 7 Dec. 1793*
Woodford was now reinforced in his idea that the opening of Manila
and other Philippine ports to the British in India would open the Atlantic
front doors of Spanish America to Indian manufactures and the Philippines
itself to British and Irish produce. These British exports would yield
"the pure "bullion of Mexico" for the replenishment of the treasury at
Bengal and the Coromandel, which was "being drained of specie by the
continual remittances to Europe of "the vast fortunes accumulated by
individuals." Spain had had no merchant marine in the East; the Portuguese
had been the main carriers between Manila and the Indian coasts, but they
were trusted "with difficulty from their bad faith."* By undertaking this
direct commerce, the English would save the Philippine Company the
"exorbitant expenses" of the mercantile expeditions to the said coasts,
and the latter would aleo not be "imposed upon in their purchases as they 
2
actually are," Moreover, the establishment of English commercial houses 
in Manila would introduce credit between the Philippines and India, a mode 
of transaction which no doubt would benefit both contracting parties.
Woodford’s plan appears to have been received favourably by Dundas 
and Lord Cornwallis. William Devaynes, the Chairman of the East India 
Company’s Court of Directors, however, seems inclined to look at the
1 Woodford to Johnson, 14 Aug. 1798. Woodford enumerated the articles 
from Great Britain and Ireland "which it is surmized Spain would 
permit to be imported at Manila on board of the licensed ships;" 
also the articles, "the growth of Old ? or New Spain which the Royal 
Philippine Company may send to the English East India Company’s 
settlements." Woodford to Dundas, 29 Sept. 1793.
2 "Translation of (de las Heras’) Suggestions communicated in reply to 
Sir Ralph Woodford’s Note B."
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matter from the point of view of benefitting the China trade,1 and 
would advise that the proposed direct trade between India and the
Philippines be carried on by English individuals with license from the
2
Company, rather than by the Company itself. A third school of thought, 
the most ambitious of all, one which seems to have prevailed amongst a 
segment of the King’s Ministry as we have seen and will again notice in 
the next chapter, was that now espoused by Cockerell* formerly a resident 
of India. By way of ensuring a vast network of exchange involving 
British merchandise and encompassing China, India, the Moluccas, Acapulco 
and Peru, as fax as the Mediterranean, the English should obtain the 
cession of Luzon ”or more of the Philippine Islands.” The immediate 
possibilities from this acquisition lay in the geographic position of the 
islands, or its proximity to China which would spare British merchants 
from the exactions of the Canton monopolists* since the large fleets of 
Chinese junks which at one time visited Manila would again be drawn to it.
In return for the cession, Spain would be allowed to have factories
in Manila and at Calcutta or Madras, or if preferred, she could have
Chandernagore and ”some unfortified place on the Coast” which formerly
3
belonged to France.
1 Devaynes to Woodford, 14 Aug. 1793.
2 Idem to Dundas, 2 Sept. 1793*
3 Cockerell’s "Memorial upon the subject of concerting a new plan
of commerce with the Spanish Aeal Compania Philippina between India 
and the Philippine Islands, with a view to its extension to 
Acapulco through the means of the Spaniards by the way of Manila, 
as well as from the English possessions in India to Spain direct.” 
Enclosed in V/oodford’s letter to Dundas, 27 June 1793*
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It is unthinkable that Spain would have even considered the idea 
of ceding part or all of the Philippines. Cockerell was certainly out 
of touch as far as understanding the Spanish concept of seigniorial 
power. Spains tenacity with respect to her overseas possessions was 
"both emotional and political. Two hundred years of "evangelical labor" 
in the Philippines could not have been bartered for a mere commercial 
advantage. Besides, possessions in the Bast were still a powerful 
prestige symbol amongst the European imperialist nations.
The official English attitude towards projects such as Cockerell’s 
was summed up by the Minister in charge of Indian Affairs, while 
admitting the "ingeniousness" of some of the propositions, Dundas
complained that the projects all "embraced a great deal too much."* As
2
to Woodford’s plan for an Anglo-Spanish commercial entente * yet another 
item was to be added to the nation’s archives. The recurrent discord 
between the two nations intervened again to nullify his efforts. The out­
break of war in fact reduced him to appeal for "some compensation for the
trouble and pains" he had taken in the Philippine negotiations of 1793 and 
3
1794. Heplacing his plan in the ministerial chambers was another of 
attacking Manila, or for a repeat performance of the 1762 invasion.
1 Dundas to Cornwallis, Somerset Place, 22 March 1795»
2 "Project of a convention between the Sovereigns of Great Britain 
and Spain, ratifying the articles agreed upon between the English 
East India Company and the Hoyal Philippine Company."
3 Woodford to Dundas, 26 July 1797.
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CHAPTER Till
Further British Projects 
in the 
Philippines
I have dealt at length with the principal British activities in 
the Philippines within the period selected for this thesis. The 
invasion and occupation of Manila and the settling of Balambangan each 
constitutes only a Brief interval in the forty-five year period. If we 
include the time which went into their planning and organization, those 
intervals stretch just over the first fifteen years. Nevertheless,
British interest in the area may Be shown to persist throughout the period. 
This has already Been demonstrated in connection with the trade at Manila, 
an interest which manifested itself strongly in projects calculated to 
make that field of commerce yield direct advantages to English merchants. 
These projects, as we have noted further, came to nothing.
Such was also the end suffered By various other schemes conceived 
with the same politico-economic views as those observed in the first 
fifteen years of our period. One was aimed at re-estaBlishing the 
BalamBangan settlement, another at repeating the invasion of Manila.
Three more proposals relate to the island of Mindanao, and were forged on 
the same considerations as those which generated the two plans for a 
trading Base on Balambangan.
In dealing with these projects, I make the same Broad propositions 
as those suggested in initiating this study and in treating of the actual 
activities of the British in the Philippines. First, they may Be used to
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illustrate the nature and extent of British interest in the entire East. 
Secondly, they can he helpful in providing further insight into the 
situation in the Spanish Philippines.
In Mindanao, some spadework was actually done by Company agents 
toward acquiring an English trading base near the spice center. The 
first efforts were made in 1762 and resumed in 1775* A proposal presented 
in 1780 for a campaign in the South Seas against Spanish America included 
an operation en route in Mindanao where the King’s forces were to assist 
those of the Company in obtaining the desired spot for a settlement. The 
whole scheme was dropped, however, in favor of another involving an 
attaek on the more strategic Cape of Good Hope.
In 1797, a formidable expedition was prepared at both the Bengal 
and Madras presidencies and was all but launched against its target, Manila. 
This would have subjected the Spanish dominion in the Philippines to 
another severe test, like the invasion of 1762, and might well have 
provided a fresh turning-point in the history of the colony.
In I8O5, the Balambangan settlement was restored b.y order of the 
governor-general in Bengal, Wellesley, one of the pace-setters of British 
empire-building. It was presently ordered to be withdrawn by the Company’s 
Directors in London, who held the Dutch spice islands a better economic 
prize, and thought that they might gain them as a result of the upheaval 
taking place in Europe.
These enterprises affecting Mindanao, Manila, and Balambangan provide 
the subject of the concluding chapter of this thesis. They were part and
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parcel of the Company’s general scheme for commercial hegemony over the 
Eastern sectors of the globe. The Mindanao projects, like those proposed 
for Balambangan, were based on the idea that the island was favorably 
situated for gathering the produce of Borne© and tapping the spice trade; 
that it was suitable for the cultivation of certain spices; that by its 
proximity to the Philippines, the Chinese junks might be induced to make 
a stop there, and a 1 severe check’4 might be dealt to the Spaniards at 
Manila; and finally, that it would make a convenient half-way station on 
an alternative track to China.
In the debate on the proposed invasion of Manila in 1762, the 
Company’s Secret Committee tried t© wring from the King’s Government some 
tangible compensation for the aid which they had been asked to extend to 
the project.* Draper, who was appointed to head the expedition, and the 
Commander of the King’s squadron in the Bast received instructions from
Government, evidently in reply to the Company’s request, to proceed to
2
take possession of Mindanao after the conquest of Manila. Both, however, 
left Manila without so much as attempting to go to Mindanao, much to the 
chagrin of the Company.^ Drake and his council, who constituted the
1 See the chapter on the Manila invasion.
2 Cf. Secret Instructions to Brigadier General William Draper from the
Court of St. James (Draft), 14 Jan. 1762, C.Q. 77/20; and Secret Orders
and Instructions to Rear-Admiral Charles Steevens, 26 Jan. 1762,
Ata Z / X V t Z .
3 In the word of the Company, "Draper’s sudden departure from Manila 
before other objects such as the attack of Mindanao* had been under­
taken was certainly irregular...” Separate Despatch to George Pigot,
50 Dec. 176^, in Henry Dodwell, Calendar of the Madras Despatches,
V.2, p. 387*
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Company’s government in occupied Manila, consequently took it upon 
themselves to undertake the project, hut without the use of force.
In February 1762, before the invasion, the Sultan of Mindanao
sent an envoy to Manila to arrange a treaty of peace with the Spanish
government. Having apparently accomplished his mission, the envoy was
preparing to leave for his country when the Bnglish came. On January 24,
1763* he requested Governor Drake and Council to allow him to return to
Mindanao, offering to deliver any message they might want to send to his
1
King and promising to return with the latter’s reply.
The Moslem emissary had earlier intimated to Governor Drake that 
his sultan would gladly bind himself in an alliance with the Bnglish, 
which was the customary line pursued by Malay chieftains of allying them­
selves with the superior of two contending powers. The Manila Board 
immediately perceived how such an alliance would be useful toward the
taking of Zamboanga, the Spanish stronghold on the island of Mindanao, or
2
any other spot on which to build the desired base for Bnglish trade.
The economic importance of the island, as had already been emphasized
The reason given by Cornish for not attempting the settlement in 
Mindanao was that he had no ship to spare to do it. "Confidential 
Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Governor-General and 
Council in Bengal and to the Presidents and Select Committees at 
Fort St. George and Bombay, dated 2 Oct., 1780, with a postcript 
dated the same day". Minutes of Secret Committee, V . 3* ^ • 119 •
1 Letter to the Mianila Board from Gundao, Ambassador from Mindanao, 
in Manila Consultations, V. 6, p. 20.
2 Consultation, 24 Jan. 1763* Ibid., p. 21-2.
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■by those familiar with the area, lay in its production of cinnamon1 and 
the "abundance of staple commodities".
Mindanao, or Magindanao, the second biggest island in the Philippine 
archipelago, was described in the following manner by Captain Thomas 
Forrest, who made the second attempt to secure a settlement on the island.
MThe island is of a triangular form, having three 
remarkable capes or promontories; one near Samboangan 
where the Spaniards have their chief settlement to the 
westward; Cape Augustine or Pandagitan to the eastward; 
and Suligow/Surigao_7 *0 the northward. The island 
may be divided into three parts; each under a distinct 
and independent government. First under the Sultan who 
resides at the town of Mindano /"Mindanao^/ or Selangan, 
by far the largest and most ancient; formerly comprehended 
the greatest part of the sea coast. The second under the 
Spaniards which covers a large portion of the sea-coast, 
to the west, north and northeast, where they have planted 
colonies of Christians from the Philippines called Bisaya.
The third under the I llano or Illanon sultans and rajahs, a 
fort of feudal chiefs who inhabit the banks of the Great 
Lake or Lano and thence a good way inland, towards the hills... 
they possess also the coast of the great bay, situated on 
the south side of the island".2
At the time the Company’s Government at Manila were considering 
the proposals of the Mindanao emissary, they were also discussing the 
terms of an alliance with the deposed Sultan of Sulu, Alimudin I , also
1 The species found in Mindanao was called cassia, said to be 
"little inferior" to Ceylonese cinnamon. Manila General Letter 
to Fort St. George, 25 Dec. 1762, para. 16. Madras Military 
Consultations. Range D, V. 49, f . 79.
2 A voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas from Balambangan: 
including an Account of Magindanao, Sooloo and other Islands; 
And illustrated with 50 copperplates. Performed in the Tartar 
Galley, belonging to the Honorable Bast India Company, during 
the years 1774, 1776, and 1776, by Captain Thomas Forrest,
to which is added a Vocabulary of the Magindano Tongue.
London, 1779.
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in Manila. The latter showed greater enthusiasm in favoring the
English as he was anxious to return to his throne with their aid. He
offered to cede to the Company "such part of his own dominions on Xolo
or Borneo as they may chuse to erect forts or factories upon for the
security of their trade* to confirm the treaty of commerce between
Dalrymple and the present prince /  Bantilan, brother of Sultan Alimudin__7*
and to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, for the mutual
2
protection of their possessions”•
Archbishop Ho jo, the Spanish governor of the Philippines at the 
surrender of Manila, objected to these transactions as a violation of 
the capitulation. He claimed that similar arrangements had already been 
made with him by this people, and in view of the fact that the surrender 
of the Philippines was made as by way of a deposit, until the resolution 
of both the English and Spanish kings was known, nothing should be done 
which might prejudice this pawn. He warned that the effect would be to 
stir up the "Moors” , a dangerous eventuality which might occasion "the 
destruction of all".^
The English, nevertheless* went on with the business, believing in 
their undoubted right to enter into agreements with any princes or people
1 See chapter on "Hevival of British Interest in the Eastern 
Archipelago".
2 Manila Consultation, 21 Feb. 1765. Borneo Factory Hecords, 
1648 - 1814.
5 Letter to the Manila Board, 19 March. Man. Cons., V. 6, p. 58.
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whatever,1 especially as Sulu "never was included among the Philippines",
fi p
and Anda continues raising and fomenting troubles".
A ship, the St. Ann, was prepared to take Prince Israel, Sultan 
Alimudin’s heir apparent, to Sulu, along with a cargo of Coast goods to 
he consigned to Bantilan and other Sulu chiefs under the treaty made with 
Dalrymple. In the same ship they also embarked the Mindanao ambassador,
1 Spanish claims to suzerainty over the island of Mindanao dated 
back to the time of Governor Sande who sent an expedition both 
there and to Sulu in 1578 to secure the submission of the people.
Under Governor Gomez Perez Dasmarinas, the campaign for the 
pacification of Mindanao was intensified, accompanied by the usual 
religious missions. In 1599, the Spanish fort La Caldera was 
erected, only to be dismantled the following year owing to the wide 
spread piracy of Mohammedan Malays, among them Sulus and Mindanao s,
in the Visayas and Luzon* In 1655* the settlement was re-established, 
now called Zamboanga, spear-headed by J 0 0 Spanish soldiers and more 
than 1000 Visayans. This was followed by the most vigorous campaign 
on the island under Corcuera. The fort was once more abandoned in 
1662, when the Chinese pirate Kue-sing threatened to invade Manila.
In 1717 the fort was again standing, and since then had served as 
the Spanish bastion against the marauding Malays of the South and 
especially for keeping the Sulus and Mindanaos in line. On the whole, 
the Sulus were more intractable, and with their stronger political 
integration, were a greater impediment to Spanish expansion in the 
South. The Mohammedans on the island of Mindanao, on the other hand, 
were usually divided under various independent kinglets. At the 
time of Forrest’s visit, the most important and unified of the 
Mindanao principalities was that of the same name, anciently called 
Tamontaca, and located at or near the present site of Cotobato City. 
Its relations with the Spaniards fluctuated between hostility and 
peace, but in general it was disposed to remain in still water under 
the menacing aspect of the nearby fort of Zamboanga. The Illanuns, 
who were found to the north, around Lake Lanao, were a more 
piratical lot and seldom descriminated between Mohammedans and non- 
Mohammedans when an a plundering spree. See Chapter on the 
Balambangan settlement for Spanish accounts of Mindanao which also 
treat of Sulu.
2 Cons., 19 March, Man. Cons.. V. 6, p. 60.
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escorted "by John Durand, Quartermaster of the Company’s troops.1
The latter was ”to use his endeavours with the Sultan of Mindanao 
to put him in possession in the name of the British King_7 
Samboangan or any of the Spanish settlements on that island* or... to 
obtain a convenient spot for a settlement near a river, if possible 
navigable for ships, if not, at least for large sampans...” He was also 
to cultivate the friendship of the envoy in order to obtain information
of the island of Mindanao, of the Spanish settlements there, and of their
2
relations with the sultan or his chief men.
3
Toward the end of July of the same year, a letter was received 
from Durand, telling of his arrival in Jolo, of his friendly reception 
by the chief leading men, and of the caution which had to be taken against 
the common people "who were not very scrupulous of murder, especially of 
strangers”.
From Sulu, Durand proceeded with his charge to Mindanao. It
appears that he was warmly received there, that he obtained assistance
from its people in the reduction of La Caldera, an old Spanish settlement 
4
near Zamboanga. However, the Spaniards rallied upon the arrival of a 
reinforcement from Zamboanga and forced them out.^ With the restoration
1 Cons., 12 April, Ibid, p. 74-5.
2 Instructions to John Durand, 14 April. Ibid., p. 83.
3 Letter dated Jolo, 11 May, read in Cons, of 25 July. Ibid., p.159-60.
4 Letter from Quint in Crawford, Manila, 4 Aug. 1764.
Abstracts Fort St. George Letters Received, Ho. 1.
5 According to a Spanish account, Anda appointed Pedro Yame to take 
charge of the defense and custody of the port of Zamboanga, not trusting 
in the short experience of the governor there. When Yame arrived, two
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of peace between Spain and England, the Mindanao project, which had been
1
initiated thus by the Company’s agents, governing at Manila, came to an end.
In June 1771, when the Company Directors launched the Balambangan 
settlement, they gave directions to the agents in charge of it to under­
take "the acquisition and cultivation of those valuable articles", the
2
spices. They had been assured by Dalrymple that cinnamon, cloves, 
nutmegs, pepper and clove bark could be easily introduced into Balambangan 
from Sulu and adjacent islands which grew them. This meant exploring 
and discovering places which produced spices but which had no connections 
with the Dutch settlements.
A voyage to Hew Guinea which lay to the eastward and obviously
outside of the Dutch limits was thus ordered from Balambangan by its 
3
chief, Herbert. The man picked to command the expedition was Captain 
Thomas Forrest, who had served briefly in Fort Marlborough before joining 
Herbert on his way to establish the settlement. This voyage, which lasted 
twenty months, took him through the Moluccas, Sulu, Mindanao and the 
islands to the south-west of Sulu. Forrest left a wealth of information
English ships, a man-of war and a frigate were believed to have 
come to the settlement and to have been driven away by Governor 
Ignacio Andrade. Marques de Ayerbe, Sitio y concruista de Manila 
nor los Ingleses en 1762, Zaragoza, 1897, p. 15.
1 On March 18, 1764, the Manila Board delivered to the Spanish deputies 
meeting with them on the restoration of the conquests their "orders to 
Ensign J. Durand (or in case of his death or absence, to Serjeant 
Labonte) at Mindanao for restoring any places he may have taken there". 
Man. Cons.. V. 9, p. 68-9.
2 Abstract Separate Letter to Bombay relative to Balambangan, sent per 
Britannia, in Personal Hecords, V. 10, f. 26I-3.
3 "The Memorial of Captain Thomas Forrest to the Court of Directors of 
the East India Company", Or me Collection, Various, V. 88, f. 19^-200.
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about the places he visited, but of these we shall interest ourselves 
only in Mindanao.*
His vessel, called the Tartar, was a Sulu proa, of a mere ten-ton 
burthen. A small vessel of this type was not only extremely navigable 
in those narrow seas but was also highly suited to the crew he was taking 
with him* Most of them were Malays, "or natives of those islands that 
lie east of Atcheen Head". He took on board omly two Europeans, as he 
believed more of them would surely get into quarrels with the Malays.
On November 9, 1774, the Tartar galley was rowed out of the north­
east harbor of Balambangan.
On May 5» 1775* she entered the river Pelangy /pulangi_7,2 and early 
the following morning came abreast of the fort of the Sultan of Mindanao. 
At this point, a man, whom Forrest had known at Balambangan, came aboard 
and told him of the taking of the English settlement there by the Sulus.
Forrest was welcomed to the Moslem Kingdom of Mindanao /"the present
Cotobato_7 *y a brother-in-law of Rajah Moodo, the latter, a nephew of the
sultan and heir-apparent to the throne. This man seemed to wield a
3
greater influence and power than his uncle, and with him Forrest quickly
1 The source of the subsequent account is Forrest’s published memoirs 
A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, etc., cited above.
2 Forrest undoubtedly meant the "Mindanao river”, which he accurately 
placed in subsequent paragraphs of his Voyage. Pulangi is a river 
in the interior which reaches all the way to the north.
3 From the letters addressed to the British King and the Company by 
Rajah Moodoo and his father Fakymolano, it appears that the aging 
sultan had given up "all command and authority into the hands of 
Rajah Moodoo". See infra.
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ingratiated himself.
During his stay in Mindanao, Forrest found that the island produced 
"much gold and wax" "besides nan excellent kind of cassia," or cinnamon.
He was then struck with the idea of an English trading "base here, some 
small island near the mainland, ’’which shall have "behind it a harbour, 
and on it room sufficient to establish a fort and warehouse”. The island 
Ebus, or Bos, twenty miles from Mindanao River, seemed to him to "be the 
right one. Furthermore, he was told that he could have a grant ©f it, 
together with a portion of the opposite mainland. But when he saw the 
island of Bunwoot /"now called Bongo/7, which faced the river and formed 
the shelter to Police harbour, he thought differently, yet did not dare 
ask for it, "apprehending the favour would be too great”.
To his satisfaction. Rajah Moodoo made an offer of the island* On 
September 5* 17751 Forrest was sunmoned by the sultan, and informed that 
he, his elder brother Fakymolano, Rajah Moodoo, and all their relatives 
had agreed to grant Bunwoot island to the English Company. The document 
was signed and sealed on September 12, 1775* This was in turn forwarded 
by Forrest to Herbert, who, following the loss of Balambangan, had 
transferred the settlement to Labuan, an island off north Borneo.
On the 8th of January, 1776, Forrest left Mindanao, accompanied by 
two of Rajah Koodoo’s soldiers. He bore with him two almost identical
letters from Rajah Moodoo and his father Fakymolano, one addressed to the
1 2 British King and the other to the Company, each accompanied by a
1 "Sultan of Mindanao /SicJ to the King /of Great Britain__7» 15 June
1775”. In the original Arabic. "Received 8 March 1777 from Mr. Roberts, 
Chairman of the East India Company”. Home Miscellaneous Series /hence-
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box of cinnamon "as a tokeri of what is produced in quantities in /theirJ7 
dominions". The English were offered any island in the Mohammedan 
Kingdom on which they might settle* build a fort, and mount as many guns 
and soldiers as they pleased, together with a strip of the opposite main­
land measuring 1,000 fathoms along the seashore and 1,000 fathoms inland.
Four years later, in 1780, Forrest was again mentioned in connection 
with a proposed expedition in the south Pacific which was to rendezvous 
at Mindanao and set up a settlement there.
As before, whenever a war seemed imminent, the Company Directors
chose a Secret Committee from among themselves, generally the Chairman
and the Deputy Chairman, to consult with the King’s Ministers relative to
naval or military operations. France had flung down the gauntlet by
entering into a treaty with the rebel American colonies. Before long,
Spain would follow suit and make common cause against England. Under
these circumstances, the Company’s concern turned on the safety and
security of their Eastern settlements and trade. Their fear of Spain
sprang from the presence of Spanish forces in the Philippines capable of
inflicting serious damage to the China ships. Thus they asked the King’s
Minister, Lord Weymouth, to allow them to authorize their Indian settlements
3 .
to commit hostilities against the Spaniards.
forth to be abbreviated as H.M.S.7, V. 138, 495-7.
2 "Translation of Fakymolano and Sajah Moodoo’s letter to the Honorable 
Company. In Chairman and Deputy Chairman’s... 19 August 1780".
Ibid., V. 146, f. 143-5.
3 Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to Lord Weymouth, 12 June 1779, 
inclosing draft instructions to the Presidencies in India.
Ibid., V. 143, f. 193-8.
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The reply was a summons to the Secret Committee to appear before 
Lord North, head of the King’s Government, who laid before them a 
proposal for an expedition to South America.1 A body of I3OO British 
troops with 2000 Mohammedan Lascar Sepoys was to sail from Madras in
May the following year on board armed transports or old East-Indiamen,
2
escorted by a detachment from Sir Edward Hughes’ squadron. This 
expeditionary force would make for the Pacific coast of Spanish America, 
but on the way, it was to take possession of one of the Philippine 
islands and a spot on New Zealand for purposes of "refreshment, 
communication and retreat". From New Zealand, the armament would then 
sail directly to South America, where "there is not one place from 
California to Cape Horn, capable of resisting such an equipment, if 
properly provided and properly conducted". Military outposts were to be 
planted and fortified, but terms of independence should be open to native 
Mexicans, Peruvians and Chileans, no doubt in retaliation for Spanish 
support of revolutionaries in British North America. Meanwhile, on the 
Atlantic side, the home Government would effect a diversionary operation 
against Spanish imperial defenses.
The Company endorsed the project in principle, as expected, and 
then went into the customary committee meetings^ to weigh the risks and 
advantages to their corporate interests which their joining in the
1 Minutes of the Secret Committee, 18 July 1780_7» V. 22.
2 "Proposal of an Expedition to South America by India, dated June 3rd,
1780, laid before the Cabinet by Lord North". Ibid., f. 23-5*
3 See Secret Committee Minutes of 18 July; 5* 8* 15* 19 1780,
ibid., f. 22-33.
enterprise might entail, a s  in the previous expedition to Manila, their 
main concern was the safety of the Indian settlements, and now more than 
ever, the security of the China trade. In view of the "very gloomy 
aspect" of the situation in India,'*' the expedition to the south seas 
presented an opportunity of adding a "very respectable strength" to the 
force there, which otherwise could not he obtained. This strength was 
estimated at 2000 soldiers, one 64-gun ship, one 32* besides armed 
transports which would convoy ten or twelve of the Company ships to India.
Their expectation was that/the expedition reached India and found 
the settlements in danger, it would be detained until such danger was 
over or had been removed.
Another prospect of the proposed expedition was the establishment 
of a principal "Further Bast Asian" settlement on Mindanao and of an 
auxiliary one on Celebes. Needless to say, the main attraction of the 
area was the cultivation and trade in spices. The auspicious beginnings 
made by Captain Forrest in Mindanao were recalled/ a country which was
1 The situation in India was described by the Secret Committee as 
follows: "Our Bombay troops were totally and shamefully defeated. 
Hagobah, our friend and ally had been delivered up to the Poonah 
Government. The French, and as we were secretly informed, the Butch, 
were courting an alliance with the Marattas. Hyder Ally appeared 
hostile; our situation on the Coast of Coromandel was very distressing 
The settlement was in great want of money; our returning ships were
in utmost danger, as we had ordered their rendezvous at the Cape, and 
a French Squadron was there to intercept them". Minutes of 8 Aug., 
ibid., f. 42.
2 "Sketch of a Plan", enclosure No. 8 in the minutes of 18 July.
Ibid., f. 26-7.
3 Letters from the rulers of Mindanao to the British King and the 
Company, which were written as a result of Forrest’s visit in that 
island, were reproduced and enclosed in the Secret Committee’s
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represented as breing "too powerful to “be subdued by the Spaniards” and 
as a convenient base for an attack on Manila and for obstructing Spanish 
commerce. In Celebes* the English had been earlier invited by the Bugis 
King to settle on his territory which adjoined Macassar and lay contiguous 
to the Spice Islands.*
Lastly, the projected armament would forestall any designs of the 
French and Spaniards to way-lay the trading ships plying in the China seas.
As to the Company’s assistance in the project* an understanding
was reached whereby they would provide two 40-gun ships and another of 20,
2
along with a Sepoy contingent.
3
However* in their letter of August 19th to Lord Hillsborough, one 
of the King’s principal Secretaries of State, the Company reneged on their 
former proposal and offered instead two ships of 20 guns each. As to the 
Indian force to go on the expedition, ”they could not absolutely pledge 
themselves”. They conceded that they should assist with 2,000 Sepoys, 
but they would not commit themselves further than to say that "they shall 
be granted if the affairs of the Company in India render it practicable 
without risking the safety of their possessions, and if the native troops
Minutes of 19 Aug. 1780: "Letter to His Britannick Majesty from the 
Sovereign of Mindanao” , and "Translation of Fakymolano’s and Bajah 
Moodoo’s Letter to the Honorable Company.” Enclosures Ho. 18 and 19 
f. 64-6. respectively, ibid., f. 61 - 6.
1 In 1768, the King of the Bugis offered Captain Carteret a portion of
his territory on the sea coast on which the English could erect their
settlement. Enclosure in the Secret Committee’s Minutes of 19 Aug.,
No. 12: "Papers relative to Captain Carteret”. Ibid., f. 67-9.
2 "Sketch of sin Expedition to the South Seas", enclosure No. 9.
Ibid., f. 28-32.
3 H.M.S., V. 146, f. 131-137.
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can "be induced, to embark on so distant an expedition".
The cabinet* however, would insist on the number and size of ships 
originally agreed upon to be contributed by the Company.1 This was 
conveyed in writing to the Secret Committee by Hillsborough, who
categorically pointed out that those ships and 2,000 Sepoys from India
2were "absolutely depended upon by Government”.
The correspondence between Company and Government on the subject 
of the expedition also hinged on the stance to take with respect to the 
Dutch settlements in the East. The Company obviously toyed with the idea 
of exploiting the project to achieve their long-sought ends in that sector. 
They suggested rather obliquely that if their presidencies in India should 
find themselves "justified in attacking the Dutch", the proposed armament 
should be used first in the reduction of the Spice Islands on its way to
South America. The reply of Government was a flat rejection of any form
of hostility against the Dutch settlements which was not in retaliation 
to acts of aggression on the part of Holland. The King was at the moment 
at peace with the Republic; thus "the greatest caution should be used to 
prevent views of advantage and acquisition from misleading to violence, 
breach of faith and injustice."^
The Company would like further to make use of the occasion to 
collect a debt of £159,877, supposed to be due to them from the Spanish
1 "Minute of Cabinet, Lord Amherst’s, 51 Aug.,... Present Lord George
Germain, Lord North, Lord Amherst, Lord Hillsborough". H.M.S. >
V. H 6 f f. 156.
2 Letter dated St. James1 , 7 Sept. 1780. Ibid., V. 147, f. 265-4•
5 Ibid., f. 264.
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Court as a result of the capitulation of Manila in 1762. The Cabinet, 
however, would adhere to their hands-off policy with regard to the 
subject of the so-called Manila ransom, which obviously had caused 
some embarrassment to the King in his relations with the Spanish monarch. 
The Company then requested that any booty obtained from the expedition 
should be first applied to cover the said debt.* This was also denied* 
as we shall see later.
The Company’s plan for a settlement on Mindanao was elaborated 
upon to suggest the size of force to be left there. A ship or two of 
strength and 500 soldiers, bolstered by an alliance with the sultan,
"will not only be able to render any attack from Manilha abortive, but 
a sufficient force, perhaps a hundred men, may immediately be spared to 
make a settlement with the King of the Bugguese". Since Mindanao will 
be the rendezvous and serve as depot, repair station, and hospital, 
Government should bear all expenses previous to and during the expedition. 
As soon as the Company is settled there and upon the withdrawal of the 
Government’s authority, all charges devolve on the former. As to Celebes,
all expense incurred subsequent to the landing of the troops shall be
2
borne by the Company.
To assure their settlement in those two islands, the Company 
requested a letter from the King recommending them to the sultan of 
Mindanao, also an authorization from him to his commander to open a
1 To Hillsborough from Lau. Sulivan, Deputy Chairman of the
Company’s Court of Directors, East India House, 12 Sept. Ibid., 
V. 147, f. 277-281.
2 Ibid., f. 278.
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negotiation with the Bugis King on behalf of the Company*
An agreement was drawn and signed on September J O t h  by Government 
and Company who undertook jointly to carry out the proposed expedition 
to the South Seas.'*’ The former carried their points with respect to the 
Company’s contribution of force and claim to a share of the booty to the 
extent of the Spanish debt. This claim was waived in favor of the 
Company’s military contingents joining the expedition in India.
The Company, on the other hand, was confirmed in their suggestions
regarding the proposed settlements in Mindanao and Celebes. During the
whole of the expedition, all the officers in the Company’s service would
be under the King’s Commander, irrespective of his rank. However, upon
the establishment of any new settlement or settlements, the Company’s
civil administration should appoint any of the Company’s officers or
servants to take military command thereof. This was an improvement in
the Company’s benefit over that which transpired in Manila during the
2
invasion and occupation of the 1760’s.
In drawing up the Agreement, a difference apparently arose with 
respect to the point held and stressed by the Company as being most vital
1 "Draught of an Agreement with the East India Company”, ibid.,
f. 515-322, finalized into the ’’Agreement relative to the Expedition 
to the South Seas”, dated London, 3° Sept., and signed Hillsborough, 
W. Devaynes and Lau Sulivan, ibid., f. Cf. Letter from the
Committee of Secrecy to Bengal, Fort St. George, and Bombay, dated 
London, 2 Oct. with Postscript dated the same day. Ibid., f. 478-86.
2 The King’s Commander made the choice of the commandant to be left to 
head the garrison in Manila, and thus caused much altercation later. 
See chapter on the "Manila Invasion".
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to their interests. According to the terms of the Agreement* the 
proposed armament should he detained for military service on the Indian 
settlements if these were found "under the circumstances of an actual 
attack”. In the Company’s circular letter to the Indian Presidencies, 
dated October 2nd* the conditional clause was worded to read instead "in 
the circumstances of danger". This letter was read and evidently approved 
by the Cabinet on August 21st. The Company’s Secret Committee then drew 
up the draught of agreement in conformity with the letter. When the 
draught came back from the Cabinet* it had been altered in the above 
mentioned clause. The Company raised an objection to the use of the words 
"actual attack" as being too limited in sense and proposed an explanatory 
article whereby a SUropean enemy landing in India should be considered 
as an actual attack. The Secretary of State* however, rejected the 
proposal* but gave them to understand that the Cemmander-in-Chief of the 
expedition would be authorized to construe the clause liberally and post­
pone the expedition if he should find the settlements "in imminent danger
1
of being attacked by an Suropean enemy".
The Company’s confidential letter to the presidencies written on 
the same date as the circular letter was a recapitulation of their motives 
and objectives in joining the Government’s project. It also demonstrated 
their adherence to the time-honored tradition of allowing their agents in 
India to make the final decisions as to whether or not the Company’s force
1 Postcript to the "Confidential Letter from the Committee of Secrecy 
to the Governor General and Council in Bengal and to the Presidents 
and Select Committees at Fort St. George and Bombay, dated 2 Oct. 1780". 
Minutes of Secret Committee, V. 5* 125-6•
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should he diminished hy an expedition abroad and also with respect to 
the establishment of new settlements. Finally* it affirmed the Company’s 
right to commercial monopoly over the projected settlements by virtue of 
the charter granted to them by the King.*
The proposed expedition to South America by way of India was*
however, abandoned before it got underway. Another expedition to be
directed by Commodore Johnstone was contemplated by the Cabinet, with
Montevideo as the ultimate target. In the plan, the Company’s ships were
to accompany the attacking force to help carry the troops and to add to
the impression of enormous strength. The Company resisted this scheme as
2
risking their Indian settlements and China ships.
This plan was also rejected upon the declaration of war against the
Dutch, the opportunity long awaited by the Company. At last, they could
get their hands not only on the Moluccas Islands but Ceylon as well.
Their proposal was a dovetailing of the Company’s economic interest in
territorial acquisition with Government’s strategic considerations. The
armament should attack the Cape of Good Hope first, then head for Madras,
where the expedition as planned by Colonel Fullarton was to be launched.
On the way to South America, the armada should reduce Ceylon* then the
Moluccas island, using Mindanao as rendezvous, and finally make for South 
5
America.y
1 Full text of confidential letter, 2 Oct. 1780, ibid., f. 114-24.
2 ’’Minute by the Deputy Chairman" ^n.d.^7* * “ 5*
3 ilU-
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On December 26th, a letter was received by the Company from 
Hillsborough laying aside all previously proposed expeditions involving 
aid from the Company, and announcing Government’s new plan to attack 
the Cape of Good Hope with 5*000 men from the King’s forces.*
Thus were English ambitions to strike at the heart of the Spanish 
colonial empire from the rear, by way of the South Pacific, laid aside. 
Thus ended also the Company’s schemes for settling on Mindanao.
The next British design against the Spanish colony in the East 
involved an attack on Manila. This was to be a repetition of the 
successful one of 1762, but to be carried out on a much larger scale.
Like the earlier expedition, that proposed in 1797 was the result of the 
outbreak of war with Spain.
The Company’s governments at Bengal and Madras had earlier
anticipated this rupture on the European front and initiated a discussion
2
of the possibilities of an expedition against Manila. As before, a 
breach with Spain meant the strategic necessity of attacking Manila, 
whence, in the minds of the Company’s Directors in London and their 
representatives in India, "an active enemy might destroy the China trade".
1 At a Committee of Secrecy, ibid., f. 7-8
2 President Hobart of Fort St. George appears to have written to 
Governor-General Shore of Bengal on 15 Dec. 1796, stating that
he had reasons to expect orders for an expedition against Manila. 
From advices received from a certain Vfickham at Bern, war between 
England and Spain seemed highly probable. Shore’s reply of 2 Jan. 
explored the feasibility of an expedition against either Manila or 
Batavia. See further correspondence on the subject between Hobart 
and Shore, in President Hobart’s Minute in Council on 21 March. 
Madras Secret Proceedings, V. 4, f. 275-94.
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The preliminary discussion revolved on how to raise the force 
necessary to make the attack. It was agreed that Madras should provide 
the main hody of troops* with Bengal assisting as much as possible to 
insure success. Moreover* the troops destined for either the Gape of 
Good Hope or Europe should he detained and prepared for the intended 
service. Meanwhile, information should he obtained with regard to the 
military strength of the Spaniards in Manila.*
On February 27th, 1797, the subject was explored by Governor-
General Shore, who was at Lucknow on leave, with Vice-President Speke,
2
who was acting in the Governor’s place at Fort William. By that time, 
however, it was too late to fit out an armament which would reach Manila 
before the rainy season. It was thus decided to wait for further news 
and instructions from Europe before preparations for such an attack should 
actually begin. In the meantime, Lord Hobart, President of Fort St# George, 
would inquire further into the matter while consulting with Admiral 
Rainier, Commander of the King’s naval forces in the East Indies. Also, 
Admiral Pringle, commanding at the Cape of Good Hope, would be asked to 
estimate the amount of naval assistance which it would be possible for 
him to give if the expedition was ordered to be carried out.
As had been predicted in the Indian settlements, war was declared
1 Vide, Bengal Secret and Separate Consultations /~2 Jan. 1797_7*
V. 44, p._/.
2 Enclosure Ho. 8, "To Peter Speke, Vice-President in Council, Fort 
William^ from the Governor-General, J.Shore, Lucknow, 27 Feb. 1797." 
Ibid. /  24 March J ’.
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"between Spain and England and orders were sent from London to India for
an assault on Manila. As in 1762, the attack was not to "be attempted if
2
the British possessions in India were or would "be in danger. The attack
was further made conditional on the state of the conquests recently made
from the Dutch, particularly Ceylon, Cochin, and Malacca, which should
3
"be defended and preserved in English hands.
Also, like the previous expedition, the proposed one was an imperial 
rather than a local necessity. The Government in London was anxious to 
seize a possession so vital to Spain as to compel the latter to come to 
terms in Europe. The difference lay in the fact that now the Company 
seems to have "been moved "by patriotism rather than the usual prosaic
1 Orders of this kind to the Indian Presidencies emanated from the 
Committee of Secrecy of the Company’s Court of Directors, 
consisting in practice of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman.
Since the enactment of Pitt’s India Act of 1784, a Board of Control, 
composed of six unpaid privy councillors, passed on all despatches 
to India which were of a political or military nature, and could 
even send orders on its own without the Directors’ consent. The 
Secret Committee, nevertheless, continued for sometime to exert a 
strong influence on the Company’s external policy, resisting 
attempts to turn it into "a mere ministerial instrument.”
Vide, C.H. Philips, "The Secret Committee of the East India Company, 
1784 - 1858," reprinted from the Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, Vol. X, Part 3, 1940-2.
2 The responsibility for launching the attack was not fixed on any 
one of the presidencies, unlike the expedition of 1762 which was 
ordered to he undertaken by Fort St. George with assistance from 
Bombay and Bengal.
3 See "Most Secret to the Governor-General and Council At Bengal 
and the Governors and Councils at Fort St. George and Bombay.”
This was a draft letter drawn up by the Secret Committee, composed 
of D. Scott, H. Inglis, and J. Manship, and approved by the Board 
of Control comprising H. Dundas, W. Pitt, and E. J. Eliot, at 
Whitehall, on 9 Nov. 1796. The letter in conformity with the draft 
and despatched to India was signed by the Secreta Committee at 
East India House on 11 Nov. Board’s Drafts of Secret Letters to
India, V. 2 /~n.p._7. Cf. Board’s minutes of 9 Nov. in Secret 
Minutes of the Board oflTontrol, V. 10 £"n.p
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considerations of trade expansion. For many years* since Clive’s
military exploits in Bengal, circumstances had been reshaping the
character of the Company’s rule in India. It had become a territorial
sovereign, a far cry from the trading corporation chartered by
Elizabeth I in 1600. Taken up by politics and the cares of government,
1
it had abdicated most of its commercial prerogatives. Thus its interests 
were now more closely linked with those of the State and the King’s 
Government.
The size of the attacking force to be sent on the expedition was 
to be determined beforehand by the officers in command of the King’s and 
the Company’s troops in India. The main body should consist of Indian 
recruits; the greater their number the greater the ’’saving” in Company 
and royal troops. Thus care should be taken not to create ’’the smallest 
dissatisfaction” among any of the Company’s native troops.
Expectations of success for the expedition were very high. Viewed 
from Europe, Spain’s capacity to reinforce her strength in the Orient to 
any material degree was very limited. Even if proper precautions had been 
taken to put the Philippines in a defensive posture, the English would 
still be at an advantage. The forces at their command were greater and 
were within easy reach of Manila, from India. Affairs in the Indian 
settlements were under control; there was no immediate danger to English
1 See C. H. Philips, "The East India Company ’Interest’ and the 
English Government, 1783-4,” reprinted from the Transactions 
of the Roval Historical Society, 4th Series, Vol. XX, 1937; 
idem., The East India Company 1784 - 18^4, Manchester, 1940; 
Lucy Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth Century 
Politics, Oxford, 1932.
authority requiring undivided attention.1 Indeed, conditions were more 
favorable now than in either 1762 or 1780. Moreover, a reinforcement 
was promised by the next ships from England, which would bring the 
number in the King’s regiments in India up to 1000 rank and file each.
The orders for attacking Manila reached Madras and Bengal on the
2 5
18th and 24th of March respectively. On March 21st and April 21st, 
the Secret Department at Madras met to consider proposals for the 
expedition and to draw up the plan of attack. The most tricky part of 
this job proved to be the determination of the size of the fighting unit
From the intelligence received by Lord Hobart with regard to the
military strength in Manila, there was no formidable opposition awaiting
4
the English there. The Spaniards had a regiment of 700 "Americans” 
(Mexicans), J 0 0  cavalry, and 16,000 militia. The regiment was "good," 
the cavalry "a mere rabble,*1 while the militia had been recently raised, 
"undisciplined... badly officered... composed of natives of the country, 
not deemed well affected towards the Spaniards." To meet this force, 
Hobart deemed it necessary to send from 5000 "to 6000 troops, half of 
whom should be Europeans and supported by a "respectable" naval armament
1 The Bengal Government’s view of the situation in India boiled
down to this: That they had nothing to fear from the Marattas 
and the Kizam. Tipu did not constitute a threat without the aid 
of a large French force. They did not believe that either the 
French or the Dutch were prepared at this time to retake captured 
colonies. "Bengal letters," April 1797_/, H.M.S.♦ V.606, f.448.
2 Madras Secret Proceedings, Vol. 4, f. 273-94.
3 Ibid., f. 312-16.
4 To Shore from Hobart, 25 Jan., read in Secret Consultation of
21 March. Ibid., f. 279-82.
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The Bengal government, on the whole, was more cautious in its 
approach to the problem at hand and with respect to the entire expedition. 
The military commander, for instance, was sceptical of the information 
that had been reaching the English regarding the state of the fortifi­
cations* the military equipment, and the troops at Manila. This 
information he regarded as too vague to enable anyone to estimate the 
exact force which would be required to take the place. He was particularly 
worried about the naval armament which had recently arrived in the city, 
the improvements which might have been done on its defensive works since 
the last invasion* and the possibility of a union of the French squadron 
in the East with the Spanish fleet in Manila.
The safest course open to the English was to make the attacking
force as large as circumstances would permit. General Clarke estimated
2
that 7,500 fighting men would ensure a safe margin of success. This was 
about 2,000 more than that proposed by Hobart and would mean a corresponding, 
substantial reduction in the force remaining to protect the Coromandel 
Coast. As a compromise* it was agreed to adopt the figure suggested by 
the Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George, which was 7,000. This was
1 The naval force in Manila was reported to consist in the preceding
January of three ships of the line and five frigates; but "from the 
length of time they have been from Europe and the general mismanage­
ment of their ships, their situation is supposed to be indiffernt."
See letter from Bombay, 8 March, H.M.S.» V. 606, f. 461.
2 Minute of Lieutenant-General Alured Clarke together with the returns 
and statements mentioned in it. Bengal Sec, and Sep. Cons.
/~7 April_7, V. 44, enclosures nos. 5* 6, 7, 8, 9, 9A.
5 Memorandum of Lt.-General George Harris, laid before Council on
21 April. Madras See. Proc., V. 4, f. J 1 6 .
r
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more than twice the fighting force "brought against Manila in 1762.
Of the proposed number, Bengal was to provide a European regiment 
of ahout 800 men and an Indian marine "battalion of $ 0 0 . Madras, on the 
other hand, would supply the rest, or some 5t700 men. To "bolster their 
contribution, the Bengal administration undertook to provide most of the 
ships necessary to transport the troops and stores from both settlements. 
They pledged for that purpose the full-armed and dismantled ships in the 
settlement, two extra ships, and all the country vessels at port.*
It should be noted that the planning and execution of the project 
fell mainly on the Madras presidency. A similar expedition was success­
fully launched from the settlement in 1762, and no doubt valuable lessons 
could be drawn from that experience. The Madras government, in fact, 
showed great enthusiasm at the beginning to get the projected expedition 
under way. Later, however, when the Supreme Government at Bengal thrust 
upon them the ultimate responsibility for the project, they began to balk 
and were only too eager to shirk it.
Other factors had helped to cool the enthusiasm of the Madras 
Administration for the proposed expedition. News had arrived of Lord 
Cornwallis* s appointment as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in 
India. This was construed as reflecting the royal Government’s new 
attitude toward affairs in India, particularly with respect to the
1 A total of about 25 ships. Cf*, Vice-President Speke in Council, 
Beng. Sec, and Sen. Cons. £ 7  April_7, V. 44, Ho. 2 enclosure; 
ibid. /~24 July 7, enclosures nos. 1 - 19, giving details of the 
embarkation; letter from the Secretary at Bengal to Port St. George, 
7 April, Mad. Sec. Proc., V. 4, f.
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Bengal Army. Within this context, it would appear imprudent to withdraw 
any of the King’s troops from Bengal "before the new appointee’s arrival, 
since he might need them to accomplish his objects, ’’whatever they may be.” 
Thus Hobart suggested that the expedition should wait until Cornwallis 
arrived and decided whether or not it should proceed.
Furthermore, the promised reinforcement of 5,000 recruits from 
England had not arrived. In the experienced voice of the Commander-in- 
Chief at Madras, if the reinforcement did not arrive and the forces 
proposed for the expedition were detached, the presidency would have 
’’great difficulty in collecting even a small army on any sudden emergency.”
Governor-General Shore himself had shown a half-hearted interest in
the project. While agreeing to it verbally, he was entertaining the idea
5
of diverting it from Manila to Batavia. On July 14th, Hobart gave M m
to understand that since it was uncertain when Cornwallis was arriving,
the Governor-General was being depended upon to make the final decision
4
as regards the launcMng of the Manila expedition. Shore's reply of the 
2Jrd following was an exhaustive inquiry into the political situation in
the Indian settlements, on the basis of which he believed that the
5expedition should proceed. But he avoided the question of ultimate
1 Hobart interpreted Cornwallis’s appointment as Government’s measure 
”to put an end to the agitating spirit in the Bengal Army, for which... 
the most serious apprehensions are entertained at home, and to enforce 
their ultimatum with respect to the Military Arrangements.” See 
letter to Shore, 14 June, read in Cons. 8 Aug. Ibid., V. 5> 409-14.
2 Minute of Lieut. Gen. George Harris delivered in Cons, of 1 Aug.
Ibid.. V. 4, f. 591-4.
5 See Hainier’s letter to Hobart, 22 June; idem to Shore, 21 June.
Ibid., Y. 5, f. 429-57.
4 I M A ., f. 457-44.
5 Ibid., f. 444-557.
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responsibility for the project.
Three days later he reiterated his opinion that the expedition
should he carried out.* But he was giving the Government of Fort
St. George full powers to countermand the expedition if previous to
the departure of the armament, they should receive any fresh intelligence
2
of preparations by Tipoo, or of reinforcements reaching Manila, or of 
French and Dutch forces being dispatched to India.
Lord Hobart was chagrined. The Supreme Government was retreating 
from what was inherently its responsibility and was passing it on to the 
Madras presidency. The Governor-General himself delineated the gravity 
and delicacy of the responsibility in view of Tipoe’s reported new move­
ments. "If the intelligence should be in any degree exaggerated or 
altogether ill-founded* by countermanding the departure of the troops we 
expose ourselves to the consequences of having stopped the expedition 
upon ill-grounded apprehensions. If, on the contrary, it should prove 
true, and Tipoo should have actually formed a determination to attack 
the Company, we expose ourselves to a more serious consequence from 
diminishing the forces for its protection and from the absence of His 
Majesty’s fleet."5
1 Letter read in Madras Secret Cons., 11 Aug. Ibid., f. 553“7*
2 ‘Tipoo /"or Tipu_/ Sultan was the ruler of Mysore, the resurgent
Hindu state in the South. He and his father, Haidar /HyderJ  
Ali had had border clashes with the Company at Madras and the 
latter’s allies. They found ready and effective support in their 
military plans and operations from the French, a fact which 
heightened the threat against English interests. Vide, W. Cooke 
Taylor, A Popular History of British India, etc., London, 1842;
Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, Third edition.
3 Letter from the Governor-General in Council to Fort St. George,
4 Aug., enclosing Shore’s Minute. Read in Cons, of 18 Aug.,
Madras Sec. Proc., V. 5*
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Lord Hobart was irked particularly by Governor Shore’s pre­
occupation with Tipoo*s doings and designs. The reports1 which the 
Governor seemed to he giving much credence to were dismissed by Hobart 
as either unfounded or exaggerated. Going meticulously over the problem 
of security in the Indian settlements* he concluded* with his Council 
in agreement with him, that the preparations for the expedition should 
continue and the campaign be launched. It was further agreed that if the 
fleet found it too late to take the direct route to Manila* that is, via 
the south China Sea, it should go by way of the Straits of Balabac and 
Mindoro Sea, the passage which was first explored by Dalrymple for the 
English.2
The Madras Presidency proceeded to draft the instructions which
3
would serve as a guide to the commander of the expedition. The final
instrument is remarkable in one respect. All civil and military authority
was to be vested in one person, the chief commanding officer of the
campaign. The only exception to this authority was in revenue and
commercial matters, but even in these he could interfere "if urged to it
4
by the strongest necessity." This concentration of authority in one
1 The latest intelligence regarding Tipoo was received from Capt. 
Macleod and Major Daveton and transmitted to Bengal from Madras 
on the l^th and 17th of July. It obviously bore much weight in 
the Governor-General*s framing of his minute of 4th Aug.
2 President Hobart’s Minute in Council, 18 Aug. Ibid., f. 590“8«
3 The command of the expedition was first given to Major-General 
Braithwaite. Upon his appointment to the deputy-governorship of 
the Spice Islands, Sir James Craig was chosen to take his place 
in the proposed expedition. Secret Cons, of 21 April and 11 Aug. 
Ibid., V. 4, f. 317, and V. 5 , f. 56O-I
4 Draft of instructions to Sir James Craig approved in Cons, of
15 Aug. Ibid., f. 568-75.
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person was in contrast with the principle of government adopted in 
Manila during the invasion of 1762. The council form of government 
which had been the standard administrative structure in the settlement 
of new territories had disappeared. Gone too was the traditional 
scruple in distinguishing and separating military from civil authority.
The disastrous political muddle which characterized thelast invasion was 
a hard-learned lesson in divided authority and was being avoided in the 
present one.
Also of some interest is that part of the commander’s instructions 
prescribing the method of. dealing with the conquest and its native 
inhabitants. Here again, the influence of the 1762 experience may be 
felt. Any capitulation which might be entered into with the Spanish 
Governor at Manila for the surrender of this city should include the whole 
Spahish possession in the Philippine islands. Every effort should be made 
to conciliate the inhabitants, promising them freedom of religion, "the 
most extensive encouragement to their commerce," and all the advantages 
"enjoyed by those who have the happiness to live under a British Government." 
A proclamation to this effect should be made immediately upon making a 
landing on the Spanish colony. There was an obvious advantage in this 
policy of appeasement and attraction, but as the invasion of 1762 
demonstrated, the sword had as much appeal to the natives as a free and 
orderly way of life.
It was agreed that the forces from Bengal and Madras should rendez­
vous at Penang. On July 26th, five armed Indiamen and nine transports
were scheduled to leave from Bengal* These did not sail, however, till 
2
9th August. On the following day, a violent gale arose* wrecking two 
ships on the sands and damaging two others. The disaster resulted in 
the loss of large quantities of provisions* guns, and ordnance stores.^
Of the nine ships which Bengal was to have sent to Madras to embark
4  5
the troops and stores there, only four were actually dispatched. Of
these, three arrived at their destination two weeks after the appointed
time, thereby holding up the Admiral’s Squadron which was to accompany
them to Penang. Moreover, they arrived in such shattered condition that
6
they were declared unfit to go on the expedition.
On August 21st, the first division of the armament proceeding from
Madras sailed for the rendezvous, eleven ships in all. On the 28th of
the same month, the second division was to have made its departure for
7
the same destination.
The schedule set for the entire expedition had already been stretched
1 Bengal Sec, and Sep. Cons., /. 7 and 10 July_/, V. 44.
2 Ibid. /~11 Aug._7. No l-Jl enclosures, regarding the fleet and 
its departure.
3 Ibid..V 21 Aug._/. No. 1j To Shore from leger, on board the
General Goddard, Sanger Hoads, 12 Aug.
4 Letter from Shore to Hainier, 26 May. Madras Sec. Proc., V.4, f.378-81.
5 Beng. Sec, and Sen. Cons. /. 7 JulyJ7, V. 44, Ko. 4: List of ships
with their tonnage to proceed to Madras.
6 ,TMadras Letters;’ HJff.S., Y. 606, f. 441.
i
7 Ibid.
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to the limits of safety. The entire armament was supposed to have 
arrived in Penang by the 20th August, whence it would have just enough 
time to make a safe passage directly to Manila through the China Sea.1 
After all the delays and with the approaching seasonal had weather, it
was deemed dangerous to take the direct route. The alternative one,
2
round Balambangan island, was thus considered. However, when asked to
comment on the feasibility of this route, Admiral .Rainier suggested
deferring the expedition till the next favorable season. Meanwhile,
Major-General Craig, who was to head the expedition, had been alluding
4
to the use of the armament for objects "other than Manila.” This view 
was shared by the Governor-General who,as we have seen, had proposed an 
attack on Batavia instead. Even Rainier, who had pledged naval support
5
to the Manila expedition to the extent of all the ships under his command,
seemed to be wavering from his original intent, suggesting as he did the
deployment of the armament to include Macassar and Temate among its 
6
targets.
1 See "Memorandum for Mr. Bristow, Acting President, Board of Trade." 
Beng. Sec, and Sen. Cons. /"17 JulyJ , 7. 44.
2 Mad. Sec. Proc. /~18 Aug._7* V.
5 I M i . /~2S AUg.J 7, t.614-9.
4 Letter dated 17 Aug., ibid., f. 612-3.
5 See Rainier’s letter to Speke, dated on the Suffolk, Madras Road,
21 March. Read in Cons, of 3 April /"no. 3 enclosure_7,
Beng. Sec, and Sen. Cons., 7.44
6 Idem, to Shore, 10 Aug., read in Cons, of 4 Sept. Ibid.
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But Hobart was averse from either the diversion or the deferment 
of the expedition."^ He preferred that all the troops should return to
their respective stations, leaving a sufficient force with the Admiral
2
with which to attack the ships at Manila.
On August 28th, the Madras government received a despatch from 
Bombay advising them of a report which had arrived from Constantinople 
of the conclusion of peace between the German Bmperor and the French 
Directory.^ This was the cue Lord Hobart had been waiting for to get 
him out of a delicate situation* The new political development in Burope 
was sufficient cause, perhaps an excuse* for him to abandon the Mianila 
project altogether. Admiral Hainier, Sir James Craig, and Lieutenant- 
General Harris all appear to be in agreement with him to countermand the 
expedition. With the Madras Board also concurring, orders were quickly 
issued recalling all the forces which had embarked from both Bengal and 
Madras for Penang.
With bureaucratic thoroughness, Lord Hobart went on record to
explain the circumstances and arguments behind the relinquishment of the
4
Manila project. The conclusive point in his statement was that the late
1 In letter to Craig, 25 Aug., Mad. Sec. Proc., V. 5* f* 620-1
2 Hobart earlier consulted with Hainier on the advisability of 
sending a naval force to attack the Spanish ships in Manila Bay.
This was to be a secondary operation in the general campaign to 
capture the city of Manila. See Hobart’s letter to Hainier,
28 June, and Hainier’s reply, 12 July, read in Cons, of 8 Aug. 
Ibid., f. 414-2^.
5 Diary, 28 Aug., ibid., f. 655-5*
4 Ibid.. /~29 kag.J, t. 659-49.
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reconciliation "between Germany and France would lead to either a general 
peace in Europe or an intensification of hostilities* particularly in 
India. In the first case* Manila would have to be returned to Spain in 
accordance with established diplomatic precedents* thus rendering the 
expedition* if it were carried out* as an unnecessary expense. On the 
other hand* if peace should net have been concluded between England and 
France* the departure of the proposed expedition would leave the Indian 
settlements open to a renewal of hostile activities by an enemy now 
relieved of a continental war.
Winding up his long exposition* he suggested the hind of relation­
ships which he deemed to be to the best interest of England and Spain if 
initiated and maintained between their respective possessions in the Bast. 
His suggestions were on the same theme as that successively played upon 
in the past four decades by Englishmen of experience in Eastern affairs. 
Manila and the British East Indies should be opened to reciprocal commerce 
on terms of mutual benefit to the governing nations. The exchange should 
consist essentially of manufactures from England and the agricultural 
products of the Philippines. This commerce would particularly benefit 
the treasury at Madras by the expected yearly remittances of specie from 
the Spanish colony.
1
Thus ended another project against Spanish dominion in the East.
1 When advised of the cancellation of the expedition, Admiral Hainier 
remarked that he did not think it advisable at the moment to attempt 
the destruction of the Spanish naval force in the Philippines.
Earlier, he had urged the adoption of this measure when he felt that 
the expedition might be laid aside owing to the many delays in its 
preparation. Cf., H.M.S.* V. 606, f. 456, and Hainier* s letter to 
Shore, 10 Aug., read in Cons, of 4 Sept., Beng. Sec, and Sep. Cons.,
V. 44, encl. no. 1.
Judging from the magnitude of the force proposed to go on the expedition* 
the outcome might have "been a favorable one for the English. The entire 
armament involved a fighting strength of 7,060 men, divided between 5*040 
Europeans and 4,020 Sepoys, besides the ships1 complement, Lascars, 
pioneers, and followers. The whole, with baggage, stores, and six months’ 
provisions, was to have been conveyed in twenty-five transports, supported 
by ten or twelve ships of war.1 Compared to the expedition of 1762, the 
proposed one would have looked truly formidable.
The Spaniards in Manila, on the other hand, appear to have been 
ill-prepared for such a major attack.' .an English sea-captain, whose 
frequent business visits to the city gave him some first-hand knowledge 
of its military situation, later attested to the minor alterations made
on the fortifications since the last assault. He further maintained that
I
the Spaniards had nob intended to stand out at the fort, but to retreat 
into the interior, where their knowledge of the country would make up for 
their military deficiencies and enable them to keep up a protracted 
guerrilla warfare. They had in fact embarked the city’s ’’riches,” for 
immediate transport to the Laguna at the first sign of enemy attack.
From here, the treasure would be conveyed to the mountains to be buried
2
there or to the east coast of Luson for shipment to places of safety. Iu
other words, the Spaniards had planned to do what they did during the
1 See overall figures in H.M.S., V. 606, f. 462-5•
2 Memorandum from Captain Lindsay transmitted with E.I. Farquhar’s 
letter to Wellesley dated Fort Cornwallis, 6 Jan. 1804.
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations L  18 July 1805_/,
Hange 166, enclosures no. 15 and 16.
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British occupation in the 1760’s and which turned the balance of 
fighting ultimately in their favor.1 The English, knowing this, might 
well have drawn their own lessons from the same experience.
The last British project in the Philippine area which falls within 
out period and winds up this study is the Balambangan settlement of 180 3 - 
I8O5.
The direct impetus to the restoration of the English settlement in 
that island was the treaty of Amiens of 1802. The treaty provided for the 
return of Malacca and the Moluccas by the English to the Butch. The 
English Company had painfully anticipated the restitution of those Butch 
territories won by British arms in the last war. Set on maintaining a 
foothold in the area, they issued on April 22, 1801 their oft-repeated 
injunction to their Indian presidencies to establish a settlement amongst
p
the Malaysian archipelago. Their choice was Gebi, one of the islands 
which were occupied by Lieutenant McCluver in 1794. They suggested 
that the island should be acquired by purchase from Hewco,-/ an avowed
1 See Fr.Joaquin Martines de Zuniga, Estadismo de las Islas Pilipinas, 
written in I8O5 and published by W.E. Retana in Miadrid, 1896. It is 
an account of the author’s travels over the Philippines in the year 
1800 in company with Don Ignacio Maria de Alava, the commander of the 
squadron sent in 1796 from Spain to Manila to defend the latter 
against any attack by the English. The purpose of the travel was to 
familiarize the Admiral with conditions in the colony, and the author 
had many occasions to draw parallels with the military situation in 
the islands during the invasion of 1762. It should be noted that 
before writing his History of the Philippine Islands, Zuniga grounded 
himself particularly in the documents relating to the English 
invasion and occupation of Manila.
2 General letter from the Court of Directors in the Political Depart­
ment, 22_April 1801 /~©xtract_7, in Bengal Foreign Coasultations,
V. 80, /  31 March I8O3, enclosure no. 2_/.
3 Newco had been a disgruntled chieftain under the Dutch regime. When 
the English came, he quickly took their side, overthrew the reigning
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English partisan.
Meanwhile fiobert Farquhar, English governor at Amboyna, was
concluding separate treaties of peace* commerce* and alliance with the
1
sultans of Tidore, Ternate and Batchian. These negotiations had the
effect of recognizing those Malay chieftains as independent monarehs,
and as such they possessed the right to give a grant of any of their
territory. The Sultan of Batchian* as a matter of fact* "made a present"
2
of the island of Ouby Major to the English Government.
The Treaty of Amiens* however, posed the question of the legality 
of the grants of Gebi and Ouby Major, or of whether under the unqualified 
restitution of the Dutch settlements, the British Government had the 
right to retain any of the islands ceded to them by the Malay sultans, 
one of whom was a usurper under the Dutch law while the other two were 
former vassals of the Dutch.
sultan at Tidore, and proclaimed himself ruler of the island, 
receiving recognition of his new position from the English.
Thus when asked for a formal grant of Gebi, he readily gave it 
to the English officer commanding in the Moluccas. Extract of 
Lieut.-Col. Oliver’s letter to the Court of Directors, Amboyna,
7 March 1803^ Boards Collections* V. 159 /""2769J7.
1 For copies of the treaties, see Beng. For. Cons., V. 80 £_ March, 
1803. enclos. nos. 5* #
2 Extract of a letter from Lieut.-Col. Oliver to the Government of 
Fort St. George, 6 March 1802. Ibid. /~idem, encl. no. 9 J .
3 The question was the subject of an extensive correspondence between 
the Company and the governments of Bengal and Madras. Vide, ibid., 
r idem, enclosures nos. 1, 3* 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 3 *
Board’s Collections, V. 159, Nos. 2769 and 2770, passim.
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The Bengal Government’s verdict on the matter was that those grants 
violated the spirit of the Treaty and were therefore untenable.  ^ Moreover* 
to legalize those grants would he tantamount to establishing a precedent 
which could be used later against the British possessions in India by 
rival colonial powers. The engagements entered into by Farquhar were 
declared null and the cessions of Gebi and Ouby Major relinquished.
Evidently the Company’s representatives in India no longer prized
the Dutch spice islands as extremely vital to English commercial economy 
3
in the East. They were expecting in fact the collapse of the spice
monopoly long held by the Dutch and were looking forward to the complete
liberation of spice cultivation and trade in particular and of Eastern
4
commerce in general. The needs of English trade could be satisfied
1 The Government at Fort St. George evidently had a large say in the 
making of this decision. Vide* Letter to Wellesley in Council,
2 Nov. 1802, Bene. For. Cons., V. 80, /"”51 March 1805. encl. no. i_7- 
Extract of Fort St. George Political Consultation, idem., Board*s 
Collections, V.159, no. 2769; Extract of Foreign Letter from Fort 
St. George, 9 May 1803* ibid., no. 2770.
2 To H.T. Farquhar, from E.B. Edmonstone, Secretary to the Government,
15 March 1805. Bene. For. Cons., V.80, / :51 March 1805, encl. no. 50J
3 Measures had been taken to extend the cultivation of spices in India,
and the Government at Fort St. George had calculated that those would 
have the effect of reducing the value of the Moluccas Islands, "to 
such an extent as to diminish the advantages to be opposed to the
expense which must be expected to attend the formation and defence of
a settlement in that distant quarter.” Extract Fort Stl George 
Political Cons., 2 Eov. 1802. Board’s Collections, V. 159, ho.2769.
4 Farquhar predicted that "there never will be again a monopoly of
spices such as the Dutch enjoyed in former times." Even if the 
Moluccas Islands were restored to the Dutch, the latter would not be
able to preserve such monopoly on account of the "thorough insight"
the English had gained into their navigation and trade in the East, to 
which the English were formerly strangers. "Extract letter from 
Farquhar... the Resident at the Molucca Islands, dated 3 Aug. 1801,
to the Court of Directors." Ibid.
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elsewhere. Balambangan especially could he re-settled without the risks
of international complications. Acting in his usual audacious manner,
Wellesley, Governor-General of Bengal, ordered the restoration of the
Balambangan settlement, without previously consulting either the Company
1
in London or the other governments in India.
The choice of Balambangan island as the most suitable site for a 
British settlement in the Eastern Archipelago was based on the same 
arguments previously urged in its favor by Dalrymple and others. One 
interesting fact about the proposed ”re-settlement” was the procedure 
prescribed by Wellesley for going about it. The acquiescence of the 
Sultan of Sulu in the "restoration” of the defunct settlement of 1773 was 
to be obtained as a necessary expedient and consequently might require 
some concessions on the part of the English. They should be granted 
provided they were not of such kind as would involve the English in future 
disputes or hostilities with the neighbouring native states. Furthermore, 
the Sultan should be made to understand that the validity of the Company’s 
right to Balambangan did not depend on his consent, and that whatever 
concessions the British Government might be induced to yield "must be 
considered to originate exclusively in motives of regard for his interest.”
1 Wellesley’s order addressed to Farquhar and signed by N.B.Edmonstone, 
was dated 15 March I8O3. Full text, ibid., Ko. 2770. a  letter of 
the same date was also addressed to Lord Clive, Govemor-in-Council 
at Fort St. George and signed by the Governor-General-in-Council.
The letter informed of the orders given by Wellesley for the restor­
ation of the Balambangan settlement. Ibid. Later, it was indicated 
that there had appeared no record of Wellesley’s orders amongst the 
Bengal Consultations received in London up to April 1804. Wellesley’s 
plan was probably to withhold information of his orders until after 
they were carried out. Vide, Personal Records, V. 12, f. 269-71; 
also Add. MSS. 13*909.
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As a finishing touch to the contradiction in the English position,
Wellesley affirmed that "although the island of Balambangan has tacitly 
reverted to the dominions of Sooloo, the claim of the Company to the 
possession of it has never been formally renounced and may therefore be
considered to be still in force*"
Farquhar, who had been commissioned to take charge of the restitution
of the Dutch conquests, was to restore the Balambangan settlement during
1
or after the performance of his principal mission. At the head of a force
calculated to make "a full impression on neighbouring European and local
powers of the strength, consequence, and resources of the English on their
2
first settlement" in that area since 1775, Farquhar arrived in Balambangan 
on September 29th, I8O5.
s
The site chosen for the new settlement was the very spot on which
the first one was made in 177}. The needs of the settlement were to be
supplied by cultivation of the interior and the "extensive dependencies,"
the latter by the Dalrymple grant reached from the southern part of Sulu
to the northern promontory of Borneo, with an estimated population of one 
4
million.
1 See Clive’s letter to Wellesley, Fort St. George, 20 Jan. 180^; 
"Advertisement published at Fort William, 25 Feb.; and Instructions 
to Farquhar from Fort William, 15 March. Beng. For. Cons. / 3I March 
I8O3JJ7, Bange I65, V. 80, /"enclos. nos. 18, 26, and 30 respectively/7.
2 Letter to Wellesley /"in Council/7 from Farquhar, Balambangan, 26 Bov. 
I8O5. Beng. Sec, and Pol. Cons., Bange 166, £  Cons. 18 July I8O5, 
encl. no. 12_/.
5 Idem, 16 Feb. 1804, ibid. / idem, encl. no. 2
4 The area, called Felicia by Dalrymple, extended from the southern part
of Sulu or Paragua to"Kiaanneerf*and Sandakan Bay on Borneo, comprising
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Everything augured well for the Infant settlement. The climate was 
’’extremely favorable." There was an abundance of good water* cattle* 
poultry, fish, and grain, enough to supply "ten-fold the needs of the 
settlement and also those of India in times of shortage."^ In one month*s
time, l^O country ships had visited the port, while the number of settlers
2
on the island had reached 1600 within the first few months. The neigh­
bouring country powers seemed pleased that the English had returned and 
re-settled amongst them. The chiefs of Sulu, Borneo and Mindanao, 
particularly, sent in "unbounded professions of friendship and regard," 
while their subjects "flocked" to the new settlement.^
besides the islands Balambangan, Banguey, Balabac, Malawallee, 
and several other small ones. This territory, lying between
a-nd- 8°30* Korth Latitude, and from 115*50f to 118°29* East 
Longitude, formed part of the so-called Archipelago of St. Lazarus, 
which theoretically comprised also all the Dutch and Spanish settle­
ments in the Philippine and Molucca islands. Farquhar*3 letter of 
16 Feb. 1804, ibid. See also chapter on the first Balambangan 
settlement.
1 Ibid.
2 At the outset of the expedition, Farquhar engaged "a few settlers" at 
Malacca to proceed to Balambangan, besides "a number of every descrip­
tion of useful artizans and laborers" who were to be supplied from the 
Company*s stores until they were settled. Letter to Wellesley, etc.,
29 Aug. I8O3. Ibid., encl. no. 6.
It appears further that Farquhar brought with him some convicts and 
that there was a plan to make Balambangan some kind of a penal colony, 
the Prince of Wales Island. Idem. Also Farquhar* s instructions to 
Major Eales, 7Dec. 1803* Ibid., Bange 167 encl. no.28_J7'• Ob 1 Sep. 
1804, Major Eales, commanding at Balambangan reported the number of 
the Company’s Bengal convicts on the island as 95 in all. Bengal Public 
Consultations. Bange 6, V. 7 /7"cons. 14 Feb. I8O5* enclos. nos.35 36/.
3 The Sultan8 of Borneo and Magindanao made offers of territory to the 
English in the vicinity of their respective capitals, apparently to 
dissuade the English from settling on Balambangan and establishing close 
liaison with the Suluans, a militant and predatory neighbor. The 
Bornean chieftain proposed Labuan island where the first Balambangan 
settlement retreated afterjthe loss of the latter. The Sultan of Magin­
danao offered Saranguine /  Sarangani_7 which was close to the Moluccas.
Farquhar, however, "civilly declined" both offers, thinking it best to 
concentrate the English force and to avoid clashing with the Dutch by 
being too close to them. Letter to Wellesley, etc. , 16 Feb. 1804.
Beng. Sec, and Pol. Cons. /  18 July 1805* encl. no.2 3 Bange 166.
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In fact the political relations between two of those rulers had 
played into the hands of the English. The Sulus and Borneans had been 
at war when the English arrived. The cause was ostensibly the "unprovoked 
murder" of certain Sulu ambassadors by the Sultan of Borneo. The 
incident revived the old-time dispute over the northern part of Borneo 
and adjacent islands. The Borneans claimed that those territories had 
been seized from them by the Sulus and that they were merely taking them 
back. This state of affairs gave Farquhar an unexpected opportunity for 
reasserting English rights to Balambangan without having to commit his 
government to the native authority. The war between the two kingdoms 
having apparently reached a draw# both the rulers were willing to 
abdicate their claim to the disputed area in favor of the English and 
recognize the latter’s sovereignty over it. Thus# contrary to his 
instructions# Farquhar proceeded to occupy Balambangan without previously 
visiting the Sultan of Sulu.'1’
1 Farquhar was also to deliver a letter addressed to the Sultan 
of Sulu by Wellesley# proposing the renewal of relations between 
their peoples and the adjustment of the terms through the 
Commissioner. This message begins thus: "This letter of friend­
ship is written by His Excellency the Most Hoble the Marquis 
Wellesley K.P. Governor General of India to His Majesty the most 
powerful Sultaun of Sooloo to whom His Excellency wishes all the 
blessings of health# long life# and a prosperous reign." Full 
text in Board1s Collections# Ho. 2770, enclosed in the letter of 
instructions from Fort William to Farquhar, 15 March I8O3.
Owing to the internal situation in Sulu, Farquhar deferred 
delivering this letter until a more favorable opportunity by 
which the Bengal Government could avail itself with the best 
possible effect of the rebel datu’s offer of the island of Sulu. 
See Farquhar1s instructions to Major Eales# 7 Dec. I8O5.
Beng. Sec, and Pol. Cons.# Hange 167, / ”cons. 18 July 1805# 
encl. no. 28_7-
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Moreover, this ruler was having difficulties in his own house.'1'
One of the pretenders to the Sulu throne, actually the legitimate 
successor whom the people had put aside to install the incumbent, was 
engineering a rebellion* The Sultan’s fear for his throne was 
heightened by the possibility of an alliance between his political 
opponent and the English newcomers. It was said that he was involved 
in the murder of Captain Pavin of the ship Buby in 1800, which he was
now trying to cover up for fear of English reprisal. He thus made haste 
to draw up a document wherein he indicated his "perfect concurrence" in 
the English resettlement of Balambangan and which he sent to Farquhar 
"under his Hoyal Chop."
The troubled state of Sulu politics offered a tempting opportunity
for intervention by the English. They could back up the rebel faction
and take possession of the kingdom "without meeting resistance."
Farquhar, however, was content with the possession of Balambangan and
its dependencies. With these, not only would the English achieve their
ends in that quarter, but also would he free from the expense and risks
2
of political alliances. As to the methods of dealing with the neighboring
1 Farquhar gave an insightful report of the political state of Sulu.
He explained the possibilities and advantages that could be derived 
by the English from intervention in the shaky state of affairs in 
the Sultan’s Court. On the other hand, he adverted to the difficulties 
and expense which such intervention might cost the English. "Notes 
_ , ^  gija-te of Sooloo, etc.,""Ibid., Range 166,
2 Farquhar proposed the establishment of a factory only at either Sulu 
or Borneo, without any military force whatever. He thought it advis­
able to leave those countries entirely in the hands of their own 
chieftains, since the establishment of free trade as a result of the 
resettlement of the British on Balambangan would be sufficient induce­
ment for peoples of the area to resort to the British base. Letter 
to Wellesley in Council, 16 Feb. 1804. Loc. cit.
----
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native rulers* Farquhar opted for one which was to he adopted later in 
the entire Malayan area. He drew up the draft of a treaty* which he 
proposed should he made not only with the sultans of Sulu, Borneo, and 
Mindanao, hut also with all the rajas on the coasts between Balambangan 
and Prince of Wales Island. This treaty should he accompanied further 
by a trifling present of 2 or J 0 0 dollars to each of those native rulers. 
Structurally, the treaty was such as would impose the fewest obligations 
on the part of the British Government, while at the same time providing 
an instrument for the protection of British ships and personnel from the 
maraudings and atrocities of Malays.
Farquhar left Balambangan on December 8, I8O3. Prior to his
departure, he appointed Major John Eales to the chief authority in the
3 4
settlement. His instructions to the latter interest us here as they
1 The master draft was entitled "Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and 
navigation between the Honorable English East India Company and 
the Kingdom of Sooloo concluded by H.T. Farquhar, Commissioner 
from His Excellency the most Koble the Governor-General-in-Council 
of India for the re-establishment of the British authority at Balam- 
hang&n and its dependencies on the one part, and His Majesty the 
Sultaun of Sooloo and Council on the other part." Encl. no. 26, ibid.
2 Farquhar was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Prince of Wales Island 
on July 21, 180}. Personal Records, Y. 8, p. 248. Volume 10 gives 
the conflicting date of Oct. J O , In any case, Farquhar assumed his 
new charge in January of the following year. See his letter to 
Wellesley in Council, 6 Jan. 1804, in Beng. Sec, and Pol. Cons.,
Hange 166, 2  Cons. 18 July I8O5, encl. no. 17_/.
J Eales combined in him all civil, military and commercial authority
over the settlement. Concentration and consolidation of power had 
been the order of the day since the enactment of the India Bill of 1784.
4 Instructions dated Balambangan* 7 Dec* 1803* Ibid., Hange 167
r Idem, encl. no. 28 J .
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reflect the changing attitudes with respect to the settlement of new 
territories in general, and particularly toward the establishment of a 
British foothold in the Malaysian archipelago.
Bales was not to enter into the trade of the neighboring countries, 
nor should he commence trade in Balambangan without previous instructions 
from the Bengal Government* There had been as yet no merchants of 
important means in the settlement, but in order not to disappoint native 
traders bringing in merchandise, Eales should authorize the exchange of 
such goods with those of the Company found in store.*
At the moment, the principal function of the settlement was as a
”port of refreshment” for all British ships, i.e., the King’s, the
Company’s, and the Country vessels. Maritime and strategic requirements
thus took precedence over purely commercial considerations. This was the
reverse of what was suggested for the first Balambangan settlement and
was in effect an affirmation of the principles underlying the acquisition
2
of Prince of Wales Island.
3
Bales proceeded to put the settlement on a solid footing. He 
established the suggested post at the mouth of Benkoka River in Maludu 
Bay, Borneo, where food and other supplies could be collected from 
adjacent territories. But no sooner had he done this, when trouble began.
1 Bales was* however, to declare Balambangan as a free port ”in 
the most comprehensive and public manner.”
2 Vide, letter from the Governor-General at Bengal to the Chief 
of Penang, 22 Jan. 1787. Extracted in Farquhar’s instructions 
to Bales, loc. cit.
3 See plan of the Balambangan settlement in 1803 following this page,
photocopied from the chart drawn by J. Gordon and preserved in the
British Museum.
i
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The Sulu Chiefs in Banguey were intimidating their subjects in Benkoka
to prevent them from supplying the English.* Eales remonstrated strongly,
and although the Sulus professed innocence, one of them addressed a letter
2
to the people of Benkoka enjoining them to assist the English.
After this episode, the English practically had no contact with the 
Sulu people. They depended entirely on the Borneans for provisions and 
supplies, hut the failure of crops in Borneo, in the year 1804 left the 
English almost destitute. Moreover, up to September that year, not a 
single English ship arrived from either China or India to succour the 
settlement.
Within two months after its establishment the post at Benkoka was 
4
withdrawn. The place was found to be extremely unhealthy, causing wide-
5
spread illness amongst the troops. In the following March, Illanun 
pirates were seen deploying round Balambangan. A fleet of 40 proas then 
anchored about a mile and a half south of the town, while another fleet 
got into the north harbor. The English then prepared for what appeared 
to be a two-pronged attempt against their settlement. On the following 
day, however, both fleets moved off without attacking.
1 Vide, Eales* letter to Fort William, 15 Jan. 1804, encl. no. 9 %
Cons. 4 April I8O5. Beta.»Sec. and Pol. Cons., V. 154.
2 Copies of the letters exchanged on the occasion make enclosures
nos. 96, 97, 98, idem., ibid.
*
5 Before the episode, Major Eales despatched Lt. Sexton of the cruiser
Ply -to Sulu to deliver Wellesley’s letter to the Sultan, along with
those from Eales himself and Farquhar. The Sultan’s replies were 
couched in very polite and flattering language, and were as non­
committal as the letters sent to him. See encl. nos. 99, 100, 101,
102, 105, idem, ibid.
4 Eales’ letter to Lumsden, 17 March 1804, encl. no. 99, idem, ibid.
5 See letter to Eales from E. Stone, Assistant Surgeon, lenkoka,
25 Feb. Encl. no. 107, idem, ibid.
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A month afterwards, in April, another armada of Malay vessels, this 
time manned "by Sulus, appeared in the northeast passage "between Balamhangan 
and Banguey. The English were assured "by a Sulu Chief in Banguey that 
those vessels were on their way to Sulu. The English were nevertheless 
suspicious and prepared for the worst. Towards evening of the following 
day, the greater part of the fleet was seen rounding the southeast end of 
Banguey, ostensibly on a passage to Sulu. The rest, however, anchored 
off that part of Banguey opposite the English settlement. Eales thus 
ordered his troops to he ready "to turn out on the shortest notice.” On 
the next day, the Sulus weighed anchor and headed southeastward, 
apparently to join the other part of the fleet. Eales dispatched the 
cruiser Fly to keep track of their movements, and although the commander 
reported hack that they had heen seen clear through the passage to Sulu, 
information was repeatedly received thereafter hy the English of Sulu 
proas "lurking” in their vicinity.3.
Throughout the month of May, the English at Balamhangan were kept
on the alert. Their main concern were the Sulus who apparently had no
2
intentions of associating themselves with the Ehglish. The two peoples
1 Account of these happenings in Eales* letter to Fort William,
1 Sept. 1804, Encl. no. }7, Cons. 14 Feb. I8O5. Bengal Public
Council, Bange 6, V. 7.
2 On August 27, 1804, a letter was addressed to W. E. Phillips,
Acting Lieut. Gov. of Fort Cornwallis, Prince of Wales Island,
hy W. Farquhar, Commanding Officer at Malacca. The letter advised 
of information having heen received from Batavia about a French 
squadron of 12 ships lying in Batavia Hoads and destined for an 
attack against Balamhangan. In Cons. 4 April I8O5, encl. no. ll}, 
Bang. Sec, and Pol. Cons., V. 154.
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were rightly suspicious of one another. "The well-known character of 
the Soolooese for treachery and circumvention,” confirmed by their 
surprise attack on the first Balamhangan settlement had naturally put 
the English on their guard. The Sulus, on the other hand, were aware 
that the English had an axe to grind, and the fact that the Borneans 
were getting on well with the English was enough to arouse their hostility.1
In any case, the Sulus never dared to repeat their coup of 1775.
The English were much better prepared this time against attack by any of 
their neighbors. Eales had meticulously seen to the construction of a 
strong fort and the clearing of the entire ground around it. In 
referring to the Sulu menace, he stated that it made him more cautious 
than he otherwise should have been in guarding against a surprise attack.
The settlements difficulties stemmed from other sources. The 
problem of supplies was particularly serious and increasingly so. Eales* 
letter of September 1, 1804 struck a truly sombre note. "The resource 
which I had been taught," he wrote, "to look to of a plentiful supply of 
paddy from Borneo and the neighboring islands completely failed." The 
failure of rain in the last northeast monsoon had caused a famine
throughout the entire archipelago. Unless supplies arrived from Bengal
2
soon, the outlook for the settlement was "dreary in the extreme."
1 On Feb 20, 1804, a delegation from the Court of the Sultan of Borneo 
delivered a letter from their Chief to Eales. The Sultan was offering 
to grant the English any one of the three islands of Labuan, Pulo Tega, 
and Pulo Gaya to which the English could remove their settlement from 
Balamhangan. Sales declined but promised to transmit the Sultan’s 
offer to the Bengal Government. See ends. nos. 104, 105, 106, Cons.
4 April I8O5, Beng. Sec and Pol. Cons., V. 154.
2 Eales’ letters, both dated 1 Sept. 1804. Ends. nos. 38 and 39, Cons.,
14 Feb. I8O5. Beng. Pub. Council, Hange 6, V. 7.
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On March 11, I8O5* orders were sent from Bengal for the withdrawal
of the Balambangan settlement. The troops and stores in the latter were
to he returned to the presidencies to which they formerly belonged. The
2
troops to he embarked at Balambangan numbered 1,147 while the number of
3
settlers asking to be removed reached 9^0. On December 16th of the same 
year, the transports which had been sent to evacuate the British from 
Balambangan arrived in Prince of Wales Island.
Thus ended British activities within the Philippine area. The
problem of a British base in the Malaysian archipelago had to be tackled
elsewhere. The Company’s Directors, in ordering the withdrawal of the
Balambangan settlement, entered strict instructions not to renew the same
in the future without specific direction from them. They appear to have
been irked by Wellesley’s precipitate restoration of the settlement, in
view of the resumption of hostilities with France and Holland and since it
would be impossible to maintain the island without fortifications and "a
respectable force" for its defense. Such necessary precautions, they
further maintained, "could ill be spared under the probable circumstance of
4
our again taking possession of the islands belonging to the Dutch."
1 Orders addressed to B.T. Farquhar^ then Lieut. Gov. of Prince of Wales 
Island. Bengal Political Cons. £ 3 0  May I8O5, encl. no. 34_/, Hange 
117, V. 45.
2 See letter to the Governor-General from the Marine Board at Bengal,
1 May I8O5. Ibid. /  encl. no. 41_/. Cf. Prince of Wales Public 
Consultation of 17 Dec. I8O5, Factory Records Straits. Settlements, 
Index No. 12, f. 666,667.
3 In Lumsden’s letter to the Committee of Embarkation, Bengal, 9 April 
1806* Cons. 30 May I8O5* encl. No. 40. Beng. Pol. Cons., iange 117,
V. 45.
4 "In the Political Department," 15 Aug. 1804, Madras,p01 itical 
Letters Sent, No. 1.
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CHAPTER IX
Review
British and Spanish writers alike have written glosses on the 
English invasion of Manila in 1762. Spaniards, in fact, made capital 
of this military event to show off their own achievements in subsequent 
decades as regards their only important possession in the Eastern seas.1 
At present, it is not uncommon amongst chroniclers and historians in 
the Philippines to divide the periods of the history of the country into 
pre- and post-British invasion.
1 Alejandro Malaspina, head of the round-the-world politico - scientific 
expedition sent out by the Spanish Court in the 1790's, wrote the 
following eulogy of the period subsequent to the invasions
"The English invasion is an event of great importance in the annals 
of Manila. It roused the Spanish Court from its lethargy as regards 
the preservation of the Eastern colony. It gave new emphasis to the 
possibility of defending that possession in a military campaign and of 
relying on the loyalty of its native inhabitants. In that same court, 
with the return of the magistrate Anda and Commander Bustos, the rich 
natural resources of the islands were disclosed, along with the heroic 
exploits of the war. The invasion further prompted the first 
unsuccessful attempts to exploit the route via the Cape of Good Hope.
It also led to the increase in government subsidy for the maintenance 
of the colony's fortifications. Finally, the invasion opened up 
relations with the English Oriental colonies and introduced useful 
English pilots from there, with their new and more active plan of 
commerce, and amongst whom was Felipe Thompson who happily caused the 
frustration of new combinations forming in the Acapulco trade. Later 
appointed Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines, Simon de 
Anda commenced a vigorous administration in the 1770's, the salient 
points of which are, no doubt, the colony's independence of the govern­
ment in Mexico, the direct contact with the Court at Madrid, a closer 
link with the European colonies in the East, and the first steps in 
the establishment of the Cavite Arsenal."
See "Reflexiones politicas sobre las Yslas Filipinas y Marianas,"
one of three articles written by Malaspina on the situation in the East.
Add. MSS. 17,624, f. 25 et. seg.
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On the side of the English, this military exertion was only a 
minor aspect of their interest in the Spanish Philippines and adjacent 
territories which were also claimed by the Spaniards. Forces stronger 
than the conquest motive were at work, coinciding with those operating 
in other parts of the British Eastern empire.
There were two principal drives behind British interest in the 
area belonging to or claimed by the Spaniards as included in their 
Filipinas during the period 1759 - 1805. They were specie and trade.
In the 1750's and early 60's, the lines of British commercial and 
imperial development were falling into a pattern. In the East, the 
military victories in India and the expanding trade with China posed new 
problems of politico-economic exploitation. Within the East India 
Company, in particular, an ambivalence was gradually arising between 
satisfying territorial ambitions and promoting trade interests. As the 
Company became absorbed in the first, country traders were entrenching 
themselves in the trade system of the East.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the prospects for 
private merchants appeared to be very bright indeed with respect to the 
trade of the Malaysian islands, this particularly as a feeder line to the 
increasingly important China trade. Servants of the Company on the spot 
had in fact provided the incentive by advocating the establishment of 
trading settlements in the area. One of those Company servants, Dalrymple, 
began in the 1760's to expound the case for the resumption of British 
activities amongst the Eastern islands, on a scale which would not only
enable the Company to recover its lost share of the spice trade but to 
expand its existing trade even further. The interest in the area now, 
however, lay least of all in the cultivation and marketing of spices.
The Malaysian archipelago was a source of bullion so chronically needed 
at Canton to finance the English trade there, and of products which had 
a great demand in the China market. The many islands that comprise it 
were not only a market for British trade goods, such as opium and piece- 
goods from India, but a potential one for British manufactures.
Dalrymple1s choice of a site for his proposed East Indian trading 
center fell on one of the islands wedged between Spanish and Dutch pre­
serves, a peripheral no-man1s-land, "uncommitted" to any European power 
and strategically located with respect to China, India, and the spice- 
producing islands. The territory was populated by Mohammedan Malays 
called the Sulus, who, although piratically inclined were sufficiently 
trade-conscious, having had commercial connections with Manila and neigh­
bouring islands and with merchants from China. Its greatest significance 
to Dalrymple, however, lay in its accessibility to merchants from Amoy 
and the provinces to the north of it. Its proper management and develop­
ment into an English commercial centre might in time re-channel the 
onerous Canton trade and divert the traffic at Batavia, thus creating a
i
vast network of exchange of Chinese, Indian, Malaysian, and European 
produce, a function which was destined later for Singapore and Hongkong.
Other projects for a British settlement within the alleged limits 
of the Spanish Philippines involved the island of Mindanao, where a
Spanish fortified settlement was being maintained chiefly as a bulwark 
against the Mohammedans to the south, and where spice cultivation was 
being jealously watched and frustrated whenever they could by the Dutch, 
The main British concern in the island was to get as close as possible 
to the centres of spice production and to tap a source of supply for the 
British markets. Those projects, however, remained on paper, as risking 
too much with respect to either the Spaniards or the Dutch.
The invasion of Manila was undertaken mainly as a show of strength 
to bear pressure on an imperial power, whose policy in America obstructed 
expansion of the British trade economy, to come round to the British 
point of view. The invasion produced positive results for the invaded 
rather than for the invaders. For the latter it meant in fact the sus­
pension of a supply of Spanish dollars which the British settlements in 
India, particularly in Madras, had taken care to preserve and promote to 
help finance the Company's investments in Canton. The Manila trade, 
although not conducted on the Company's account, redounded to the latter's 
benefit. This particular trade connection had been productive of 
substantial residual cash, which private or country merchants turned over 
to the Company's use in Canton for bills on either the Indian presidencies 
or London. After the war, the British in India were content to resume 
trade relations with Manila on the old conditions. The creation of the 
Royal Philippine Company did not alter the fact that the English Company 
stood to gain by allowing and encouraging private merchants to supply 
Manila, as elsewhere in the regions between India and China, with piece-
goods, which by now had become only second on the list of Manila trade 
exports to Spain and America.
The reduction of Manila in 1762 was followed by a period of 
occupation of that city and adjacent places by the East India Company, 
lasting one year and six months. Efforts were made to reconcile the 
natives to the new rule by abolishing the capitation tax and "personal 
services" rendered by them under the Spanish government. But the general 
state of economic backwardness of the country made it impossible for the 
Company's administration to draw revenue through the customary channels, 
as in the Indian settlements. Thus the English re-established the several 
monopolies, which had existed under the Spaniards, and introduced the 
system of farming them out to individuals who were all Chinese. The 
licensing of gambling and retailed liquor added to the demoralization of 
the natives, whose humdrum existence had already been dislocated by the 
violence of the invasion and the resistance organized by the Spaniard» 
Anda. Brigandage became general and serious uprisings were unleashed in 
several places. But the Company's officials could neither suppress the 
first nor turn the latter to their account. The English further fell to 
bickering amongst themselves, a most disastrous antagonism having 
developed between the Company's representatives and the King's commanders. 
On balance, the British occupation of Manila merely provided an exercise 
in colonial rule, benefitting neither the Company nor the English King.
The fruitless invasion of 1762, nevertheless, did not restrain the 
English from contemplating and preparing another and bigger one in 1797-
As before, the idea of seizing the Philippines in order to force Spain 
to come to terms at the peace conferences in Europe was the decisive 
element. The Madras and Bengal establishments were to combine their 
resources in launching the new expedition. The extent of the Company’s 
involvement in the project was to be greater than that in the earlier one, 
which shows how in the intervening period the Company's interests had 
come to coincide with those of the King's Government. But just before 
the scheduled departure of the entire force from the rendezvous at Penang, 
orders were issued in Madras to withdraw the expedition. The security of 
the Indian settlements, which had always been the paramount consideration 
behind British exertions in the Par East, was believed to be at stake 
owing to the new political developments in Europe.
Other projects of an aggressive character were conceived against 
the Spanish Philippines in the 1780's, and originated also in the 
ministerial chambers in London. They were, however, designed to enable 
the English to penetrate the Spanish American trade through the back doors 
on the Pacific. A subsequent effort was made to breach the Atlantic front 
doors of that same trade, by means of a contractual arrangement to be 
entered into between the English East India Company and the Spanish Royal 
Philippine Company. Philippine ports were to be opened to British products 
and manufactures from India, which the Spanish Company would then trans­
ship to America through Spain. The plan of agreement was devised by 
Ralph Woodford, the man who had been earlier commissioned by the English 
King to negotiate a commercial treatyiidth the Spanish King's Ministers.
The resistance of the latter to such overtures might
have been expected by the English Company's Directors in London, whose 
enthusiasm appears to have waned since 1788. In that year, the Spanish 
Company itself initiated proposals for the delivery of 600,000 dollars' 
worth of Indian piece-goods to its account By the English Company, then . 
backed out, apparently for lack of support from the Spanish King's 
government•
Of the British activities in the Philippines during the period 
covered by this study, that which Dalrymple initiated with respect to the 
Sulus had the most far-reaching effects for both.the British empire and 
the Spanish rule in the islands. Long before the arrival.of the English, 
the Spanish government in Manila had tried to subdue the Sulus, one of 
many groups of Malays of Islamic faith inhabiting 1he lands round Zamboanga, 
the Spanish outpost in Mindanao. The Spaniards were mainly unsuccessful 
and often reduced to defending the southern Philippine islands from their 
retaliatory and plundering visits. Thus this people, who were noted in 
the early 1700's as giving the Spanish arms "much to do," became in 
subsequent decades "the most adept in the practice of piracy in the whole 
of the Philippine archipelago." During the occupation of Manila by the 
British and in the years following, the Sulus devoted themselves more 
freely to outrages on the Philippine provinces; such was their temerity 
that in 1769 they broke into Manila Bay and seized twenty inhabitants in 
Malate, just outside the walled city. The British alliance with the Sulus 
and the proposed settlement in Balambangan heightened the fear of the 
Spaniards for the Visayan islands, the vanguard of the Christian
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Philippines against the infidels of the south.
In 1764* the deposed Sultan of Sulu, who had been held ”captive” 
by the Spaniards in Manila before the English invasion, was restored to 
his throne by Dalrymple. The culmination of this man’s exertions with 
the Sulus was the cession of the latter1s territories in Borneo, including 
the adjacent islands. In December 1773 > the Balambangan settlement was 
erected by servants of the East India Company. A little more than a year 
afterwards, a Sulu band of raiders put an end to it.
In 1803, upon the restitution of the Dutch conquests in the
cBHqusstsxinxiii* Eastern seas, Wellesley ordered the re-establishment of 
the Balambangan settlement without previous sanction of the Company’s 
Directors in London. The new settlement was, above all, a half-way station 
on the track to China for British shipping and a point of contact with 
neighbouring native powers. Until all the facilities for commerce had 
been provided, particularly with respect to security in the settlement for 
people coming to trade, the Company should not enter into trade with the 
neighbouring countries. The settlement was thus better fortified than the 
earlier one and more carefully guarded, particularly against the Sulus 
who were believed to be contemplating another coup against the English.
The latter who appeared to be friendly towards the Borneans were eyed with
suspicion by the Sulus.
In 1805, with the probability of another war with the Dutch and of 
reconquering their Eastern possessions, the Directors in London ordered 
the withdrawal of the Balambangan settlement. They were now categorically
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opposed, to any form of expansionism which might involve considerable 
outlay and political complications. Prince of Wales Island, which had 
been acquired in 1786, was to their mind best suited to promote their 
interests, r,being placed in a most favourable situation for an emporium 
and commerce in the Eastern Seas, and for becoming a commanding station 
for the rendezvous, refitting and supply of that portion of His Majesty's 
Navy required for the protection of the Company's possessions and affairs 
in the eastern parts of Asia."
Besides the island, the Company possessed the town and fortress of 
Malacca which gave them control of the Straits of that name, and also 
Fort Marlborough. There remained one weak point in the strategic defense 
of the Bay of Bengal, e.g., the west coast of Sumatra, "where the French 
in the last two wars were enabled to refit and supply their ships and 
speedily to resume their depredations in the Bay." Thus the Directors 
recommended the occupation of the port of Atjeh.
However, considerations other than the security of the Bay of 
Bengal continued to absorb those who were faced with the actual situation 
in the East. The Archipelago was plagued by pirates who intensified their 
activity following the successive defeats of Dutch arms by the British.
In 1804> Farquhar, Lieutenant Governor of Prince of Wales Island, proposed 
dealing with the problem through "a system of future prevention." By this 
he meant entering into a series of treaties with the independent, 
feudatory Malay states on the basis of "a community of interests and a 
sense of reciprocal benefits for all concerned." This was the general 
idea in subsequent dealings made by the English with the country powers
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in the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and Sulu.
The Spanish government in Manila, meanwhile, continued to be sorely 
tried by the problem of piracy harassing the provinces within the territorial 
limits of the Philippines. The repeated threats of another English invasion 
of the capital tied the Spaniards hands with respect to the Sulus, their 
principal "Moro" enemy. Thus throughout our period, the Spaniards merely 
held on to a course of sporadic expeditions and punitive reprisals. Not 
until the middle of the nineteenth century did they embark on a systematic 
reduction and assimilation of the Sulu islands, contributing in the process 
to the establishment of peace and normal commercial intercourse in 
adjoining areas. The introduction in 1848 of ateam vessels, purchased from 
the English, emboldened the Spanish government to revive the offensive of 
the 1630*8. But just as the latter were resolving on conquest with 
permanent occupation, the Borneo part of the Sulu dominions was slipping 
away. The English, encouraged by the comparative security in the area, a 
state to which, ironically enough, Spanish arms contributed in no small 
measure, had become active in Borneo.
In I864, a Spanish royal commissary visiting the Philippines adverted 
to the impending loss of the northern end of Borneo and adjacent islands to 
the English, based on a "recovery of rights" supposedly acquired in 
Alimudin's cession to Dalrymple.1 The Spaniard categorically denied the
1 D. Patricio de la Escosura, Memoria sobre Filipinas y Jolo 
(published by D. Francisco Canamaque), Madrid, 1882, p. 271-8.
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validity of this grant, repeating the arguments of Spanish authorities 
before him.^ But "what security is there," he asked, "while the 
territory in question is not occupied by us yet that it will not occur 
to the Government of Great Britain, or that of India, or to any English 
commercial company, if not to Mr. James Brooke or any other adventurer 
stimulated by his example, to settle Balambangan again or for the first 
time in the Joloan territory of Borneo?" In 1876, by the deed of lease 
signed by the Sulu Sultan, Jamalul A ’lam, Dalrymple1s claims were finally 
made good.
1 Escosura argued that, first, the attack on Manila was a surprise 
and it was not possible to know about it in the European courts 
at the time of its occurrence; thus the English in the East could 
never return by right the liberty and autonomy of the Sultan who 
was then a Spanish prisoner in Manila. Secondly, Alimudin could 
not exercise the right of contract without in any manner violating 
previous treaties with the Spaniards, like those of 1646 and 1737 > 
thereby "the supreme authority of Spain was expressly recognized." 
Finally, the Treaty of Peace of 1763 stipulated the full re­
establishment of the statu quo antebellum, except where it was other­
wise explicitly and definitively stated in detail. Ibid.
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